Four Related Approaches to Quevedo's Burlesque.

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FOUR RELATED APPROACHES TO QUEVEDO'S BURLESQUE

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks a reappraisal of Quevedo, and of our habits in evaluating his output. I argue that much of what is normally construed as his 'satire' cannot be seen as an extension of Quevedo the Christian moralist and is often of a subversive quality far more radical than that of sniggering sexuality or schoolboy scatology. I make frequent appeal to contemporary theory and practice, emphasizing rhetoric. Simultaneously, coincidence of Renaissance and modern attitudes is acknowledged. Most of the evidence is drawn from the poetry, still largely unexplored, but I refer to the prose as necessary.

Chapter II suggests that the grotesque in Quevedo is capable of honest definition, that it is at odds with the moralistic, and that its genesis can best be understood as a challenge to the metaphysics of Catholicism. Chapter III examines the inadequacy of the terminology available at the time as a guide to content, and also concludes that in calling his works 'satirical' Quevedo's contemporaries were not necessarily praising their moral rectitude but often intended precisely the contrary. The last chapter finds that any attempt to postulate an 'ironical' moralist behind the dissident can, at best, be only partially successful. Not only the poems themselves but the rhetorical structures plausibly used defy such an interpretation. The Conclusion applies these findings to those theories which have presented an 'overall' view of Quevedo's work, and questions both their substance and the critical assumptions upon which they are based.

Chapter I can be taken as independent of the main theme, but is an essential preparation for the criteria forwarded for the definition of grotesque. Justification of the use of 'burlesque' in the title is inherent in Chapter III.

NOTE

James O. Crosby asks 'Has Quevedo's poetry been edited?: A review article', Hispanic Review, XLI (1973), 627-38. Blecua's Castalia edition is not perfect, although compared with its predecessors it often seems to be. While the question of the apocrypha may never be finally resolved, it is assumed below that both the Castalia and Planeta editions amount to reliable, basic texts.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

Quevedo Texts

Planeta	Obras completas, I (Poesía original), ed. J. M. Blecua, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1968).
Castalia	Obra poética, ed. J. M. Blecua, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1969-71).
OP	Obras completas, I (Prosa), ed. Felicidad Buendía, 5th ed., (Madrid, 1961).
OV	Obras completas, II (Verso), ed. Felicidad Buendía, 5th ed., (Madrid, 1964).
Janer	Obras, III (Poesías), ed. Florencio Janer, Biblioteca de autores españoles, LXVI (Madrid, 1953).
Epistolario	Epistolario completo, ed. Luis Astrana Marín, (Madrid, 1946).
Parnaso	El Parnaso español (Madrid, 1648).
Las tres musas	Las tres musas últimas castellanas (Madrid, 1670).

Other

BAE	Biblioteca de autores españoles
BHS	Bulletin of Hispanic Studies
BM	British Museum, London
BN	Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid
CL	Comparative Literature
HR	Hispanic Review
JWCI	Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes
MLN	Modern Language Notes
PMLA	Publications of the Modern Language Association of America
RFE	Revista de filología española

All quotations from the Vulgate are taken from the Colunga-Turrado 4th ed., (Madrid, 1965).

A NOTE ON PRESENTATION

With certain self-explanatory exceptions, spelling (unless a change of pronunciation would be involved), accentuation, punctuation and capitalization have been modernized. But quotations of English texts in modern editions which retain the original orthography are unaltered. Latin spelling has been regularized. Where Greek occurs in a text that is either directly or indirectly quoted the word is rendered thus: parabole. In open discussion the term is normally transliterated: parabole. In a few cases the Greek itself is given: παραβολή.

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This thesis does not exceed 120,000 words.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Sint pauci sermones tui.

Sit autem sermo vester, est, est:
non, non; quod autem his abundantius
est, a malo est.

The historian scrutinizes the documents and traces of past human activity and concocts a theory as to what may or must have transpired. The objectivity of history, in this view, is not so much truth as verisimilitude. The historian as such seeks a hypothesis which economically accounts for the appearances. He is not absolutely committed to his own theory. As a good scientist he is always ready to readjust it to accommodate any new data which may come to light.

Avery Dulles

I

THE PICTORIAL

This chapter attempts to clarify the nature of the visual or pictorial in Quevedo. For the sake of an overall lucidity the two are taken as synonyms but possible discriminations between them will be suggested parenthetically. Some initial distinctions are best made between the pictorial, the concrete, and the descriptive. Truly pictorial are those passages or lines (or even words) that stimulate the mind into visual image making. With deference to the ability and indeed the pre-disposition of the individual to visualize we finally might have to talk about the potentially pictorial, in which the potential appears considerable rather than negligible. Speculation of this sort will be examined later on. In the pictorial the picture is either the writer's meaning or is a necessary pre-condition to achieving that meaning or some other aim of his.

A considerable difficulty lies in that the species pictorial is too often confused with its genus concrete, meaning what is non-abstract and precisely defined. It is well to avoid an approximation of the concrete to the solid since arguably it should be extended to include not only individual and generic material objects but also actions, states, things such as thunder, not easily disassociated from lightning and storm-clouds, and 'the smell of frying bacon' in which the olfactory element is vitally connected with the concrete substance. In the context of seventeenth-century poetry we must first be wary of those 'concretes' which have long since been conventionalized into abstractions

(and have not had the good fortune to be rescued from that fate), either through the Petrarchan tradition, as in the case of 'fuego' and 'hielo', or by older poetical usage 'corazón' and 'fénix'. However, true concretes are often to be found where their visualization is not a prerequisite for understanding. Consider this from Quevedo:

> La licencia del cabello
> el cuello siembra de minas. (Planeta, 467)

He is making a point about hair that is both golden and luxuriant, but the overall effect is not representational despite the concretes 'cabello', 'cuello', 'sembrar', and 'minas'. Had Quevedo wanted us to see something he would hardly have thrown up a lot of concretes whose cumulative effect, if visualized, would only confuse. 'Mina' is only there because of its association with gold and by virtue of the fact that, like the root of a hair, a mine runs below the surface. Unless Quevedo is intent upon deflation rather than flattery, and the context of the poem rules this out, it seems fair to assume that we are not meant to undertake some physiological exploration into the lady's skull but rather to admire her crowning glory. The combination of 'sembrar' and 'minas' also defies the power of vision. It is the result of sowing, growth in abundance, that matters and not the action itself. But before all else these lines should inspire our admiration of the poet's wit and if we do envisage a fine growth of golden hair we merely enjoy an added bonus. Here is another example where Quevedo's main concern is to be witty:

> Aquí, donde tus peñascos,
> gloriosamente soberbios,
> calzan espumas del mar,
> tocan estrellas del cielo ... (Planeta, 480)

If we must see a picture here, then it can only be that the sea is at the bottom of the cliffs and the stars can be seen beyond their peaks, and while this is plausibly the point of departure of the poetry, it can only have a decidedly secondary role. 'Calzar espumas' is not precisely visualizable. Foam does not look like shoes or leggings or stockings and again there is no indication from the context that Quevedo is trying to be funny.

In an essay on Quevedo's contemporary and occasional source Marino[1], Stephen Warman goes a long way towards defining the concrete, albeit by implication, but closely equates it with the visual. He writes:

> It is clear that the factor which dominates Marino's selections from the established canon of images, and the occasional modifications and additions which he makes to the canon, is the concreteness and appeal to the senses of the images concerned. (63)

and in his discussion of the fire images shows how Marino uses its various properties and functions, for example its power to give light, to burn, dry, melt etc., all of which may be considered concretes by the criteria outlined above. How far they 'appeal to the senses' is another matter, although Warman himself does not stress the visual in the case of fire. Elsewhere he does. The following lines

are said to be based upon 'the reciprocal resemblance between the sun and a rose', a 'more concrete visual resemblance' than the eye = sun equations of conventional imagery (71).

> Tu sei con tue belleze uniche e sole
> Splendor di queste piaggie, egli di quelli,
> Egli nel cerchio suo, tu nel tu stelo,
> Tu Sole in terra ed egli Rosa in Cielo. (71)

The metaphor of the first three lines is of the variety which Aristotle called proportional (Poetics, XXI, 11). A is to B as C is to D, and the physical appearance of the one vis-à-vis the other is in no way vital. The stalk of the rose looks no more like the orbit of the sun than meadows resemble the day-time sky. The point is other, that the sun's outstanding beauty in the heavens is only matched by that of the rose on earth, and this leads to the last line which pays a witty compliment to both without in any way pursuing a physical resemblance between them. At the same time, both the rose and the sun are concretes since here they are not ciphers for anything else as they often were in poetry of the time.

In one instance Warman's example does seem to go beyond the merely concrete. He offers this as one of Marino's 'animal images employed for purely visual representations' (99). It depicts a newly emerged mole in a field:

> Somiglia in puro latte immonda mosca,
> Anzi vago arboscello in prato ameno. (100)

In the first line there is an inter-relevancy of physical

detail. Although the metaphor can still be explained 'Fly is to milk as mole is to field' the picture 'fly in milk' is similar to the picture 'mole in field' in that both have a small dark, animal object contained within a much larger and lighter area. It is not necessary to go so far as to attempt a fusion of the two pictures. A careful contemplation of the fly image of itself suffices to sharpen our appreciation of the mole picture by its vivid evocation of the tinyness and helplessness of the insect. The second line does not operate nearly as effectively. For a start, the animal to mineral relationship is not matched but is substituted by a vegetable to mineral one. Furthermore, the adjectives 'vago' and 'ameno' impose little discipline upon our imaginations and indeed can only smudge the definition inspired by the fly image - if the meadow is so very pleasant, then the chances are that it contains rather more than a single shrub. The blackness of the mole's coat, one of the more striking features of the animal, was intensified by the sharp black/white contrast of the fly image but that again can hardly be matched by the shrub. In short, both these lines contain concretes but only the one functions more productively when studied as a picture.

The descriptive may be taken to be the informative enumeration of detail about a given subject and it is the presence of detail which separates it, however imperfectly, from definition. At first sight it might be tempting to classify the pictorial as a type of description but, as we shall see, the former need not rely on explicit detail although it is often enhanced by it. The following

comprises a representative part of Quevedo's account of the daily routine of the Augustinian, later archbishop and saint Tomás de Villanueva:

> Su vestido era limpio, pero tan modesto que edificaba a los otros más que le servía a él. Dormía muy poco, por dar todo el tiempo a la oración, teniendo en los oídos aquellas palabras que dijo Cristo en el huerto a sus tres discípulos: "Velad, no entréis en tentación." Su comida era un ayuno continuado, entreteniendo con ella la vida, no satisfaciendo el cuerpo. Amó el silencio con tal extremo, que nunca se detuvo en corrillos ni conversación de otros religiosos ni seglares si no fuese tratando de caridad o de obediencia, enseñando o consolando algún afligido. (OP, 1141b-2a)

According to the criterion suggested above, this may be taken as a straight description. Any visualization that might take place will be incidental or certainly of secondary importance. Even 'vestido' and 'comida' are false concretes - for all practical purposes, abstractions - and it would be ironical to try to 'see' the latter. Descriptions can be largely or totally pictorial, of course, but the purest strain is not always easily isolated. Here comes Gradaso's army on the war-path: -

> a Francia marcha con cien mil legiones,
> y más de la mitad con lamparones.
>
> Más lleva de ochocientos mil guerreros,
> escogidos a mocos de candiles;
> por el calor los más vienen en cueros,
> tapados de medio ojo con mandiles;

> más de los treinta mil son viñaderos,
> con hondas en lugar de cenojiles;
> seis mil, con porras; nueve mil con trancas;
> los demás, con trapajos y palancas. (Planeta, 1314)

Taken superficially this might seem replete with solid visibles but a lingering scrutiny reveals there to be a surfeit which undermines their being seen. The sheer weight of numbers given rules out any precise visualization. For whatever reason, and there is no indication that Quevedo's numerology here is merely arbitrary, a good deal of the information given is 'figures', and to respect the latter while simultaneously visualizing the concretes, with even a semblance of accuracy, would amount to a prodigious feat well beyond the even above-average imagination. We might feasibly conjure up some of the detail, e.g. one or a small number of soldiers each with his cudgel or staff, but even to the precision of a thousand we could not match this with a similar image of six or nine thousand thus armed, much less with a panorama of the best part of eight-hundred thousand half naked. When abstracts (here numbers) slip in posing as concretes the real concrete often become harder to see.

If the above is offered as a direct, catalogue-like description then the following may be proposed as an indirect description with as few claims to true pictorialism. It is probably more typical of the sort of poetry normally associated with seventeenth-century Spain, being executed in the witty or conceited manner, and comprises the beginning of a poem in which Quevedo is trying to ingratiate himself with royalty by celebrating the slaughter of a wild boar by the infanta Maria, daughter of Philip III.

> Tú, blasón de los bosques,
> erizada amenaza de los cerros,
> temoroso escarmiento de los perros,
> que con las medias lunas espumosas
> de marfil belicoso y delincuente ... (Planeta, 238)

Stress is laid largely upon the aggression of the aggrieved beast and its ability to terrify. What may at first appear to be a merely vaguely moralistic interpretation ('delincuente'), has an Old Testament precedent[2], again an abstract piece of information. 'Erizada' and the whole of the fourth line might be directively pictorial but in the context of the entire description, which continues for another twenty lines, these are rare flashes, soon forgotten. For all the wit we are constantly returned to the object's anthropomorphic attributes rather than the object itself. We are given information in a witty fashion rather than treated to witty elaborations of facts subordinate in importance.

My definition of it has avoided a confusion of the descriptive with the visual. However, the rhetorics available in Quevedo's Spain designated descriptio as a stimulant for the visual imagination and there is some evidence that this influenced the meaning of descripción and related forms. In fact, descriptio had more than one meaning in rhetoric but we are concerned here with its commonest, so far as Spain was concerned[3]. Fray Luis de Granada renders it thus:

> Descriptio est, cum id quod sit, aut factum est, non summatim aut tenuiter exponimus, sed omnibus fuscatum coloribus ob oculis ponimus: ut auditorem sive lectorem iam extra se positum, velut in theatrum avocet.[4]

Much the same is given by the Jesuit Melchior de la Cerda:

> Descriptio, quae variis nominibus appellatur, et in hac a me late significatione sumitur, est oratio exprimens rem, aut factum, aut dictum, aut personam, aut affectum, mores, et circumstancias, ita clare et copiose, ut lectori ante oculos ea versetur, veluti quaedam picture eius, quod describitur.[5]

Cerda's indication of the range of descriptio is especially comprehensive and it is not easy to appreciate the visualization of a 'dictum' for instance. Both he and Fray Luis, in their discussions of the concept subsequent to definition, present it as embracing what we might be tempted to consider as pure abstractions. But then both were writing for a public stimulated to imaginative vision both by preaching and works of devotional meditation. Therefore, under prosopographia, one of the three subdivisions of descriptio or its synonym[6], Cerda can confidently include God and the Angels and even Virtue and Justice alongside the familiar socio-moral types of the avarus and the miles gloriosus. In Fray Luis, almost exclusively concerned with the moral, concrete detail is conspicuously lacking but he does not cease to stress that the moral portraits he gives are meant to be seen (114). Cerda does indicate that a fully prosopographic account should be drawn 'ab adiunctis animi, corporis, et fortunae' (8), but in a later handbook which, unlike the Apparatus, does not deal exclusively with descriptio, he includes a brief descriptio oratorio de homine (349-57) which is limited to physicals, thus demonstrating perhaps the essential, and certainly a widely accepted usage[7].

The reading of descrevir found in Covarrubias clearly reflects the rhetorical definition, 'narrar y señalar con la pluma algún lugar o caso acontecido, tan al vivo como si lo dibujara'[8]. Similarly informed is Bartolomeo Bravo's rendering of descrevir in his Thesaurus hispanolatinus (Valladolid, 1662), 158b, 'Oculis rem subicio, maxime propiis verbis definire'. The first half of this plainly shows the debt as it is little more than a paraphrase of sub oculos subiectio, one of the rhetorical synonyms for descriptio. The second half reflects the more 'modern' sense of describir, without insistence on the visual though with stress on detail ('maxime'), and not the description as definition of Logic. Autoridades has three definitions of descripción[9]. The third belongs to Logic. The first again exemplifies the influence of the rhetorical term while the second embraces the broader concept:

> Delineación, figura o dibujo de alguna cosa por todas sus partes. Viene del latín Descriptio que significa esto mismo . . . Vale también narración, discurso, representación con palabras, de alguna cosa, menudamente, y con todas sus circunstancias y partes. (143a)

This is especially interesting since it demonstrates that the rhetorically-coloured value survived alongside the less specific, and even dominated it, into the early eighteenth-century[10]. Both emphasize the necessity of detail. It might appear in consequence that César Oudin's rendering of descrevir as simply 'mettre au écrit' is too free but, as we shall see shortly, this also was a value current certainly in mid-seventeenth century Spain[11].

In short, when we come across descrevir or a related form in a Quevedo text we might be faced with a description as I originally defined it. On the other hand, there might follow a truly pictorial passage or one that contains very little inter-relevant detail, much less any pictures. The editorship of González de Salas reflects this multiplicity. He endows the sonnet 'Flota de cuantos rayos y centellas' (Planeta, 348) with the title 'Describe a Leandro fluctuante en el mar'. In the poem the object Leander is of decidedly secondary importance and Quevedo's energy is concentrated into a set of conceited extrapolations drawn from his unhappy dip. It can hardly be claimed that he is being described by parts or circumstances, so this would seem to derive from the vaguest meaning of describir. The sonnet 'Ya la insana Canícula' (Planeta, 350) more justly deserves its title 'Descripción del ardor canicular, que respeta al llanto enamorado y no le enjuga'. The two quatrains and the first tercet identify various effects of the heat-wave and we never lose sight of the latter whereas Leander easily slips from view. According to the epigraph for 'A ser sol al mismo sol' (Planeta, 467), it contains two descriptions, one of a bodily beauty and one of that of the soul. The latter is practically non-existent as a description but the former is recognizably a pintura, a style to be discussed shortly, and while it may not strike one as particularly visual it does enumerate parts - eyes, cheeks, hair, and hands. In this example González de Salas simultaneously employs the single term in both a specific (it corresponds to the first Autoridades definition) and a very vague sense.

Although it first appeared in print in Las tres musas, the epigraph for 'Este de los demás sitios Narciso', classifying it as a descripción, might be the work of González de Salas (Planeta, 233). It corresponds certainly to the second Autoridades definition because of its abundant, relevant detail[13].

Although the separate types of pictorialism will soon be distinguished one from another it might be useful at this stage to single out a truly pictorial as opposed to a merely descriptive passage. In his Vida de San Pablo Apóstol Quevedo issues the following directive to those who enjoy the status of privado:

> No quitéis los ojos de la cabeza de Pablo y de su garganta. Mirad aquel semblante menoscabado, aquel color fallecido en amarillez, aquellas mejillas descaecidas y pálidas, aquel ceño cuyas rugas predican desengaños; aquellos labios, en silencio desmayado, abiertos, hablando con el bostezo mudo; aquellos ojos apagados en muerte; los cabellos y barba congelados con la sangre helada; aquellas fibras y arterias del cuello, que fue órgano del Espíritu Santo, desigualmente segadas del acero. (OP, 1532)

The predisposition to see that is invited by the imperatives 'No quitéis los ojos' and 'Mirad' cannot be disappointed by the wealth of detail here, although such directives often fail to fulfil their promise and seemed planned to invoke indirect stimulation. It is rather the nature of the detail than its quantity which marks this out as a pictorial passage. Quevedo had evidently seen a corpse or two in his time. Even where figurative language is employed it works

to focus attention upon the characteristics of death and not to distract it. This is especially striking in the description of the lips 'hablando con el bostezo mudo', and of the colour of the face 'fallecido en amarillez'. As every mortician knows, the dropping of the jaw and the sudden change of skin pallor are among the regular features of recent death. What Quevedo has done is to bring this home in a most striking fashion for those of his readers who might have been spared the sight in their everyday lives. The depiction of the severed head is even more arresting in its detail. The pictorial may be said to operate with enhanced effect when it deals with the novel or unfamiliar, with a sight we might reasonably suppose the reader neither to have seen nor imagined. With his physical account of Paul's corpse Quevedo seems to have taken a different line from Saints Ambrose and John Chrystostom (OP, 1530), nor does he draw upon the Byzantinae historiae of Nicephorus Gregoras although he quotes the latter in his own translation of a cameo of Paul's appearance (OP, 1530). His leisure over the lurid details would appear to be intimately linked to his desire to drive home a message into some of those in high places, although it may possibly reflect certain devotional techniques at the same time.

Some justification seems necessary for my assumption that the pictorial in Quevedo is an issue in the first place. Robert Pring-Mill's 'Some techniques of representation in the Sueños and the Criticón', BHS, XLV (1968), 270-84, makes an intelligent assessment of some of the basic ideas involved, notably as regards methods of visualization. Those who have

attempted to explain Golden Age imagery by its 'sensuousness' or 'appeal to the senses' tend to quickly degenerate into flabby generalizations which have earned the approach a bad name. Góngora seems to have suffered particularly here. What is more, that part of Quevedo's technique which comprises his wit and concettism has commanded the lion's share of critical attention. And it is usually explained by appeal to the theories of Gracián and with reference to a major critical work, Rosemond Tuve's Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947). The latter has had a considerable influence, markedly over A. J. Smith and S. L. Bethell of comparativists and Arthur Terry among hispanists. Three articles by Arthur Terry all owe a good deal to Tuve's ideas and he explicitly recognizes the debt. These are 'A note on metaphor and conceit in the Siglo de Oro', BHS, XXXI (1954), 91-97, 'The continuity of Renaissance criticism: poetic theory in Spain between 1535 and 1650', BHS, XXXI (1954), 27-36, and 'Quevedo and the metaphysical conceit', BHS, XXXV, (1958), 211-222. Her presence is also apparent in his introduction to An Anthology of Spanish Poetry 1500-1700 (Oxford, 1965), I, xxiii-xxiv, although without a specific acknowledgement. Tuve argues that 'the place found by Renaissance poetic for sensuously accurate images is a narrower one than we would expect. Moreover, other considerations override accuracy' (89), and she maintains that a basic continuity of attitude towards imagery persisted from Elizabethan times through to the Metaphysicals (and that the latter were not really revolutionary at all, a claim which has not gone undisputed)[14] and that it was reflected in and

influenced by the formal rhetorical training then part and parcel of education. It is hardly surprising to find that for Arthur Terry sense-appeal of any sort has little to do with Quevedo's conceits. I think it can be argued that the relationship between wit, conceit and the visual cannot be dismissed easily if due attention is paid to all that Renaissance writers have to say on the subject. And A. A. Parker has shown how such an approach need not be confined to the more superficial of critical approaches. His examination of a passage from La fortuna con seso y la hora de todos leads him to conclude that 'The characteristic of this paragraph is that the wit is pictorial not verbal'[15]. The case of the 'buscona piramidal' is in no way an isolated phenomenon. She has counterparts throughout the Quevedo canon.

But wit is not the only field in which pictorialism in Quevedo calls for revaluation. His possible debt to one painter for specifics of technique has lately come under scrutiny and the validity of the comparison will be examined in the following chapter. One is always tempted to find some connection between the pictorial and the emblem habit. This has been done in Quevedo's case by Hector E. Ciocchini[16]. However, Ciocchini has perhaps a too catholic estimation of what qualifies as pictorial, and he seems unfamiliar with some of the more relevant texts if he can conclude that 'Es curioso no hallar, stricto sensu, emblemas en la obra de Quevedo'[17]. Margarita Levisi has also attempted some parallels between Quevedo and Alciati specifically[18]. Suffice it to say that while emblems provide a useful precedent for some of the more far-fetched inventions that Quevedo

produces, even where he does base a poem on a particular emblem the result is not necessarily pictorial itself (e.g. Planeta, 579). But before examining some of these topics in greater depth some discussion of the background to the Renaissance view of poetry's pictorialism might prove useful.

There is ample material which demonstrates that Quevedo's precise and near contemporaries were very much alive to the visual impact and potential of poetry, even of that sort of poetry we might now consider witty or conceited. Yet much of this possible evidence needs to be treated with some circumspection. For example, in many of the treatises written on the plastic arts in Spain and Italy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries poetry is compared with painting. In many cases the comparison is made as part of a campaign to have painting upgraded and included among the Liberal Arts. It is probably more accurate to talk of campaigns because while painting was often championed out of idealism there were sometimes more practical motives involved. And the comparison was not only with poetry, as painting was held up to each of the Liberal Arts in turn, often with tortuous ingenuity. An indication of the part this issue played in the poetry/painting comparison as discussed in Italian treatises may be seen in Rensselaer W. Lee's 'Ut pictura poesis. The Humanistic Theory of Painting', Art Bulletin, XXII (1940), 197 et seq. Although the movement for an 'official' revision of the status of painting dates back at least as far as Leonardo, the matter became a local and burning issue for the first third of the seventeenth century in Spain.

It is probably not without significance that in Felipe de Guevara's Comentarios de la pintura (? 1560)[19] the comparison is a non-issue. But with the new century artisan status threatened loss of earnings and worse and the painters' agitation won them champions as considerable and diverse as Lope and Jáuregui. Gaspar Gutiérrez de los Ríos's treatise, published in Madrid in 1600, sets the mood for the century. Its very title is symptomatic, Noticia general para la estimación de las artes, y de la manera en que se conocen los que son mecánicas y serviles. According to the lawyer Juan de Butrón, this book was the direct result of a government move to conscript teachers of painting, a measure based on the assumption that painters were artisans like the members of any other guild[20]. Butrón goes on to say that a repetition of this move in 1626 led him to write his own Discursos apologéticos (Madrid, 1626) (f. 204r-v). A further official gambit to impose a tax at the rate of one per cent on painters' earnings inspired him to a 'memorial en derecho' in 1627, a very technical document, the substance of which is given on f.205r, which successfully defeated the proposals (ff.204r-205r). This same motion on the part of the 'señor fiscal' provoked the defences of Lope, Jáuregui, Lorenzo Van der Hammen y León, José de Valdivielso, along with those of the preacher Juan Rodríguez de León and another lawyer, Antonio de León, all of which are printed at the end of the Carducho volume (ff. 164r-203r)[21]. The matter did not rest there. Jusepe Martínez took up painting's case in an 'apéndice encomiasta' to his Discursos practicabiles (1673), and a document dating from 1677 purports to be about a deposition in favour

of the painters by Calderón, delivered when the former were again threatened with the barracks[22].

Most of the above-mentioned take up the poetry/painting idea as part of the Liberal Arts issue and there is some diversity between their readings of it. Gutiérrez de los Ríos takes what may be called the middle way. His brief is that painting is anart in its own right. Less forthright is the staid Butrón who goes to great and tedious lengths to prove that painting is related to each of the recognized Liberal Arts. On the other hand, Martínez argues that they 'come into' painting while 'Calderón' maintains that painting 'comes into' each of them and so transcends them all, a conclusion previously reached by Francisco de Holanda[23].

When the poetry/painting comparison is postulated as part of the Liberal Arts issue it is best treated with some caution although it need not be dismissed too hastily. Of those involved in the 1626 lobby, Jáuregui has little original to say about the similarity and yet he does go to the length of misrepresenting Philostratus's opening remarks in the Icones (Carducho, f.199r). Lope runs through a little routine, making one of the inevitable, and in his case unacknowledged, references to Horace (Ars poetica, 9-10; Carducho, f.165r).

Appeal was often made, if only perfunctorily, to the Horatian ut pictura poesis. Horace's words had been pirated out of context and made into an epigram. As a result their context was shown scant respect although el Brocense's claim to have been the first to understand what he styled a 'locus obscurus' is exaggerated (In artem poeticam Horatii annotationes (Salamanca, 1591), f.25r). The point Horace actually

makes when he uses these words is that there is a great variety of quality and depth in both poetry and painting: some works bear scrutiny better than others, some can be revisited and please more than just once (Ars poetica, ll. 361-5; p.73 in the ed. of A. S. Wilkins, London, 1939). The other occasion on which he mentions poetry and painting together (ll. 9-13) is even less relevant to the subject but it too was unfailingly arbitrarily forwarded as proof of an affinity between the two. Pacheco exemplifies the more wilful plundering. He craftily isolates ll.180-2 from their context and translates them so that they lend the impression that the superiority of painting over mere words is being proposed:

> Las cosas percebidas
> de los oídos, mueven lentamente;
> pero siendo ofrecidas
> a los fieles ojos, luego siente,
> más poderoso efeto
> para moverse, el ánimo quieto.[24]

The full context reveals Horace making the simple point that a play is more stimulating than recited poetry:

> Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,
> quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus, et
> quae ipse sibi tradit spectator. (ed.cit., 67)[25]

Plutarch's account of some words of Simonides was similarly offered as an authority for the brotherhood of the two arts. The passage is worth quoting.

> Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting: for the actions which painters portray as taking place at the moment literature narrates and records after they have taken place. Even though artists with colour and design, and writers with words and phrases, represent the same subjects, they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his narration like a painting. Assuredly Thucydides is always striving for this vividness in his writing since it is his desire to make the reader a spectator as it were.[26]

This passage was distilled down to two ideas. The first, usually given in either the vernacular or the Latin version, 'picturam esse poesim tacentem, poesim picturam loquentem' was admired for its wit, rearranged and even challenged, and repeated ad nauseam, often without acknowledgement of its source since, like the Horatian formula, it had become proverbial. The second, that painters 'imitate' (for this is how the Renaissance read it, of course) with colour, the second element being variously translated, and poets with words, was even more widely diffused and abused, with reference to source even rarer. It came to be associated with a separate idea, not found in Plutarch, that poetry describes the inside of a man, his thoughts and emotions, while painting deals with his visible attributes as well as those of the rest of the material world. In its crude form this modification practically denies the pictorialism of poetry

and is rarely found unqualified. Too easy an identification of fuori with colori and of dentro with parole was usually resisted. Bendetto Varchi is typical:

> E così avemo veduto perché la poesia si chiama arte, e che è simile alla pittura, perché amendue imitano la natura; ma è da notare che il poeta l'imita colle parole e i pittori co' colori, e, quello che è più, i poeti imitano il di dentro principalmente, cioè i concetti e le passioni dell' animo, se bene molte volte discrivono ancora e quasi dipingono colle parole i corpi e tutte le fattezze di tutte le cose, così animate come inanimate; e i pittori imitano principalmente il di fuori etc.[27]

Lodovico Dolce suggests a similar qualification[28]. The significance of all this lies in that a formula which would deny poetry the visual is modified and the essence of Plutarch, who would otherwise be misrepresented, is restored. In less exploited parts of the text he puts every emphasis on pictorialism. The word translated as 'vividness' is enargeia, the setting of the matter before the reader's eye, and it is perhaps a reflection of just how few had read the original text that the reference to 'making his narration like a painting' was so often passed by. Unlike others, G. B. Gelli parades his ignorance of the ultimate source although he is close to the spirit of the original:

> Imperoché la poesia imita con le parole, e la pittura co' colori; per la qual cagione sono stati alcuni, i quali hanno detto che la poesia è una pittura che parla e la pittura una poesia mutola. Onde quegli sono chiamati migliori e

> più eccellenti poeti, i quali sanno meglio rappresentar negli animi nostri tutto quello che vogliono.[29]

The dispersal and adulteration of the two dicta is well in evidence here. Other nominal big guns were ineffectually marshalled in an effort to establish the basic poetry/painting comparison - Cicero, in a passage from De Inventione, Aristotle, and Plato, which is wily since he has little good to say about either of them (Republic, Bk. 10, 605 et. seq.)[30].

There is other material which at first sight appears to argue the case for pictorialism in poetry, or else to exemplify it, and yet needs to be evaluated with caution. For instance, any number of poems employ the jargon of painting (Planeta, 226, 233, 234 etc.) but generally in a stylized way - Lope springs to mind here. Gareth Davies quotes an example from Mendoza:

> Pinceles dulces de pluma,
> floridos, tiernos y alegres,
> que en el abril de un romance
> los flores pintáis más verdes.[31]

and adds that 'The pincel is a significant image, for Mendoza was conscious of the pictorial artistry by which he might capture moment, movement and atmosphere' (113). But perhaps the lines have a conventional ring about them, and the sentiment is sooner a commonplace than an insight? We might also beware those dedicatory and/or panegyrical poems which often head painting treatises or the works of poets known to be interested in painting. These are usually formal and

formula-ridden, rushed and superficial. Those by Pacheco and Francisco de Catalayud which prefix Jáuregui's Rimas (Seville, 1618), rehash Simonides along with a few platitudes of their own. Lope again is a great one for this sort of thing. Into the same class we might put the anecdotal, Michelangelo dashing off another few yards of ceiling after reading Dante, Raphael inspired by Virgil. The Italian treatises are plagued by such stories.

Those poems which deal with a specific painting or other work of art are best considered as a species apart. Jean Hagstrum terms them 'iconic'[32]. These rarely result in pictorial poetry. Those written by Quevedo aim at something other than the firing of our visual imagination (Planeta, 261, 310, 345, 383, 506, 535, 644, 1138). The style was much favoured by certain poets, Miguel Colodrero de Villalobos, Cristóbal Mosquera de Figueroa, and both Antonio Álvares Soares and Luis Carrillo y Sotomayor in two very protracted exercises[33]. This poetry is usually seized upon by those who have been rather too eager in their desire to establish the visual in Golden Age poetry. In a series of writings Emilio Orozco Díaz has unearthed much that is very relevant to the subject. But he is not selective in his choice of examples. It is difficult to agree that in the line 'oro, lilio, clavel, cristal luciente' (from Góngora's 'Mientras por competir con tu cabello') 'las realidades nombradas se aislan en su misma sonoridad como bellas cosas independientes que nos impresionan la vista con su luminosidad y color'[34]. Góngora's message in the poem is a bitter version of 'Collige, virgo, rosas' and he effects it by an

ironical application of the hackneyed compliments of poetical convention. Oro, clavel and the rest have little independent existence as visibles. Orozco Díaz's books generally overstress the pictorial. J. J. de Urríes y Azara is another who, in his discussion of Jáuregui's 'Acaecimiento amoroso', fails to take account of how the much repeated, the familiar, and the conventional tend to undermine the pictorial rather than to establish it[35].

Thus precautioned, we stand better equipped to sift out the more substantial apologetics for poetry's pictorialism. It might be supposed that those who championed the revision of painting's status were endowed with more than usually well developed visual imaginations since many of them were painters or keen connoisseurs, and that therefore their opinions cannot be taken as typical of their day. But it is precisely this awareness and the critical insight it sometimes prompts that is so valuable. The poetry/painting comparison did not always result in the barren reiteration of formulae. Some explored the idea with a fresh critical outlook despite the often formalized language involved. In the fourth of his Diálogos de la pintura Vincencio Carducho makes a list of those poets that he finds pictorial (f.60v). He is not specific about his reasons for including most of them but his remarks about Góngora are telling, not least because it is the Góngora of the Soledades and the Polifemo rather than the writer of the smaller pieces that he singles out:

> Bien se conoce, pues, aquí me ha ofrecido a don Luis de Góngora, en cuyas obras está admirada la mayor ciencia, porque en su Polifemo y Soledades parece que vence lo que pinta, y que no es posible que execute otro pincel lo que dibuja su pluma. (f.61r)

I suggest at a later stage that Quevedo is pictorial with the aid of, and not in spite of a radical use of metaphor and conceit. Carducho is saying something similar about works of Góngora's which are thickly metaphorical.

In the previous century Felipe de Guevara had proposed the study of history and poetry for the painter so that he might benefit by 'mayores grandezas, y mas fantásticas ideas de cosas admirables, las cuales se hallan en los antiguos mostradas y puestas delante de los ojos, con palabras tan excelentes que moverán a cualquier poeta ingenioso a emprender cosas que él por sí no bastara ni osara emprender' (Comentarios, 21). It is reasonable to see subiectio ante oculos in 'puestas delante de los ojos' and this was a synonym for enargeia. This explicit reference to visual stimulation may be contrasted with the more formal presentation of the same idea by Giovan Paolo Lomazzo:

> Né men giovevole è al nostro pittore la poesia di quello che fra l'historia, anzi è tanto congiunta, che si può dir quasi una medesima cosa con la pittura, per infinite convenienze che hanno insieme, e massime per la licenza del fingere, e inventare. E però sempre che il pittore sarà accompagnato dalla poesia, saprà rappresentare il suoi concetti e trovati non men vagamente e vivamente a gli occhi co'l penello, e co'i colori, di quello che sogliono con la penna, e con l'inchiostro i poeti.[36]

Even Lomazzo assumes that poetry will appeal directly to the eye rather than to the more intellectual part of the brain. Guevara, it must be remembered, had no particular axe to grind, so far as I know, on painting's behalf. One who did was Gutiérrez de los Ríos and he went so far as to issue this uncompromising imperative: 'El poeta . . . debe en sus versos representar las cosas de manera que parezca que las estamos viendo' (Noticia general, 158). The idea was also current that poetry might even supersede painting in this. One of the interlocutors in Gregorio Comanini's Il Figino, Guazzo the poet, argues that 'convien dire che, essendo più perfetta la rappresentazione della poesia che quella della pittura, l'una meglio porti all'occhio dell' intelletto la cosa rappresentata, e più vivamente gliele dimostri, che l'altra'[37]. Earlier in the dialogue Guazzo has to counter the objection of Martinengo the theologian who proposes that 'cose scientifiche o d'arti' are not fit subjects for poetry and that for this very reason Aristotle had called Empedocles a philosopher and not a poet. Guazzo replies:

> Io non credo che Aristotele stimasse Empedocle più filosofo che poeta perché trattasse cose di filosofia, ma perché non le attò forse con modi poetici, ne le cantò, né la rappresentò con tanti idoli sensibili, quanto a poeta si conveniva. (Trattati, III, 268)

This plea for poets to use inventions other than the ordinarily mimetic (idoli) which can be comprehended by the senses (sensibili) is an advance on both the frequent reduction of

the poet's representational ability to mere 'particularization', and its restriction to a few, permissible sorts of imitation. Comanini subscribes to the idea that these idoli would be mostly visual rather than aimed at one of the other senses out of a natural leaning, but the primacy of vision among the senses was a commonplace of the age[38].

The graphic in poetry also captured the attention of other commentators, critics of literature rather than of the plastic arts. Among them were Daniello, Patrizi, Borghini, Mazzoni, Robortelli, Barbaro, and Fracastoro. What they have to say has already been made familiar by scholars[39]. Let it be noted for now that many of them identify the pictorial in poetry with the fantastic and extremes of invention and that this caused them no little difficulty in reconciling it with the more conservative and influential understanding of imitation. Some of these, like Mazzoni and Patrizi, went back to classical sources of the poetry/painting comparison, and sought to connect the idea with an alternative reading of imitation.

The rhetorics themselves may justly be cited as potential promoters of and mentors for literary pictorialism. Like others of his day Quevedo exhibits more than a passing acquaintanceship with rhetoric, quoting Aristotle, Demetrius, Caussin, Quintilian, Lullo, the doubtfully attributed Dialogue of Orators, Cicero, and Luis de Granada, both the latter as rhetoricians let it be stressed (OP 469, 467, 1334-5, 402, 471, 985, 472, 515 etc.). This was a two-way commerce for Quevedo since his poetry was cited by Ximénez Patón and he was praised in a later rhetoric (OV, 1274, 1378). What

obviously came naturally to Quevedo was to use rhetorics as poetics (OP, 472) and this seems a point worth making so as to avoid the sterility of any poetic versus rhetoric argument. He also used Aristotle's Rhetoric for quite another reason (OP, 1312), which supports the impression that at the time rhetorics were used as a sort of substitute encyclopedia for the thinking man.

The rhetoricians were alive to the value that was to be gained from inspiring the visual imagination of the reader or listener. The ability to do this and its presence in a piece were variously defined but the most important designations were enargeia, and hypotyposis and, for Spain at least, descriptio. The exact nomenclature varied considerably, especially as regards sub-divisions, but the essence is a constant. Cipriano Suárez typically defines it: 'Hypotyposis, quam descriptionem Cicero appellat, est proposito quaedam forma rerum ita expressa verbis, ut cerni potius videatur quam audiri'[40] and Ambrosius Calepinus gives the following for enargeia: 'Quum res ita describitur, ut cerni videatur.'[41]

A fair amount may be learned from the very multiplicity of terminology to serve what was essentially a single concept. Ximénez Patón provides the most exhaustive list of synonyms without any acknowledgement of the differences between them: 'Hypotyposis, cuius varia sunt nomina enargeia, evidentia, illustratio, suffiguratio, demonstratio, descriptio, effictio, deformatio, subiectio ante oculos, illustris explanatio dicta a Cicerone . . .'.[42] To these may be added diatyposis, given by Ceruto (Suárez, 259); representatio,

quoted by Calepinus (loc.cit.) and by Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria, VIII, 3, 61); imago and notatio from Caussin; and praesentio from Nebrija[43].

Enargeia was consistently the global and abstract term, and was not used to denote a particular species or application of the technique. Descriptio was also used in this way by Caussin (416), and Cerda (Apparatus, 5; quoted above), as was hypotyposis by Ximénez Patón and Suárez, as we have seen, and later on by Artiga[44]. But descriptio was also used specifically by Palmireno[45] and Cerda (e.g. Camporum, 259), being commonly employed as a substitute for one of the subdivisions, prosopographia, topographia, and chronographia. Even hypotyposis suffered the same fate. A Hypotyposes clarissimorum virorum was published in Valencia in 1573[46].

It is not altogether clear why the term descriptio was favoured by certain Spanish rhetoricians. It was never used quite in this sense by the Ancients. Quintilian uses it in one instance as a specific instance of hypotyposis or evidentia but even that is rare[47]. Despite Suárez's claim, Cicero never uses the term exactly in this way. Of the meanings in Cicero the closest is 'the exposition of results likely to follow from an action'[48], without any insistence upon visual stimulation. This is the same reading of descriptio as we find in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (in which demonstratio fulfils the function of enargeia)[49]. Even Palmireno, who actually quotes from the Herennium, displays that predilection for descriptio as against Herennium's demonstratio, or any other synonym, a preference

shared by Cerda and Fray Luis de Granada and whose influence was felt, as previously argued, in everyday usage.

Quintilian complained that in his own day enargeia had been unnecessarily sub-divided (Institutio, VIII, 3, 63) but the distinctions are very pertinent to the whole topic of pictorialism. There are two main types of distinction, on the grounds of subject matter and on grounds of accuracy. In an interesting correction of Suárez's definition Ceruto supplies diatyposis for the more accurate sort of hypotyposis and leaves the latter to signify that which is tenuior (loc. cit.)[50]. Quintilian himself is more specific in his own bi-partite distinction (Institutio, VIII, 3, 63-66). The first sort 'tota rerum imago quodammodo verbis depingitur' and does not need much detail in order to do so. He quotes a not particularly vivid piece from one of the Verrine orations and asks, who 'tam procul a concipiendis imaginibus rerum adest' that he will not forbear to visualize, 'sed quadam etiam ex iis, quae dicta non sunt, sibi ipse adstruat'? The second sort begs more by way of detail: 'ex pluribus efficitur illa quam conamur exprimere facies' (ed.cit., III, 246).

How later rhetoricians came to grips with specifics is best appreciated if we turn our attention to the sub-orders determined by subject. The most familiar of these are prosopographia or prosopopeia, the description of people; chronographia, that of time; and topographia, that of place. Cerda indicates that a fully prosopographic account should be drawn 'ab adiunctis animi, corporis et fortunae',[51] but effictio was reserved for physical description by Cerda

(Apparatus, 441-512), and by Caussin (417). The authority for this would seem to be the Rhetorica ad Herennium: 'Effictio est cum exprimitur atque effingitur verbis corporis cuiuspiam forma satis sit ad intellegendum' (IV, 49, 63. ed.cit. 386). Here effictio is distinguished from notatio, character delineation, and the distinction is followed by Caussin again (loc.cit.). Ximénez Patón, however, reserves ethopeia for character and more or less keeps to prosopopeia for the overall 'ficta personarum inductio' (ff. 253r, 21v), a Ciceronian term. He closely identifies it with fictio and sermocinatio and remarks that 'apud pictores et poetas aeque versatur' (f. 252v), thereby maintaining the strong visual emphasis. As Fray Luis points out (127), sermocinatio properly means an account given by the subject of himself but Ximénez Patón covers this by prosopopeia recta.

Other means of rhetorical amplification were allied to descriptio in order to increase its efficacy. Cerda's 'Descriptio Oratorio de Homine' (Camporum, 349 et.seq.) is obviously informed by divisio. Quintilian defined it like this: 'Divisione autem adiuvari finitionem docet [Cicero], eamque differre a partitione, quod haec sit totius in partes, illa generis in formas' (Institutio, V, 10, 63; ed.cit. II, 234). Cerda's list evidently reflects a divisional procedure. He devotes a passage to each of the head, hair, forehead, eyes, nose, ears, mouth, neck, breast, abdomen and back, in that order. Palmireno also specifically united divisio totius in partes with descriptio although he employed the notion quite independently (Prolegomena, II, 68, 70). He is again responsible for examples of description amplified

'ab adiunctis'. Initially the difference between the latter and division may be hard to discern. But it seems that, for Palmireno at least, 'ab adiunctis' allowed some scope whereas division kept to a more strictly defined enumeration. Thus his 'Descriptio deformis feminae a divisione totius in partes' deals exclusively with physical features while his 'Prosopographia Caroli Quinti Caesaris ab adiunctis' gives a concurrent account of the facial and the moral, 'oculi caerulei, suaves, nulla acri severitate formidabiles, et ii quidem ad ingenuum pudorem virilemque modestiam instituti' and the 'Descriptio senis argumento ab adiunctis' comprises description of physicals, of dress, and of the various habits and disabilities that accompany decrepitude (Prolegomena, II, 68; I, 29-30; II, 68). Divisio was more likely to be the structure behind a purely physical description if only because it is easy to appreciate how the parts of a body make up the whole. Where morals and manners are concerned the whole to be divided eludes definition in the first place and inclusion or exclusion of components becomes problematical, to put it mildly. It is no surprise that Caussin defines notatio as 'descriptio morum ab adiunctis' (417).

Enargeia is not always easily separated from what must be counted the essentially separate notion of energeia. The latter meant 'forcefulness', 'vigour of style', 'stress'. Indeed the English 'energy' gives a fair idea of what was involved. Nebrija gives the Latin synonyms perfectio, actio, affectio (Dictionarium, n.p.), and Bravo, vis, efficacia, bona latera. Not surprisingly, the two were subject to differing confusions. A common fault was to give the

definition of enargeia with the spelling energeia. This was done by Nebrija (loc.cit.) who, notwithstanding, correctly gives both their separate definitions with appropriate spellings. Caussin supplies the enargeia definition for the energeia spelling (409) and so does Artiga:

> La energía, o la ficción,
> o hypotiposis se usa,
> para describir un caso
> con ponderaciones muchas. (Epítome, 300)

Although Artiga's definition is rather watered-down, it is clear from his subsequent example, explained in terms of 'retratar' and 'pintar', that he has enargeia in mind. The confusion does not reflect any usage peculiar to Spain nor particularly widespread there. Quevedo himself was able to keep the two quite separate (OP, 472, 1503) and in the following century Pineda defines energía as 'Energy, the stress that is laid upon some words' in his Nuevo diccionario español e inglés (London, 1740). Autoridades takes up Covarrubias's definition of energía which is also orthodox with the interesting qualification that it is a quality of certain 'palabras preñadas' (461).

The trouble is not some local manifestation but starts right back with Aristotle. He uses the word ἐνέργεια where one might expect ἐνάργεια, as in 'Things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality (ἐνέργεια) . . . . "thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will" expresses actuality (ἐνέργεια)'[52]. In his glossary to the Rhetoric Freese gives 'vividness' for ἐνέργεια and also renders 'actualization' as 'putting before the eye' (ed.cit., xliii).

Liddell and Scott, actually quoting the above passage (Rhetoric, III, 11, 2), offer 'vigour of style' for ἐνέργεια and indicate that the reading 'actuality' should be reserved for the Metaphysics. However, Freese's reading seems most accurately to reflect Aristotle's meaning[53]. It would seem that Aristotle is ultimately responsible for the energeia spelling of the concept since both Cicero (Academia, II, 17) and Quintilian (Institutio, VI, 2, 32; VIII, 3, 61) spell it with 'a'. Demetrius (De Elocutione, IV, 209-20) has enargeia as stressing detail but without any insistence upon visual stimulation and Cicero could even relate it to the vaguer idea of perspicuitas (ibid.). Souther's Glossary of Later Latin also renders it as mere 'lucidity'. These demonstrate an almost antithetical tendency to dilute the idea of enargeia so that it becomes more easily identified with energeia.

Whether taken as a figure or as an ornament there was nothing to preclude enargeia informing metaphor or any other trope which might prove amenable. Rosemond Tuve writes:

> The rhetoricians from Quintilian on persistently note that metaphor is necessary, because there are no words for naming things, and that it enhances by including more of the significance of things. One may not name the 'leg' even of a rustic bench by saying 'stick of wood'; the supportingness is left out. Metaphor directs the mind inward to supply from remembered experience what is unstated. Tropes were not commended as suitable to clear visualizing of object, act, place, person; they were commended as a means of getting around the inadequacies of

> language economically, of making the reader think connections which the language does not actually say. (101)

In Spain a rather different, or at least complementary line was taken by some theorists, with no less a claim on the sanction of Classical authority. Quintilian wrote that 'Translatio permovendis animis plerumque et signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiiciendis reperta est' (Institutio, VIII, 6, 19; ed.cit. III, 310). Although Quintilian devotes a good deal of time to metaphor's usefulness in defining the undefined ('signandis rebus') there is no indication in the text that he places greater importance on this than on 'sub oculos subiiciendis', by which he clearly has enargeia in mind. This much is evident from IX, 2, 40, where he identifies subiectio sub oculos with evidentia adding a cross-reference to VIII, 3, 61, wherein evidentia and enargeia are identified one with the other (ed.cit., III, 396; 244)[54]. Furthermore, the force of 'plerumque' would subordinate both functions to the wider goal of 'permovendis animis'. Quintilian remarks previously that the three reasons for metaphor are necessity, making clearer, and decoration (VIII, 6, 5), and 'sub oculis subiiciendis' would be included under the third. This is consistent with his classification of enargeia at VIII, 3, 61: 'inter ornamenta ponamus' (loc.cit.).

Cicero is an even more formidable authority for crediting metaphor with sense-appeal, particularly to the eye:

> Quod omnis translatio, quae quidem sumpta ratione est, ad sensus ipsos admovetur, maxime oculorum, qui est sensus acerrimus. Nam est odor urbanitatis et mollitudo humanitatis et murmur maris et dulcitudo orationis sunt dicta a ceteribus sensibus; illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae paene ponunt conspectu animi, quae cernere et videre non possumus . . . facilius enim ad ea, quae visa, quam ad illa, quae audita sunt, mentis oculi ferentur . . . haec vel summa laus est in verbis transferendis, ut sensum feriat id quod translatum sit . . . [55]

Like Quintilian who followed him and Aristotle who went before, Cicero said that metaphor was needed to define and to make clear but obviously he did not hold this as a barrier to visualization. The inference to be drawn is that sense stimulation might aid the other tasks of metaphor. Fernando de Herrera owes much to Cicero in his discussion of metaphor. He first acknowledges the point about necessity and then talks of the pleasure to be gained from 'palabras ajenas', those 'extranjeras y transferidas'. He ascribes this pleasure to three things, to the ingenuity shown in seeking out the unusual and despising the familiar; 'porque el que oye va llevado con la cogitación y pensamiento a otra parte, pero no yerra, ni se desvía del camino', a rather obscure locution; and to the gratification given to the senses. Herrera's articulation of this last reason is nothing more than a wholesale borrowing from Cicero:

> Porque toda la traslación , que es hallada con razón alguna, se llega y cerca a los mismos sentidos, mayormente de los ojos, el cual es agudísimo sentido, porque el olor de la cortesanía, la blandura y terneza de la humanidad, el murmurio del mar, y la dulzura de la oración, son deducidas de los demás sentidos pero las de los ojos son mucho más agudos y de mayor eficacia y vehemencia, porque ponen casi en la presencia del ánimo las cosas que no pudimos mirar ni ver.[56]

In its context this reads as a rather strange interpolation. It is not altogether clear what Herrera has in mind with extranjeras and agenas but he does not appear to be talking about 'foreign' words as such. The more likely explanation is that he is getting to grips with the ingenious or far-fetched in poetry. In that case it is significant that he has identified a function of metaphor with what is, for all practical purposes, enargeia, and has wrenched Cicero from his context to do so.

Palmireno had given the first function of metaphor as 'Rei ante oculos ponendae causa' (Prolegomena, II, 80; Campi, 43). His authority here is Herennium as is evident from his wording and from the example he gives by way of illustration, which is taken directly from source. The Herennium text runs: 'Ea [translatio] sumitur rei ante oculos ponendae causa' (IV, 34, 45; ed.cit., 342). It also makes the point that this is something other than mere embellishment ('ornandi causa', ibid), which intimates that metaphor might actually direct and define what is to be seen. Fray Luis de Granada had ventured that metaphor among other

devices might increase the efficacy of enargeia:

> Non mediocriter tamen [descriptio] adiuvatur collationibus, similibus, dissimilibus, imaginibus, metaphoris, allegoriis, et si quae praetereae sunt figurae quae rem illustrant. (Ecclesiasticae, 113)

It is not difficult to see Aristotle's influence reaching into the Renaissance mind. Whatever else he might have said about metaphor, Aristotle decreed that the best sort of metaphor would put something before the eyes (Rhetoric, III, 10, 6; ed.cit. 398-9) and that the marriage of metaphor with actuality was especially striking in Homer's habit of speaking of the inanimate as animate (Rhetoric, III, 11, 2; ed.cit. 405-6). So for many metaphor was not a totally 'intellectual' device and it does not come as a complete surprise to find someone like Gilio claiming that metaphor and metonymy were legitimate devices in painting[57]. At the same time it is only fair to remember Bulgarini who, according to Baxter Hathaway, had explicitly separated enargeia from metaphor, although this should be seen as a part of a personal campaign to establish the 'intellectual' character of poetry (Hathaway, 358).

Rosemond Tuve also suggests that for the English Renaissance there existed a pretty strict distinction between metaphor on the one hand and simile, icon, and other types of comparison on the other, these being closely related to descriptio and enargeia (80, 100). In practice they are not always so easily distinguished. Aristotle again sets a precedent whose influence was to endure:

> The simile [eikon] is also a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles,
>
> he rushed on like a lion,
>
> it is a simile; if he says, "a lion, he rushed on", it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion. (Rhetoric, III, 3, 4; ed. cit., 367)[58]

Quintilian's reading is not very different here: 'In totum autem metaphora brevior est similitudo, eoque distat, quod illa comparatur rei quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dicitur' (VIII, 6, 8; ed.cit., III, 304). Fray Luis de Granada offers a more abrupt version: 'translatio est similitudo ad unum verbum contracta' (Ecclesiasticae, 200), and he took into account the eye-appeal of metaphor, simile, and exemplum (ibid., 200, 246, 243). And it is not surprising to find that Herennium gives 'rei ante oculos ponendi causa' as a function of similitudo as well as of metaphor (IV, 47, 60; ed.cit., 380). Quintilian at one point singles out that type of simile 'quod eikona Graeci vocant (quo exprimitur rerum aut personarum imago, ut Cassius: Quis istam faciem lanipedis senis torquens?)' (V, 9, 24; ed.cit., II, 282). Much of the force of the imago here relies on a metaphor - lanipedis, 'woolly-footed', i.e. bandaged up because of gout[59].

Tuve herself quotes the example of the description of Duessa from Spenser's Faerie Queene as the use of an 'icon' or emblem where the poet 'desires immediate emotional repose rather than the careful perception of distinctions . . . each detail of dugs like bladders, rough maple-bark skin,

fox-tailed rump, is not meant as a metaphor' (112). It is worth quoting those parts of the passage which are similes:

> Her dried dugs, like bladders lacking wind,
> Hong downe, and filthy matter from them welde;
> Her wrizled skin, as rough as maple rind,
> So scabby was, that would have loathed all womankind.
> . . . . . .
> And eke her feete most monstruous were in sight;
> For one of them was like an eagles claw,
> With gripping talaunts armd to greedy fight;
> The other like a beares uneven paw.[60]

Had Spenser written that one of her feet was an eagle's claw the simile would become a metaphor (although in the context we could be forgiven for believing that it actually was a claw), but this would amount to a small technical difference rather than one of essence as Aristotle and the others cited foresaw. If the first line were re-written as 'Her dried dugs, bladders lacking wind,' the effect on the reader is exactly the same as that of the simile since 'lacking wind' forestalls our taking this as fact and thinking that part of her monstrosity was to have bladders instead of breasts. The reference to the fox's tail, however, does operate in precisely this way. Spenser writes that 'at her rompe she growing had behind/ A foxes taile, with dong all fowly dight'. Now Duessa does not have a tail which is <u>like</u> a fox's tail, she actually has a fox's tail where a normal human being would have nothing at all. Tuve's distinction is a very useful tool for tackling the intricacies of metaphor in such as Donne but it does not seem to take into account the simpler forms of metaphor[61].

Tuve is very right of course to stress the relationship that existed between enargeia and the various sorts of rhetorical comparison. These were catered for by a frightening abundance of classification whose usage is not particularly consistent. Quintilian complained that the distinctions had been overdone and were prone to pedantry (V, 9, 30-1). He himself makes a general division between those similitudes which 'probationis gratia inter argumenta ponuntur' and those 'ad exprimendam rerum imaginem compositae' (VIII, 3, 72; ed.cit., 250). He then goes on to isolate the special case of redditio contraria. In all comparisons, he says, the compared goes first or second, by which he means nothing more complicated than 'He was like a lion' or 'Like a lion he was'. In simple sorts of simile the two elements are kept separate.

> Interim, quod longe optimum est, cum re, cuius est imago, connectitur, collatione invicem respondente, quod facit redditio contraria, quae antapodosis dicitur. . . . Redditio (autem) illa rem utramque, quam comparat, velut subiicit oculis et pariter ostendit.
>
> (VIII, 3, 77; ed.cit., 254)

He gives an example from a lost speech of Cicero, 'Quo ex iudicio velut ex incendio nudus effugit', adding 'Huic subiacet virtus non solum aperte ponendi rem ante oculos, sed circumcise atque velociter' (ibid.). The compared (the shamed miscreant rushing from the courthouse) and the comparative (the naked man rushing from the burning house) mutually inform one another ('collatione invicem respondente'), the

two actions being very similar. Whereas, if I say of a swift runner that he is a greyhound, the simile does not tell me anything about the greyhound and there is no reciprocal (invicem) resemblance between them. In his definition Quintilian stresses the visual impact of redditio and that much is obvious from the quoted example. It is clear that he thinks of the two images as being seen separately, although at the same time (pariter), an effect not matched by the ordinary type of simile. Comparisons of this kind are likely to deal with physical similarities. In the case of the man and the greyhound the point of correspondence is the single abstract 'speed'; in Cicero's figure it is multiple and physical, a man rushing at great speed out of a building is common to both halves of the comparison.

When Quintilian undertakes a classification of simile (simile or similitudo) as distinct from other sorts of comparison (such as exemplum), he differentiates between three kinds, similitudo, collatio, and eikon. The first sort is best achieved without any mixture of metaphors and 'ex rebus paene paribus'. The second, Cicero's collatio or parabole, is more far-fetched and may be drawn 'et a mutis atque etiam inanimis'. The third we have already met in the shape of the scowling individual mocked by Cassius the epigrammatist (all refs., V, 9, 22-4; ed.cit., II, 282). This last is obviously the most visual type of simile for Quintilian although it is easy to see how redditio might come in the guise of the first. The miserable gout-sufferer and the bad-tempered face-twister reflect each other in a perfect redditio contraria. Quintilian's definition of eikon, 'quo exprimitur rerum aut

personarum imago' recalls Cicero's formulation of imago, 'est oratio demonstrans corporum aut naturarum similitudinem'[62]. Herennium stressed the physical even more exclusively, 'Imago est formae cum forma cum quadam similitudine conlatio' (IV, 49, 62; ed.cit., 384). Calpan identifies this with post-Aristotelian eikon (ibid., 385). Whatever it was called this type of simile was to maintain its identity into the Spanish Renaissance.

From the point of view of enargeia it might operate in two ways. Either you see the compared and the comparative separately and so appreciate the likenesses between them, or you see the compared in terms of the comparative. Quintilian's eikon and redditio function in the first way. None of Cicero's or Herennium's other distinctions between types of comparison throw any light on the subject and their definitions of imago are not explicit, although again they might indicate the first possibility. Ximénez Patón had the democratic habit of ignoring the niceties of Classical terminology (hence his list of 'synonyms' for hypotyposis) so it is not surprising to find that he lumps icon, imago and simile together. However, this might reflect a disposition to see the essence of simile as enargeiaic: 'Icon, o imagen, o simile es cuando pintamos la cosa retratada con mucha propriedad, y buena acomodación, no en sí misma sino en un símile' (Mercurius, f. 120r). This definition implies that the comparative predominates over the compared, something stated quite definitely in Artiga:

> La imagen, o icon se hace
> bosquejando una pintura
> de algunas cosas con otras,
> con propriedad, y hermosura. (Epítome, 304)

In his Latin section Patón gives the Herennium definition for imago, so perhaps he took his cue for the representational priority of the comparative thence (Mercurius, f. 256v). He also makes it clear that he does not wish utterly to identify imago with hypotyposis, which had been done by unspecified 'algunos' (ibid., 120r). Caussin was one of the culprits. Imago comprises one species in his four-part division of descriptio, being defined according to Herennium again (De Eloquentia, 416). It is clear from this and from the wording of Ximénez Patón's and Artiga's definitions that for some the identification of simile and enargeia had become more exclusive than even in Quintilian.

In the dedication to his edition of the poems of Luis de León Quevedo himself discusses enargeia. He commends Fray Luis for his claridad[63], which he subdivides into three qualities, the third being enargeia (OP, 472). He then quotes a rhetorician, Antonio Lullo[64], whose similarly three-fold division distinguishes between purity of diction, explanation and elegance, and finally 'evidentia, et subiectione eorum ob oculos quae dicuntur' (ibid.). Quevedo translates this as 'evidencia y poniendo delante de los ojos'[65]. The examples he selects to illustrate it are revealing:

> Y por representar delante de los ojos lo que decía, [Virgil] no excusó la menudencia en Palinuro:
>
> 'Madida cum veste gravatum'
> (Cargado con mojada vestidura);

y en Dido:

> 'Ter sese adtollens cubitoque adnixa levavit:
> Ter revoluta toro est.'
> (Tres veces afirmándose en el codo
> procuró levantarse.)

Y el repetir <u>sese</u> (a sí, a sí), es poner delante de los ojos las acciones. (<u>OP</u>, 473)

In the first the reference to detail or particularization (<u>menudencia</u>) is especially interesting. In certain quarters attention to detail was not thought to be proper in a poet, and this is reflected in Quevedo's <u>excuso</u>[66]. What is significant here is that Quevedo isolates a single detail as a promoter of <u>enargeia</u> and not some extended passage. On one occasion he spoke slightingly of 'lo descriptivo', and it seems that for him the nature of the detail rather than its accumulation is what is liable to stimulate visualization (<u>OP</u>, 355). The second quotation from Virgil looks rather less than vivid at first sight but, while it may prove Quevedo a man with an unusually well developed visual imagination, it certainly shows that the jurisdiction of rhetorical <u>enargeia</u> was not limited in practice to the obviously colourful and concrete. It could cover a seemingly innocuous trifle such as this. Sometimes Quevedo appears to be self-confessedly engaging in a bit of <u>enargeia</u>, (e.g. <u>OP</u>, 731, where the results disappoint at least one pair of eyes). Of Ecclesiastes, XII, he writes 'Todo el capítulo te pone delante de los ojos la ruina de tu cuerpo y la diminución de su hermosura y fortaleza en metáforas doctísimas' (<u>OP</u>, 1415). This close liaison between metaphor and <u>enargeia</u>

causes some especially vivid effects in vv.2-5, and Quevedo evidently meant to include the much discussed and enigmatic v.6 which is concrete enough in its own right but at the same time is a symbol. In short, he saw metaphor as an aid to pictorialism as did others of his day[67].

While there was, then, a considerable theoretical lobby for literary pictorialism, it remains to be seen how this was put into practice, if at all, by Quevedo. Our concern is with the image, which will be used henceforward, and unless otherwise indicated, to denote the visual image specifically. There is a general justification for this in that the visual is reckoned to be by far the most numerous of images[68]. I take image to mean the sense data contemplated by the eye of the mind, thereby aligning it closely with the Renaissance reading of <u>imago</u>, and not in our modern, comprehensive sense of 'a figure of speech', nor even in the more restricted sense of a metaphor or simile which produces a picture[69]. This limited usage suffers from no mean crudity certainly from the psychological point of view, but it is not intended as definitive, only as a means of making distinctions necessary for the present argument. Because of modern critical usage it has become difficult to talk of a line such as 'His face beamed happiness' as an 'image' in a way that is simultaneously applicable to the words on the page, the sense effect they provoke in the brain and the mind's understanding of that effect. Image is used as Johnson used it when he said that 'Cowley gives inferences instead of images and shows not what be supposed to have been seen, but what thoughts the sight might have suggested. . . . his

endeavours were rather to impress sentences upon the understanding than images on the fancy.'[70], or in a sense close to that of H. C. Warren in his Dictionary of Psychology, where he describes the mental image, not the exclusively visual sort, as 'an experience which reproduces or copies in part, and with some degree of sensory realism, a previous perceptual experience in the absence of the original sensory stimulation'[71].

The truly pictorial image is produced (or constructed if it is exceptionally unusual or involved) and then contemplated by the mind and is not dismissed as irrelevant to, or liable to confuse the meaning of the words which inspired it. It may be blurred or sharp, shifting or steady, boundless or framed, Technicolored or watered-down black-and-white. The viewer may see it quite objectively or, especially if a number of moving images are involved, he may feel himself 'inside of' the imagery, as in a dream. So far as specific technical devices are involved, the pictorial image will be an essential stage in the understanding of a figure or trope. At most it is the goal itself or object of the trope and at the very least it can be an 'optional' embellishment of same.

We can safely isolate what may be called the 'recognition image', by which I mean those split-second pictures the mind creates upon the stimulus of a word and with which it may immediately dispense if, upon that instantaneous recognition, it has no further need of them. Geoffrey Hartman, in The Unmediated Vision (New Haven, 1954), seems to have much the same in mind:

> A musical phrase may be heard without a distinct image forming in the mind, but a verse containing the word "tree" cannot be heard without the formation, however fleetingly, of the image of a tree. ... the poet, though he will treasure words, must respect the things they conventionally represent. (128)

Despite Hartman, these images can be so fleeting as to be negligible and in some cases simply non-existent, especially in the case of those metaphors which are used according to what amounts to an established convention between poet and reader or speaker and hearer. If I call a twenty-stone man an elephant, the elephant is not used as a picture but merely as a cipher for obesity or great size. But if that same man has large, flappy ears, an unusually elongated nose, is suffering from a blood condition which lends to his skin an ashen pallor and happens to be wearing a grey suit, the mind will probably entertain the recognition image a while longer. (The possible results of such study will shortly be discussed). The point becomes more obvious if we talk about 'a great mountain of a man'. There is too much that is foreign to a man, however fat, for the physical likeness to be successfully pursued. The figure justifies itself on the abstract grounds of enormous size. Respect for the things words 'conventionally represent' will often come a long way down the list of a poet's priorities and might even interfere with his intentions. Witty poets were often deliberately disrespectful in order to achieve maximum effect. At other times their policy appears to have been to take this respect for the signified to the other extreme and Quarles himself is exemplary of this.

Before discussing how images are or are not produced in Quevedo it is appropriate to meet certain 'psychological' objections to the whole premise of image provocation by literature. The first maintains that some people do not have much, if any imagery, that they are 'non-visile' or 'haptic'[72]. For a start, such people are as rare as those endowed with 'photographic' imagery and who think solely in eidetic imagery, in extreme cases without being capable of much abstraction. Where the rest of us may think in images when faced with a pictorial passage they would have to adopt an alternative, abstract process, one that may be slower, less accurate and less satisfactory. The general division between haptic and visual individuals has not gone unchallenged itself. What possibly causes a subject to think he is haptic is a tendency to rule out visual abstraction as imagery. Most of us can call upon an image when we read 'dog'. It may be the remembered image of a dog we have known, perhaps, but it might well be an abstract or 'ideal' picture, a generalized representation of dogkind, deduced from all our previous observations of the individual canines we have encountered. Whatever its particular debt to experience, it is an image. Morgan and King observe that 'People who really "think", even if they have fairly good eidetic imagery, tend not to use it. Instead, they abstract certain parts of their experiences and use images of these parts in thinking'[73]. That few are incapable of even a rudimentary system of image abstraction is given some substance by the remarkable testimony of a young woman, Francine Rénée (in the London News of 26 July 1972), who

was born blind but gained her sight after an operation:

> Until I was 25 years old I thought elephant tusks stood upright on the animal's head, like the horns on a deer. I laughed a lot when I realized my mistake.
>
> But I laughed a lot that Spring in 1967, because until then I had thought so many things looked different.
>
> . . .Up to that never to be forgotten day in March five years ago I had seen only with my mind's eye.

It will be argued later that some of Quevedo's figures depend for their very understanding on a careful discrimination of physical detail of which this young woman, when blind, would have been incapable[74].

The second objection, less serious, argues that imaging is essentially a personal affair and that it is impossible for us to generalize about, or a writer to predict, the effect a passage might have on the individual imagination. But to be pictorial a passage does not need to make us see the same thing, only the same sort of thing. For instance, pictorial descriptions of any length rely upon an internal cohesion based on the inter-relevance of the component parts. It is only this scheme that needs to be reproduced in the mind of the individual writer and not a precise correspondence of the appearance of the detail. Finally there are many instances in which imaging would be counted an optional way of comprehending. Examples will be discussed in due course[75].

There are at least five kinds of pictorialism in Quevedo, some of which we have met already. The first comprises straight-forward and substantially non-figurative descriptions which are relatively full and unequivocal in their detail of visualizable objects, qualities, states, results, and associations. Into this category fits Quevedo's sketch of Brutus's medal, an etching of which may be seen on the title page of the Marco Bruto (OP, 33).

> El retrato de Marco Bruto le saqué de una medalla de plata de su mismo tiempo, original, cuyo reverso va al pie de la tarjeta, bien digno de consideración, en que se ve entre los dos puñales el pileo o birrete, insignia de la libertad, y abajo en los idus de marzo la flecha del día en que dio la muerte a César. (OP, 822)

This invites a working out of spatial relationships that will be best achieved by visualizing, something that is hardly requisite in order to follow this little history:

> Érase una cena
> con cinco personas;
> todas cinco cenan;
> una menos que otra.
> Sentámonos juntos,
> desgracia notoria,
> los dos de sombrero,
> y los tres de gorra. (Planeta, 1132-3)

No sustained visualization is needed here. The poem is a sequence of facts which are not sufficiently novel or unexpected as sights to provoke pictures. On a visual level the whole poem fizzles out. Less skeletal and familiar are

these two demons preparing to do battle with the risen Christ:

> Uno, de ardientes hidras coronado,
> formaba en su garganta ruido horrendo;
> cuál, de sierpes y víboras armado,
> las estaba a la guerra previniendo. (Planeta, 195)

Although it might seem to invite an 'auditory' rather than a visual image the second line makes very good sense in visual terms. Formaba captures the action rather than the sound itself. Much is left unstated here; for instance, the other particulars of appearance of the demons. But as Quevedo himself in his comments upon Virgil showed, just one or two details might suffice to bring the whole into view. Contemporaries of his reading this would, I imagine, apply the details here to some abstract image of the human form, since devils, like angels, were usually understood anthropomorphically.

In the second sort the desire to draw attention to the something seen overrides one or both of two other tendencies, to make witty verbal capital out of what is seen, or to derive a purely conceptual metaphor from it, one that does not depend on contemplation in order to be understood. There are several metaphors in this passage, none of them particularly original. All of them look to the object:

> En lágrimas los ojos anegados,
> el cabello en los hombros divertido,
> la venerable frente y rostro arados,
> con la postrera nieve encanecido. (Planeta, 199)

We are not meant to see floods, furrows, or snow, and the metaphors themselves are not of a sufficiently demanding intellectual calibre to cause us to dwell on their ingenuity. Each of them is subordinated to the claims of the portrait of Adam as a whole, and the reader finds himself returned to the object. A more involved type of metaphor is used in 'Miraba de los árboles las hojas / entenderse por señas y meneos' (Planeta, 418). The love-lorn swain is recounting how he used to watch the shaking and waving of the leaves in the wind but that much has to be inferred from the metaphor. 'Entenderse por señas' conveys the notion of their being turned by the wind so as to face one another and meneos, which lacks the personificatory element, consolidates this impression. The metaphors work as part of an overall circumlocution. When they are unravelled, they disclose the very sight which prompted them in the first place. There is no direct statement upon which the metaphors then proceed to embroider. Manuel Muñoz Cortés argues that the metaphors of Quevedo and Góngora resemble those of Vélez de Guevara in that they represent an 'huída de la realidad . . . parten de un objeto de la realidad; pero después hay un juego de tangencia y elusión, más amplio o más limitado, pero siempre juego'[76]. Some of Quevedo's metaphors seem rather to work back towards reality, in a way that is obliquely pictorial.

This is something they have in common with the third type of pictorialism, which holds the distinction of being perhaps the most questionable variety, and covers those cases in which the onus to visualize is put upon the reader,

and those in which the very subject matter, and the poet's intention in so far as it may be judged, seem likely to spawn images. These two are not mutually exclusive, of course, and they may be defined as the oblique. Religious contexts often provide many instances which belong in this category. It is probably no exaggeration to claim that Quevedo might rely upon his readers to have their own, ready-made images of God, Christ, the angels etc. and that he himself seems to have employed specific devotional techniques. In his Tratado de oración mental y ejercicios espirituales (Saragossa, 1562) Fray Luis de Granada had defined two types of meditation. The first dwells on the abstracts of God's mercy and perfections, the second involves imaginar and its material is the life and Passion of Christ, the Last judgement, hell, and the glories of paradise (f. iii r-v). Fray Luis uses the term considerar in two ways. It can mean 'ponder upon' and also 'look at', as here:

> Considera cómo, hecha esta oración, tres veces fue puesto en tanto agonía, que comenzó a sudar gotas de sangre, en tanta abundancia, que iban por su sagrado cuerpo hilo a hilo hasta caer en tierra. (f. vii v)

This is also clearly the sense in a reference to a 'consideración de la representación' (f. iiii v). The same ambivalence of the word is evident in the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius Loyola,[77] and again in Quevedo's own translation of Saint Francis de Sales. In the latter the word is used both to double for imaginar and to indicate meditation on pure abstracts, thus serving both types of

contemplation as defined by Fray Luis. In Chapter XI, Meditation III, 'De los beneficios de Dios', among the consideraciones are included 'Considera los dones del espíritu . . . Considera las gracias espirituales' (OP, 1585), which may be contrasted with 'Considera una hermosa y serena noche, y cuán agradable es ver el cielo con tanta multitud de variedad de estrellas', an injunction which occurs in a meditation on paradise (OP, 1589). Admonitions of the ved and mirad types are commonplace in both strictly devotional and generally religious writings of the day but instances of considerar might be overlooked. Here is one instance from the Virtud militante in which Quevedo surmises about what might happen should Man have to return all he has 'borrowed' from Nature:

> Considérale vestido de púrpura, pesada y pálida con el oro, granizada de perlas, encendida en diamantes; o pomposo en el lustre de la seda, variado de labores; y supón que el animal, cuya sangre es la grana, le pide su veneno; los cerros, el oro etc. . . . Fuerza es que el miserable hombre, si volviese estas cosas a sus dueños, quedase más desnudo que los erizos y las arañas. (OP, 1278; contrast 1394, 1396)

This text goes rather further by way of directing the imaging than many, it is true, but it is not a completely isolated case. In a passage from the Providencia de Dios two mira imperatives are followed by extended if not utterly graphic elaborations on the subject of hermosura postiza (OP, 1395-6). In his elaboration on the description of Behemoth in Job, XL, Quevedo has apparently taken certain liberties with the text.

The sonnet's two quatrains and first tercet are introduced by the device ' ¿No ves ?', a meditational stalwart (cf. OP, 1591). Quevedo's most striking re-working seems to come in the second quatrain, but the poem as a whole offers more by way of direction for imaging than was commonly the case:

> ¿No ves a Behemoth, cuyas costillas
> son láminas finísimas de acero,
> cuya boca al Jordán presume entero
> con un sorbo enjugar fondo y orillas? (Planeta, 163)

The representational accomplishment of this (the first quatrain) is due as much to the source (vv. 13, 18) as to Quevedo's paraphrase[78].

The oblique is a ruse with obvious attractions for the graphic pornographer. After all, human nature is rather more disposed to look at some things than at others. The professional courtesan laments that casual adultery is depriving her of a livelihood. She lifts up her skirts and takes a look at her assets:

> Y mirando a su molino,
> donde la espiga se muele,
> y de los granos se saca
> la harina blanca de su leche . . . (Planeta, 909)

This works like an enigma; the solution is in the last line. Formally it is a similitude, more extended than a simple simile yet shorter than a full-blooded allegory, Cicero's collatio. Amédée Mas has drawn attention to another oblique sexual reference in the same poem, 'perillo de falda, / que la lame y no la muerde' (Planeta, 907), but this one achieves its effect simply by the unstated[79].

The following piece from the Buscón is taken from don Toribio's lecture on the art of genteel poverty:

> Y cómo siempre se gastan tanto las entrepiernas, es de ver como quitamos cuchilladas de atrás para poblar lo de adelante; y solemos traer la trasera tan pacífica de cuchilladas, que se queda en las puras bayetas. Sábelo sólo la capa, y guardámonos de días de aire, y de subir por escaleras claras o a caballo. Estudiamos posturas contra la luz, pues, en día claro, andamos las piernas muy juntas, y hacemos las reverencias con solos los tobillos, porque, si se abren las rodillas, se verá el ventenaje.[80]

This is hardly linguistically rich by Quevedian standards and much of its very vividness derives from the insinuated and not the directly stated. How they would look if caught out on a windy day makes the joke and their exposure if they dared to make the full bow attains its full comic effect only if visualized. The mood of the context determines whether we remain with the merely verbal or go further and view. When it comes to the practical results of Villanueva's charity we are constrained to avert our gaze: 'Y no teniendo más de siete años, dos veces vino desnudo de vestidos y vestido de Dios por haber dado sus ropas a un pobre,' (OP, 1140). The oblique is an efficient means of provoking disgust as when Quevedo, in one of his tirades against Gongorism, declares of his enemy 'Tu nariz se ha juntado con el os / y ya tu lengua pañizuelo es' (Planeta, 1177). The concrete nature of the handkerchief is of itself irrelevant but it does not impede actualization since the first line

makes it quite clear that it is the function and not the appearance that Quevedo has in mind. In the following quatrain from the romance 'Una niña de lo caro' the shock effect is a little more explicit:

"Los tobillos de los postes
calzan tablados que tienen,
del catarro de las once,
alfombras en que se sienten." (Planeta, 802)

This deals with the construction of the 'grand-stand' for a 'fiesta de toros y cañas'. The first two lines work in an essentially different way from the second two. In the first a definite distinction is maintained, in representational terms, between tobillos/calzar and postes/tablados. The greater length of the upright pole rises above the planks of the board-walk (cf. the entry for tablado in the Espasa-Calpe encyclopedia) and to that extent tobillo is accurate. But it is hardly necessary to see an ankle to appreciate the relationship and to attempt to see calzar would only be self-defeating. Carpets might normally be laid upon the planking for spectators to sit upon but the boards are only graced with the accumulated expectorations of gentlemen. This is not stated directly but can be inferred without too great a strain on our ingenuity. There is no indication that the phlegm looks like a carpet, it has merely taken over its location. Once that has been established, disgust is aroused by the sight of someone sitting down on it. This may be classed as oblique because it is not stated that it actually does happen. Amédée Mas again seems to be talking of a case of the oblique when he claims that 'on voit apparaître une absurdité, ou une malice' in the opening line of a sonnet

on one of his pet hates, women in farthingales, 'Si eres campana, ¿ dónde está el badajo?' (267). The resemblance between clapper and penis can hardly be called far-fetched. This looks to be a case of malice rather than of absurdité.

The ability to appreciate spatial and dimensional relationships is the very essence of visualization and Quevedo appears to rely upon it in some of his extended similes. I distinguish the latter from single simile (he was like a lion), from the eikon/imago type, and from exemplum. It corresponds more or less with Cicero's collatio of which Quintilian had said 'longius [than in a simple simile] res quae comparentur repetere solet et a mutis atque etiam inanimis interim simile huius modi ducitur' (V, 11, 23; ed. cit. 284). In this example the shepherd describes his devastation by love

> mas ya, como la cierva
> que, por la herida, sangre y vida pierde,
> busco el remedio por el campo verde. (Planeta, 418)

There are no involved spatial relationships here which need to be looked at in order for the poet's meaning to be understood. But a delayed perusal is precisely the order of the day in this passage:

> Éstos son con cola, como la lanterna, que alumbra al que la lleva y no la ve, y encandila al que en ella pone los ojos. Son como la lombriz del anzuelo, que viste de un gusanillo las lengüetas, para que despreciando su pequeñez el pescado, abriendo la boca al alimento, la cierre la prisión. (OP, 1301)

This forms part of a tirade against the hypocrisy of fawning favourites, the Bushys, Bagots and Greens of this world, and it comes within a longer section of the Virtud militante on the theme of desprecio. Quevedo makes two main points about political flattery; that it rates the object far beyond his worth, and that it simultaneously involves generous applications of self-deprecation. He concludes with a general sort of insult, 'son con cola', perhaps insinuating the feline (the selfish and crafty) nature of their activities, and this is the cue into the first similitude. To appreciate it one needs to be able to visualize the lantern hanging from its pole which is being carried over the shoulder so that the carrier cannot actually see it. A casually swift image of just a lantern on its own is not sufficient. The meaning then becomes clear: the prince materially supports his sycophants while they direct his policy (light his way) without his being aware of it ('no la ve'). If he tries to scrutinize them, their flattery effectively bedazzles him. The second works a little less precisely but it still calls for a scrutiny of the concrete detail of the comparative. The big lug-worm is secure centrally on the hook while the barbs themselves are covered by a small maggot. The prince, who is the fish, proudly looks down on the self-deprecation (the maggot) hiding the true intentions (the barbs) of the flatterer. He greedily swallows the flattery (the lug-worm) without realizing that this is closely connected with the self-deprecation and he is hooked by the flatterer's true intentions. It might be thought that in cases like these two knowing how a thing looks rather

than actually seeing it will serve to grasp the point. But in the first instance it is not merely necessary to know what a lantern looks like. Its position, that of its bearer, and the range of the light have all to be presented together in some image, however schematic. In the second Quevedo's point will be missed altogether unless we realize that both maggot and worm are connected by the hook and that the maggot completely covers the barbs.

In more straight-forward types of comparison the picture is more obviously related to meaning. These lines are taken from an extended plea of poverty made by Quevedo to a pair of gold-diggers:

> que los dedos de mis pies
> por mis zapatos se asoman,
> como tortuga que saca
> la cabeza de la concha. (Planeta, 900)

If Quevedo had left the matter at 'asoman' the whole sense of the movement of the toes that is lent by the tortoise simile would have been lost. Aristotle, we may remember, had been interpreted by Demetrius as meaning that active metaphors were the best (De Elocutione, II, 80; ed.cit., 355). This is not a case of redditio, since the toes tell us nothing about the appearance of the tortoise, but rather one of eikon: it is hardly drawn 'ex rebus paene paribus' and cannot qualify as a simple similitudo. A careful as opposed to casual perception of the activity of the tortoise's head sharpens the preceding image. He does not brazenly stick his toes out, proud of his poverty. On the contrary, they peep out, timidly, unwillingly, and slowly. This note

of ironical shame runs throughout a greater part of the whole poem.

In the final type metaphors and those figures which would normally be classified as conceits direct and control imaging, either as an end in itself or as an indispensable stage in the attainment of meaning. In many instances a distinction between metaphor and merely nominal similes will not always easily be maintained. As a preliminary the matter of 'sensual accuracy' begs attention. Herein some writers seem to have created rather than defined or discovered a problem. For instance, Rosemond Tuve, in her chapter 'The Criterion of Sensuous Vividness', reduces its whole range of possibilities to that of accuracy. The measure by which she assumes we will judge a trope or figure, 'Is it representationally accurate in its sensuous detail?' (80), might be better replaced with 'Is it representational at all?'. Next would come the question 'If so, is it accurate?'. It is symptomatic of Tuve's case that she closely identifies <u>enargeia</u> and <u>descriptio</u> with the presentation of 'sensually accurate images' (80). But, as has been shown, Classical and Renaissance theory and application saw the jurisdiction of these as of much wider range as well as allying them with metaphor itself. Quintilian had said that detail was characteristic of just one type of <u>enargeia</u> and Quevedo himself could find the latter in a mere 'sese', hardly sensory and still less accurate. Of course, all this must be seen in the light of Tuve's wish to warn us off from a post-Imagistic approach to Renaissance metaphor. But by denying the representationally accurate in Renaissance metaphor she has ended up by playing down the representational

itself to such an extent as practically to deny it altogether. Arthur Terry follows her in this. Referring to a line of Herrera's, 'con voz, que entre las perlas blanda suena', he writes that 'the replacement of "dientes" by "perlas" creates only a very imprecise sense-impression; the metaphor is justified principally by the abstract qualities which link the two terms: beauty, value and perfection[81]'. It is hardly surprising that the stock Petrarchan commonplace, unredeemed by any ingenious application, should fail to engender an image. I hope to show by a more wide-ranging selection that Terry's case holds good for some but not all metaphor. He relates his comments on Herrera to the fact that 'Sixteenth-century critics do not deny that a metaphor may appeal to the senses . . . Where they differ from modern critics is in not looking to metaphor for a more <u>accurate</u> rendering of a sense impression . . . what really matters is the relationship which the poet establishes between the terms of his comparison, rather than the nature of the terms themselves.'[82]. As I read them, those Renaissance critics who actually deal with the sense-appeal of metaphor neatly side-step the intrinsically awkward notion of accuracy and link it via <u>enargeia</u> to the much more elastic concept of vividness instead. Tuve effectively rules out vividness by reducing it to a question of accuracy and Arthur Terry appears to do the same. It is always possible, of course, that those who thought metaphor produced 'subiectio ante oculos' might have assumed that accuracy played a part in the process but this is never made specific in any cases with which I am familiar.

The relationship that exists between metaphor, conceit and wit is at once self-evident and problem-ridden. Gracián demonstrated that wit could consist in non-verbal sutileza del pensar and in agudeza de acción but most of his examples of verbal wit and his definitions of the concepto have their base, like ordinary metaphor and simile, in the comparison of the hitherto unconnected. Most of his raw material is metaphor[83]. The main problem lies in deciding when a metaphor becomes a conceit and whether a conceit need necessarily be metaphorical. Gracián's definition of the concepto does not help a great deal. As the late Professor Jones remarked, 'Ordinary tropes could well be included in this definition.'[84]. Gracián never sufficiently distinguished correspondencia in its essence from plain comparison for it clearly to demarcate the divisions between conceits and other tropes based on comparison. Most contemporary and twentieth-century commentators on seventeenth century wit are committed to seeing its identity in comparison (whose ingenuity increases with the disparity of the correlates) and its regular manifestation in far-fetched metaphors and hyperboles. This is not total, however, and Sarbiewski for one rejected comparison-based devices as the mainstay of wit[85].

Obviously any sort of pictorial wit will be based on comparison. Some of the hind-sighted, modern theories are especially useful here. Helen Gardner defines the conceit as follows:

> A conceit is a comparison whose ingenuity is more striking than its justness, or, at least, more immediately striking. All comparisons discover likenesses in things unlike: a comparison becomes a conceit when we are made to concede likeness while being strongly aware of unlikeness.[86]

There is some danger of the conceit becoming a purely personal affair. A comparison will be a conceit if we think that the poet has successfully performed a sort of balancing act, raising himself above mere metaphor or simile without lapsing into the ludicrous. This danger is largely avoided in the case of the metaphysical conceit as James Smith defines it. In this species, 'Once made, the figure does not disintegrate; it offers something unified and "solid" for our contemplation which, the longer we contemplate, only grows the more solid.'[87]. In her own evaluation of the metaphysical species Helen Gardner comes up with something similar: 'the metaphysical conceit aims at making us concede justness while admiring ingenuity' (op. cit., xxv). It seems to me that in Quevedo there occur many comparisons of a tolerable calibre of ingenuity which grow into something 'more solid' the longer they are considered and that this something solid amounts to a picture. Whether or not this permits us to talk of a 'visual conceit' remains to be seen.

Consider these impressions of geriatric dentition:

> Una bocaza de infierno
> con sendos bordes por labios
> donde hace la santa vida
> un solo diente ermitaño.

. . . . . .

Vieja de diente ermitaño.

. . . . . .

Y bamboleando un diente.
volatín de la vejez . . .

. . . . . .

El diente, que viene a ser
el tronco de ovas vestido. (Planeta, 906, 852, 797, 961)

In the first two the tooth's distinction as sole survivor among its fellows is the link with the hermit. Status and not appearance connects them. In the third all that is visible, the wobbling of the tooth, is already contained in bamboleando. The further comparison with the acrobat is an added extra that does not consolidate the physical resemblance. There is too much that is visibly incongruous between a tooth, however loose, and an acrobat for us to overlook it in favour of a visible likeness. In the fourth, which incorporates a quotation from Lope (cf. Blecua, loc.cit.), the second element of the comparison actually defines the appearance of the first: it is brown and furrowed like bark and is covered with some green, bacteria-laden growth. Where the tooth and the tree trunk are materially different is in their size. As to shape it is only the length of the trunk that weakens the comparison, although if tronco is taken in its sense of 'log' this aberration is to a great extent removed. So the points of correspondence between the two correlates are not single but multiple and, what is more, physical.

Off goes don Lesmes de Calamorra for a haircut 'Con mondadientes en ristre' (Planeta, 792). He holds his tooth-pick, a somewhat larger and more permanent affair than the modern variety, as though he were holding a lance, summoning courage to brave the penance he perforce must undergo at the hands of the barber. The whole mock-heroic tone of the poem precludes our reading 'en ristre' as merely 'at the ready'. Quevedo wants us to see something, a sight all the more ridiculous in view of the fact that don Lesmes is what the seventeenth century called a fop - in modern parlance, a poofter. A technical classification of this line is not easy. The sense is obviously 'como en ristre', a simile, but the demands of the metre might account as much as anything for the omission of the como[88]. It seems reasonable to assume that don Lesmes, if only because of his very impoverishment, is not actually wearing a suit of armour, so this cannot be taken as a literal statement. We are therefore forced to admit that, technically speaking, it is a metaphor. Ximénez Patón gave a pretty standard definition of metaphor as 'mutatio significationis a propio ad non proprium per aliquam similitudinem' (Mercurius, f. 3v). Here ristre is taken from its strict meaning 'lance-rest' and made to signify 'in the position of a lance-rest'. To be precise, this is an 'improper' application of the word but it hardly qualifies the comparison as a conceit. Yet concurrently another comparison has been established, between the tooth-pick and a lance, one that does not depend on ristre at all (since the 'aliquam similitudinem' is the position in which both are held) , but on the physical likeness of the two

objects. The truth of this may be judged if we consider for a moment that he had been holding a bunch of flowers en ristre. The second comparison consolidates the first. Because of it we cannot escape the image of Lesmes holding the pick as though it were a lance and pretend that for en ristre we can read 'all set' or 'at the ready', nor that he is just holding it in the air in a vaguely determined fashion. This combination lends ingenuity that the metaphor of itself lacks and it may itself be classed as a conceit in consequence. It is visual in that its 'final' image is Lesmes about to charge, his toothpick protruding menacingly from an armpit. Of the two established correspondences only the 'real' element is left in each; the lance-rest and lance, the comparatives, are nowhere to be seen nor is there any redditio contraria. This is, then, typical of that sort of visual comparison in which the comparative is used to sharpen and define the compared without itself being simultaneously brought into focus, and without there being any confusion of the two. It is further a visual conceit because only the ingenious cross-reference between the two comparisons makes this possible Such finesse is entirely lacking in this couplet from the same poem: '"El rostro, perro de agua,/ ya de perro chino sale;"' (11. 33-4). On a pictorial level this example does not make preciser either in one direction or the other or in both simultaneously. Trying to see anything here and to follow the wit at the same time will only land us in that sort of confusion of which C. S. Lewis once bemusedly confessed himself the victim[89]. The basis for the comparisons, such as they are, is merely 'hairiness' and

'baldness' respectively, and they are made 'ingenious' in that Quevedo can maintain the canine continuity and think up an example of a hairless as well as a hirsute hound without having recourse to tortoises or frogs.

Redditio in conceits goes some way towards answering or even neutralizing the call for a consideration of accuracy in comparison-based tropes. Consider a simple example: 'Ándase aquí la picaza / con su traje dominico' (Planeta, 860). It is tempting to think 'black/white' and so pass on. But such a superficial abstraction belies a correspondence that can only be fully grasped by looking. The magpie plumage and the Dominican habit are linked not simply by colour but by its distribution in large areas. Furthermore, the Dominican scapular and cloak are black like the magpie's head, nape and wings. The white wing flashes on the wings correspond to the white sleeves of the habit, of which the rest is white to match the bird's under-belly. In order to see what the magpie looks like we have had to take more than a cursory look at the Dominican. A more striking example is to be seen in this quatrain:

> Los más en los salpicones
> de carrera dan de hocicos;
> en disciplinas del sorbo,
> son abrojos los chorizos. (Planeta, 1052).

The day-out brigade are literally and metaphorically making pigs of themselves on the banks of the Manzanares. As they tuck in to the cold meats they bite off chunks of chorizo and swallow them whole. Of all the different types of scourge Quevedo obviously has a particular one in mind,

composed of a single rather than of multiple lengths with metal, thorn-shaped pieces tied in at intermittent intervals (abrojos). But that much can itself only be established if we follow the passage of the pieces of chorizo, at intervals, down the gullet. The affinity is composed of an elongation broken up by lumps. And we can only assume that this latter is what Quevedo means if it is likely that he has this sort of disciplina, and not some multi-flailed item in mind. I make no excuses for avoiding the very pertinent problem of which picture comes first, assuming one must. Suffice it to say that a continuous cross-reference between one and the other eventually determines both the manner of the gluttony and the model of the scourge. The whole qualifies as a conceit because the two terms are sufficiently foreign one to the other and because the likeness is carefully based on a spatial perception, a length broken by knots of material. Nor is it fanciful to suppose that Quevedo means that they bit off pieces so huge that they stuck in the gullet, were too big for its diameter. The discomfort this would involve is already catered for in disciplina. It also renders the redditio more sharp since the abrojos stick out from the cord which holds them rather than being contained within it.

In the third type of visual conceit there exists the possibility that images of the two terms will become in some way fused. Valladolid's housing standards did not earn Quevedo's approval: 'y que cojas son tus casas, / y sus puntales muletas.' (Planeta, 929). The crutch and the buttress have shape, construction and material in common. They are even used at the same angle. Size most obviously

differentiates them. Because of 'cojas' it is not difficult to envisage the buttress as a huge crutch, so that the final image will have the dimensions of one term with all the physical characteristics of the other. Sometimes confusion rather than neat amalgam is involved. The eyes of an unfortunate pensioner are spoken of as 'en dos cuévanos metidos' (Planeta, 960). Here it is not easy to separate the wrinkles around the eyes from the actual wickerwork itself. If I read him aright, Manuel Durán appears to acknowledge the existence of this phenomenon, or something like it when, quoting 'Todos ajuares del infierno: las ropas y tocados de los condenados estaban allí prendidos, en vez de clavos y alfileres, con alguaciles' he writes: 'los alguaciles se fundirán plásticamente con los alfileres y los clavos en unos objetos equívocos y risib_les'[90]. An image here would probably need to involve a reduction in dimension of the officers in question. That an image is likely may be demonstrated if we contrast the above with 'Alguaciles y alfileres/ prenden todo cuanto agarran;' (Planeta, 1077), which is also based on the ambivalence of prender but stays there. The interesting thing about the quotation from the Sueño del juicio final is that it comprises a literal statement and not a metaphor. Quevedo has taken the pun at its word. And that is what qualifies the sentence as a conceit rather than the rather ordinary correspondence between the two senses of prender. Like all images which involve a change in dimension this is not as clever as those which depend upon spatial discrimination.

In all three types of visual wit, defining the compared, mutual definition, and mutual metamorphosis, the conceit narrows down the range of possibilities rather than expanding it. The more it is considered as an image the more credible it becomes. As James Smith said of the metaphysical conceit, it is 'startling; but also it is plausible, satisfying, natural, or - the contradiction forces itself upon one and perhaps should not be resisted - not startling' (167). It does not open up 'long vistas of meaning' as do some conceits,[91] but rather shuts off as many of these avenues as it can without totally undermining its own ingenuity. One way in which this can be achieved is by the inclusion of some consolidating element sufficiently to distract the mind from disparity. In the puntales/muletas example any doubts I might have about the resemblance of the two objects per se are parried by cojas. Of itself this conveys nothing more specific than the 'lopsidedness' of the houses but it immediately reinforces the image of the buttress as a crutch.

The most remarkable specimens of visual conceit come in conglomerates. These are very much the mark of the mature Quevedo[92]. Even isolated specimens are rare in his early work. Concretes abound in the early dateable romances and canciones but they are usually at the service of the equívoco, of poor reputation[93]. To give more than two instances would be tedious. The first is taken from Quevedo's reply to the begging letter of a pedigüeña. González de Salas's title, 'Responde con equivocación a las partidas de un inventario de peticiones' gives a fair warning of the tenor of the greater part of the poem.

En lo que toca a los brincos,
no serán de plata o perlas;
mas procuraré enviarlos,
aunque de una danza sean. (Planeta, 925)

This quatrain works on the two senses of brinco, as the trinket worn on the headgear (which involves the further pun on tocar), and in the sense of 'leap'. We do not need to see silver or pearls to catch the joke. Quevedo might just as well have written oro and rubíes and the humour, if not the metre, would be every bit as good. The sheer impossibility of visualizing a brinco de danza being parcelled up is, of course, part of the very absurdity Quevedo has in mind. The second, 'la más sonada del mundo/ por romadizos que engendra;' (Planeta, 1094) combines an ironical compliment on Valladolid's renown with a grumble about its climate. Both of these poems can be dated to before 1605, or possibly in that year in the case of the first. They are typical of the burlesque poems of this era, even of those which do not rely on the equívoco, in that however much they may appear to be littered with things, when wit is involved, Quevedo's final concern is with something other than picture-making. Of the handful of exceptions ' y sus puntales muletas' is one that belongs to the pre-1605 era. 'Ándase aquí la picaza' dates from 1613 and lines 37-40 of the same poem may be said to operate in the same way. Visual wit really only comes into its own after about 1620 and all conglomerates are dateable to that time. Some examples may be found in Planeta, 800, ll. 9-10, 13-16; 790, ll. 23-4, 31-2; 792, ll. 11-12, 15-15; 794, l. 61; 1051, ll. 3-6, 27-8; 1052, ll. 53-6; 1054, ll. 103-8, 121-2; 1055, ll. 157-60; 1331, ll. 681-6, etc.

Amédée Mas has shed some light on the matter of pictorialism in Quevedo's poetry. Of the line from the Orlando, 'Espeluznóse el monte encina a encina', he writes (with an explicit snub for conceptismo) 'Pourquoi Quevedo n'aurait il pas vu immédiatement la montagne comme un crâne (ou le dos d'un chat) qui se hérisse sous l'effet de la peur?' (230). This seems to sum up many of the issues discussed so far. For extended investigation he chooses the canción 'No os espantéis, señora Notomía' which dates from 1603 or earlier. He deduces that Quevedo 'paints' in four ways: by comparisons and metaphors; by multiple expressive adjectives; by playing on words; and by hyperboles of a fantastic style (25). With the exception of line 15 of the poem none of his examples correspond with what I have defined as visual wit, and his understanding of pictorialism seems to embrace a great deal. Lines 77-8, 'sisándole las ancas y la panza,/ os podrán enterrar en una lanza.' (Planeta, 622) contain no metaphor as such but they beg to be somehow accommodated under the heading of visual wit. The rest of the poem, and there is a lot of it, tends to take us away from the object by a series of witty excursions on the general theme of emaciation.

The prose tends to confirm the evidence of the poetry. Apart from the cited example from the Sueño del juicio final, nothing in the first four Sueños answers to the description of visual conceit. The same can probably be said of the other early burlesque pieces. There is a distinct change with the Sueño de la muerte (1622). Apart from isolated examples (e.g. 'tumbas con orejas . . . vaivenes de serradoes

. . . .espátulas desenvainadas y jeringas en ristre'; 'haz de barbas . . . remate de cuchar . . . como si le disparaban de un arcabuz'; (OP, 175, 186) several may be found in the descriptions of both the Dueña Quintañona and don Diego de Noche (OP, 189, 191). The Discurso de todos los diablos can boast of a couple of excellent representatives ('unas barbas de orocuz mascado . . . pellejos en zancos'; OP, 201, 219). Quevedo was still making full use of the different varieties by the time of La fortuna con seso ('melones con bigotes . . . arrugas jaspeadas de pecas; un gesto de la impresión del grifo . . . moño rapante'; OP, 234, 239). Professor Parker's masterful study reveals how in one outstanding paragraph Quevedo uses wit to build up a complete image and simultaenously pass comment on it (art.cit.).

My observations here are drawn from the dateable, burlesque material. Given Quevedo's vast overall output (twelve thousand poems at least, apart from the prose), it would be foolhardy to attempt any further generalization. A typical specimen of the later, multiple conceits is contained in the poem 'Llorando está Manzanares' (1642-3). It consists of one of Quevedo's many eulogies of the female elderly:

con dos pocilgas por ojos,
por espinazo un rastillo,
  por piernas un tenedor,
y por copete un erizo,
por tetas unas bizazas
y por cara el Antecristo. (Planeta, 1054)

The first and last lines are rather more imprecise than the others. The first gives the impression of the eyes being

sunken and lined with discharge while the last would seem to be a cipher for general hideousness rather than a direct reference to Apocalypse, XIII, 1. Saint John's beast had seven heads with ten horns and it would be difficult to reconcile those with the other features specified by Quevedo. His only reference to the face is to a 'lion's mouth'. The remainder are far more wittily self-justifying. Those of us who have had the misfortune to have actually seen an old woman's dug will be struck by the apposite choice of the pack-saddle. Flat, evacuated and unshapely, the breast can even match its wrinkled texture to the pack's rough leather. The correspondence between the two is not simple but manifold. The physical common denominator of the spine and the rake is that of verticals attached to a longer horizontal, a spatial likeness again. Quevedo may well have the curled hedgehog in mind in view of the shape of a copete but the essence of the connection is the spikey stiffness of her hair. The graphic quality of this one may be appreciated by contrasting it with the hair-do Quevedo gives Diogenes, 'en el color y en lo yerto, / juntos erizo y castaña.' (Planeta, 951). To see the shell and the chestnut together would be a nonsense. What he has done here is to let us know that the hair is dark brown and stiff without actually showing it to us.

Whether these six lines are sufficient to provide a 'complete' picture of the old woman is a problem that returns us once again to the matter of accuracy. Now while it is true that Quevedo does not detail every part of her anatomy (he has been silent about her arms and hands, for instance), his selection is still distributed around the body as a whole

so that an overall impression is easily possible. Some readers might supply the 'missing' detail for themselves, adding the arms in this case. Supplementary imaging of this sort is a psychological common-place. John B. Bender writes: 'The reader's task as he confronts pictorial writing . . . is to participate actively in the imagination of vision. The poet cannot show everything and may spoil things if he tries.' (op.cit., 31). Quevedo knows that the best way to paint a forest is not to try to record each separate leaf. What he has done in this particular instance is to pick upon some of the outstanding features of decrepitude. So stunning is the total result that extra imaging might quite possibly be superfluous. As Rudolph Arnheim and others have shown, incompletion is very much a characteristic of the visual image and the brain appears to be usually untroubled by the 'missing' items.

I have treated the passage as metaphorical and yet it comes dangerously close to literal statement, as with Duessa and her fox's tail. If this is so, then Quevedo has created a monster. Grammatically this interpretation is permissible but we should look to the context as final arbiter. In those contexts in which Quevedo has either substituted our reality or exaggerated it beyond reasonable recognition it is often difficult to decide between metaphor and literal statement. This entire question of exaggeration will be investigated in the following chapter. As for the present example, suffice it to say that Quevedo's panorama of Madrid at leisure is at least in part so far removed from the real that a reading of the old woman's portrait literally is conceivable. T. E. Hulme

once talked about poetry being a substitute for a language that would hand over sensations bodily[94]. Whether Quevedo would have agreed or not, passages such as this knock autumn moons like red-faced farmers into a cocked hat.

It might be hoped that a rich source of visual material would be found in what Gareth Davies calls the genre of pintura or pintar una dama[95]. Such an assumption would be misleading. When examples do occur this is probably one of the occasions upon which 'pictorial' is perhaps a more suitable epithet than 'visual' in view of the static, portrait-like images that are normally inspired. As a genre pintura may be said to cover only those poems which deal with the facial, bodily, personality and moral characteristics of the woman or man (in the case of the latter the piece is rarely serious) in question. While this is a fairly wide-ranging definition it does not take into account all those cases in which the epithet pintura or retrato seems to be used with precision. For instance, Cubillo de Aragón's long 'Retrato de un poeta cómico' is a satire on those who pirate plays with a mere four lines (13-16) given over to what might be termed physical description[96]. Artiga's prose 'Pinturas diversas', offered as exemplary of good 'conceptual' style, are of too broad a range (including descriptions of angels, Samson and the lion, a rainbow, the assault on a town etc.) to be included under the genre pintura (Epítome, 477-492). At the same time it is legitimate to talk of a poem belonging to the style if it totally or for the greater part concerns moral qualities and/or social habits to the exclusion of anything more tangible so long as its frame of reference

is a single person, whether real, invented or idealized. And there are many examples of formal, physical pinturas not called as such, sometimes because of the whim of the editor and very often when included in longer poems (e.g. Planeta, 628, 807-8, 905-6).

The seventeenth century was the era of literary portraiture in Spain and its popularity appeared to increase towards mid-century, which was decidedly the hey-day of the anti-portrait thanks largely, perhaps, to the patronage of Quevedo himself. Polo de Medina begins his marathon self-portrait:

> Pues hay dama, ni fregona,
> zapatero, ni pelaire,
> que no se retrate, y pinte,
> Musa mía retratadme.[97]

Portraits both serious and burlesque account for a good percentage of both Miguel de Barrios's Flor de Apolo (Brussels, 1665) and Luis Antonio's Nuevo plato (Saragossa, 1658), in proportions which cannot be matched earlier in the century. Alfay's Poesías varias contains possibly more pinturas (and certainly a greater variety of them) relative to its size than any other previous anthology of the century[98]. Exercises in the style had also been penned by the brothers Argensola, Góngora, Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza, Anastasio Pantaleón de Ribera, Lope, López de Zárate, Colodrero de Villalobos, Trillo y Figueroa, Cáncer y Velasco, Díez y Foncalda, and Quevedo[99]. There are several self-portraits among these. Examples can also be found in the Cancionero antequerano and the Cancionero

de 1628[100]. Significantly, whereas Covarrubias is silent on the matter, Autoridades defines pintura 'translá́ticamente' as 'la descripción o narración que se hace por escrito o de palabra de alguna cosa, refiriendo menudamente sus circunstancias y calidades: como la pintura de una ciudad, de una dama, etc.' and retrato 'Se llama la relación, que regularmente se hace en verso, de las partes y facciones de una persona.'. However, a distinction between literary 'portrait' and literary 'painting' did not actually hold. Autoridades quotes Pérez de Montoro's opening line to one of his efforts, 'Breve retrato dispongo', after its retrato definition. But Montoro's editor classifies it and its like as pinturas[101]. Similarly Luis Antonio's printer Juan de Ibar styles his opening poem a painting while Antonio evidently prefers the alternative term (Plato, 1). This interchangeability of the two within the style was general. Although both portrait and anti-portrait were centuries old they were looked upon as something of their own invention by these seventeenth-century Spaniards.

A 'pure' or archetypal portrait is not easily isolated. We might say that it deals with physical attributes in an enumerative order but little besides can be added by way of definition. Descriptio of some description would seem to be behind it. Cerda's 'Descriptio oratorio de homine' followed a vertical sequence and some keep to an order very similar to this. Polo de Medina begins a poem 'Comienzo a lo usual por los cabellos' (Bureo, 159), and Trillo de Figueroa also conforms, 'Si por los cabellos / Ha de empezarse,' (Obras, 156). This is not a matter of routine for Trillo because

he re-arranges the classic order in his own mock self-portrait (ibid., 180 et.seq.). Cáncer y Velasco's 'Pintura a una dama' which Alfay collected in Poesías varias (161) follows the standard sequence. Other poems, while they adhere to enumeration of parts, are more randomly arranged and the funny ones obviously less stylized in their selection from the anatomy. A burlesque in Poesías varias begins 'Para pintarte empiezo por la boca,' (204). The speaker is a woman and her subject a man. But straight versions might as likely follow a gravitationally illogical order.

The type of rhetorical descriptio which informed pintura in its pristine state was effictio or that allied with divisio totius in partes. It is easier to appreciate how much more readily the parts of a body are to be separated from the whole than moral credits or shortcomings from the spiritual identity of a person. Autoridades gives plain descriptio for pintura but 'descriptio metrica partium corporis alicuius' for retrato. The structure of this reduction into components is maintained even in those long, gloss-like exercises wherein the actual physical feature is merely the point of departure for the poet's talents and not itself of any interest to him. There are instances of descripción being substituted for pintura. The Cancionero de 1628 supplies descripción for a formal division into parts effort (434) although it also classifies as 'descripción de una dama' a very loosely constructed piece which barely acknowledges the object at all, much less keeping to a distinction of parts (522-4). The non-rhetorical sense of descripción is probably intended here. Colodrero has a parts enumeration poem which

he calls pintura whereas his editor prefers the term descripción (El Alpheo, f. 29r).

The Quevedo texts alone give a fair idea of the scope and potential of, and variations on pintura. González de Salas calls the romance 'Tus niñas, Marica' (Planeta, 472) 'Pintura no vulgar de una hermosura', insinuating that Quevedo's reworkings are a cut above the run of Petrarchan and pseudo-Petrarchan clichés rather than praising the poem for its continence. The quatrains are divided, unevenly, into the division into some parts with 'inconsistent' order. The ballad-structure is tailor-made for division, of course. But the sonnet does not lend itself so comfortably to formal pintura. Quevedo's 'Crespas hebras, sin ley desenlazadas' (Planeta, 491), 'Retrato no vulgar de Lisi' according to González de Salas, overcomes this somewhat in a seemingly conscious attempt to keep to the style, managing hair, cheeks, lips and eyes, in that order. By its very size the sonnet imposes limitations of the number of components that may be included and the detail allotted to them. In both the romance and sonnet the portrait format as an excuse for a series of witty compliments on the parts that themselves have little to do with their appearance.

Quevedo's outstanding contribution was to the anti-portrait. At the outset it is best to say that a description of an old woman, while it may be a pintura in its own right, does not strictly constitute an anti-portrait. The latter comprises two main types. In the first Quevedo either attacks Petrarchism for its own sake or, the more usual procedure, makes some unorthodox application of its terminology to

demonstrate the ravages of time or pay ironical compliments to the gross (Planeta, 628, ll. 15-16; 573, ll. 1, 4, 8, 9, 14; 807-8, ll. 29-32, 37-40, 57-60; etc.). In the second his target appears to be general rather than specifically Petrarchan abuse of metaphor by poets accompanied often by delight in the vicarious revenge of Time over looks (e.g. Planeta, 937). In either case a consequence if not the primary intention of the poem concerned is often to return the reader to the object by a cold shower of the visually shocking that instantly dispels the hyperbolical abstractions of the self-conscious Petrarchan stance. Whence Marica who, gingerly nibbling here at her bread in premature senility, goes gradually decomposing towards a syphilitic death:

> Las perlas almorzadoras
> y el embeleco oriental,
> que atarazaban las bolsas,
> con respeto muerden pan.
> . . . . . .
> Los labios de coral niegan
> secos su púrpura ya:
> ni de coral tienen gota,
> mucha si gota coral. (Planeta, 808)

If we are in any doubt as to the convention that ultimately is responsible for the framework of the poem we need only note that Quevedo ends the portrait with 'Éstas, pues, son de esta niña / las partes y calidad,' (Planeta, 809). Anti-portraits were hardly Quevedo's invention. In Spain the tradition can be traced back as far as the Cancionero de obras de burlas (Valencia, 1519), which contains a couple of remarkable examples. Both follow the arrangement into facciones,

keeping to a more or less vertically descending order. One of them, an anonymous piece, parodies the whole technique by extending the inventory to those items that lay below the belt, a stock device for the seventeenth-century burlesquers[102]. Now both these examples are straight-forward if unflattering sketches of the lady in question and do not operate by a parody or obvious rejection of Petrarchisms. Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola also produced a striking specimen in this style (Blecua, II, 507). But those poems of Quevedo which are wholly or partially female anti-portraits and not simply invectives against old-age, ill-looks, or deformity, rarely (i.e. in no case that I have located so far) are free from at least a couple of back references to the clichés of the canon, and are more likely to be thoroughly 'indebted' to it. The two Cancionero de obras de burlas poets appear to be intent on deflating a more naturalistic version of descriptio which had not yet become infected by Petrarchism, the sort of thing that was eventually stylized in prose by Agnolo Firenzuola in his Celso. Dialogo delle belleze delle donne[103]. Just when the specifically anti-Petrarchan anti-portrait came to the fore in Spain is a matter which remains to be researched.

As you would expect, Quevedo used the rhetorical format of pintura in one of his favourite campaigns. The first half of 'Los médicos con que miras' (Planeta, 845) is given over to a series of volleys against the pedigüeña, each reference to avarice based on some part of the body, predictably with little visual appeal. Quevedo's own use of the terms pintura and retrato is especially interesting. The cuckold's

discussion of his life-style is termed retrato (Planeta, 684), marking it out as one of the purely moral (or immoral) portraits. About two-thirds of the way through the long satire 'Pues más me quieres cuervo que no cisne' Quevedo announces a pintura of himself - it is later twice called retrato (Planeta, 673, 675, 676). It is about the most 'detailed' sample he ever executed and maintains almost perfectly the top-to-bottom running order before reducing it to absurdity with the introduction of his wardrobe. The whole thing is an extended collatio, working by a parallelism between the parts of his body and the qualities of the lady to whom the poem is addressed. These two tercets are typical of it:

> Son como tus mentiras mis narices,
> grandes y gruesas; mira cómo escarbas
> contra ti, mi Belisa: no me atices.
> . . . . . .
> Como son tus pecados, son mis dientes,
> espesos, duros, fuertes al remate,
> en el morder de todo diligentes. (Planeta, 674)

What she is and how he looks are, judged pictorially, kept quite separate. Presented simultaneously, they are represented without integration. Quevedo seemed to rate the pictorial quality of his labours on this occasion very highly:

> Ésta mi imagen es y mi retrato,
> adonde estoy pintado tan al vivo,
> que se conoce muy bien mi garabato. (Planeta, 675)

The tongue-in-cheek flavour in evidence here in no way affects the pictorialism of the poetry but simply reflects on the tradition behind it. This is another instance of a trend in

Quevedo noted before, namely that his own standards for literary pictorialism are less exacting than the modern critic might demand.

CHAPTER ONE - NOTES

(1) 'The subject-matter and treatment of Marino's images', Biblioteca dell' Archivum Romanicum, Serie 1, Vol.106, Studi Secenteschi, X (1969), 57-131. For Quevedo's use of Marino see Joseph G. Fucilla, 'Riflessi dell' Adone de J.B.Marino nelle poesie di Quevedo', Romania: Scritti offerti a Francesco Piccolo (Naples, 1962), 279-287.

(2) See Genesis, IX, 5.

(3) It could also mean 'definition' (see Cicero, De Inventione, I, 11, 32, 54, 55 etc.) and 'the foreseeing of results likely to follow an action' (cf. Cicero, De Oratore, III, 53, 205; Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, 39, 51).

(4) Ecclesiasticae rhetoricae, sive de ratione concionandi libri sex (Lisbon, 1576), 113.

(5) Apparatus latini sermonis (Seville, 1598), 5.

(6) The other two were chronographia, the description of time, and topographia, of places. The further distinctions of topothesia, for imagined places, and prosopopeia, for imagined people, were sometimes added, although prosopopèia and prosopographia were as likely to be treated as synonyms.

(7) Camporum eloquentiae (Colonia Agrippinensium, 1637), 349-357. Palmireno regularly uses descriptio for one of its own sub-divisions. See note (45)

(8) Sebastián de Covarrubias Orozco, Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española (1611-74) ed. M. de Riquer (Barcelona, 1943).

(9) Diccionario de la lengua castellana (Madrid, 1726-37); all references are from the edition supervised by the R.A.E. (Madrid, 1963-4).

(10) It is possible that rhetorical 'ab adiunctis' is behind the second Autoridades definition. The precise rhetorical value also appears to exert a lasting value in English. Dryden talks of some 'lively and apt description, dressed in such colours of speech that it sets before your eyes the absent object', Works (Berkeley, 1956), I, 53; and Johnson actually defines description as 'the power of presenting pictures to the mind', Lives (Oxford, 1905), I, 51.

(11) César Oudin, Tesoro de los dos lenguas española y francesa (Lyons, 1675), 35.

(12) See James O. Crosby, 'La huella de González de Salas en la poesía de Quevedo editada por Pedro Aldrete' in Homenaje a don Antonio Rodríguez-Moñino (Madrid, 1966), I, 111-123.

(13) Cf. describe in Planeta, 1051.

(14) E.g. by Patrick Crutwell in 'The love poetry of John Donne; Pedantique weeds or fresh invention?', Metaphysical Poetry, ed. D.J.Palmer and M.Bradbury (London, 1970), 11-39.

(15) 'La buscona piramidal: Aspects of Quevedo's Conceptismo', Ibero-Romania, 3 (1969), 228-234. The reference occurs on p.232.

(16) 'Quevedo y la construcción de imágenes emblemáticas', RFE, XLVIII (1965, although actually published 1967), 393-405.

(17) Page 402. But see Planeta, 579; OV, 752 and Gareth Davies's A Poet at Court . . . (Oxford, 1971), 69.

(18) 'Las figuras compuestas en Arcimboldo y Quevedo', CL, XX (1968), 217-235, esp. 220.

(19) The date ? 1560 is given by F.J.Sánchez Cantón, Fuentes literarias para la historia del arte español, I (Madrid, 1923), xiv. In the prologue to his edition of the work (Madrid, 1788) Antonio Ponz dates it at 1535. All subsequent references are taken from this last text.

(20) The information is included in Butrón's 'Por los pintores y su exempción', printed in the same volume as Vincencio Carducho's Diálogos de la pintura (Madrid, 1633) ff. 204r-220r; 204r.

(21) Butrón's success was only partial in a permanent context. Cf. f. 229v of the same volume.

(22) Jusepe Martínez, Discursos practicabiles del nobilísimo arte de la pintura (c. 1673), ed. Julián Gallego (Barcelona, 1950), 49-56. 'Deposición de D. Pedro Calderón de la Barca . . .' in Cajón de sastre (Madrid, 1781), 25-43.

(23) Three Dialogues on Painting, trans. C.Holroyd and A.J. Clift (London, 1911), 253-4.

(24) Francisco Pacheco, Arte de la pintura. Edición del MS original acabado el 24 de enero de 1638. Ed. Sánchez Cantón, (Madrid, 1956), 2 vols; I, 220.

(25) An excellent all-round discussion of the fortunes of 'ut pictura poesis' is given by Jean H. Hagstrum, The Sister Arts (Chicago, 1958), 57-65, 130-9, 149-169 etc.

(26) Moralia, IV, 346 F; in vol.IV of the Loeb ed., trans. F.C.Babbitt (London, 1936), 501.

(27) Lezzione di Bendetto Varchi, nella quale si disputa della maggioranza della arti . . . (Florence, 1546), reprinted in Trattati d'arte del Cinquecento, ed. Paola Barocchi (Bari, 1960-2), 3 vols, 1, 54-5.

(28) Dialogo della pittura . . . intotolato l'Aretino (Venice, 1557), reprinted in Barocchi's Trattati, I, 141-206; 152.

(29) From the tenth of his Tutte le lettioni fatti nell' academia fiorentina (Florence, 1551).

(30) For a representative selection of the Classical sources invoked see Gutiérrez de los Ríos, 160-2.

(31) A Poet at Court: Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza (Oxford, 1971), 113.

(32) John B.Bender, Spenser and Literary Pictorialism (Princeton, 1972), 51n. 23, calls them 'ecphrastics', a term Hagstrum reserves for something else.

(33) Colodrero, Varias rimas (Cordoba, 1629), passim; Mosquera, Obras, ed. G.Díaz Plaja (Madrid, 1955), I, 108, 184, 211, 236; Soares, Rimas varias (Valencia, 1963 [Lisbon 1628]), 97-108 - this poem is also much indebted to the formal pintura style, discussed towards the end of the chapter; Carrillo's poem is edited by E.Orozco Díaz in Amor, poesía y pintura en Carrillo y Sotomayor (Granada, 1967).

(34) Manierismo y barroco (Granada, 1970), 90. The other writings referred to are Temas del barroco. De poesía y pintura (Universidad de Granada, 1947); Introducción a un poema barroco granadino (Universidad de Granada, 1955); El poema "Granada" de Collada del Hierro (Granada, 1964); Amor, poesía, as in note 33.

(35) Biografía y estudio crítico de Jáuregui (Madrid, 1899), 81.

(36) Idea del tempio della pittura (Milan, 1591), 36.

(37) Il Figino, overo del fine della pittura (Mantua, 1591), reprinted in full in Barocchi, Trattati, III, 237-379, from which all quotations are taken; this one, 288.

(38) For Comanini's discussion of particularization, cf. 252-3. The relationship between idolo and simolacro will be discussed in Chapter 2.

(39) See Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1961), I, 64; II, 724, 774, 851; Baxter Hathaway, The Age of Criticism. The Late Renaissance in Italy (New York, 1962), 122, 331, 332, 321 et seq. etc.

(40) De arte rhetorica libri tres (Verona, 1589), 259. As it happens, Cicero does not.

(41) Dictionarium octolingue (n.p., 1609), 541.

(42) Bartolomé Ximénez Patón, Mercurius trimegistus (Biatiae 1621), f. 23r.

(43) Nicolas Caussin, De eloquentia sacra et humana (Paris, 1630), 416; Antonio Nebrija, Dictionarium Latinohispanicum (Antwerp, 1570).

(44) Francisco José Artiga, Epítome de la eloquencia española (Huesca, 1692), 300.

(45) Juan Lorenzo Palmireno, Rhetoricae prolegomena (Valencia, 1567), Pt.II, 68. The same examples are repeated in his Campi eloquentiae (Valencia, 1574), 32-33. Both of them are prosopographiae. Palmireno uses descriptio as the global term in e.g. Prolegomena, 66-7.

(46) See Domingo Gascon, Juan Lorenzo Palmireno Desiderata n.p., 1905), 9.

(47) Institutio oratoria, IX, 2, 44; in the edition of the Loeb Library (London, 1921-54), 4 vols, trans. H.E.Butler, III, 398. All quotations are taken from this edition.

(48) For references see note (3). Cicero actually translates enargeia as 'perspicuitatem aut evidentiam' in the Academia, II, 17, in the ed. of James S.Reid (London, 1885), 193, for which he is corrected on the inclusion of perspicuitas (mere 'clearness') by Quintilian, VIII, 3, 61. His other preferred term for it is 'sub aspectu subiectio', De Oratore, III, 53, 202, ed. A.S.Wilkins (Oxford, 1892), 520. All quotations will be taken from this edition. Quintilian once registers the consequences meaning, IX, 1, 31.

(49) IV, 39, 51; IV, 4, 68; in the edition of the Loeb Library, trans. Harry Calpan (London 1954), 404, 356.

(50) Calpan's identification of diatyposis with Herennium's descriptio and hypotiposis with its demonstratio indicates the opposite.

(51) Apparatus, 8.

(52) The "Art" of Rhetoric, Loeb. ed. by J.H.Freese (London, 1926), 405.

(53) Bernard Weinberg, I, 64, says that Patrizi, seizing upon this passage, argued that one meaning of imitation in Aristotle was enargeia, i.e. not energeia.

(54) Cf. VI, 2, 32; IV, 2, 63.

(55) De Oratore, III, 40, 160; III, 41, 163; ed.cit. 497-9.

(56) Obras de Garcilaso de la Vega con anotaciones de Fernando de Herrera (Seville, 1580). All references are from p.84.

(57) Due dialogi di M. Giovanni Andrea Gilio da Fabriano (Camerino, 1564). In Barocchi, Trattati, II, the second is reprinted, 1-115, this reference 108.

(58) At III, 10, 3, Aristotle says they differ 'only by the addition of a word' (ed.cit., 397), which would seem to be the source for Luis de Granada's definition mentioned below. Demetrius, following Aristotle, was also an important authority for the close identification of the two (De Elocutione, II, 80, 89).

(59) 'Torquens' is also a metaphor and technically the example is not a simile at all since the 'as' or 'like' element is not made explicit.

(60) Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, I, 8, 47; in Works ed. of London, 1840, intro. by T.C., 44.

(61) The fox's tail ref. occurs in I, 8, 48; ed.cit., 44.

(62) Eikon in Aristotle simply means simile. The Cicero reference is from De Inventione Rhetorica, I, 49; Loeb ed., trans. H.M.Hubbell (London, 1949), 88. All quotations will be taken from this section.

(63) Perspicuitas and claritas, as Quevedo recognizes, were altogether vaguer qualities than enargeia proper. Arthur Terry deals with perspicuity in 'A note on metaphor . . .', 94 etc.

(64) De oratione libri septem (Basileae, 1558), 430-2.

(65) This is one of the few instances of Spanish synonyms I have encountered. Calepinus gives manifestación and representación. I have corrected the OP reading of ab to ob and así, así to a sí, a sí.

(66) A defence of detail is put up by Jáuregui in Apología por la verdad (Madrid, 1625), ff. 27v-28r.

(67) It is more than unfortunate that Quevedo's Retórica ejemplificada de poetas has been lost (OV, 1361).

(68) This is a commonplace but see Margaret Sutherland, Everyday Imagining and Education (London, 1971), 54-5, as typical. She also refers to visual image stimulation by literature in an experiment of E. Allison Peers, 68.

(69) Imago will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2. Manuel de Faría y Sousa's identification of imagen with the words on the page would seem to be a very early and untypical usage, Rimas varias de Luis de Camões (Lisbon, 1689), III, 1.

(70) Lives, ed.cit., 51.

(71) Quoted by Peter McKellar, Imagination and Thinking. A Psychological Analysis (London, 1957), 23.

(72) The term 'visile' goes back to Galton. 'Haptic' was coined by Viktor Lowenfeld. Cf. his Creative and Mental Growth, 5th ed. with W.Lambert Brittain (London, 1970), 236-9 etc.

(73) C.T.Morgan and R.A.King, Introduction to Psychology, 5th ed. (London, 1975), 175.

(74) Lowenfeld, 3rd ed. (New York, 1957), 451, demonstrates that the blind have difficulty in co-ordinating detail as opposed to comprehending it in a one-by-one sequence. Again it is the interrelationship of physical details upon which Quevedo so often relies.

(75) For the best introduction to the psychology of visual imaging see Rudolf Arnheim, Visual Thinking (London, 1970), esp. Ch.6.

(76) 'Aspectos estilísticos de Vélez de Guevara en su Diablo cojuelo', RFE, XXVII (1943), 65.

(77) See the ed. of Joseph Rickaby (London, 1915), 23, 41, 94-5, 155 etc.

(78) The epigraph to the sonnet in Las tres musas, but perhaps the work of González de Salas (cf. Crosby, art.cit.), indicates that the sonnet is not utterly true to the source and this is confirmed by comparing it with the Vulgate. Ver in the sense of 'realize' was also used in meditational works, of course.

(79) La caricature de la femme, du mariage et de l'amour dans l'oeuvre de Quevedo (Paris, 1957), 184.

(80) La vida del Buscón llamado don Pablos, ed. Fernando Lázaro Carreter (Salamanca, 1965), 157-8.

(81) An Anthology, xxiv-xxv.

(82) Ibid. Cf. 'A note on metaphor . . . ', 94.

(83) Baltasar Gracián, Obras completas, the Aguilar ed. (Madrid, 1967), 65 and passim.

(84) Poems of Góngora (Cambridge, 1966), 11.

(85) Maciej K. Sarbiewski, De acuto et arguto, ed. S.Skimia (Warsaw-Crakow, 1958), III, esp. 'Deinde tantum abest etc.'

(86) The Metaphysical Poets (Oxford, 1961), xiii.

(87) 'On Metaphysical Poetry' (1933), in A Selection from Scrutiny, ed. F.R.Leavis (CUP, 1968), 157-171, 167.

(88) The exigences of scansion were recognized by Quevedo himself (Planeta, 950, 48) and Baltasar del Alcázar, Poesías ed. F. Rodríguez Marín (Madrid, 1910), 110.

(89) Poems, ed. W.Hooper (London, 1964), 1.

(90) 'Manierismo en Quevedo', Actas del segundo congreso internacional de hispanistas (Nijmegen, 1967), 108; OP, 131-2.

(91) The phrase is Professor Jones's, op.cit., 11.

(92) I base my observations on the chronology established by Crosby in En torno a la poesía de Quevedo (Madrid, 1967), 95-174, augmented by the common-sense additions of Blecua, e.g. the dating of 'Marica, yo confieso' to pre-1604. My remarks are limited to the burlesque material.

(93) Gracián, ed.cit., 401; Artiga, Epítome, 263; Alberto Díez y Foncalda, Poesías varias (Saragossa, 1653), 146; etc. The equívoco should not be totally identified with 'pun'.

(94) Speculations, ed. H.Read (London, 1924), 134; 'It is a compromise etc.'.

(95) A Poet at Court, 124. The study promised by Davies has now come forth, '"Pintura": background and sketch of a Spanish seventeenth-century court genre', JWCI, XXXVIII (1975), 288-313. Since my section is substantially different from his treatment I have left it unaltered. We coincide only in one or two details. It is as well to point out here that Davies sees the forerunner of the genre in 'the Greco-Latin "descriptio pulchritudinis" or "descriptio puellae"', 293.

(96) Álvaro Cubillo de Aragón, El enano de las musas. Comedias y obras diversas (Madrid, 1654), 389-391.

(97) Salvador Jacinto Polo de Medina, El bureo de las musas (Saragossa, 1659), 105.

(98) Nuevo plato, 1, 21, 32, 54, 74; Flor de Apolo has eighteen (cf. tabla); Poesías varias de grandes ingenios españoles, anthology by José Alfay (Saragossa, 1654), ed. Blecua (Saragossa, 1946), 57, 196-7, 165-6, 161, 204.

(99) For Góngora and Hurtado de Mendoza see Gareth Davies, op. et art.cit.; Rimas de Lupercio y Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, ed. Blecua (Saragossa, 1950-1), 2 vols; I, 266; II, 507; Pantaleón, Obras (Madrid, 1634), f. 41r; Francisco López de Zárate, Obras varias (Alcalá de Henares, 1651), 30, 47; Colodrero, El Alpheo (Barcelona, 1639), f. 29r, f. 89r; Varias rimas, 107-9, 124-5; Trillo, Obras, ed. A.Gallego Morell (Madrid, 1951), 156, 180; Cáncer, Obras varias (Madrid, 1651), f. 17v-19r, 'Pintura a una dama' appended to Doce comedias nuevas (Madrid, 1700); Foncalda, Poesías varias (Saragossa, 1653), 42-5.

(100) Ignacio de Toledo y Godoy, Cancionero antequerano (1627-8), ed. D.Alonso and R.Ferreres (Madrid, 1950), 49, 106-7, 155; Cancionero de 1628, ed. Blecua (Madrid, 1945), 287, 434, 37, 522-4.

(101) Obras póstumas líricas y humanas (Madrid, 1736), 52, 55, 246, 255. Montoro died in 1694, having published some single works in his life-time from 1685 on.

(102) In the ed. of J.A.Bellón and P.Jauralde Pou (Madrid, 1974), 146, 78.

(103) Opere, ed. Seroni (Florence, 1958), 519-596.

II

GROTESQUE

There exists a great temptation for the modern reader to call some of Quevedo's writing grotesque. The word itself is often used in an imprecise and casual fashion and usually with the implication that we agree as to its meaning. A. Valbuena Prat, Gerald Brenan, Karl Vossler, J. O. Crosby, and J. Goyanes y Capdevila use the word in a very general way. For Frank J. Warnke, Quevedo 'approaches' it in a certain type of love poem; for Valbuena, in a context different from the above, it can be applied to a single poem[1]. A. A. Parker examines some specific instances of grotesque pictures in Quevedo, adding some brief comments as to the nature of the grotesque. Manuel Durán has ventured some definition of what constitutes the peculiarly Quevedian grotesque in his study on mannerism in Quevedo[2]. The overall objective of this chapter is simply to test the suitability of 'grotesque' as a meaningful approach to some of his work.

We may distinguish between two sorts of literary grotesque, 'technical grotesques' and '<u>the</u> grotesque'. Although there was a small place for the latter in Renaissance theory our understanding of it today is coloured by a tradition that dates from the eighteenth century. Walter Bagehot's <u>Wordsworth, Tennyson and Browning; or Pure, Ornate and Grotesque Art in English Poetry</u> (London, 1895 [1864]) signals the first incisive examination of the grotesque in literature. Earlier studies, such as that of Victor Hugo in his <u>Préface du 'Cromwell'</u> (1827), are more concerned with the plastic arts

and general aesthetics than with literature. It is probably safe to say that only with Wolfgang Kayser's The Grotesque in Art and Literature[3] does the literary phenomenon receive anything like a thorough examination coupled with justification for the use of the term. The works of Thomas Wright and J. A. Symonds are vague and of small benefit by comparison[4]. Such recent writers on the subject as I have consulted owe a good deal to the criteria set up by Kayser.

When the Renaissance theorized about the grotesque the raw material for the examination usually comprised plastic works of art, sculpture, stucco work and book design as well as the more familiar mural paintings, rather than literature. And the theory as such was often coloured by contemporary views of the fantastic. However, application of the word to literature is certainly not a habit deriving from the eighteenth century. Arthur Clayborough gives examples of this usage from both the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in France[5]. Francis Bar quotes an especially interesting text from Pellisson's Histoire de l'Académie Françoise of 1652 which points to burlesque as the new-fangled usurper of grotesque. It includes a reference to 'les termes grotesques, c'est à dire, comme nous parlierons aujourd'hui, burlesques'[6]. For a large part of the seventeenth century in France, Bar argues, the two were used interchangeably (xii, n.14; xiii). So far as I have been able to tell, the Spanish form grotesco was not applied to literature in the seventeenth century or earlier. There were precedents in Italy. It was as early as 1553 that Anton Francesco Doni had dubbed il Burchiello a 'poeta pittor

di grottesche', adding some revealing words by way of justification for the title[7]. In 1587 Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo published his Rime with the co-title of I Grotteschi, and the volume includes a long apology for, and examination of the grotesque, which he evidently considered a potential and actual driving-force for literature[8].

The technical grotesque in literature is best approached via an investigation of what the Renaissance understood by 'una grottesca'. The least consensus of opinion that Renaissance sources can offer is that it denotes an example of a usually minor (and for many, a second rate) and essentially decorative style characterized by the more or less striking admixture of its components, these latter theoretically comprising any selection from the sum of Creation,[9] and, in situ, by the normally symmetrical regularity of the whole design. Unfortunately, this is as close to unanimity as is likely to be reached and the reading is based on actual definitions of grotesque and not on the usage of grottesco and its various forms which, as will become evident very shortly, admitted of some very imprecise applications.

For many sixteenth-century men, as for most of us now perhaps, a grotesque meant that disparate elements rather than wholes of some combination of flora, fauna, the architectural, and the human are brought together in the creation of new, hybrid entities. We think of figures half-man, half-plant; of delicate, woven filigrees, sometimes almost 'abstract' looking but often patently floral, supporting massive masonry[10]. Renaissance men like Giorgio Vasari and Cardenal Paleotti saw the essence of the grotesque here[11].

But for some a grotesque could equally well be composed of wholes, the classification earned because of the incongruity of the combination, or because of the location of the design, or simply because it was a design or ornament, these last two being two widespread although seemingly inappropriate reasons current by the middle of the sixteenth century. The denomination in the case of these 'whole' grotesques might be due to some absurdity of relative proportion between the wholes (birds painted bigger than lions), or by some other transgression against verisimilitude (foliage supporting cross-beams, men untroubled in the company of wild beasts, fish and boats suspended in mid-air), characteristics shared with the first type of grotesque, of course. Lomazzo saw (or very much wanted to see) the grotesqueras an ingenious reconciler of integers rather than a combined amputation and transplant specialist and Armenini describes some Roman originals he saw as being of this type[12].

Armenini may be indicative of a general tendency, strongly resisted by Paleotti for one, to classify as grotesque most any mural found in the so-called grotte. The same laxity is discernible where the modern paintings are concerned. Grottesche would often include the sometimes more naturalistic pictures in the various sub-panels and other subordinate spaces around the central picture as well as (or even rather than) the more fanciful or decorative border. In certain locations, such as corridors and outdoor colonnades, the entire wall with its separate parts might constitute a grottesca even though the central panels might contain nothing more fantastic than mythological

subjects. If the grotesque was originally prescribed for certain secondary places only (and even its champion Lomazzo says it is best in 'certi suoi luochi convenienti e appartati', Trattato, 424), there grew up a tendency to call whatever went into those locations a grotesque.

A very good idea of the multivalency of the term for his day is given by Cardenal Paleotti. He thought the word had been bandied about too freely and determined to set matters to right.

> E per levare ogni equivocazione che potesse nascere, diciamo che sotto questo nome di grottesche non intendiamo quei lavori de fogliami, tronchi, festoni o altre varietà di cose che talora si pingono e possono essere secondo la natura; né quelle invenzioni degli artefici, che nei fregi, nelle tavolati, nelle opere dette arabesche, nei recami et altri ornamenti proporzionati alla ragione sogliono con vaghezza rappresentarsi; né manco intendiamo di quei mostri, o marini, o terrestri, o altri che siano che dalla natura talora, se bene fuori dell'ordine suo, sono stati prodotti. Ma solo comprendiamo sotto questa voce quelle forme d'uomini o d'animali o d'altre cose, che mai non sono state, né possono essere in quella maniera che vengono rappresentare, e sono capricci puri de'pittori e fantasmi vani e loro irragionevole imaginazioni. (Trattati, II, 425)

All of these distinctions will be examined in due course. It is sufficient to point out for now that many paintings might simultaneously demonstrate two or more of the tendencies isolated by Paleotti. A drawing of Perino del Vaga which is in the British Museum provides a typical illustration.

It looks to be a sketch for one of the smaller tableaux rather than for a more integrated part of a continuous border[13]. There are three figures. The first has the face of a young child, a comparatively well developed pair of breasts, and wings which resemble two leaves of savoy cabbage rather than anything ornithological or angelic. From the waist down it threatens to be mermaid-like but eventually terminates in a tail more vegetable than animal. The second is a satyr and the third is a normal child. All three are cosseted by an abundance of swirling, luxuriant plant life. So this one example may be said to contain the real, the fantastically hybrid, and the traditionally hybrid, with plenty of 'fogliami' thrown in for good measure.

There were, then, grotesques and grotesques. It is probably fair speculation to say that theory may have been coloured by the particular grotesques that a writer or his source knew personally. Nowadays Nero's Domus Aurea and/or the palace and baths of Titus are often quoted as the home (the spiritual home, at least) of grotesques[14]. But Vasari claims there were sites at Naples (Neapolis) and Pozzuolo (Puteoli) and Lomazzo added Baia (Baiae) to these two. Both acknowledge undefined Roman sources[15]. Armenini claims to have found those that interested him 'vicine a San Gregorio, sotto certe vigne' (196) and it is not altogether clear how many of the Roman originals available to the likes of Armenini are still extant today.

Now, when the theorists combed the literature of the ancients for some discussion or description of the phenomenon one of the few precedents they located, and certainly the

most influential, was a passage from the De Architectura of Marcus Vitruvius Pollio[16]. Vitruvius wrote this work on architecture and engineering in the time of Augustus and so could hardly have been acquainted with the Domus Aurea (built A.D.64-68), the baths of Titus (A.D. 80) or a residence such as the Domus Flavia which also displays grotesque murals and is post-Augustan[17]. He may have seen those at Baia or one of the other places mentioned by both Vasari and Lomazzo. Pompeii is also another likely candidate. Although not fully excavated until the eighteenth century and therefore unknown to the sixteenth-century Italians, the town, which was in the region of Naples, Baia and Pozzuolo, can boast of grotesques essentially the same as those of the later Empire[18]. The authority of Vitruvius was enlisted by those who sought to define grotesque by his twin criteria of the presence of mutations unsanctioned by mythology, and the introduction of other, not necessarily corporal absurdities such as defiance of the law of gravity and other rudiments of physics. They must have been familiar with specimens very similar to those that so annoyed him.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that by the end of the first third of the sixteenth century the treatise writers had a good selection of contemporary grotesques to serve as the raw materials for their thoughts. Much of the discussion concerns the Renaissance artefacts, sometimes to the exclusion of those of Antiquity. Raphael executed grotesques not only for Popes Julius II and Leo X, but for the banker Agostino Chigi in the Villa Farnesina and for himself in his own Villa Madama. Many others besides him

and his crew produced grotesques in the papal loggie. Lomazzo gives two comprehensive lists of painters fluent in the style, the first based at Rome and including the accredited discoverer of grotesques, Giovanni da Udine, and a second wave more active in the provinces (Trattato, 422). The painter/architect Baldassare Petrucci (Peruzzi), who enjoyed a considerable status in his own day, played the double role of painter of grotesques and apologist for them, as did Lomazzo himself[19]. He worked with Raphael on the Villa Farnesina. The work of all these that was thought of as grotesque by their contemporaries is very variable and we moderns are likely to be seriously confused if we persist in thinking of the grotesque as one style rather than as several related styles.

Before examining some of these varieties in greater depth, it would be useful to consider a feasible objection, namely that the Renaissance drew a workable distinction between ancient and contemporary grotesques, and that this precludes our having to search for more subtle distinctions. Now some writers did see a difference but there is no particular uniformity in their discrimination. The alacrity with which Vitruvius was cited, with tedious regularity, to criticize the contemporary version indicates an essential similarity between the two and this impression is reinforced by a scrutiny of the artefacts themselves. The various permutations of mutational grotesque are common to both eras. Pompeii, the Domus Aurea, and the baths of Titus alone provide examples of the following combinations: animal/plant, animal/animal, man/plant, man/animal, man/architecture, and plant/architecture[20]

And they can be matched by Raphael and his team, and Perino and his, between them[21]. The 'impossible support' also dates back to Roman times and Raphael seems to have been especially fond of this little piece of whimsy[22]. The very tendency to classify any wall decoration as grotesque probably owes a great deal to the fact that excavation of a single building would uncover a variety of styles of lesser or no extravagance alongside the more sensational grotesque. These ranged from simple, purely floral or foliate designs to those that included a bird, medallion, or human head positioned at regular intervals, to patterns involving intact wholes combined with varying degrees of incongruity, or with none at all. Only then in the hierarchy of the fantastic came the mutations as such. Both the Domus Aurea and the earlier Domus Augusti (Casa di Livia) are fair examples of the co-existence of the different styles under one roof[23]. All of the latter had their equivalents along the corridors and colonnades, and in the studies and bathrooms of Renaissance villas and palaces. And even the most inoffensive arabesque might come to be called a grotesque.

Lomazzo appeared to claim an identity for the modern brand:

> Sono stati eccellenti per questa parte anco molti altri come Polidoro, Maturino, Giovanni da Udine, il Rosso, Giulio Romano, Francesco Fattore, e Perino del Vaga, che furono i primi ad introdurre nelle grottesche animali, sacrificii, fogliami, festoni, trofei e altre simili bizarrie, togliendo dalle grotte antiche dipinte da Serapione e dagli altri il più bello e vago che se ne potesse levare. (Trattato, 422)[24]

His estimation of the innovatory contribution of the moderns seems rather generous and calls into question the depth of his familiarity with the Roman originals. The inclusion of animals in this list is the most obvious case in point. Foliage seems to have been a mainstay of Roman grotesque but Lomazzo's evaluation here may not be altogether without justification. The Roman version is always a very sparing, economical affair with the backing wall plainly visible. However, while this style was repeatedly imitated, in the sixteenth century an alternative came into fashion in which the foliage was thick and luxuriant to the extent of blocking out the background completely. Raphael executed several borders in the new style on the ceiling of the Loggia di Psyche in the Villa Farnesina[25]. The foliage is interspersed with clumps of fruit, vegetables and flowers but is itself represented quite naturalistically and not in geometrical - regularity. It contrasts quite sharply with the more traditional, symmetrical, arabesque foliage on the window arches of the same room. The border of the frontispiece of a copy of Dioscorides's <u>De Materia Medica</u> which belonged to Philip II also exemplifies the 'thick' style but one that is still symmetrical[26]. Paleotti was possibly aware of the Renaissance innovation when he distinguished the class to which <u>fogliami</u> belonged from that of which arabesque was a species (loc.cit.).

At the back of Lomazzo's judgement there lies a desire to upgrade and even to justify contemporary grotesque. This same motivation probably accounts for an apparent distinction between ancient and modern made by Vincenso in the second of

Gilio's dialogues. Vincenso quotes Vitruvius and then Horace (Ars poetica, 11-13) as authorities to support his claim that poetic licence should always be ruled by the demands of 'l'ordine de la natura', adding:

> Il che potiamo con l'esempio de' moderni pittori considerare, non avendo esempio degli antichi: e ciò ne le loggie del palazzo del Papa dai moderni fatte. Ne la prima vediamo dipinte ogni sorte di grottesche, et ogni sorte di fiori che possono far vaga con verdura una loggia, con bellissimo ordine distinti; non però tra quelle verdure vi si vede dipinta cosa repugnante a la natura, como che i gesmini produchino le rose, gli aranci i pruni, et altre cose tali. (Trattati, II, 18)

It is clear from the preceding discussion that Vincenso has the mutational grotesque censured by Vitruvius in mind when he claims that the Ancients transgressed against the precepts of imitation. He simply ignores the fact that essentially the same mutations are present in many of the papal loggie decorations and concentrates instead on the 'whole object' variety, also to be found there. Why he chooses to do this is not altogether clear, although the mere sanction of papal patronage might be exerting a certain influence here[27].

Throughout the dialogue Gilio eschews the term grottesco for Roman grotesques, yet this again is hardly typical of his day. The context does not help much in deciding just what he means by grottesca in the passage quoted above but it seems fair to conclude that he means something more than decoration and something less than full-blooded grotesques. His usage is therefore personal rather than representative

and the same holds for his distinction between ancient and modern, rather clumsily and unconvincingly formulated to justify the latter. The example he selects to forestall objection is trite. Raphael, Perino and their assistants may not have painted plum-laden orange trees but their various permutations of mutation equally if not more fittingly qualify as 'repugnante a la natura'. Whenever a writer appears to distinguish between grotesque in its original and in its revived form or even to deny, directly or by implication, a continuity between the two, the seeming distinction is usually attributable to a preference of terminology or some other factor. Armenini for instance attempts no essential separation other than to reserve chimera for Roman grotesque (24, 193). When Felipe de Guevara claims that 'este género de pintar semejantes fantasías no se puede llamar antiguo' (67) he is but repeating what Vitruvius had to say about the genre in his day, not denying that the Romans had produced recognizable grotesques.

Any attempt at differentiating between types of grotesque should take into account the fact that for most of the sixteenth century in Italy the very word grottesco was subject to a certain devaluation arising from the identification of the style with other decorative manners. Many so-called grotesques resemble nothing so much as disciplined doodles, a sort of early rococo. This variety is easily confused with the non-naturalistic convoluted filigrees of arabesque although the latter was already a feature of Quattrocento art and quite independent of the excavations at Rome and elsewhere[28]. Despite Paleotti's understandable

plea that the two should be kept separate, the foliate element in many of the Roman murals is itself practically indistinguishable from arabesque or moorish proper[29]. It might be useful to isolate a decorational grotesque, one in which the floral or arabesque predominates at the partial or total expense of animal or human elements, and in which symmetry of design counts for more than any incongruity in combination of components. Certainly grottesche often meant little more than 'decorations' or 'the decorations for specific (secondary) locations'. Part of Annibale Caro's programme for Tadeo Zuccaro's work in the Palazzo Capravola runs as follows:

> Ci restano dodici atri vani minimi, tramezzati tra gli minori già detti. Ed in questi, non potendo metter figure umane, farei alcuni animali, come per grottesche, e per simboli di questa materia della solitudine . . . Restano gli ornamenti; e questi si lasciano all' invenzione del pittore. Pure è ben d'ammonirlo, se gli paresse d'accomodarvi in alguni luoghi, come per grottesche, istrumenti da solitari e studiosi; come sfere, astraboli etc.[30]

The sense here is evidently 'as grotesques' and not 'instead of grotesques', and grottesca simply means the fill-in decoration for the minor spaces, in practice consisting of an object or animal naturalistically represented and symbolical in an elementary and very self-evident fashion - a far cry from the grotesques that caused clerical and scholarly blood to boil. Caro wrote this in 1565 and it represents a diluted sense of the word not found at the turn of the century.

To seek the decorational grotesque in Quevedo or in any literary context would be a fool's errand. The search for the remaining types of technical grotesque may be better rewarded. These two definitions show how right into the seventeenth century a basic division between whole and elemental grotesque survived:

> La pintura que hoy llamamos grutescos (que es cierto género de composición de hojas, cogollos, animales, y otras cosas impropriamente puestas, aunque con artificio e ingenio acomodadas).
>
> (Carducho, f. 28r)

> Grotesque is properly the painting that is found under ground in the ruins of Rome; but it signifies more commonly a sort of painting that expresses odd figures of animals, birds, flowers, leaves,or such like, mingled together in one ornament or border.[31]

Yet there is a similarity between the two in that neither mentions a human factor. Of all the sins of which grotesque stood accused in the sixteenth century the most heinous were connected with the abuse of the body, most obviously in cases of non-traditional (mythological) hybrids. Before examining these in greater depth it should be pointed out that decorative, whole and hybrid grotesques would in practice often be found together in a particular situation, and that this of itself is enough to account for the wide jurisdiction of the word grottesco that was so deplored by Paleotti. Something very like the arabesque was a feature of the style that Vitruvius had damned, although it was there employed in the service of the physically absurd.

Vitruvius's words are best quoted in their entirety since they furnished the Renaissance anti-grotesque lobby with the only classical authority specifically to censure the style:

> [Nam pinguntur] tectoriis monstra potius quam ex rebus finitis imagines certae, pro columnis enim struuntur calami striati, pro fastigiis appagineculi cum crispis foliis et volutis, item candelabra aedicularum sustinentia figuras, supra fastigia eorum surgentes ex radicibus cum volutis teneri plures habentes in se sine ratione sedienta sigilla, non minus coliculi dimidiata habentes sigilla alia humanis, alia bestiarum capitibus.[32]

For him its essence lies in transgression against verisimilitude and the law of nature, 'Haec enim nec sunt nec fieri possunt nec fuerunt . . . Neque enim pinturae probari debent, quae non sunt similes veritate' (loc.cit.). Although absurdity is common to them all there are three different techniques of the style according to Vitruvius: the impossible support ('pro columnis . . . figuras'), the dissonance of combined wholes ('supra . . . sigilla'), and the mutational, hybrid, elemental, or chimerical ('non minus . . . capitibus'). Sixteenth-century men had no hesitation in assuming that Vitruvius was talking about the Roman ancestor of their own grotesque and their commentaries on him are revealing. Here is Daniello Barbaro for one:

> Quae in re acriter invehitur in id picturae genus, quod nostri Grottescam vocant, ut pote quae res sit, ut nullo modo stare possit; nam cum pictura sit rerum, quae sunt, vel quae esse possunt, imitatio, qui fiet, ut recte factum iudicemus quod in eo genera tentatur et efficitur? Animalia scilicet aedes ferentia, cannas arudinesque columnas significantes, monstrorum articuli naturarum dissimilitudines, et variorum generum mixtiones quae fieri minime natura patitur. Certeque quemadmodum fantasia confusae in somnis rerum imagines nobis affert saepeque res natura dissimiles spectris aggregari solet, ita recte possumus dicere ab eo picturae genere fieri, quod picturae somnium recte nominare possimus.[33]

Barbaro forgets about the least radical feature (the combination of wholes) and concentrates on the sensational. It is obvious from the examples he gives that he is not merely paraphrasing Vitruvius but probably speaking from his own experience of Italian grotesque. 'Variorum generum mixtiones' indicates the whole range of possible combinations whereas Vitruvius's two selections are restricted. Also missing in Vitruvius, though very much a commonplace in the Renaissance, was the connection of grotesques and dream. Theologically speaking there were two sorts of dream. The first was a favour rarely granted and consisted of a message from God, either directly or via some simple symbolism[34]. The second, that enjoyed by most mortals, was a confused travesty of reality, more a curse of the devil than some blessing from above, to be dismissed immediately and not scrutinized for significance. Barbaro clearly associates

the grotesque with this variety and the comparison is not meant to flatter either of them[35].

Likewise Felipe de Guevara reduces grotesque to its most radically absurd productions:

> El grotesco es un género de pintura, el cual aunque conste de líneas y colores, a rigor no se puede llamar pintura. Porque la pintura es imitación, como en el principio habemos dicho, de alguna cosa natural que es, o que puede ser; y por el contrario el grotesco consta de cosas que no son ni pueden ser, pues en si contiene tantas diversidades de monstruos e imposibilidades. (Comentarios, 67)

Guevara goes on explicitly to cite Vitruvius when distinguishing between the monstrous/grotesque on the one hand and 'cosas sabidas y determinadas' on the other (loc.cit.), but in the above passage he is closely following another of Vitruvius's commentators, Gulielmus Philander[36]. While this exclusion of grotesque from the fold may strike us as extreme, its spirit is typical of those who rejected the style out of a strict reading of imitation by which it was carefully laid down just how fantastic the fantastic might be. Vasari is another who defines grotesque according to the dual characteristic of nonsensical architecture and whimsical hybrid with some allowance for the gratuitous incorporation of wholes. This makes him that bit closer to Vitruvius than Barbaro but his examples again are his own and it is to be doubted that he actually 'quotes' from Vitruvius (cf. Kayser, 20):

> Le grottesche sono una spezie di pitture licenziose e ridicole molto, fatte dagli antichi per ornamenti di vani, dove in alcuni luoghi non stava bene altro che cose in aria; per il che facevano in quelle tutte sconsciature di mostri, per strettezza della natura, e per griciolo e ghiribizzo degli artefici, il quali fanno in quelle cose senza alcuna regola, appiccando a un sottilissimo filo un peso che non si può reggere, ad un cavallo le gambe di foglie, e a un huomo le gambe di gru, ed infiniti sciarpelloni e passerotti, e chi più stranamente se gl' immaginava, quello è tenuto più valente.
>
> (Vite, I, 91-2)

Compared with some of the abuse which was heaped upon grotesque this is very moderate criticism and it is notable that he ascribes their origin to nothing more sinister than a capricious pre-disposition to frivolity on the part of their makers.

While those who appealed to Vitruvius radically circumscribed the grounds of qualification as 'una grottesca', Paleotti went even further by restricting them to 'quelle forme d'uomini o d'animali o d'altre cose, che mai non sono state, né possono essere' (Trattati, II, 425), and it is abundantly clear from the whole of the chapter he devotes to grotesque that by this he means the hybrid or mutational kind. Naturally Paleotti could hardly avoid recognizing Vitruvius (ibid., 444) but his own determination is more extreme than that of those who wholeheartedly subscribe to him. Not the first to voice disapproval, he none the less wrote the only really thorough anatomy of grotesque to my knowledge available at the date of its publication (1582). It must be of some significance that the man in the vanguard

of the anti-grotesque campaign wore the cloth. Unlike Vasari and others Paleotti could not dismiss the manner as a merely irritating playfulness. It raised issues other than the aesthetic and although he does deal with these his objections are predictable. The objections on moral grounds are more enlightening.

As indicated, the grotesque for Paleotti belonged to the artificially monstrous, to be distinguished from both the naturally and the divinely monstrous. It is not certain whether he has the naturally deformed and freakish or simply the exotic in mind when he speaks of 'quei mostri, o marini, o terrestri, o altri che siano che dalla natura talora, se bene fuori dell'ordine suo sono stati prodotti' (425). Scriptural and artificial monsters together make up the imagined variety, 'Mostri imaginati si possono pigliare in due modi, cioè o che sono falsamente finti dalla pura imaginazione, overo che sono formati dalla imaginazione nostra, mossa però da cause superiori e divina revelazione' (420-1). The latter are exemplified by Daniel, II, 31-5, and Apocalypse, XII, 3-4; XIII, 1-3. He elsewhere refers to Saint Bernard's condemnation of centaurs and 'semi-homines' as 'ridicula monstruositas', quoting a similar opinion of Saint Anthony out of Aquinas's Summa, and then adds: 'Onde non è meraviglia, se il glorioso S.Bernardo con tanta veemenzia si mostrò sdegnato contra queste pitture' (445). The reason for this pious indignation is not hard to appreciate. When it involved the human body the chimerical grotesque constituted a serious slander against Man as the supreme artefact of Creation and, to put it mildly, an insult to the God who had granted

him this favour by fashioning him in his own image and likeness, body as well as soul. This goes a long way towards explaining why Paleotti should follow Saint Bernard in his attack on centaurs and satyrs when he is generally indulgent with mythology itself (though not always convincingly, cf. 450-1).

At one stage Paleotti concedes that some 'favole de' Greci' are rightly called allegorical and that they contain sound morality underneath. He continues: 'Per la quale ragione potrà parere forsi ad alcuno ch' anco queste grottesche si possano defendere col senso della moralità et allegoria che dentro vi è posta! (450-1). His counter to this objection is that the grotesque is frivolous and that any message it might have would be too obscure to be understood by any but a few, and that it would sooner serve to deceive than to edify:

> Noi, quanto al proposito delle grottesche, diciamo che esse ordinariamente, come ognuno sa, non hanno ascoso alcuno senso giovevole, ma sono fatte a capriccii; e quando pure ve ne fosse alcuno, viene ad essere tanto recondito et abstruso, che serve per pochissimi et inganna moltissimi, e però si ha da tralasciare. (451)

This repeats a warning he had made earlier when, starting from the familiar aphorism that pictures were 'libri agli' idioti [unlettered]', he concludes that grotesques 'non solo non giovano, ma possono intricare le menti de' semplici in mille errori' (442-3). The exact nature of these errors is never made explicit but in view of his extremely narrow

definition of grotesque it seems reasonable to suppose that they must be intimately involved with the misrepresentation of created nature and of the human form in particular. Grotesques belong to an alternative or rival Creation, one that does not simply provide an option but dismembers and apparently wantonly re-assembles parts of God's Universe in order to furnish its own. It not only steals from reality but adds sacrilege to sin by setting up the disfigured mutations as its very substitute.

Paleotti was self-confessedly engaged upon a Counter-reformational revaluation of painting. His references to Trent are frequent (e.g. 391, 148 etc.). The moral implications of a painter's exertions were never far from his mind. It may be of no mean importance that he thought of grotesques as something special, not just pictures which could be classed as 'vane et oziose', nor generally 'ridicole', nor even 'monstruose' in its widest acceptance. These were all denominations denoting styles essentially distinct from grotesque, and dealt with in separate chapters (Chs. 30, 31, 35). When he came to criticize grotesque on aesthetic grounds his arguments to a great extent coincided with those critical conservatives whose reasons for confining the mimetic derived from a to-the-letter reading of Horace (Ars poetica, ll, 1-10) coloured by a sometimes explicit adherence to the Christian world-picture. The following is typical:

> Le [grottesche] non hanno parte alcuna né di vero né di verisimile, como ciascuno vede: perché altro è il referire una cosa che non si sa certamente come sia stata in molti particolari, ma è verisimile che potesse stare nel tale o tal modo - e questo non disconviene né al poeta né al pittore - altro è il volere narrare una cosa che non solo ripugna alla verità del fatto, ma ancora alla possibilità della natura, e questa non ha luogo né tra poeti buoni, né tra pittori. (449)

Barocchi here refers us to some of Gilio's distinctions from the second dialogue. Vincenso divides non-historical painting into invention ('il finto') and the fabulous ('il favoloso'), 'il finto è quello che rappresenta o può naturalmente e veramente rappresentar il vero; altramente non sarà finto ma favoloso' (Trattati, II, 21). This is made more explicit later on by Pulidoro:

> Il finto è quello che non è in quell'atto che si dimostra, ma può essere. Et avertite a questo passo che, dove il vero non può aver luogo, ivi finzione non può essere, perché altro non è la finzione, che la maschera del vero. Il favoloso è quello che non è e non può essere. (ibid., 29)

He illustrates with examples from the Aeneid: Aeneas landed in Italy long before the founding of Carthage so that his romance with Dido is pure invention on Virgil's part whereas the transformation of Aeneas's ships into nereids is pure fable. The one might have happened, the other far exceeds the bounds of possibility[37]. The lawyer Vincenso is finally responsible for Gilio's decision as to which parts of the

fabulous are to count as permissible. Two other interlocutors, Francesco and Troilo, suggest to him the possible areas in which painting's 'licenza poetica' reaches 'fuora del naturale ordine':

> Di ciò ve ne do l'esempio de le statue che termini si chiamano, i quali paiono uomini messi ne' bigonzi. Dopo, infiniti mostri vedrete: chi ha faccia d'uomo e membra d'animale, chi di cavallo, chi di cane, chi è mezza donna e mezzo pesce, altro è più difforme che'l mostro d'Orazio; de' quali altri sostengono colonne, altri tengono festoni o altre cose tali, e pur sono fuora d'ogni naturale ordine. Nondimeno per la forza de la poesia s'ammettono. Oltra di questo tutte le cose favolose: come che gli uomini si transformino in diversi animali, del che Ovidio et altri poeti n'hanno scritto a pieno.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Vediamo in [Roma] a le volte i termini che voi dicevi, a le volte mezz'uomini e mezzi serpenti, a le volti animali scontrafatti, a le volte delfini, a le volte omini naturali, a le volte serpenti, a le volte viti piene d'uva e di pampini, a le volte trofei antichi per le colonne, et altri capricci tali senza regola e senza legge alcuna. (16-17)[38]

The <u>termini</u> were archetypal chimerical grotesques proper to architecture, comprising the human head or head and torso built into (sometimes projecting from) a column or pillar. Francesco's reference to them as statue in his jocular definition may refer to items executed outside of a strictly architectural context but it could simply be a case of loose usage. <u>Termini</u> were often found painted in murals alongside

the other types of hybrid from which they are to be distinguished only in that the two elements of their admixture are constants. They should not be confused with the other kinds of three-dimensional mutations. Among these (as among all painted grotesques) they were the only sort to be graced with a proper name[39].

Vincenso's attempts to accommodate or reject these different manifestations are not at first sight utterly consistent. The mutations as a whole are dismissed with appeal to Vitruvius and Horace, although some concessions are made for certain <u>termini</u> he considers to have some symbolical value, while the mutations in the papal <u>loggie</u> are passed over in discreet silence, leaving their less controversial adornments to be praised (18). Mythological metamorphoses are allowed as are traditional monsters such as Cyclops and satyrs, both as part of the permissibly fabulous, 'le cose finte possono cadere tutte sotto la poetica licenza, ma il favoloso regolatamente et in quel modo che s'è detto' (21). The monstrous is also excluded ('non è da concedersi') unless it comprises freaks or prodigies produced in nature or those referred to in Scripture (21). Vincenso again returns to the mutations of grotesques when he talks of painters' <u>dissonanze</u> and those 'mostri che si fingono ne' fregi fra le cornici' (19, 21) as part of the monstrous. Thus he caters for the unconventionally chimerical under the forbidden varieties of both the fabulous and the monstrous. Why he never actually calls it grotesque is a matter for surmisal only. Perhaps the wide-spread acceptance of the papal examples as <u>grottesche</u> made him restrict its application to

those alone (see 18), leaving him to define and then to attack the phenomenon with some alternative set of critical terminology and without casting aspersions on what Popes had seen fit to condone. Nevertheless his views are fairly representative of those who thought that creative invention could only benefit from a strict surveillance. His evaluation of the monstrous largely coincides with that of Paleotti and is directly at odds with the view aired by Holanda who, individualistic as ever, argued that a mutational grotesque could only be called monstrous if it were ill painted[40]. Similarly the fabulous was fenced about to deter those who might seek to use it as a recreation ground for unchecked fancy. Butrón, conservative and with good reason, said that painting could only be 'fabulosa por la permisión que tiene en disponer de las fábulas, según el referido lugar de Cicerón: "Deos novimos ea facie, qua pictores fictoresque voluerunt"', and he even goes on to identify Horace's 'pictoribus atque poetis . . .' with the presentation of conventional myth (Discursos, f. 9r).

Vincenso comes down heavily upon both mutations (termini included) and non-mutations which give the illusory sense of supporting columns, crossbeams and ceilings:

> Da questo uso impropriamente poi questi termini sono stati messi per sostengo de le volte e de le case. Tal dirò anco de' mostri che si fingono ne' fregi fra le cornici. . . . Che il delfini e gli uomini possano sostentare le colonne e le volte, niuno sarà che 'l dica; non potendo dunque essere in vero, meno si deve usare per finzione. (21)

So he effectively discounts the second feature of 'high' grotesque, the physically absurd, a direct challenge to the law of nature, and in a different class entirely from the vague and unspecific inter-relationship between components that often exists in the grotesques of wholes. In the dedication of this dialogue to Cardenal Farnese Gilio makes it clear that his purpose is none other than to define exactly what Horace had meant by poetic licence (3). It must be admitted that Horace is, in spirit, the perfect anti-grotesquer. The opening lines of the Ars may refer to items present in the sort of paintings that had given poor Vitruvius such a turn, although Wilkins suggests the possibility that Horace has a centaur, a harpy, and Scylla in mind (ed.cit., 225). If this latter is the case it would only make Horace's attack upon non-traditional hybrids all the more positive, albeit by implication. Fans of the grotesque were naturally wary of quoting this particular piece of Horace when it came to providing it with some respectability.

At the same time the pro-grotesque faction managed to parry the various attacks levelled against it with some vigour. Lomazzo was its most whole-hearted apologist. His outstanding and revolutionary contribution to the definition of the grotesque is contained in the introductory material to I Grotteschi (1587) but a more restrained and careful defence is given earlier in the Trattato (1584). It occurs throughout a chapter innocuously entitled 'Compositione de le grottesche' (Bk. VI, ch. 48) but is obviously designed to counter the very objections put forward by Paleotti two years earlier so that the temptation to think of it as an answer

to him specifically is hard to resist. Barbaro is the only one of the enemy that he actually names (422) while he alludes to others as 'alcuni stitichi, che non gli vogliono ammettere' (423) and proceeds to argue that grotesques can be as usefully symbolical as 'sacre pitture'. The inference that he has Paleotti in mind here cannot be particularly far-fetched.

The whole of the chapter is marked by two tendencies, Lomazzo's consistent reluctance to say what is essential grotesque, and a continual playing down of the human element and of the importance of hybrids. As to the first, he makes his hesitation explicit, 'non starò ad investigar più sotilmente ciò che siano grottesche, perché non lo sa manco la istessa verità, nonché lo sappiano i pittori, ni di che cosa si compongono' (423). The overall impression he gives is that for him the grotesque is that of wholes. Only at the end of his long list of suitable items for inclusion in a mural does he slip in the hybrids: 'sacrifici, trofei, istromenti, gradi, concavi, convessi, in giro, e pendenti, e rilevati; e oltre di ciò tutti gli animali, fogliami, arbori, figure, ucelli, sassi, monti, fiumi, campi, cieli, tempeste, saette, tuoni, frondi, fiori, frutti, lucerne, candelieri, accesi, chimere, mostri' (423). Many of these are very familiar but 'monti, fiumi, campi etc.' come over as perhaps esoteric selections as raw material for a grotesque. Lomazzo is here playing upon, or being influenced by the multivalency of the word grottesca as outlined previously. The hills, streams and so forth mentioned here would be purely naturalistically represented and positioned either in one of the subsidiary spaces or, along the wall of a garden colonnade,

as the central picture itself or as a good part of it. The human factor is but vaguely indicated by _figure_, although it is not unreasonable to read it in as a component of _mostri/chimere_. Earlier on, following Petrucci, Lomazzo had allowed the unaltered human form a place in those grotesques proper to _spatii_:

> In queste grottesche il pittore esprime le cose, e i concetti, non con le proprie, ma con altre figure: come se vuole rappresentar uno di buona fama, farà la fama nelle grottesche allegra e splendida; s'un' altro di mala fama vi farà l'istessa fama oscura e nera. (422)

He advises that if the subject of the main painting is a man of good reputation, then an allegorical (probably female) human figure, suitably reflective of the qualities of the subject, should be inserted in each of the adjacent spaces. In the visual arts of the time such figures, often accompanied by some appropriately symbolical object, would often serve to represent some abstraction. 'Geometry' would have his compass, divider and rule; 'Astronomy', star charts and telescope[41]. Clearly Lomazzo is quite happy to use _grottesche_ to mean the 'sub-panels' or 'minor, accompanying pictures'. Whether we conclude that he is simply subject to the general devaluation of the word or that he is deliberately abusing it in order to create a smoke-screen behind which grotesque's more dubious practices might carry on unmolested, is not readily decided. At all events, his reading is very liberal and it tends to play down the hybrids in favour of the acceptable face of grotesque.

Lomazzo is more enthusiastic about the less subversive side to grotesque's whimsy. But here again he argues with apparent cunning, especially in his treatment of the illusory support device. These can maintain 'una cotale verisimilitudine naturale' so long as they are not blatantly farfetched but rather seem to suit their position: a tree-trunk as part of a column is permissible, 'Ma se si facessero appese di sopra ad un picciolo filo come molti usano, né in cima né manco dalle bande, si converrebero. Conciosiaché quelle cose che con la natura in qualche parte non convengono, non possono mostrar gratia' (424). This apparent willingness to toe the line and recognize Vitruvius is deceptive, for Lomazzo evidently subscribes to an ideal of qualified absurdity. The support motifs he allows are 'animali bizarri, mostri e simili che sostengono, con ornamento di mascheroni, arpie, scale, e cartozzi' (ibid.), another crafty move since Gilio had rather awkwardly to concede that a fabulous beast might bear an impossible weight (Trattati, II, 21). He was talking about the sphinx, corresponding to non-traditional hybrids in Lomazzo, who thereby manages to include them, though it is one of the few occasions upon which he mentions them at all. The rest of his case shows him to be committed to a complementary belief in qualified naturalism: make sure your proportions are accurate; if you paint anything up in the air give it wings or some other visible means of support; avoid birds hovering happily directly above flames, or smiling into the faces of snakes (425). By openly criticizing some of the more facile and obviously not serious tricks in which grotesque sometimes indulged Lomazzo distracts attention from the hybrids issue, about which he maintains a studied silence.

The whole effect is stage-managed; a not altogether blameless whipping-boy is made responsible for the sins of others as well as his own.

On the positive side Lomazzo makes some observations on the nature of grotesque later to be developed in I Grotteschi. While admitting that there is some justification for the recurrent criticism that grotesques are badly executed,[42] he can still claim that, technical ability permitting, the creation of grotesques involves a very high order of furor poeticus:

> Nell' inventioni delle grotesche più che in ogn' altra vi corre un certo furore, e una naturale bizzarria, della quale essendone privi quei tali con tutta l'arte loro non fecero nulla; si come anco poco più hanno conseguito coloro, che quantunque siano stati bizzarri e capricciosi, non le hanno però saputo rappresentar con arte, perché in ciò l'una e l'altra hanno de concorrere insieme giuntamente furia naturale e arte. (424)

Here, as throughout, Lomazzo uses bizzarro, capriccioso and related forms as compliments. The words were essentially free of any moral value but became insults or flattery (or retained their neutrality) according to the disposition of the user. Bizzarro meant that which was far-fetched, extravagant or strange in the sense of wonderful as likely as of weird. It is close to English 'bizarre' but without the heavily perjorative colouring that the word usually carries. Only in one of its secondary meanings did it match the sense of Spanish bizarro, 'gallant', 'spirited',

'dashing'[43]. Often used as its synonym, capriccioso could mean something rather less serious but the two are in essence identifiable. Paleotti characteristically uses the terms as criticisms (425, 438 etc.), Doni (loc.cit.) and Comanini (Il Figino, passim) favourably, and Armenini and Zuccaro simply to define (De' veri precetti, 194 etc.; L'idea, 20). In any case grotesque could more safely suffer association with these, and even with the technically false, than with the monstrous proper.

Lomazzo also suggested that grotesques were full of meaning:

> Egli è parere di molti dotti e esperti nelle lettere, che queste grottesche . . . venivano fatte non altrimente che enimmi, o cifere, o figure egittie, dimandante ieroglifici, per significare alcun concetto o pensiero sotto altre figure, come noi usiamo negli emblemi e nelle imprese. E per me credo che ciò fosse perché non ci è via più accomodata per disegnare over mostrare qual concetto si voglia della grottesca. (423)

No illustration is forthcoming here and it looks as though Lomazzo is trying to improve grotesque's image by associating it with established, respectable sorts of symbolism. While the concetto behind an allegorical figure of Fame is easily appreciated, the example he had given previously and the only one he does explain, Lomazzo would be hard put to it to give an account of a man/bird/vegetable hybrid in such a way as to avoid presenting it as a casual travesty of Creation or as a challenge to it. He wisely assumes assent from his reader. His idea may not be totally original anyway.

Barbaro had already heard the excuse about hieroglyphics in his day and was having none of it: 'Excusant se pictores artificiosamque rem dicunt, et quasi hieroglificam, signis et monumentis praeclaram, eam picturae speciem volunt esse' (op.cit., 243). His own most valuable contribution comes towards the end of the chapter:

> A mio parere più difficile cosa è il dar ordine ad una cosa disordinata che seguirne una ordinata, la quale havendo seco l'ordine non ricerca altro de ch' egli si conosca, dove in quella oltre che conviene conoscere esso ordine, bisogna ridurla dalla natura disordinata alla ordinata. (425)

This may not be totally unrelated to some previous remarks about the need for harmony in the balance and distribution of the composition of grotesques but in this context it points to something apparently more profound. Lomazzo ventures that the grotesques are antithetical to the superficially real, the literal 'prosa' and that they work by 'convertendo l'istoria in favola' (ibid). Whether they themselves are responsible for the creation of the disorder in the first place, or whether they are correctively imposed upon it, is a question unresolved.

It is to some extent elucidated in I Grotteschi, parts of which self-professedly set out to define 'il grottesco' and not merely to acknowledge certain characteristics of grottesche as in the previous work. Whereas the Lomazzo of the Trattato had been defensive and cautiously evasive, a new man wields the pen here, manifestly eccentric but cocksure and proud of the fact. Most of the relevant material

is contained in the dedicatory verses, in the 'Origine del grottesco', and in the 'Capitolo dove si dimostra che cosa sia grottesco', but some of the poems, the whole lay-out of the book and even the title-page itself all contribute towards the definition. For instance, the following extract from the verbose title-page contains both recognition of the charge of moral imprecision or unorthodoxy so often levelled at grotesque, and a simultaneous reply to it, 'E però intitolate Grotteschi, non solo dilettevoli per la varietà de la invenzione, ma utili ancora per la moralità che vi si contiene'. Lomazzo's argument is not exclusively theoretical since it includes justification for his own Hell grotesques which are described at some length, and is meant to support further his use of the term to cover a wide range of topics in the poetry. He has no hesitation in applying the term to literature. Lomazzo's case is not exactly what one could call solid and sensible but there is consistency of a sort throughout which adds up to one of the most original apologies for any breed of the fantastic that the sixteenth century was to produce.

This excerpt gives an impression of the flavour of the whole:

> Nasce il bizzar Grotessco, a cui s'apprende
> Ogni spirto gentil, dal naturale,
> Fra cavi, e più altro spiegando l'ale,
> Dimostra tutto quel, ch'a noi s'estende.
> E con diverse forme al mondo rende
> Diversi toni, ma in natura eguale
> A nostri affetti; e non meno anco vale
> Quando in far una cosa un'altra prende. (12)

Several ideas recurrent in Lomazzo, and all at least seminal in the Trattato, are in evidence here. First, and of a fundamental importance, comes the claim that the grotesque belongs to nature rather than otherwise, and herein Lomazzo antedates Victor Hugo by a couple of centuries. His conceit on its 'birth' derives from the falsely based etymology of grottesco and leads into the notion that the latter constitutes a complete system for the artistic re-interpretation of human experience, one that does not offend but ultimately satisfies human emotions more fully than the apparent organization of things natural. Similarly the intellect will be directed to a fuller understanding of the truth:

> E che a mistura le cose ponessi,
> Secondo venea commodo al tenore,
> Acciò ch' il ver da falso discernessi. (19)

From the wording in this and similar passages it seems that Lomazzo has the charge of falsehood in mind and his counter seems to be that grotesque brings the false sharply into focus, its rearrangement of the furniture of the world and its formation of the hybrid somehow distilling out what is unreal so that it will the more sharply contrast with the real. Although meaning is always finally discernible it can only be appreciated through coming to terms with the fundamental paradox of grotesque, that its message is always backed, Janus-like, by its antithesis. Grotesques are 'sogni sgombri', 'clear dreams' (13),

> Quindi i concetti son si oscuri e chiari,
> Ch' usciti paion fuor dal gran caosse,
> Rivolto in vari modi sottosopra. (12)

Presumably this contains a reference to the Chaos of mythology and it is only the strength of the paion that prevents our making a complete identification of the grotesque (and thereby of the legitimately natural, Creation) with the chaotic. In contexts such as these it may not be far-fetched to see Lomazzo flirting with heresy. As indicated, Lomazzo was careful to forestall the charge of falsehood, as in this example, remarkable both for its lack of modesty and ignorance of geography:

> Ne'quali il falso non vuò che l'ingombri
> Come cosa ch' ammorba spesso il mondo,
> Ma vuò con Citheron Parnasso l'ombri
> In questi . . . (13)

But obscurity was a virtue, necessarily of course since it was intimately related to the meaning. And yet Lomazzo seems often to have prided himself on remaining incomprehensible to all but the acute:

> In strani modi v' ho pinto l'affano,
> Con l'allegrezza e costume moderno,
> Ch' apenna scorger molti lo potranno. (13)

Mystery was a principal ingredient of the concetti (ideas) proper to grotesques, 'Che que' capricci dan si illustri e rari,/ Ch' a spor i gril non vi vorria che fosse' (12). He clearly experienced no little difficulty in reconciling this with his overall conviction that grotesque was meaningful, and at one point indulges in palinode:

(Perché) il mio chiaro, e naturale instinto,
È di dir giustamente la ragione
A tutti, senza mostrar volto finto. (20)

In all it must be remembered that Lomazzo studiously avoids telling us just what the meaning of grotesques might be. Paleotti had complained that, when it had a meaning, it could only serve to mislead the vast majority since it would perforce be too obscure for their comprehension. Lomazzo defends his own efforts against this allegation:

In questo mio dipinger, o parlare,
Ch' egli si sia, non si potrà già mai
Alcun error di fede imbertonare. (20)

But again he fails to give any specifics of grotesque's message. One can only admire the off-hand fashion in which he dismisses the entire mimetic embargo with an innocent 'Io non ho senza spin pinte le rose' (19), and yet his silence on grotesque's more serious assaults on the authority of Nature does not render his case readily credible. Nevertheless, the latter is sufficiently consistent to be summarized. Judging from the foregoing material and other more general remarks, 'Questo mio fascio detto il gran Grottesco, . . . Diverse cose pinte in modo strano' (14, 15), the obscurity of certain claims in the Trattato is rendered less opaque. For Lomazzo the grotesque disorganizes the physically natural and proceeds to reassemble it in a way that will bring out its meaning or even create one for it. This significance will not always be readily understood by all, and the plight of those so perplexed is not alleviated by the likes of Lomazzo who, although he claims to know what it all means, is not letting on.

A feature of his apologies for the grotesque is that both in their different ways are ad hoc and remarkably personal documents, lacking any appeal to the authority of the Classics, and with only Petrucci of the moderns forwarded for the defence. More scholarly and conventionally styled pleas were made by certain writers on behalf of the fantastic, closely related to the grotesque, usually as the genus of its species but sometimes with a preciser identification. Whence Jáuregui, when he writes that 'Vitruvio dice mucho en varios lugares, y él solo en los antiguos discurre de la fantástica pintura, que llaman grutescos, en el libro 7 cap. 5'[44], Rather more representative was Federico Zuccaro. When he came to classify the painting of externals he proposed a three-fold distinction, between the naturalistic, the 'artificiale perfetto' (corresponding to Gilio's finto), and the 'prodottivo,discorsivo, fantastico' which 'rappresenta tutto quello che la mente humana, la fantasia, e il capriccio di qual si voglia arte può inventare' (L'Idea, 17). Here capriccio is used in its purely technical, uncoloured sense, and throughout Zuccaro makes it synonymous with invenzioni of the fantastic variety. This third style, usually referred to simply as the fantastic, informs, among other things 'grottesche, Arpie, festoni, chimere, forme matematiche . . . e che so io?' (ibid.). Just how we are meant to take grottesche here is difficult to decide. It is tempting to think that they must denote the types which lack festoons or mutations since these are mentioned separately but there is no evidence that Zuccaro intended the items to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary

one is left with the strong impression that had he called the style grotesque the name would have suited perfectly well, given its multivalency. His very wording recalls Lomazzo's when he came to list ingredients for grotesque and the reminiscence is reinforced by the termination of another such recipe, 'e in somma tutte le cose' (19). Furthermore, he mentions Giovanni da Udine, Perino and Petrucci as leading exponents of the fantastic although they were possibly more renowned as grotesquers. He concludes, 'in questi disegni della terza specie, per essere capricci e bizzarrie, non si può dar regola particolare' (20), which recalls Armenini's words on the grotesque, 'questo modo di dipingere sia fuori di ogni uso di regole, e sia pieno di ogni licenza' (De'veri precetti, 194). Neither of them saw this as a negative criticism as such.

A basically three-fold distinction was also maintained by Vincenzo Danti:

> L'arte del disegno può, con la pittura, con la scultura, e con l'architettura, tutte le cose che si veggiono imitare o veramente ritrarre; e non solamente le cose celeste e naturali, ma l'artifiziali ancora di qual si voglia maniera; e, che è più, può fare nuovi composti e cose che quasi paranno tal volta dall' arte stessa ritrovate: come sono le chimere, sotto le quali si veggiono tutte le cose in modo fatte che, quanto al tutto di loro, non sono imitate dalla natura, ma si bene composte parte di questa e parte di quella cosa naturale, facendo un tutto nuovo per se stesso. Le quali chimere intendo io che sieno come un genere, sotto cui si comprendano tutte le specie di grottesche, di fogliami, d'ornamenti

di tutte le fabbriche che la architettura compone e d'infinite altre cose che si fanno dall' arte, le quali, come s'è detto, nel loro tutto non rappresentano cosa alcuna fatta dalla natura, ma si bene nelli parti vanno questa e quell' altra cosa naturale rappresentando.[45]

What has happened here is that the mutational has assumed responsibility for all forms of the fantastic or, at least, has such importance for Danti that he is completely silent about them. The multifarious grotesque would appear to be exerting more than a little influence here. Danti's chimerical, like Zuccaro's fantastic, is clearly intended to cover those artefacts not catered for by the real, natural or divine, or by the imagined (though still naturalistic), which he calls artificial, Zuccaro's artificiale perfetto, the technically false.

In his Idea del tempio della pittura Lomazzo made a more unorthodox division of the subject matter of painting into five: sacred topics, biblical scenes and miracles; 'cose significante', including animals, the senses, and representations of virtues and vices (these first two corresponding more or less to the first in Zucarro and Danti); 'inventioni naturali, spirituali e meravigliose' (the second in Zuccaro and Danti); 'cose imaginabili - favole, e tante altre fittioni, e capricci di poeti; 'i fantastichi - grotteschi, i fogliami, i legamenti, i fregi, i trofei, e gli altri ornamenti' (81-2). What Lomazzo has done here is to separate that which is fantastic in its subject matter (the fabulous) from that which exhibits the quality more

obviously in its execution, and for these latter he reserves the term fantastic. Whether the distinction is a particularly resilient one is perhaps doubtful but Lomazzo has managed to define that part of the fantastic that is peculiar to painting, something of its own that it does not owe to myth or any of the other fanciful creations of poets. This makes his classification more penetrating than the normal tripartite divisions, and incidentally directly challenges Paleotti who had seen one of the ultimate sources of grotesque in 'uso de' poeti' (432). Although it occupies pride of place in his list, Lomazzo is either playing down the grotesque or narrowing down its definition in comparison with his previous treatment of it, unless we again assume that the items which follow are included under it. Even if this is so, the more sensational forms of decoration are given no prominence and the extent to which those mentioned are themselves fantastic is not specified. At all events, the liaison between grotesque and fantastic is quite explicit, and both are inequivocably set apart from the fabulous, Lomazzo's imaginabile.

Theoretical talk about the fantastic often sounded very much like, or exactly the same as, theoretical talk about grotesques. Theory of any sort for the more licentious sorts of creativity was in comparatively short supply. Comanini was one very lucid spokesman for the fantastic, and his arguments, as set out in Il Figino, provide a valuable alternative apologetic for grotesque. He has no particular brief for the latter but he does include a justification for the work of Arcimboldo, itself not totally unrelated to

grotesque. Comanini's case is based on a division of imitation into the icastic and the fantastic. His immediate authority for this is literary, Mazzoni's In difesa della Comedia del divino poeta Dante (Cesena, 1573 and subsequent reprints), and the ultimate source is philosophical, Plato's Sophist (266d)[46]. A scrutiny of this latter text reveals it as rather obscure and hardly upholding the simple distinction for literature presented by Mazzoni. Plato is more or less arbitrarily included , and his abduction shows the length to which champions of artistic licence were prepared to go in order to procure for their campaign that touch of class that only a classical precedent could lend. Torquato Tasso for one saw it as an exercise in arbitrary source-hunting[47]. The basic distinction is given by the poet Guazzo after a brief acknowledgement to Plato, although it is to be doubted that Comanini had actually consulted the Sophist text itself:

> La prima [icasta] è quella che imita le cose le quali sono, la seconda è quella che finge cose non esistenti. . . . Quel pittore adunque, il quale imitera cosa formata dalla natura, come sarebbe uomo, fiera, monte, mare, piano e altri simili, farà imitazione icastica; ma quegli che dipingera un suo capriccio non più disegnato da alcun altro, almeno che egli sappia, farà imitazione fantastica.
>
> (Trattati, III, 256)

This is subjected to a series of modifications so that every topic mentioned in the classifications of Lomazzo and the others is covered. The supernatural, for instance, is included under the icastic, not surprisingly since, along with the

natural it comprises the real - the existent, to use Tasso's term[48]. Angels and devils will normally be imitated icastically. Thus Figino, with an important reservation:

> Avendo gli angeli et i demonii il vero essere, et essendo vere e nobilissime sostanze, l'imitazione che di loro si fa si debba allogare sotto l'icastica. Dalla'altra parte, non essendo corporei, né meno avendo quelle forme, o belle o brutte, con le quali i poeti et insieme i pittori li fingono, potrebbesi dire che queste imitazioni si riducono sotto la fantastica. (275)

Guazzo's reply to this is a refinement of the basic premise of angels' reality. Although spiritual beings have no body of their own they often appear in bodily form and this appearance is itself real. Therefore imitations of it will be icastic:

> Io stimo che l'imitazioni fatte degli uni e degli altri sieno icastiche, e non fantastiche. La ragione che mi persuade a ciò credere e questa: che, quantunque né gli angeli né gli diavoli abbiano veramente corpo, nondimeno veramente sono appariti sotto forme corporee e visibili, e tali apunto, quali i poeti soglion formarle. (ibid.)

Although many of the early fathers of the Church held that angels were corporeal - quite reasonably in view of the substance of biblical texts such as the book of Tobias, Matthew, XXVIII, 3-4, Mark, XVI, 5 etc. - the exclusively spiritual nature of angels was finally insisted upon by the fourth Lateran Council (1215) while it was admitted that angels sometimes assumed human form in order to deliver their messages.

Comanini is writing strictly within this tradition. Guazzo goes on to say that the painting of wings on an angel, while symbolically appropriate, is fantastic since the Bible records no cases of winged apparitions. The apparent exception of the multi-winged seraphim in Isaias, VI, 2 is afforded an explanation. They appeared to Isaias in the type of vision comprising 'quelle che si fanno dentro la fantasia', not those 'reali e fatte agli occhi esteriormente' (ibid.). One can appreciate Comanini's point: it is difficult to conceive of the marvels the prophet witnessed as taking place on his own door-step, and his further argument that most prophetic visions are of the imaginaria type lends some weight to it. That is as far as Comanini is prepared to go and a discreet silence is suddenly drawn over the matter. The reason probably lies in that this sort of theological hair-splitting is fraught with danger. Comanini had identified the fantastic with the non-real. This may not be too important when it comes to wings on angels or the depiction of God the Father as some sort of splendid and sagacious-looking geriatric, which he also classifies as fantastic. But according to Comanini's criteria the prophetic vision of the Church's universality afforded to Peter in Acts, X, 10-17, would have to be counted as fantastic, owing its appearance rather too much to the power of the individual imagination and too little to the direct inspiration and desire of God. It takes a certain temerity to call into question the 'reality' of a divine vision, even of one so obviously symbolical as Peter's.

Such doubts can be to some extent allayed. Comanini is best seen as the victim of his own subtlety which has led

him, paradoxically, to establish the heavy-handed distinction between the two sorts of vision, the latter being quite of his own invention and not deriving from any established theological source. It seems to have evolved directly from his own interpretation of the fantastic/icastic distinction, which depends heavily upon a close association between the fantastic and the imagination, the <u>fantasia</u> or <u>immaginativa</u>. This may seem a painfully obvious point to make but it carries several serious implications. For a start, Comanini argues as though the fantastic is the logically fully-developed state of the imagination. The powers which other men have or leave under-developed the creator of fantastics brings to fruition. And he himself is not abnormal but rather outstanding as the perfect specimen:

> La virtù fantastica - l'ufficio della quale è di ricevere le specie apportate dagli esteriori sensi al senso commune, e di ritenerle, et ancora di comporle insieme - [è] gagliardissima nell' Arcimboldo, poiché egli, componendo insieme l' imagini delle sensibili cose da lui vedute, ne forma strani capricci et idoli non più da forza di fantasia inventati, quello che pare impossibile a congiungersi accozzando con molta destrezza e facendone risultar ciò che vuole.
>
> (270)

The opening definition here is based on the standard psychological authority of the time, Aristotle's <u>De Anima</u>. Quevedo's own discussion of the topic makes this quite clear:

> Lo que se llama fantasma o fantasía es la imaginación. Su oficio es juntar las cosas sensatas, quiere decir sensibles entre sí; y es como un tesoro de las imágenes o semejanzas del sentido común. Que hay, demás de los cinco, éste que llamamos sentido común, afirma, contra algunos que le negaron, toda la escuela peripatética, y de común consentimiento los filósofos. Dícelo Aristóteles en el libro III de Anima, cap. 7, texto 31, y en el libro de Morte et Vita, cap. 1.
>
> (OP, 1409)

The sensus communis was not a sixth sense as such but a kind of controller of and co-ordinator between the five. Aristotle ascribed four functions to it. One was to distinguish between the objects of any two senses, another to enable perception of perception itself. Both Comanini and Quevedo see the imagination itself as the store-house of images although in Aristotelian terms the memory rather than the phantasia itself could equally be the ultimate supplier of images. Their reading is probably explained by the fact that the images kept in the memory would be ideal or universal. In fact these were often called ideas and it was assumed that they were identical as such in the minds of all men[50]. In his art of memory Juan Velázquez de Azevedo uses the terms idea and image as interchangeable and so, not surprisingly, unlike the other two he sees the function of the imagination as purely operative and not retentive. Otherwise his presentation of it is as thoroughly Aristotelian as theirs:

> No sólo recibe la memoria las ideas que le han ministrado los sentidos, sino las que habemos dicho que imagina y forma la cogitativa [fantasía],

> la cual contemplando las imágenes que están en la memoria, junta una con otra, o saca y recoge otras nuevas de aquéllas, y éstas después las vuelve a recibir la memoria, exempli gratia: Tengo en la memoria la idea del Sol, y la del color verde, que las he percibido con el sentido de la vista, y presentándose estas dos imágenes a la cogitativa, las junta e imagino un sol verde, y luego la memoria recibe y guarda la idea deste sol verde.[51]

Now, for Aristotle, simply to imagine walking down the street would constitute an act of the phantasia. Herein Comanini departs from him somewhat in his elaboration on the fantastic. He argues that a painter may alter or add details to a subject and that the act of imitation would still be principally icastic. The changes would of course derive from the activity of the artist's own imagination but this objection is not explicitly met. Yet an answer is implicit in his following example. He describes Raphael's Vatican painting 'L'Incendio di Borgo', in which the painter has 'invented' scenes likely to have been seen at the time and concludes 'non è però che quel gran pittore in quell' opera non habbia fatto imitazione icastica et imitatore icastico dir non si debba' (277).

One can sympathize with the common-sense of this approach. But Comanini's efforts to give some real definition to the fantastic/icastic distinction are more or less at odds with his uncommon respect for the etymological derivation of the word fantastico. The verisimilar as well as the incredible was the product of the fantasia. Comanini, aware that strictly speaking this was the case, nevertheless makes the

serious modification evident in the Raphael picture example in an effort to disassociate fantastic imitation from the conventionally life-like. This is certainly due to his own personal commitment to seeing the fullness of the imagination exemplified in the radically far-fetched creations of Arcimboldo, an attitude which itself probably explains why he did not sub-divide the faculty of phantasia and so allow himself a mental process proper to each of the two sorts of imitation. This was a possibility. Azevedo, discussing the 'virtud fantástica', writes:

> Mediante ella, habiendo oído decir que en las Indias hay algunos montes, o cerros de oro, los fingimos así; y también fantasiamos un hombre sin cabeza y otras monstruosidades como cada uno quiere componer . . . Algunos ponen a ésta por distinta potencia, y otros a ella y a la estimativa [= fantasía] hacen una misma. (f. 32v)

In other words, some saw the creation of the monstrous as beyond the jurisdiction of the imagination as regularly understood. Had he known of it, such a solution would only have undermined Comanini's brief that the production of the non-verisimilar was the proper business and not an abuse of the imagination . Not surprisingly he makes no reference to it.

In order to prove that work such as that of his friend Arcimboldo was imitative Comanini had little option but to turn to the Mazzonian interpretation of fantastic/icastic. To present radical artefacts as fantastic was to give them rather more respectability than was likely to be gained from classification as fabulous or monstrous. At the same time, to explain Arcimboldo on these grounds was decidedly a more

questionable procedure than the original defence of Dante had been, itself the victim of abuse at the hands of the conservative Tasso. Consequently the more radical substance of Comanini's claims is judiciously packaged in understatement. He also appears to make some concessions to the opposition in admitting the 'credible meraviglioso', a less precise but safer concept than the fantastic, and again originating from Mazzoni[52], and in condemning the false (non-moral) as opposed to the true (symbolically meaningful) fable (276, 285 etc.). However, the latter is consistent with his belief in the necessary meaningfulness of the fantastic (to be examined later in the case of Arcimboldo), itself a counter to the obvious objection that, once allowed out of the bounds of the verisimilar, the imagination would only indulge in unchecked whimsy. Comanini placed a massive emphasis on the importance of the phantasia within the whole human psyche, which led him to near heresy in his evaluation of prophetic vision. He coupled this with an equally irregular faith in the ability of the individual to exploit and yet retain control of the faculty with few of the restraints inherent in more orthodox mimesis[53].

Comanini's theory readily supplies a pedigree for the technical genesis of grotesques, which can be explained as products of the imagination (in its capacity as the assembler of images at its disposal) following its finest vocation (by creating new wholes not found in nature). They may be further classified. Comanini relies on Mazzoni again for the ultimately Thomist distinction between two sorts of mental imagery, that of idols, and that of simulacra or similitudes, 'essendo

simolacro quella imagine, la quale è fatta a similitudine di cosa stata, overo che tuttavia è; e idolo quella figura, la qual non è a sembianza di cosa, che mai sia stata, overo che sia' (256). Therefore 'Se'l pittore dipingesse una chimera, o vogliam dire un capriccio non mai più da altro artefice imaginato et expresso, costui farebbe idolo di cosa imaginaria e che avrebbe il suo essere nella mente è non fuori' (255). Guazzo quotes Tritons and centaurs as exemplifying the one, normal human figures and other natural things the other. Aquinas's authority is itself based upon I Corinthians, VIII, 4, the essence, allowing for context, being contained in 'nihil est idolum in mundo'. In practice Comanini is inconsistent in his discrimination, even in the mouth of Guazzo who proposes the distinction in the first place, so that simulacra may be spoken of as fantastic. But a grotesque would still be categorized as an idolo, and so not of impeccable ancestry. In psychological terms it corresponds to Azevedo's third type of visual image, the 'arbitrary', 'son las que cada uno elige, y fantasía según arbitrio', to be distinguished from the real, and the symbolical (such as personifications of Grammar and Rhetoric) (ff. 73v-74r).

Two sorts of technical grotesque appear to exist in Quevedo, chimerical mutations and physical absurdities of a less specific order. As to the first, the hybrids of the painted version lost much of their impact through repetition of familiar stereotypes. The range of combinations was theoretically limitless, but in practice most sixteenth-century examples belonged to a sort of tradition of recognized amalgams. The human body was usually represented from the

waist up and not from the waist down. A column might be surmounted by a human torso and head but was unlikely to be transformed into a pair of legs half-way down. The products become predictable, and generally appear either as respectful variations on the hybrid monsters of classical mythology or as transfixed, half-accomplished specimens of equally indebted imitations of its metamorphoses into animal, vegetable or mineral. When Paleotti had quoted one of the ultimate sources of grotesque as 'uso de' poeti' he evidently had Ovid primarily in mind (432). Quevedo's creations are in a different class. He searched the field and the farmyard, scullery and street for his raw material, with the result that the finished article seems revolutionary alongside the commonalty of the painted items. A grotesque of this kind may occur in isolation in a single line but more often appears in multiples which are themselves variegated with other devices. The senile bather referred to in the previous chapter (Planeta, 1054) is almost totally portrayed in grotesques, whereas these lines on an arch-Celestina are possibly more problematical:

> Cucharón por barba,
> por sombrero, un hongo,
> por toca, un pañal,
> por báculo, un tronco. (Planeta, 1072)

The first line involves a mutation of the human body, the next two bizarre substitutes, and the last a more innocuous substitute if tronco is taken as the stem of a shrub or small tree. But if we take it that Quevedo means a more substantial trunk the total grotesque effect is increased rather than

lessened. Grotesquers overcame the problem posed by the discrepancy between sizes of objects by simply reducing or enlarging according to the scale required by the grotesque in question. This disrespect for relative dimension was a technique thoroughly exploited for his own particular purposes by Bosch in the Garden of Earthly Delights triptych. In grotesque proper the effect is usually more modest, characterized by the shrinking of heads and the cultivation of flowers of more than generous proportions. In the present example tronco would have to diminish while hongo simultaneously grew somewhat bigger. In practice this is, I would maintain, done automatically by the reader, who would otherwise be guilty of questioning the whole a-realistic premise of the context and others like it. These are not meant to reflect objective reality; they form part of a revision and re-interpretation of it, and are answerable in the short term only to Quevedo's caprice. In the previous case the disparity of size between bizazas and tenedor does not actually register, even though Quevedo is evidently intent (as here) on giving a fully integrated impression rather than a series of unconnected details. Chimerical grotesques are most easily recognized in clusters of this sort in which the combined impact of the various substituted features strongly suggest that we are faced with an alternative reality.

When in isolation, the context supplies the appropriate authority. In his send-up of the fictitious visit of Alexander to the Cynic Diogenes Quevedo seizes upon the equally baseless tradition that the philosopher resided in a tub and elaborates it into a grotesque detail: 'De un cubo se viste loba,/y de

dos colmenas, mangas' (Planeta, 951). He has 'ojos/embosca-dos en dos cardas' (950). An old woman introduced as the epitome of decrepitude, 'Una incrédula de años,/ de las que niegan el fue' (Planeta, 796) is further defined:

> Más que cabellos, arrugas
> en su cáscara de nuez;
> pinzas por nariz y barba,
> con que el hablar es morder. (798)

Because of the extreme tone of the whole poem it is tempting to take these as literal statements, but in the second half the foreign body does not altogether supplant the anatomical features but rather appears to fuse with it. This introduces a further refinement of monstrousness, a sort of double grotesque, a true hybrid as opposed to the regular crudities produced by Frankenstein-like surgery. It is not completely without precedent in painted grotesques, where it is often difficult to decide whether we are faced with a genuine Triton or if his nether person terminates in something more vegetable than piscine. In Quevedo the existence of this sort of grotesque can only really be argued (and never proved) from the exact wording of each context. In the above it is the line 'con que el hablar es morder' which would seem to preclude our dismissing the human physiognomy altogether. The affinity between chin and nose that characterises the advance of old age, at least according to Quevedo, fascinated him. In the following version of it he pushes beyond the naturally malformed to evolve a fused hybrid again, in this case one of man/animal, in a way perhaps reminiscent of certain illustrations in Della Porta (cf. below):

Era la romana vieja
hecha en la impresión del grifo,
que con nariz y con barba
pudiera dar un pellizco. (933)[54]

This approach contrasts starkly with the grammatical directness that accompanies the mutation proper, summed up in this eulogy of the charms of the older woman: 'Las nalgas son dos porras de espadañas' (Planeta, 619) or, in more extended fashion, in the appearance of the awesome steed Rabicán in the Orlando:

Una endrina parece con guedejas;
tiene por pies y manos volatines,
de barba de letrado las cernejas,
de cola de canónigo las crines;
pico de gorrión son las orejas; (Planeta, 1331)

The second line tends to disrupt the overall grotesque feel of the passage since, while it gives a very good idea of the giddiness of the beast, which appears to be suffering from incurable St. Vitus's dance, it does not constitute a grotesque element of itself. Each of the other lines does.

Chimerical grotesques will be pictorial by the criteria suggested in the previous chapter. Part of the difficulty encountered in trying to isolate the less distinct specimens is caused by the presence of other forms of pictorialism based on what, for the sake of convenience, we may call exaggeration. Some of these could be counted as non-specific grotesques of physical absurdity, of which the impossible support syndrome was the most quoted representative for painted grotesque. While exaggeration itself is a good indication that grotesques may be present in the substance of a poem, considerable

problems are involved in deciding whether it is used to reflect comically upon the normal or to transform it utterly. In these instances the flavour of hyperbole in the poem as a whole will be as important as the specific exaggeration of the visual.

In his early abusive <u>canciones</u>, Quevedo's exaggeration usually has a formal feel to it which stops short of a plausible re-interpretation of the world. This sentiment, addressed to a gold-digging ex-mistress, is typical:

> Juzgué, cuando por raro te vendías,
> que diez piernas tenías,
> seis barrigas, dos frentes,
> y eres, al fin, como las otras gentes. (<u>Planeta</u>, 636)

The fleeting monstrosity evoked here is not offered as a substitute for the physical reality of the woman, an impression reinforced by the lines which follow, 'tienes una barriga, un cuerpo, un cuello,/ que no hay sastre ni pícaro sin ello.' Similarly, the series of improvisations on the theme of emaciation which make up the poem 'No os espantéis, señora Notomía,' separately fail to achieve novel fusions or produce mutations, and considered together their cumulative effect would only be the utter confusion of the visual. They are executed rather in the style of the Lucilius of the Greek Anthology[55]. The poem belongs to the burlesque 'in praise of' genre (for which see the following chapter), which indicates that the subject must belong to reality without having to be a specific individual. Lines such as the following may take the reader momentarily out of reality but do not permit him to stay there:

Dios os defienda, dama, lo primero,
de sastre o zapatero,
pues por punzón o alesna es caso llano
que cada cual os cerrará en la mano. (Planeta, 621)

To read this as a physical possibility would amount to a misinterpretation of the poem's mood and a dismissal of its stylistic precedents. The whole point of the joke derives from a comparison of this and the other hyperboles in the poem with the sensible actuality of a skinny woman.

'Con mondadientes en ristre' is written around one of the items in a premática of 1639 which sought to remedy the effeminacy of certain current male hair styles. In obedience to the legislation don Lesmes de Calamorra steels himself for a haircut, but from then on the poem develops in such a way that objective reality becomes obscured. According to the edict 'ningún hombre pueda traer copete o jaulilla, ni guedejas con crespo u otro rizo en el cabello, el cual no pueda pasar de la oreja' (Planeta, 792)[56]. Don Lesmes has the lot off, and the result is depicted in a true chimerical grotesque, 'Salió vejiga con ojos' (794). The scalping is not a travesty of a short-back-and-sides: it takes place at the gentleman's express command:

"Más quiero el trasquilimoche
que algún recipe de alcaldes,
. . . . . .
trasquile de tabardillo
con defensivo sin margen.
Sacaráme de pelón . . ." (793)

In the light of this, other statements in the poem must be seen as actually taking place and not merely exaggerating the

normal. Don Lesmes does hold his tooth-pick 'en ristre'; the customerless barber whiles away the vacant hours 'aporreando la panza/ de un guitarrón formidable' - we have no authority for assuming that he is really playing a normal-sized instrument in a more restrained fashion. The two of them inhabit a world which both is and is not seventeenth-century Spain; the latter has been re-organized, emphases changed. True to type don Lesmes is hungry; true to the poem he is starving:

> (estómago aventurero,
> va salpicando de hambres,
> con saliva sacamanchas,
> y con el color fiambre,
> la nuez, que a buscar mendrugos
> del garguero se le sale). (792)

'Nuez salida' can simply indicate a prominent Adam's apple. But the combined effect of these lines is that Lesmes's protrudes from the neck to an unusual degree, or that it comes up out of the mouth altogether in its search for food. Either interpretation would indicate that this constitutes a grotesque of physical absurdity. To credit Lesmes with a no more than regularly obtrusive specimen is to resist the whole genesis of the poem, reality transformed into the abnormal. Grotesques of this sort are not likely to be as static and portrait-like as the mutational kind. The quality of this one is best compared with the outrageous elasticity credited to the body in cartoon films[57].

In the final analysis it is the individual poem which invites the reader to believe in the fiction, or else persuades

him that it does not reach beyond caricature[58]. Such an act of faith may be taken for granted when considering the world of the Sueños, wherein physical absurdities abound. That 'los ladrones y matadores gastaban los pies en huir de sus mismas manos' (OP, 126) is a statement of fact. The formation of Villena in his flask, the prodigious effects produced by the visitation of la Hora (OP, 183, 231 et.seq.) are exaggerations of nothing. The nature of a text like the Buscón renders evaluation more intriguing. The description of symptoms consequent on the residence at Cabra's academy is of too extreme an order to be admitted as simple exaggeration, and the remedies prescribed only consolidate the impression that it corresponds to fictional fact and not to some private delusion of Pablos's (ed.cit., 48-9). Indeed the whole Cabra episode calls into question the homogeneity of the Buscón, for which the effect of multiple realities upon the overall message of the book (if there is one) yet lacks a thorough study. At all events the convalescence produces some prime examples of the physically implausible, as 'Nunca podían las quijadas desdoblarse, que estaban negras y alforzadas, y así se dio orden que cada día nos la ahormasen con la mano de un almirez.' (ibid.).

The technical grotesque in literature, in its purest and least equivocal form as the chimerical, may be usefully judged by those criteria employed in the case of its counterpart in painting. Some indication has already been given as to how the latter was guilty of a succession of offences against imitation, decorum and the Christian outlook. The last may be better appreciated through an examination of how the grotesque 'worked'. It broke down the divisions between

things, eroding identity. The exercise itself may often have been frivolous, the consequences were very serious. Grotesques offended through the eye, the most important and acute of the senses, and the one most closely associated with the divine. In art an eye within a triangle was a symbol of the Trinity[59]. The eye as intellect or understanding is a scriptural commonplace, e.g. Isaias, VI, 9-10; Deuteronomy, XXIX, 4; Luke, XXIV, 31; Acts, XXVI, 18 etc. Quevedo talked of its 'patrimonio a los demás sentidos', and in the same passage praised it in these terms:

> Sentido diáfano y resplandeciente, que en el cuerpo humano con la luz parece que sólo desmiente la ceniza y el polvo mortal; que en la noche de nuestra corrupción tiene presunciones de cielo; que en tanta tiniebla de tierra hace oficio de día; que por su belleza parece más de casta de alma que de cuerpo etc. (OP, 1229)

The authority for this eulogy can be traced to Christ's own declaration that the eye was the light of the body (Matthew, VI, 22-3; Luke, XI, 34-6). Our Lord was not only talking about the physical eye: his admonition to keep the eye clear so that its light shall not turn into darkness is an obvious warning against letting the understanding become corrupted. The Vulgate heads the Lucan passage 'Oculus mentis' and Erasmus held this inward eye as being responsible for the light spiritual:

> Porro quod est in domo lucerna, quod est oculus in corpore, id est animus in homine. Si lux animi non est vitiata caligine falsarum opinionum malarumque cupiditatum, si mentis oculus non alio

> dirigit aciem, quam ad verum scopum, quidquid agitur in vita, gratum Deo est, nihilque non conducit ad cumulum felicitatis.[60]

As God was Light it followed that he could be comprehended through the eye.

Theologically the eye was a mixed blessing. It made possible the first temptation, and when Adam and Eve's eyes 'were opened' it was to a knowledge of evil (Genesis, III, 6-7). The eye was the main avenue by which temptation gained access to the soul. For Saint Aelred of Rievaulx the 'lust of the eyes' was both an internal and external vice, characterized in the first instance by a taste for idle decoration and other frivolities, and in the second by that 'which the Holy Fathers call curiosity or inquisitiveness', the search for useless and even dangerous knowledge[61]. Now while it is true that Aelred is not exactly moderation personified, his views are perfectly orthodox and strongly resemble the terms used by Paleotti, the Jesuit Possevino, and others to condemn the less worthy types of painting, grotesque included.

Pacheco gives a representative idea of how the seen would eventually affect the understanding, one of the three faculties of the soul:

> Los imágenes de los ojos pasan al sentido común, éste las traslada a la imaginación, que hace imágenes, o simples, de las cosas como son; o compuestas, de objetos imposibiles y quimeras. De aquí suben al entendimiento, cuyos actos son vivas representaciones de cuanto se imagina, con tal dependencia, que, cuanto más viva y tenaz la imaginativa, tanto mejor se vale el

> artífice de la idea espiritual, fundándose en el trabazón de las potencias; de suerte, que al punto que la imaginación hace imagen de lo que llegó a los ojos, el entendimiento linéa el mismo objeto en sus actos.
>
> (Arte, 261-2)[62]

This is thoroughly Aristotelian, perhaps via Averroes or Avicenna, and is the standard psychological base upon which theological interpretations, not always consistent between themselves, were built. The physical eye, meaning the sensory act of vision, was generally understood to be without discretion in its presentation of the seen, unable to comprehend or evaluate. This is consistent with the point Aristotle makes in his discussion of the 'common sense', namely that each sense is unable to perceive its own operation. In the case of sight this involves the built-in deficiency of illusion, epitomized by Quevedo with Aristotle's own illustration, 'Los ojos nos persuaden que el círculo de la llama del sol no tiene mayor diámetro que la línea de dos palmos' (OP, 1410). Quevedo was one of those who stressed the dangers and deceptions inherent in seeing rather than its neutrality, and made of them something more sinister and all embracing than mere 'optical illusion'. This amounts to a departure from Aristotle but is quite in line with that Christian tradition which has a poor opinion of the material world, deeming it transient, insubstantial and full of misleading appearances:

> Tu enfermedad atribuyes a tus ojos: crees lo que ves; y lo que no ves, niegas. Yo te probaré que se ve mejor lo que se cree a persuasión de la razón, que lo que se mira con los ojos en las cosas mismas que se ven con ellos. Tratarlos de mentirosos no es desacreditarlos, porque no mienten por

> su culpa ni por mentir ni engañar. . . .
> Pues si la razón te enseña la verdad de la mentira de tus ojos, y te desengaña del engaño que ves, no puedes negar que se ve mejor lo que se cree a persuasión de la razón, que lo que se mira con los ojos. (OP, 1392-3)[63]

Quevedo emphasized the peril that threatened from without, a theme that held a certain fascination for him (Planeta, 371, 367, 366), although in at least one instance he explored the monster within (ibid., 1045, ll. 53-6). For Dolce the thing seen only became volatile when exposed to the inadequacies of uninformed human intelligence:

> L'occhio non si può ingannar nel vedere, se non è infermo o losco o impedito da qualche altro accidente. S'inganna bene, e molto spesso, l'intelletto, essendo adombrato da ignoranza o da affezzione. (ed.cit., 156)

Although he makes a slight concession in the face of the illusion objection, 'è più agevole che l'intelletto, che l'occhio, s'inganni', he insists upon the eye's being the 'istrumento meno errabile' (156-7).

Despite their differences these two attitudes lead to the same conclusion, that the soul has much to fear from the act of seeing. Quevedo has telescoped the three sub-spiritual processes involved (retinal stimulation, sensus communis, phantasia) into the single word 'ojo', which may explain why at one point he talks of the eye being able to learn (OP, 1445). He was quite familiar with the full Aristotelian version and subscribed to it (OP, 1409). His singularity, feasibly due to a love of brevity, is perhaps

best seen as part of his attack on Aristotle's doctrine of the dependence of the understanding on the phantasia, for which he largely relies on the criticisms forwarded by Aquinas and Father Suárez (OP, 1410-11). This itself forms part of a technical proof of the independence of the soul and assumes the intellectual functions of the common sense and the imagination to be bodily. It does not imply the heresy that the soul, in temporary union with the body, will be uninfluenced by images. Cicero's definition of the eye as the window of the soul (Tusculan Disputations, I, 46) recommended itself to Renaissance Christians as dogma in a nutshell, not heathen speculation[64].

Where the literary grotesque is concerned perception begins not with the organic eye but with 'L' occhio dell' intelletto'. As Comanini, Armenini and others use it this seems to mean that part of the imagination concerned only with the formation of visual images and actively worked upon by the intellect. Armenini writes that 'illuminato dalle debite regole, conosce il vero in tutte le cose' (23), whereas a painter may fail to see the faults in his own work if his love of it obscures this inward eye, 'che si può dir quello esser poco meno que cieco' (141). It is ultimately responsible for the condition of the image that is passed on to the understanding. In his discussion of the relationship between a painting and its subject Pacheco gives a fair idea of how the mind would construct a literary grotesque:

> Acaece, tal vez, que el ejemplo exterior no sea en la forma que se imagina, como es una quimera o monstruo formado de cabeza humana, de cuello de caballo, con plumas de ave: el motivo para esta

> ficción es ver las dichas partes distintas y la eminencia de nuestras potencias para unir fingiendo lo que vieron desunido. Haciendo interior imagen de monstruo o imposible, que ni le crió naturaleza ni lo hay en el mundo.
>
> (Arte, 261)

The language Pacheco uses here makes grotesque sound like a crude sort of wit[65], but the main point to be drawn is that a reader coming fresh to, say, the Dueña Quintañona in El sueño de la muerte would construct the composite image (compuesta, to use Pacheco's term) in the phantasia, most likely with images fetched from the memory. This must needs involve visualization: the objection that a reader may know what it looks like cannot hold in this case. It might just be emphasized that, for the Renaissance, imaging past the common sense proceeded by the same channels, irrespective of the ultimate source being the written word or visible object.

The loathing that some churchmen felt for grotesques is easily understood. They could only delude the majority of minds who sought meaning in them, and they were a rare treat for corrupt souls who would see a mockery of Creation where harmless whimsy was intended. The agency of the eye would be instrumental in both cases. When the theologian Giulio Ottonelli dealt with the phenomenon in a chapter entitled 'Dell'immagini vane, e delle ragioni di non amarle' he begins by quoting Aquinas, 'Cognitio sensitiva tunc est vitiosa cum non ordinatur in aliquid utile', relates that to some words from Paleotti about 'vain' pictures, and concludes 'Et a me pare, che tali sarebbero certe figure di grotesche, fatte alla bizzarra, e non ben regolate da una bella distintione

di cose', making an exception for those papally commissioned[66]. Nominally Quevedo's grotesques stand condemned. Comparison with some precedents will help to show just how pernicious, or inoffensive, his are.

Quevedo's 'debt' to Bosch has been flattered with much critical attention[67]. In recent years a more intriguing connection has been argued between the poet and the Milanese painter, Giuseppe Arcimboldo[68]. Levisi's is the only thorough study to have appeared yet, but the honour of having first suggested the parallel must be shared by Asensio and Ciocchini[69]. That some plausible relationship exists between Quevedo's chimeras and Arcimboldo's object portraits is beyond question; the matter of direct inspiration is as yet unproven. Levisi's case is secure so long as she restricts her case to pure 'figuras compuestas' in Quevedo but she suggests other, weaker parallelisms derived from a perhaps over-generous interpretation of pictorialism. At one point she claims that in 'Érase un hombre a una nariz pegado' 'Esta técnica llega a su máxima expresión - y casi podría decirse a su desintegración' (227). That note of qualification is pursued when she admits that all the objects replace a single feature, and that 'es mucho mas difícil visualizar este personaje que cualquiera de las viejas a que hemos referido anteriormente' (ibid.). The difficulty is probably closer to an impossibility. The poem typifies the visually disruptive exaggeration of the Greek Anthology epigram, and that is its inspiration[70]. Picturae artificiosae are another matter altogether. Also a little incautious is the quotation of part of Comanini's Flora poem as a 'literal reproduction' of the painting itself;

there are not a thousand flowers in it (222, n. 16; see Preiss, pls. 61-2). The basic tendency to see the Arcimboldean too readily in Quevedo is shared by others. Maurice Molho offers the portrait of Cabra as an equivalent to one of Arcimboldo's heads, which fails to take into account the very complex nature of that piece (loc.cit.). Ciocchini advances much the same for the Visita y anatomía del cardenal Armando de Richeleu, a baffling choice (400; cf. OP, 905).

However, likeness is well argued in the majority of Levisi's examples. Certain avenues might yet be explored, such as the relationship between Arcimboldo's 'facial landscapes' and this sort of thing in Quevedo:

> Aquí miro las carrascas,
> copetes de aquestos riscos,
> a quien, frisada, la yerba
> hace guedejas y rizos. (Planeta, 859)[71]

But there are also serious differences between the two. Some of these are technical and can be attributed to the character peculiar to each of the two media involved. Quevedo proceeds by a straight forward substitution of object for anatomical member whereas Arcimboldo often makes one object serve two features or just part of one. Comanini acknowledged his ingenuity in this respect (266; 'La parte di dietro etc.'). Certain of the painter's creations must be turned through ninety degrees, or upside-down for the second, 'hidden' portrait to be revealed. In others, such as the Herod or Flora, the human figure is constructed out of many of a single object. All these effects lay beyond the power of Quevedo's pen. Again, some of Arcimboldo's object portraits were, for all

their wit, intended to be recognizable likenesses of individuals. The 'gardener' is Rudolf II himself, the 'librarian' actually worked for Maximilian II, and the Golden Fleece sported by the 'Allegory of Fire' declares him to be one of Arcimboldo's Hapsburg patrons. Quevedo did not care to match this. For his contemporaries some of Arcimboldo's paintings impressed the viewer simply as realistic representations when seen from a distance. It was only as he approached a picture that the observer would notice that the head was composed of kitchen utensils or the contents of the garden shed. Lomazzo makes this quite clear (Idea, 154). This accomplished ambivalence has no counterpart in Quevedo.

It may be part of Arcimboldo's 'shrewd madness' that for all his eccentricity he maintains a certain respect for decorum in his restriction of objects within a single picture to those of a kind[72]. Discussing allegories of the four elements as suitable fill-ins for secondary spaces Lomazzo recommends as model

> Quelli di Giuseppe Arcimboldo, che dipinse a Massimiliano Imperatore, ne quali compose, e furno la figura del fuoco come con membri di luci, folgori di torchie, di candellieri, e d'altri membri convenienti al fuoco, l'aria d'uccelli che volano per l'aria, tanto perfettamente che le membra paiono tutti conformi de l'aria; l'acqua tutti i pesci, e ostriche del mare, cosi ben composte che veramente l'acqua pare che sia posta in figura; e il quarto elemento de la terra, di diruppi di fassi, di caverne, di tronchi e di animali terrestri.
>
> (Trattato, 349)

He follows this with a few observations on Carlo de Crema, an Arcimboldean who kept to the spirit of the master in his fidelity to decorum (350). Quevedo's composites signal a radical departure from this norm. Much of their very effect derives from the discordant contrast between the object substitutes. Aesthetically they come into a category that is more extreme than that to which Arcimboldo's belong. As will be obvious from some of the preceding arguments, both pursue a policy that is theologically as well as artistically suspect. But if Arcimboldo is out on a limb then Quevedo is actually hanging off the end.

Meaning in Arcimboldo is not easily discerned. Comanini praised his 'espressione di cose insensibili con simolacri sensibili' (268). This does not amount to anything particularly significant in the allegories of the seasons and elements where the abstract is at once apparent. But the animal symbolism of the Hunter portrait might well repay some closer scrutiny. Wittkower and Wittkower write:

> When we have learned to decipher his riddles and when the first shock of these weird configurations has worn off, they emerge as what they are: the sometimes pedantic or didactic, sometimes jesting and satirical illustrations of involved sixteenth-century para-scientific notions.[73]

Unfortunately, they are not forthcoming with much by way of specific illustration. A general attempt is made to link the pictures with Aristotelian physiognomy, and the idea is attractive. However it is difficult to see more than a cursory resemblance between the paintings and Della Porta's

handbooks. The former are vastly more complicated and the possibility that the symbolical value of one animal might conflict with that of another, or that only those creatures depicting important features, such as the eye or mouth, are intended to be symbolical, should not be ignored. It is just conceivable that Quevedo, who had visited Della Porta's house in Naples (OP, 1411), had sought some inspiration in the illustrated versions of the handbook. In these the picture of the animal in question is matched by a very much overstated likeness of the equivalent human type, possibly the source of lines such as 'con arrugas y canales,/ pase por mono profeso' (Planeta, 852)[74]. The sense of violent caricature perceptible here is not far removed from the quality of Daniel Widman's illustrations for the manual. But Della Porta's identification of human and animal faces is surely of a very different order from Arcimboldo's use of animals to represent individual features. And in practice it would appear almost impossible to apply Della Porta's method of translating the significance of features, which focuses on their physical actuality (length, shape, and quality, in the case of hair), to the paintings[75]. Meaning in Arcimboldo must remain a mystery, and perhaps its essence lies in staying unfathomable. Such, at least, would not be too cynical a conclusion to draw from the ramblings of Comanini's Vertunno and Flora poems[76]. Meaning in Quevedo is unlikely to be clarified by pursuing the matter any further.

Literary precedents also exist. Rabelais, a permanent guest on the Index in Spain, devoted three whole chapters to Quaresmeprenant. Chapter XXXI, 'Anatomie de Quaresmeprenant quant aux parties externes'. It may fairly be represented by

> La barbe, comme une lanterne.
> Le menton, comme potiron.
> Les aureilles, comme deux mitaines.
> Le nez, comme un béguin.
> Les sourcilles, comme une lichefrète.[77]

Quevedo seems to have had a certain familiarity with the Gargantua (OP, 907), and while he implied disapproval, it would be typical of him to have used as model that which he condemned. His debt to Góngora springs to mind here (see Planeta, 432, 516, 704 etc.). Rabelais's description is so long that visualization of it would be a feat rather than a probability. He uses a lot of technical medical terminology and the comparisons made between object and anatomy often seem merely gratuitously far-fetched and little related to the appearance of either. He uses the simile, which does not indicate the complete substitution of the bodily parts but rather a fusion with them. All this separates him from Quevedo. But in the subject itself and in the itemization there is a persuasive similarity between the two.

More Quevedo's contemporary was Bruscambille, whose 'À la louange de Seigneur Fouilletrou' first appeared in print in 1610. Like an Arcimboldo canvas it exhibits inner decorum:

> Il a les joues rebondies comme deux vessies de porceau; son nez est composé d'un gros cervelas; son bonnet d'une crouste de pasté de venaison; . . . ses dents son fabriquées de pieds de mouton, sa barbe d'artichaux; son pourpoint de costelettes de mouton, chamarré de cardes d'artichaux et brodé de verjus de grain.[78]

In fact the whole passage reads like a crude attempt to capture the Arcimboldean subtlety in words, and it lacks that pictorial self-justification characteristic of Quevedo's comparisons. Sigognes seems somewhat closer in spirit to the Spaniard, although his verses finally lack that shock effect which can be achieved only by brute object substitution. This quatrain comes from a sonnet first published in 1614:

> Vostre teste ressemble au Marmouzet d'un cistre;
> Vos yeaux au poinct d'un dé; vos doigts un chalumeau;
> Vostre teint diapré l'escorce d'un ormeau;
> Vostre peau le revers d'un antique registre.[79]

The quality of simile established in the first line is maintained throughout. In the last two lines it is not even possible to substitute the whole object since the overall shape in both cases would be an irrelevance, in contrast to 'vos doigts un chalumeau' where shape is all-important. This dual approach is recurrent in Sigognes. In a sonnet which is self-confessedly a <u>retrato</u> (it begins, 'Margot, en vous peignant . . .') he writes:

> Je vous fay les sourcils de goudron de navire;
> L'oeil de coque de moule et les dents de charbon;
> Le front de merlus cuit, la barbe de chardon;
> La bouche d'un esponge et le menton de cire;
> L'oreille de la peau d'une chauve-souris.[80]

The eyebrows remain eyebrows, even if caulked. But the mussel-shell eyes and sponge mouth stand more chance of being taken for replacements.

Not only France can offer comparable material. Sometime in the first half of the sixteenth-century Agnolo Firenzuola

transfigured for all time the beauty of his loved one in these immortal lines:

> La testa sua pare un pan di sapone,
> E quei suo' occhiolin' due fusaiuoli,
> Dipinti a olio, e tinti col carbone.
> Manichi son le ciglia di paiuoli.
> Il naso è come quel del mio mortaio,
> La boca ha come i popon cotignuoli.[81]

Again this is rather more tentative than the full-blooded Quevedian grotesques, a quality which may be due as much to the leisurely pace of the style as to the fact that it is based on simile. By contrast one of the anonymous pieces in the Cancionero de obras de burlas seems a much more obvious precursor of Quevedo:

> Tiene pechos angostillos
> y sequillos,
> las tetas como badaças,
> las espadas como trillos
> con portillos,
> los hombres como hogaças. (ed.cit., 146).

And in his 'Leovigildo, rey cruel' Lope, although in a more expansive fashion, experiments with the technique that Quevedo was to perfect. The poem was written about 1614:

> La moquífera nariz
> era un pepino badea,
> esmaltada de verrugas,
> forma y color de cerezas.
> (Más de blasfemias que barbas
> la boca estaba compuesta;)
> los labios de salchichas
> y de un pimiento la lengua.[82]

Of course the taste of the salchicha and the pepper is very relevant to the sense here - we are alerted to it by blasfemias - but that does not deny their purely physical significance, which is both self-justifying and indicated by the previous quatrain.

It is tempting to seek an ultimately rhetorical back-ground for many of the above examples. Rabelais's Quares-meprenant reads like a parody of 'descriptio a divisione totius in partes'. Palmireno quotes a burlesque text, as was his wont, to illustrate the concept 'Descriptio deformis feminae a divisione . . .'. Part of it runs:

> [Tiene] el cuello más descarnado que bestia muerta, los pechos angostos y secos, las tetas como badeas, las espaldas como trillos, el cuerpo al revés . . . encaramado el ombligo, los muslos fragurados etc. (Campi, 31)

No source is quoted but the passage seems largely to be based on two poems in the Cancionero de obras de burlas, the anonymous item quoted above and one by Guevara. There are exact verbal reminiscences in each case (cf. ed.cit., 78-9, 146). Quevedo may well have been familiar with Palmireno's handbooks. The Prolegomena alone ran to five editions (Gascon, 6). At any rate the piece as a whole would seem to belong to the same stable as Quevedo's itemization portraits, and the approximation of object to anatomy in 'tetas como badeas' and 'espaldas como trillos' is but a step removed from rake spines and fork legs in Quevedo (Planeta, 1054 int.al.). Ciocchini's definition of the grotesque in Quevedo allows it to include the non-visualizable ('pies de copla') as well as

the pictorial ('cuello de garrafa') (art.cit., 393). In a note he makes an observation which ends rather cryptically, 'Quevedo realizará su "grotesco" sobre la base de las artes poéticas de los siglos XII y XIII (Faral).' (ibid). Since he also describes Quevedo's prose as 'Inscripta aún en la técnica de las artes medievales' (ibid.) this is presumably a reference to E. Faral's Les Arts Poétiques du XII^{e} et du XIII^{e} Siècle (Paris, 1924), which pays much attention to the medieval development of descriptio (76 etc.)[83]. Ciocchini does explicitly refer us to an article by F. López-Estrada[84]. The latter defines descriptio with reference to De Inventione, I, 24-5. However, the term descriptio is not actually used in this context (cf. ed.cit., 70 et.seq.). In the treatise it is reserved for 'definition' (I, 32, etc.) and the wording employed is simply 'personis res attributae', of altogether wider embrace than that specific, prosopographic descriptio of Palmireno which may more safely be related to grotesques in Quevedo.

It has been suggested that chimerical grotesques were offensive to the critical and ecclesiastical establishments of their day. It seems only fair to argue redeeming factors in Quevedo's case. The creation of a monster might be legitimate. In his own version of Behemoth Quevedo incorporates details from Leviathan[85]. Behemoth's teeth are not mentioned in Job but Leviathan's are referred to as 'per gyrum dentium eius formido' (XLI, 5). Quevedo livens this up into '¿Por dientes no le ves blandir cuchillas?', a typical object substitution as in grotesque. Moreover, 'tiene por garganta y tragadero/ del infierno las puertas amarillas'.

This, which is quite visualizable in view of a precedent such as El Greco's 'Dream of Philip II', is closer to the 'portas vultus eius' (XLI, 5) of Leviathan than the undefined 'os' of the other (XL, 18). Although Behemoth is sometimes identified with the hippopotamus or elephant, and Leviathan with the crocodile or whale, both may be taken as representations of the powers hostile to God (XLI, 17 etc.). This is the line taken by Quevedo as lines 13-14 of the sonnet make quite clear, which helps to explain why he has rolled the two monsters into one. Despite this, and even though the quality of the language ('cuyas costillas/ son láminas finísimas de acero') indicates the technically chimerical, one would hesitate to call the whole a grotesque. For all his liberties, we must credit Quevedo with having kept to the spirit of the original in producing a 'divine' monstrosity, and exempt him from the stigma of grotesquer.

According to Paleotti, the origin of grotesques was ascribed by some to the Pythagorean theory of the transmigration of souls, 'Altri hanno attribuito il lutto principalmente alle opinioni vane de' Pitagorici, che volsero che l'anime passassero d'uno in altro, ora uomo, ora animale, ora arbore' (432). He names no names and just gives a standard reference to Diogenes Laertius for the Pythagoreans. Inevitably Quevedo was not too partial to these ideas and he took them to task in the Providencia de Dios (OP, 1419 et.seq.). Of his criticisms he wrote to the Jesuit Pimentel, 'Con el ejemplar de Tertuliano, burlo de Pitágoras y Empédocles, viendo que aquellas locuras no merecen respuesta seria, sino matraca' (OV, 979). The text itself is similarly unflattering,

'estas locuras aun el buen seso no las tolera en los poetas si no los socorre la alegoría; ¿cómo lo consentirá en los filósofos? (OP, 1419). In theory it is just possible that Quevedo's chimeras are one way of dealing out to Empedocles's metensomatosis the scorn he felt it to deserve. But Quevedo never makes any such intention explicit, nor does he so much as hint that this might be his purpose. We would also have to assume that all the other producers of similar monsters were possibly intent upon criticizing the unadaptable in Greek philosophy.

Saving graces will have to be sought elsewhere. The most obvious defence claims that grotesques are enrolled in the service of satire, and at the very worst represent the lesser of two evils. Where a moral stance is patently discernible this amounts to a reasonable assumption. When antidotal to the vanity that would disguise the ravages of age, or when associated with witchcraft and the office of dueña/procurer, grotesques might arguably 'high-light' the moral deficiency, although that would not justify the excessive abomination of the mutation itself (Planeta, 619, 1072, 933). More easily appreciated is the moralistic message behind many of the physical absurdities of the Sueños, as elucidated in one instance by A. A. Parker ('La buscona . . .', esp. 233). The sonnet that begins 'Pecosa en las costumbres y en la cara' (Planeta, 596) contains its only reference to any shortcoming of behaviour in that single line. Otherwise it develops a series of insults on the basis of her appearance, its grotesques ('Hecha panal con joyos de viruelas' etc.) being of the unpardonably gratuitous kind. To quote

Frye, 'Some phenomena, such as the ravages of disease, may be called grotesque, but to make fun of them would not be very effective satire.'[86].

This line of reasoning demands some evaluation of 'the grotesque'. For the notion to be developed usefully its range might be extended beyond that of the formally chimerical. The following is offered by way of a critical synopsis of some of the schools of thought on the subject, heavily qualified by the Renaissance theory as outlined[87]. A basic problem concerns whether the grotesque portrays our world or not. The idea that it exists not in a separate fantasy-world but in one more intrinsically related to our own has taken many forms. Hugo, Chesterton and even Bagehot subscribed to the notion that grotesques actually existed in nature (Clayborough, 47, 59, 44; Thomson, 17), but understood them to be the naturally deformed or ugly. Kayser (37) and Thomson (23) have pursued the line that invented grotesques exist in a world to some degree recognizable as the real. All of them (Kayser excepted) conclude that the grotesque must be separated from the fantastic (as above, and Thomson, 8). Although in sixteenth-century terms this is, strictly speaking, inadmissible (because of the incubation of grotesques in the phantasia), much of the Renaissance discomfort in the face of grotesques was due to their persistent purloining and dismantling of the stuff of Creation, offering as its substitute its very self re-formed. No other product of the phantasy could simulate such calculatedly indiscriminate subversion.

While exaggeration and excess are clues to the immediate presence of grotesque[88], they fail to define it. The terror of grotesque is that it starts and stays in matter. Not spiritually redeemed by religion like regular deformity, it is the antithesis of abstraction (cf. Bakhtine, 72; Thomson, 57), a travesty of symbolism - not so much unfathomable as totally superficial. It demands that one ask why it is as it is and simultaneously renders answer impossible. Meaning is foreign to its nature (Kayser, 186). Hell on our doorstep, devoid of any saving majesty, it shakes our faith in reality by parading as pretender to it. And the likeness cannot be denied. He who laughs at grotesques will finally only laugh himself into hysteria. The essence of ridicule, it shrugs off ridicule. Yet the grotesque, as it never explicitly theorizes, never claims to be <u>serious</u> and appearing otherwise only increases its efficiency. One of the Devil's subtlest tricks, it does not merely deviate from the natural but almost casually re-defines it, mocking not only what the body does but what it is. Exaggeration provokes an easy laugh and allows us to keep one eye on the normal. But grotesque alters the body beyond reprieve, condemning it to perpetual non-spiritual life, with no chance of escape through death. It commands the a-normal: the abnormal blanches by comparison.

Kayser associated the demonic with the grotesque when he defined the latter as 'An attempt to invoke and subdue the demonic aspects of the world' (188). This is followed by Thomson (59), and in a subdued interpretation by Steig: 'The Grotesque involves the managing of the uncanny by the comic' (259, cf. 258). Bakhtine saw it as a way of coping with 'peur cosmique' (332-7), that dread that man feels in

the face of the vastness of matter and power in the Universe. But the possibility must be faced that the grotesque conjures up forces within him that the reader/viewer may not easily manage. For in a sense you can never become accustomed to the grotesque. Rendered familiar, it ceases to be grotesque and changes into something else[89].

In all, the grotesque seems a most unlikely tool in the hands of a moralist. Paul Ilie argues that 'Philosophically speaking, Gracián makes use of a "moral grotesque", a technique of distortion that upholds the moralistic idealism of the Golden Age while rejecting many of the aesthetic ideas of that age', but this is not based on any personal or adopted evaluation of grotesque per se[90]. In the locus classicus of the chimerical (Planeta, 1054), Quevedo has refined wit out of wilfulness. Eschewing the exoticism of painted grotesque he has culled the incredible from the mundane, which links him with twentieth-century grotesquers. The piece begins 'Una vieja con enaguas/ va salpicando de hechizos', admitting of two interpretations. Either she is a witch, and so 'splashes' her spells as she paddles or, because she wears her petticoats (unlike some, 1053, 89-92) she cannot actually wash properly (and probably does not want to) and so does it by proxy of a little splashing, deluding herself that this will suffice. Neither case supplies sufficient justification for what is to follow. Moreover, 'there is a danger that the didactic point he [the satirist] wishes to make may be obscured for the reader by the nonplussing, disorienting and generally overwhelming effect of the grotesque' (Thomson, 42). The whole poem is inhabited by such a crew of misfits

it must have cost even Quevedo some effort to bring them together. His moral concern, obvious in the cases of the remendada, the peeping Tom clerics, the money-minded doctor (ll. 81-4, 125-8, 133-6), as often gives way to a purely zealous and detached relish in the unfortunate and the ungracious (ll. 72-6, 85-8, 109-12). This ambivalence is complemented by a sense of multiple realities. It comes as no surprise that the water should literally leap into the air (ll. 159-62), and when the lawyer rolls up his beard and moustache 'por no sacarlos después/ con cazcarrias en racimo' (ll. 99-100) we believe it.

In 'Con mondadientes en ristre' the loss of normality is even more total. A dream may heighten, delete, alter and replace details of our everyday lives, and yet still persuade us to accept it as real. As such it may more persistently disturb our waking hours than the more sensational type of nightmare. In this poem everything that is done or said is to some extent a travesty of plausible human behaviour. Manuel Durán, in a perceptive and sadly unexpanded statement, remarks that in the grotesque 'no es el yo el que se siente enfermo, sino el mundo externo el que parece haberse vuelto loco' (304). In this instance the madness is quite subtly managed, insidious rather than blatant in its effect. The 'point' of the poem evades definition. If Quevedo is critical of 'long-haired beauties', then having Lesmes voluntarily scalped and making a series of jokes about bald heads seems a singularly inefficient way of persuading people to have their hair cut. It makes more sense to think of the poem as ridiculing haircuts or the premática itself - Quevedo seems

not to have had too high an opinion of this type of legislation, regularly subjecting it to parody[91]. The figure of Lesmes poses quite a problem. The prototype of hidalguía postiza, he is incapable of direct speech, mixing his hyperboles with martial phraseology - just the figure one would expect Quevedo to scorn. Are we meant to laugh at both his behaviour and the provocation of it? As Thomson writes, 'Unlike the satirist, the grotesque writer does not analyse and instruct in terms of right and wrong, or true or false, nor does he attempt to distinguish between these. On the contrary, he is concerned to show their inseparability' (40). But prior to claiming that 'the grotesque' exists in Quevedo we ought to examine the adequacy of the critical apparatus available to Quevedo's contemporaries for tackling this sort of material. Such is the business of the next chapter[92].

CHAPTER TWO - NOTES

(1) Prat, Historia de la literatura española (Barcelona, 1950), II, 176; Brenan, including the reference to Vossler, The Literature of the Spanish People (Cambridge, 1951), 265-6; Crosby, 'Quevedo, the Greek Anthology, and Horace', Romance Philology, XIX (1966), 443; Goyanes, La sátira contra los médicos y la medicina en los libros de Quevedo (Madrid, 1934), 28; Warnke, European Metaphysical Poetry (London, 1961), 103; Prat, in his ed. of Polo de Medina, Obras completas (Murcia, 1948), xix.

(2) Parker, 'La buscona piramidal . . .', 232; Durán, 'Manierismo', 304. Ilse Nolting-Hauff, Vision, Satire, und Pointe in Quevedos "Sueños" (Munich, 1968), although she uses the term liberally does not substantially define it.

(3) English translation by Ulrich Weisstein (Bloomington, 1963); first published in German in 1957.

(4) Wright, A History of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art (London, 1865); Symonds, 'Caricature, the Fantastic, the Grotesque', in Essays Speculative and Suggestive (London, 1890).

(5) The Grotesque in English Literature (Oxford, 1965), 3-4.

(6) Le Genre Burlesque en France au XVII^{e}Siècle (Paris, 1960), xii.

(7) Rime del Burchiello comentate dal Doni (Venice, 1553), 4.

(8) Rime di Gio. Paolo Lomazzo milanese pittore (Milan, 1587), 13 et seq.

(9) Lomazzo gives a comprehensive list, adding 'e in somma tutto quello che si può trovare e immaginare', Trattato dell' arte della pittura (Milan, 1584), 423.

(10) E.g. Clayborough, 3.

(11) Vasari, Le Vite de' più eccellenti architettori, pittori e scultori (Florence, 1550), 2 vols, I, 91; Paleotti, Discorso intorno alle imagine sacre e profane (Bologna, 1582), reprinted by Barocchi in Trattati, II, 117-509, 425.

(12) De'veri precetti della pittura (Ravenna, 1586), 195-6.

(13) Philip Pouncey and J.. A. Gere, Italian Drawings in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum. Raphael and His Circle (London, 1962), pl. 125 (160). In the Catalogue to accompany this volume (London, 1962) it says that a ? seventeenth-century hand calls the sketch 'fregio di grotesche [sic]'. This was an alternative spelling.

(14) Clayborough, 2; Enciclopedia Italiana, 17, 1001-2. On the Domus Aurea see Nicole Dacos, La Découverte de la Domus Aurea et la Formation des Grotesques à la Renaissance, (London, 1969).

(15) Vasari, 92; Lomazzo, Trattato, 422.

(16) Plato was also cited. See Trattati, II, 516-7.

(17) See Ernest Nash, A Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome (London, 1968), 2 vols, for these dates.

(18) See Enciclopedia dell' arte antica, VI, (Rome, 1965), 335, 342, 343, 346, 390

(19) For Petrucci see Lomazzo, Trattato, 422; Armenini, 203; Federico Zuccaro, L'idea de' pittori, scultori et architetti (Turin, 1607), 18.

(20) See Dacos, passim; Arte antica, vol.cit., plates facing 854, 944, 960; Description des Bains de Titus (Paris, 1786), by M. Ponce, 8, 20, 47, 21, 23, 24, 41; F. M. Avellino, Tempio d' Isode (Naples, 1851), and see note (18).

(21) Galleria biblica di Raffaello Sanzio esistente nelle loggie del Vaticano (Turin, 1852), pls. 3, 4, 6, 7; I freschi delle loggie vaticane dipinti da Raffaello Sanzio (Rome, 1840), 6; Italian Drawings, pls. 135, 162, 194.

(22) See D. Redig de Campos (ed.), Art Treasures of the Vatican (London, 1975), pls. 96, 97, 100, 103, 106, 108, all of which are to be found either in the Stufetta or Loggetta; Italian Drawings, pl. 154, for one by Perino.

(23) See Nash, under Domus Augusti; cf. the pls. in Dacos.

(24) The reference is presumably to the miniaturist Serapio, known to the younger Pliny. No extant work of his survives.

(25) See Andrew Martindale, Man and the Renaissance (London, 1966), 88-9.

(26) Edward Grierson, King of Two Worlds: Philip II of Spain (London, 1974), pl. opp. 92; but contrast the a-symmetrical 'thick' borders on the Escorial tapestries (ibid., 207).

(27) In Giulio Ottonelli and P. Berettini's Trattato della pittura e scultura, uso e abuso loro (Florence, 1652), a distinction is made between 'grottesche disordinate, e condotte poco giuditiosamente' (95) which are not 'ben regolate da una bella distintione di cose' unlike those 'che tutte unite fanno un gratioso composto nel modo, che son fatte quelle del famoso Raffaello nelle loggie' (93). Grotesques were frequently criticized for being poorly executed, which was generally true. Perhaps here, as in Gilio, an exception is being made in favour of the superior craftsmanship of Raphael.

(28) John Pope-Hennessy, Sienese Quattrocento Painting (London, 1947), pls. 79, 84, 44. The extent to which arabesque has come to be identified with full grotesque in some quarters may be judged by comparing the entries for both in the Encyclopedia Britannica.

(29) They possibly had the same origins. See Clayborough, 19, on L. Curtius.

(30) Quoted by E. H. Gombrich, Symbolic Images: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance, II (London, 1972), 25.

(31) William Aglionby, Painting Illustrated in Three Dialogues (London, 1685), n.p.; 'odd' as 'strange, weird' was an established meaning at the time (O.E.D.). The Autoridades definition is very similar to this one.

(32) On Architecture, trans. Frank Granger (London, 1931-4), 2 vols. (Loeb ed.), II, 104, (VII, 5, 3).

(33) De architectura libri decem (Venice, 1567), 243.

(34) E.g. Genesis, XX, 3, XXVIII, 12; Numbers, XII, 6; Matthew, II, 12, XXVII, 9.

(35) E.g. Ecclesiastes, V, 6; Isaias, XXIX, 8; Jeremias, XXIX, 8; and Quevedo 'Sé que los sueños las más veces son burla de la fantasía y ocio del alma' (OP, 141); 'Embarazada el alma y el sentido/ con un sueño burlón' (Planeta, 383); Cáncer y Velasco (1651), 'los sueños son ecos monstruosos de las voces de los sucesos del día' (f. 57r). Dreams were thus commonly associated with fantasías in the sense of the extreme products of the imagination, in line with Aristotle who taught that dreams derived from the imagination unrestrained (De Insomniis, 1-3) - hence OP, 175, and Luis Antonio, 88. Pacheco grouped 'sueños, devaneos, grotescos y fantasías de pintores' together, Menéndez y Pelayo, Historia de las ideas estéticas en España (Madrid, 1962), II, 415.

(36) In decem libros M. Vitruvii Pollionis de architectura annotationes (Rome, 1544), 22 ('Italis dictas grotescas, non possunt verae dici picturae etc.').

(37) Contemporary ideas of the historically real do not always match our own. For Comanini, Aeneas was a real person, Achates, his shield-bearer, an invention of Virgil's (256).

(38) For the trofei, regular items in grotesque, see L.Venturi, Botticelli (London, n.d.), 74, fig. 5, for examples on the walls of the Sistine Chapel.

(39) For 3-d grotesques see Giulio Romano's tongs in Italian Drawings, pl. 108; F. M. Avellino, Descrizione di una casa Pompeiana (Naples, 1837), pl. 9; Lomazzo, Trattato, 423, refers to two contemporary grotesque sculptors.

(40) Three Dialogues, ed.cit., 270-1.

(41) Gombrich, op.cit., figs 83, 84.

(42) E.g. Paleotti, 440; Armenini, 195.

(43) See the Vocabulario degli academici della Crusca, for example, which gives the primary sense of bizzarro as 'per capriccioso', and the second as vivace and spiritoso.

(44) Don Juan de Jáuregui caballerizo de la Reina nuestra señora (Madrid, 1626), f. 22r.

(45) Il primo libro del trattato delle perfette proporzioni di tutte le cose (Florence, 1567), in Barocchi, Trattati, I, 235-6.

(46) For many of the leads in what is to follow I am indebted to Barocchi. Conclusions are mine.

(47) Discorsi dell'arte poetica e del poema eroico, ed. L. Poma (Bari, 1964), 86.

(48) Ibid., 7 et seq.

(49) According to A Catholic Dictionary (London, 1959), compiled by W. E. Addis et al., visions are not a 'mere subjective imagination' of appearances of the Divine, but 'their objective reality'. The authority quoted for this is Aquinas, Summa, 3^a, q. 54, a.1; 1^a, q.51, a.2 etc.

(50) Ralph Cohen discusses the continuance of 'this belief in the neutrality of things - that views of them created universal pictures in the mind' in The Art of Discrimination (London, 1964), 140.

(51) El fénix de Minerva y arte de memoria (Madrid, 1626), f. 35r.

(52) Della difesa (Cesena, 1587), 408.

(53) The great virtue of Flora is 'che non aveva l'essere in alcun altro intelletto' (256).

(54) Cf. the Dueña Quintañona, OP, 189, and Planeta, 960-1.

(55) The Greek Anthology, ed. Peter Jay (London, 1973), 252-4.

(56) For the full text see the note by F. Rodriguez Marín in his ed. of Vélez de Guevara's Diablo cojuelo (Madrid, 1918), 42.

(57) It contrasts markedly with the more reserved presentation of 'nuez salida' in the description of Cabra.

(58) Caricature was a component of some grotesques in the shape of abnormally enlarged mouths or eyes. Giulio Romano was fond of it even when not painting grotesques. Cf. S. J. Freedberg, Painting in Italy: 1500-1600 (Penguin Books, 1971), pl. 104.

(59) George Ferguson, Signs and Symbols in Christian Art (London, 1955), q.v.

(60) Paraphrases in Novum Testamentum, I, (Berlin, 1778), 75.

(61) The Mirror of Charity, trans. G. Webb and A. Walker (London, 1962), 176.

(62) According to Menéndez y Pelayo, Pacheco learned these ideas from his friend, the Jesuit Diego Meléndez (Historia, II, 417). For a clear account of Aristotle on the imagination see Aristotle (London, 1966), by David Ross, 143 et seq. Gelli so exaggerated the primacy of the visual image as to identify it with imagination itself: 'Ha bisogno l'intelletto nel suo operare di alcune potenze organiche; e queste sono la memoria e la fantasia; l'una de le quali riserba le cose intese e conosuite da' sensi, e l'altra i fantasmi o vero le imagini di le cose vedute.' From a letter quoted in La Circe e i capricci del Bottaio (Florence, 1897; repr. 1957 with intro. by G. G. Ferrero),160.

(63) Cf. II Corinthians, IV, 18, and Ecclesiastes, XII.

(64) The idea that the soul 'depended' upon the eye was freely adapted by some with little of Quevedo's dogma-informed caution. See Marino, Adone, VI, 28; Leonardo, Paragone, trans. I. M. Richter (London, 1949), 35; Guido Casoni, in Ottavio Besomi, Richerche intorno alla "Lira" di G.B.Marino (Padua, 1969), 133. The latter and Marino attribute functions of both the common sense and the understanding to the eye. In Aristotle the eye could not even perceive size or movement.

(65) It recalls Comanini's definition of the 'virtù fantastica'. Freedberg has suggested, unfortunately without too much by way of evidence, a connection between Giulio Romano and concettismo (ed.cit., 166).

(66) See note (27).

(67) Between them the following provide an adequate bibliography of the subject: Margarita Levisi, art.cit., 217n; Russell Sebold, 'Torres Villarroel, Quevedo y el Bosco', Ínsula, XV, clix (1960), 3-12; Helmut Heidenreich, 'Hieronymous Bosch in some literary contexts', JWCI, XXXIII (1970), 171-199. See also Martínez, 271-3.

(68) Levisi, art.cit.; Ciocchini, art.cit.; Eugenio Asensio, Itinerario del entremés (Madrid, 1965), 190n; Maurice Molho, Introducción al pensamiento picaresco (Salamanca, 1972), 144-5. For Arcimboldo see B. Geiger, I dipinti ghiribizzosi di Giuseppe Arcimboldo (Florence, 1954); F. Sluys and F. C. Legrand, Arcimboldo et les arcimboldesques (Aalter, 1955); Pavel Preiss, Giuseppe Arcimboldo (Prague, 1967)

(69) Felipe Maldonado, in his ed. of the Sueños y discursos (Madrid, 1973), suggests that Asensio first posited the connection in an article written in 1959 (HR, XXVII, 394-12), but it does not appear to be there.

(70) J. O. Crosby, 'Quevedo, the Greek Anthology and Horace', Romance Philology, XIX (1966), 493 et seq. For a good 'nose' bib. see M. Guglielminetti, Tecnica e invenzione nell' opera di Giambattista Marino (Messina, 1964), 78-81.

(71) Cf. Planeta, 418 etc.; Cancionero de 1628, 209; Cancionero antequerano, 64.

(72) The phrase 'shrewdly mad' derives from R. E. Wolf and R. Miller, Renaissance and Mannerist Art (London, 1968).

(73) M. and R. Wittkower, Born under Saturn (London, 1963), 285.

(74) De humana physiognomonia [sic] libri IV (Vici Aequenensis, 1586). A monkey is actually one of the items.

(75) Della fisionomia di tutto il corpo humano . . . Libri IV (Rome, 1637), 65. Quevedo was himself critical of this whole business (OP, 112, 159-60). A popular physiognomy in Spain, many times reprinted, was that of Gerónimo Cortés.

(76) See his Canzionere (Mantua, 1609), 295 et seq.; 311 et.seq.

(77) Oeuvres Complètes, ed. J. Boulenger, rev. L. Scheler, (Bruges, 1965), 624.

(78) Les Nouvelles et Plaisantes Imaginations de Bruscambille (Bergerac, 1615), 110.

(79) Les Oeuvres Satiriques du Sieur de Sigognes, ed. F. Fleuret/ L. Perceau (Paris, 1920), 104.

(80) Ibid., 110; cf. 216-7, 20; also Paul Olivier (ed.), Cent Poètes Lyriques, Précieux ou Burleques du XVII^{e} Siecle, (Paris, 1898), 113.

(81) Opere, ed.cit., 951.

(82) Obra poética, I, ed. Blecua (Barcelona, 1969), 1549.

(83) Faral's book explains the rise to favour of descriptio during the Middle Ages, which may reflect some light on the predilection for it as opposed to its synonyms as described in the previous chapter (Faral, 76 et.seq.).

(84) 'La retórica en las "Generaciones y Semblanzas" de Fernán Pérez de Guzmán', RFE, XXX (1946), 310-352.

(85) All refs. to Planeta, 163.

(86) Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, 1957), 224.

(87) Mikkail Bakhtine, L'Oeuvre de Francois Rabelais et la culture populaire au Moyen Âge et sous la Renaissance, trans. Andrée Robel (Paris, 1970); Philip Thomson, The Grotesque (London, 1972); Michael Steig 'Defining the Grotesque: an attempt at synthesis', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXIX: 2 (Winter, 1970), 253-62.

(88) Bakhtine sees the epitome of the 'style grotesque' here and argues the point at some length, 302 et seq.

(89) Cf. George Santayana in Clayborough, 55-8.

(90) 'Gracián and the moral grotesque', HR, XXXIX (1971), 30-48. See also his 'Grotesque portraits in Torres Villarroel', BHS, XLV (1968), 16-37; Edwin B. Place, 'Notes on the grotesque: the "comedia de figurón" at home and abroad', PMLA, LIV (1939), 412-21; and H. B. Powers on the grotesque in Rojas Zorilla, in Boletín de los comediantes, XXIII (1971), 1-6.

(91) E.g. OP, 59, 68, 74, 86, 101, 108. For examples in the poetry, see the following chapter and Planeta, 944. The Epistolario reflects how he awaited the appearance of the latest premática with eager impatience (374, 392, 394 etc.).

(92) Of the authorities quoted in this chapter we know that Quevedo possessed a copy of the Armenini; see A. Pigler, 'Un volume de la bibliothèque de Quevedo', Bulletin du Musée National Hongrois des Beaux-Arts, XV (1959), 34-8.

III

SATIRE AND BURLESQUE

The classification and evaluation of subject-matter that was neither epic, religious, directly moralistic nor acceptably amorous tested the moral and critical mettle of editors and commentators. Not only did there exist a general want of agreement as to the meaning of the available terminology, but many poems either defied classification or, as was the case with the pornographic and scatological, stood little chance of eluding the censor if accurately classed. López de Zárate's Obras varias (Alcalá, 1651) contains an anonymously entitled 'SONETO' whose subject is a strangely lyrical but straightforwardly frank account of sexual intercourse. This makes the poem conspicuous among the commonality of erotica offered by the legitimate press of its day. In a British Museum copy there exists a marginal note to the sonnet which reads 'este soneto es mui travíeso: describe el acto Venèreo; por lo qual lo dejo sin epigrafe' (ed.cit., 192). An editor might even be confused by a poem's contents. Doni resorted to a five-fold division to handle Burchiello's vast output of 'satirical' sonnets, and to the fifth were alloted those 'tanti fantastichi, che io credo che lui medesimo non sapesse quel che si volesse dire' (ed.cit., 18). González de Salas often felt forced to justify inclusion under a particular Muse. The celebration of a boss-eyed beauty is consigned to Erato, which calls for the footnote 'Tiene parte de donaire, respondiendo a un letrado' (Planeta, 350). De Salas included most of Quevedo's Juvenalia under Polymnia, Muse of moral poetry. In one case he explains that 'con la permisión satírica se

desliza al donaire' (Planeta, 50). However, the long satire based on Juvenal's sixth, '¿Por qué mi musa descompuesta y bronca?', appears under Thalia, and the accompanying footnote reads:

> Pareció añadirse en al fin de esta musa, por lo que el estilo en ella jocoso tanto prevalece; pues aunque por la parte de censura moral de algunos vicios, convenía a la musa II, como ella castigó allá tan triste y severa este sabor burlesco, sin duda se sintiera entonces desazonado y importuno. (Janer, 235)

A full examination of the editorship of de Salas (and Aldrete) is best prefaced by a general evaluation of the critical vocabulary involved.

Sátira and related forms had a range of possible meanings, the occasion of widespread confusion and abuse rather than of a careful maintenance of distinctions. Firstly, satire was recognized in what is to the modern reader its most familiar form as the exposure of vice or folly with a view to correction, distinguished from the overtly moral by some admixture of humour, wit or spite - some enlivening ingredient. Covarrubias writes: 'Sátira. Es un género de verso picante, el cual reprehende los vicios y desórdenes de los hombres' (929). César Oudin translates sátira as 'Satire, vers piquans et reprenans les vices'[1]. The distinguishing element was often reduced to 'maledicere' in those definitions whose ultimate source was the fourth-century grammarian Diomedes. Badius owns the debt: 'Satira carmen est (ut Diomedi placet) apud Romanos maledicum, ad hominum vitia carpenda, comediae priscae charactere compositum'[2]. Minsheu may have taken the definition

from some second-hand source, such as Polydorus Vergilius: 'Est enim Satira carmen maledicum, et ad carpenda vitia compositum'[3]. Diego López used Vergilius as an authority and his definition uses maldiciente[4]. Nebrija seems to have dispensed even with this qualifier with his bald definition, 'carmen in reprehensionem vitiorum' (Dictionarium).

In seventeenth-century Spain sátira often meant the specific 'contra estados' form, normally encased in a letrilla. Though usually comprehensive in scope, it might attack different manifestations of the same vice (e.g. Cáncer, 1657, 176). Of the letrilla satírica as such González de Salas wrote:

> De los latinos no hallo poesía con quien estas correspondan en la forma de su estructura, aunque en el sabor consuenan algo con algunos mimos, y muchos agudos epigramas. De los griegos, empero, observo yo semejanzas satíricas, conviene a saber, de fragmentos muy agudos, referidos de Atheneo. (Janer, 366)

But in spirit the 'contra estados' type reflects a sort of etymological respect for the derivation of the word from lanx satura[5]. Amaro de Roberedo maintains this in his reading of the Spanish term: 'Verso que reprehende costumes; cuja natureza consiste mais na miscelanease reprehensão que no verso'[6].

Literary attacks directed at an individual were known as satires irrespective of whether their grounds were morally or otherwise justifiable, or simply gratuitous. Slander was thus granted a measure of literary status, and the more reputable forms of satire suffered by association. This usage was to a certain extent sanctioned by some (though not all)

of those theories which sought to divide satire into 'Greek' and 'Latin', the ancient and the modern. For López Pinciano the first was a theatrical event:

> Si un hombre tenía falta en sus costumbres, salía un actor a le remedar en costumbres y disposición, y con nombre propio de tal persona; el fin de esta obra fue ya dicho, que era para que el malo se emendase.[7]

This type of personalized abuse was rightly outlawed, and poets took to writing comedy as such instead. The latter retained a moralistic intention without resorting to the naming of individuals (500). Likewise Latin satire limits itself to attacking vice, and avoids exposure of the individual (499), but does so 'con severidad y acerbidad más o menos; con más como Juvenal, con menos, y con algo de irrisión, como Horacio' whereas 'el cómico reprehende del todo escarneciendo y burlando' (501).

In his short section on the invention of satire Vergilius offers a different distinction. There was a type of satire, both Greek and Roman, which 'sola carminum varietate constabat, comediae paene par, nisi plus habuisset lasciviae . . . Alterum satirarum genus recentius maledicum, et ad carpenda vitia compositum, quod soli Latini excogitaverunt' (loc.cit.). The personal element is altogether absent here. Diego López, who translates this initial distinction practically verbatim (ed.cit., f. 1v), proceeds to develop the idea by paraphrasing another fourth-century authority, Donatus, also briefly mentioned by Vergilius. He more closely identifies the Old Greek comedy (for which, unlike Vergilius, he claims no Latin

equivalent) with Greek satire. The former named names and people would reform sooner than be publically disgraced (f. 1v). But poets abused this privilege:

> Tomaron ocasión de escribir atrevidamente ofendiendo a todos, sin tener respecto; y de aquí nació el establecerse una ley, en la cual se mandó que ninguno reprehendiese los vicios de otro debajo de nombre propio. Y de aquí vino que del fin de la Comedia Antigua tuvo principio la sátira que compusieron nuestros poetas latinos. (f. 1v-2r)

This passage, which suggests Donatus as Pinciano's source, was echoed in less formal seventeenth-century settings. The indiscriminate 'satirist' had not died along with Greek civilization. Díez y Foncalda knew of one:

> Raras son sus diferencias,
> A todos satirizarlos,
> Y hazer cuando llega a hablarlos
> Reverencias. (Poesías, 169)

The namers of names also flourished, though in the clandestine medium of manuscript rather than in print. Quevedo was one of these, but predictably censured the class in public. In the following, from the prologue to the Sueño del infierno, the oficiales mentioned are types and not individuals: 'guardo el decoro a las personas y sólo reprehendo los vicios; murmuro los descuidos y demasías de algunos oficiales, sin tocar en la pureza de los oficios' (OP, 141). González de Salas distinguished between Quevedo's satirical letrillas and their Greek precedents by the latter's being written 'con amargor más ofensivo, pues eran señalando descubiertamente el sujeto

a quien herían, como en aquella nación docta era ese horror de costumbre recibida' (Janer, 366). The spate of ad hominem attacks of the first half of the seventeenth century was to make itself felt in the Autoridades definition: 'Sátira. La obra en que se motejan y censuran los costumbres u operaciones o del público, o de algún particular' (53). Quevedo himself used sátira and satirizar in this sense (Planeta, 673, 1169, 1172).

The existence of this type of satire caused the word to be extended in two directions. The first was extra-literary and denoted any verbal attack, calumny or detraction, based on fact or fiction. Covarrubias defines satírico as 'El que escribe sátiras o tiene costumbre de decir mal' (930), and Autoridades adds to its basic definition of sátira 'Por extensión se toma por cualquier dicho agudo, picante, y mordaz' (53). The more significant development was inside literature. Satire was identified with attack, whether mildly bantering, objectively critical, or subjectively vehement. Non-moral folly called for 'satire' as much as did the most heinous sacrilege. Even objects might be 'satirized' despite the lack of any potential extrapolation back to the deficiencies of mankind (cf. Castalia, III, 132). This usage did nothing to enhance satire's reputation, largely weakening its claim to 'utility'. In his poem on a 'poeta mordaz' Miguel de Barrios oomplained:

> Señor Zoilo, allá le envío
> estos versos, o estas pullas,
> que por ser sátiro en todo
> le satiriza mi musa. (Flor, 176)

Trillo de Figueroa devoted a romance to 'unos críticos censuradores de todo', over-zealously finding fault where none exists (ed.cit., 119). Dryden noted that in England any literary attack might be dubbed a satire but the best sort consisted of 'laughing a fool out of countenance' and should avoid the 'frontal attack'[8]. The self-indulgent pessimism with which many satirists surveyed human affairs may in part account for Bravo's definition, which goes farther than most in allying the satirist with the cynic: 'Satírico. Satiricus, mordax, cynicus scriptor' (Thesaurus, 447).

Satírico was regularly employed in compliment or self-congratulation to indicate 'a real, formal satirist, closely imitating the Ancient (i.e. Roman) model', just as el Satírico would normally signify Juvenal or Horace. If Quevedo is to be believed, Góngora prided himself in this respect. Himself he has another name for it: 'satírico diz que estáis;/ a todos nos dais matraca' (Planeta, 1162). He throws the title back in Góngora's face on another occasion:

> Satírico no es razón
> ser un hombre principal
> que tiene sangre real. (ibid., 1165)

The Tribunal de la justa venganza took Quevedo to task in much the same way, declaring that 'por lo que tiene y se precia de Satírico, no haya encontrado con lo que dice Juvenal en la Sátira Octava, que el premio y honra no me recida etc.'[9]. '¡Oh Jano, cuya espalda la cigüeña!', rather more than just a translation of Persius on Quevedo's part, is called 'Sátira de Persio' in both extant MS versions (Castalia, II, 37). It would not have been called 'Burlas de Persio'. González

de Salas repeatedly refers to the long pseudo-Juvenalian satire on women as sátira in both note and epigraph (Janer, 235).

In its most elusive sense sátira could stand for a joke, humorous anecdote, or any piece of fun, thereby suffering close identification with burlesco as defined by Autoridades. Even oblique moralizing was not necessary in this, its most uncharacteristic yet fairly widespread value. The Primavera y flor contains a 'Sátira en redondillas de las calles de Madrid', comprising a series of obvious and in some cases poorish jokes deriving from street names. Only a few of the quatrains contain the bones of some trite and very tired 'censure'[10]. Gracián had a poor opinion of so-called satire, dismissing its claims to gravity and preferring a comparison with the burlesque, 'Son poco graves los conceptos por equívoco, y así mas aptos para sátiras y cosas burlescas que para lo serio y prudente' (Obras completas, 401). His prejudice against satire may plausibly have been informed by what he saw as the decadence of formal satire in his own day. In the Criticón some unidentified work of Quevedo is denied satire's standard defence, moral utility: 'Que estas hojas de Quevedo son de más vicio que provecho, más para reír que aprovechar' (ibid., 724). In the previous century in Italy Filippo Giunti, in the dedication of the second book of L'opere burlesche of Berni and others (Florence, 1555), went to some length to distinguish between satire and burlesque, possibly because of a confusion of terminology and interpretation similar to that which later infected Spain:

> Gli scrittori delle satire, quasi arbitri del mondo, senza risguardo aver né a principi né a privati uomini, ma di tutti, indifferentemente, i vitii biasmando, si sforzando di mettere altrui sulla via della virtù. Altri poeti [burleschi], poi, como ho detto, ci sono, che altro non disegnano se non recarpiacere e diletto alle genti.

The multi valency of sátira was something an author might turn to his advantage. In his prologue to the spurious Quijote Avellaneda had slighted the Novelas ejemplares as 'mas satíricas que ejemplares, si bien no poco ingeniosas', denying the satirical its didactic mission (as in Gracián) and also associating it with lack of humility, the author's being 'agresor de sus lectores', implying that gratuitous violence of which satire so often stood accused[11]. Cervantes neatly neutralizes the insult, transforming it into a compliment:

> En efecto, le agradezco a este señor autor el decir que mis novelas son mas satíricas que ejemplares, pero que son buenas; y no lo pudieran ser si no tuvieran de todo.[12]

His novels 'have everything' precisely because they are a 'mixed dish' like Roman satire; their range extends beyond mere exposure of the starkly immoral, and it links them, one suspects, with Horace and Lucilius sooner than with Juvenal[13]. Being satirical in this sense itself makes them good, lends them their very character. This appeal to etymology allows Cervantes to side-step the issue of satire's bad reputation, with which he was fully acquainted.

Burlesco was as overworked as satírico. For a start, any poem structured on the equívoco was likely to be counted a burlesque even if a satirical intention were discernible[14]. 'De Valladolid la rica' is an extended tour de force in the idiom. It is called burlesque by Aldrete, who similarly classifies 'Salió trocado en menudos', which earns the same epigraph in several MSS (Castalia, III, 136, 139). There are other sound reasons for calling the second poem burlesque but the opening barrage of equívocos (ll. 1-16) would appear to have much to do with it. Both poems are dateable to before 1606, the early period in which Quevedo relied much more on the device than he was to do subsequently. 'Ya sueltan, Juanilla, presos' can only be dated as pre-1627 but is a perfect example of what Gracián saw as Quevedo's primacy in 'equívocos continuados' (Obras completas, 401). It is burlesque according to Aldrete and two MSS, the more interesting of which reads 'Romance burlesco en que el dicho don Francisco de Quevedo da significados diversos con gala y arte' (Castalia, III, 112)[15]. At the same time the poem reads like an uneven sátira contra estados, with social criticism apparent in many of its lines (cf. ll. 5-10, 25-8, 31-6). But the preponderance of the merely playful, coupled with the total reliance on the equívoco, seems to have determined classification. In any case the equívoco was not recommended for the serious writer. Corresponding to Addison's 'false wit', it tended to leave the reader on the level of 'the resemblance of words' rather than ideas[16]. For Artiga,

> Equívoco es la más pobre
> de todas las agudezas:
> úsase para las burlas,
> y exclúyese de las veras. (Epítome, 263, cf. 264)

Even González de Salas does not try to defend it as a didactic instrument. Like Gracián he recognizes its importance in Quevedo but somewhat unconvincingly argues that the appreciation of the indecent in a <u>double entendre</u> must be ascribed to malice on the part of the reader, at least in the case of Quevedo (Janer, 373). The association of <u>equívoco</u> with burlesque was to last. Appended to the 1733 edition of Vélez de Guevara's <u>El diablo cojuelo</u> is a <u>Novela del caballero invisible, compuesta en equívocos burlescos</u>[17].

The term was usually reserved for literary parody, whether of a particular poem, of a specific subject such as a clssical myth, or of a whole style. When the latter formed part of a personal attack on a poet, the whole might as likely be called a satire. The pastoral was a favourite butt of Quevedo's (cf. <u>Planeta</u>, 904, 1141, 1236 etc.), as here:

> A la orilla de un brasero
> entre castañas y vino
> (que es mejor que de un arroyo
> entre adelfas y lentiscos)
> envuelto en un cachera,
> cargado de romadizo . . .
> yo, el primer poeta de invierno
> que han conocido los siglos . . . (<u>Planeta</u>, 1102)

The poem also contains a travesty of Petrarchan clichés (ll. 17-40). It is styled burlesque in both the <u>Maravillas del Parnaso</u> and in a MS (<u>Castalia</u>, III, 150). Quevedo's jocular reworking of the Hero and Leander legend is styled 'Hero y Leandro en paños menores' by González de Salas, with uncharacteristic drollery. It also earns the more revealing

MS title of 'Fábula de Leandro y Hero, a lo burlesco, desmintiendo los autores que la escriben' (ibid., 83). Pantaleón de Ribera's skit on the phoenix could only be known as 'Fábula del fénix, burlesca'[18]. And in the Saragossa, 1670 edition (all printings) of Polo's Obras en prosa y verso are to be found a 'Fábula de Apolo y Dafne, burlesca' and a 'Fábula de Pan y Siringa, burlesca' (205, 217). The Cancionero de 1628 offers a 'Comento burlesco de la canción del certamen de Pilar' (ed.cit., 585) which turns out to be a parody of Gongorism.

Where an epithet was felt to be expedient, burlesco would be used to camouflage scatology, pornography and sundry coarseness. Festivo and jocoso were also used in this way. Quevedo's adaptation from a Greek Anthology epigram, 'La voz del ojo, que llamamos pedo'[19], has been conserved in quite a number of MS versions, only one of which categorizes it: 'Soneto burlesco a lo forzoso a que todo humano vive sujeto' (Castalia, II, 613). The romance 'Así el glorioso San Roque' is one of Quevedo's excursions into the world of illicit sexuality. The carnality is played for laughs but some anti-doctor satire is included. The only extant source to classify it concocts an altogether misleading title, calculated to disguise the indecent (or ironically acknowledge it), 'Romance burlesco en que dice la novedad de pasar de empeños humildes a ejecuciones de más gala' (Castalia, III, 192).

The cultivation of poems devoted to the trivial reaches back to the Ancients. The Greek Anthology had its noses, and Quevedo noted that

> Cantó la pulga Ovidio, honor romano,
> y la mosca Luciano;
> de las ranas Homero. (Planeta, 620)[20]

The style only achieved the status of a genre in sixteenth-century Italy, whence it was taken to Spain and naturalized, flourishing well into the next century, thanks largely perhaps to the attention devoted to it by the academias. The poems often took the form of the ironical eulogy: the most banal or unsuitable object (the urinal was a favourite) was treated to effusive praise: the more mundane the object, the more effective the verses. These efforts were generally known as burleschi, burlescos in Spain. Francesco Ferrari's collection largely consists of offerings in the style and is entitled Le rime burlesche sopra varii et piacevole soggetti (Venice, 1570). The same holds for the two volumes devoted to Berni and his followers, L'opere burlesche (Florence, 1552-5), and the various miscellanies such as the Capitoli burleschi (n.p., 1599)[21]. Some of the subjects, noses, bald heads and fleas, were repeatedly attempted[22]. Others are not so familiar. Berni sang the praises of fish, eels, thistle and playing-cards (L'opere, I, 19, 28, 29, 33); Mauro of candles and bed (ibid., 162, 149); Varchi of pockets, pigs' trotters and fennel (ibid., 87, 93, 95). Ferrari brought to light the hidden qualities of cake and the itch (ed.cit., ff. 7r, 47r), while Firenzuola did the same for sausages and bells (Opere, 995, 962). In France Bruscambille discovered what was worthwhile about cabbage and gout[23]. In Spain Baltasar del Alcázar could turn his attention to big mouths as a change from big noses, and it was left to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza

to deliver 'Sobre la zanahoria'[24]. Poems like these had their counterpart in those amorous pieces composed around an object in some situation connected with the beloved (e.g. Planeta, 342, 344, 346, 349, 354, 367, 392, 518). Often they only barely saved themselves from self parody, as was the case with Lope's 'A un palillo que tenía una dama en la boca'[25].

What Artiga was to style the 'elogio por burla' (Epítome, 232) did not confine itself, in its wider application, to the material but sought subjects that had greater scope for the exercise of irony. Ferrari eulogized madness and prison (ff. 1r, 83r), Berni debt, and Mauro famine (49, 139). Various stages of female deformity, starting from simple plainness, provided further opportunity for extension. One of the topics prescribed for the Academia de Madrid in 1626 was a 'Romance jocoso, veinte coplas no más . . . las quejas de un galán que se lamente de no poder alcanzar a una dama coja'[26]. This shows just how the originally straight-forward eulogy might be developed. Once again, equivalents may be found in the apparently serious love poetry. Quevedo was able to justify his admiration for ladies who, though beautiful, were respectively cross-eyed, one-eyed, and altogether blind (Planeta, 350-2). Only in the first case does González de Salas admit of a possible element of fun. Quevedo's most significant excursion into unmistakably comic 'en loor de' is 'Ya que descansan las uñas' (Planeta, 1090), which Aldrete calls burlesco. It also contains a parody of some of the clichés of amorous verse (ll. 133-150), but its more important literary ancestry is recognized in several MS titles, 'Alaba

a la sarna', 'Alabando la sarna' (twice) (Castalia, III, 132). When ironical praise switched its attention from mere objects to old women and cuckoldry, allowing the poet far greater potential for self-expression and introducing a possible moral view-point, the resultant poem might be termed satirical.

In its most universal sense burlesco was defined by Autoridades thus: 'Equivale a jocoso, lleno de chanzas, chistes y graciosidades' (719). Still something of a neologism in Spain at the turn of the sixteenth-century, it seems to have derived directly from the Italian[27]. In his dedication to the first book of L'opere burlesche il Lasca had defined the 'stil burlesco' as 'giocondo, lieto, amorevole, e per dir così, buono compagno' (ed.cit., 1). Unlike the satirical it lacked a moral commitment or aggressive stance, although obviously 'burlar de' often served as the introduction to satire. Hence González de Salas's rather over-explicit title 'Búrlase del camaleón, moralizando satíricamente su naturaleza' (Planeta, 582). If we must reduce satírico and burlesco as used in seventeenth-century Spain to generalizations, ignoring the vital nuances proper to each, then it is to be doubted that we can maintain a distinction between them significantly different from most latter-day divisions between the comic and the satirical[28]. At most one might emphasize satírico's aggression at the expense of its commitment to reformational crusading.

A different line is taken by Robert Jammes, whose satírico/ burlesco distinction is based on 'L'examen des premières éditions et des nombreux manuscrits où sont les oeuvres complètes de Góngora', indicating a period more or

less contemporaneous with the appearance of early and middle Quevediana in print, and not vastly removed from publication of the Parnaso and Las tres musas[29]. From the outset Jammes's case is markedly coloured in anticipation of his conclusions. Both satire and burlesque are critical of society:

> L'une et l'autre ont ceci de commun, qu'elles impliquent une attitude critique à l'égard de la réalité sociale entendue au sens le plus large: moeurs et costumes, institutions, art, littérature etc. (42)

Obviously both satire and burlesque must use the same raw material. The sober citizen who stays at home and obeys the Ten Commandments, the prudent walker who avoids the banana-skin, are likely to be equally ignored by both satirist and burlesquer. But the postulation of even an implied critical posture on the part of the burlesquer suggests a reading of burlesco that amounts to a considerable deviation from Auto-ridades, which is precisely what Jammes intends. The 'impliquent' is significantly connected to Jammes's notion of Gongorine satire. Its note of reservation is carried over into his blanket definition of satire:

> L'auteur satirique se situe a l'intérieur de ce système de valeurs, et se borne à attaquer ce qui, dans l'univers social qui l'entoure, est en contradiction avec ce système, c'est à dire avec l'idéologie de la classe dominante: ainsi la vénalité des juges, l'incontinence des prêtres, l'incapacité des médicins . . . son des thèmes satiriques aux yeux des écrivans et du public du Siècle d'or. En les dénoncant ils défendent - ou paraissent défendre - l'ideal sociale de leur temps. (42-3)

Immediately apparent here is the confrontation of the very real problem of the relationship between poet and _persona_, but equally evident is a drastic restriction of the meaning of _satírico_ for its day, in part responsible for the eventual convolutions and heavy qualifications to which Jammes's argument is subjected.

Jammes admits to burlesque's being the real bug bear (40). He recognizes the territory of the 'traditional' burlesque, obscenity, scatology, etc., but without making clear whether or not these were acknowledged _as burlescos_ in that period (43). Albeit by implication, his blanket definition of satire and burlesque (42, as above) caters for burlesque as parody. But his major contribution is to propose an original reading of _burlesco_ as _the_ meaning for its day. He begins with the acute observation that poems of the 'carpe diem'/ invitation to hedonism type need to be approached with caution:

> Il est bien évident que l'on ne saurait pas prendre au pied de la lettre les affirmations d'un poète qui proclame la superiorité du vin, de l'égoisme, de l'amour charnel et de la vie dissolue sur les valeurs morales dont se réclame la société qui l'entoure. (44)

At the same time he will not allow that such poems function by straight-forward irony, indicating precisely the opposite of what they say:

> Ces affirmations ne doivent pas non plus être entendues à rebours: entre la condemnation de ces "antivaleurs" et l'adhésion pure et simple, il y a une grande marge d'ambigüité qui est le

> propre du burlesque et si l'on veut, la ruse par laquelle il échappe à la censure entendue au sens le plus large. (44)

In the case of Quevedo one can think of several poems which must belong to this 'ambiguous' category and yet earned the title of satirical. 'Ansí a solas industriaba', delivered in praise of cuckoldry by a professional, first appeared in the Seville, 1637 edition of Primavera y flor and in Maravillas del Parnaso of the same year, earning the respective titles of sátira and romance satírico (Castalia, II, 406). One of his explorations of the 'Ándeme yo caliente' theme, 'Después que de puro viejo', is satirical according to both González de Salas and a MS (Castalia, II, 145).

Jammes's argument continues:

> En dépit de la différence fondamentale d'attitude que supposent ces deux genres, on découvre entre eux une continuité presque parfaite: le burlesque n'est en somme que le prolongement de la satire, le moyen de mettre en cause les valeurs qu'on ne saurait - aux yeux du public et souvent aux yeux de l'auteur lui-même - critiquer ouvertement. (47)

This claim occurs in a passage in which Jammes admits to there having existed a real confusion between the two ('L'examen . . . ouvertement', 47) which he ascribes to the existence of non-conformist satire. The more satire attacks accepted values, the closer it resembles burlesque. The less ambiguously burlesque advocates alternative values, the more characteristic it becomes. The formulation of 'non-conformist' satire is intimately linked with Jammes's overall reading of Góngora. He presents him as an outsider, a non-establishment

figure, a view he has somehow to reconcile with the fact that so many of Góngora's poems were published as sátiras. These two extracts are fairly representative:

> C'est que la satire, bien qu'elle adopte en principe le point de vue de l'idéologie dominante, n'est pas nécessairemente conformiste; on peut même dire que chez Góngora elle ne l'est jamais, pour la simple raison qu'aux yeux de la société, et des autorités civiles ou religieuses que la dirigent, toutes les vérités ne sont pas bonnes à dire, même si elles sont moralement salutaires.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> C'est que Góngora ne prend jamais tout à fait au sérieux les principes moraux que la satire semble impliquer a cette époque: on sent chez lui, à l'égard de ces principes, un certain détachement, et c'est ce qui explique que la satire gongorine penche toujours du côté du burlesque. (44, 216-7)

Jammes has here touched upon something he never fully examines, the degree to which the theoretical morality of the establishment coincides with its practical execution by same, and the extent to which practice itself alters the ideology. His conclusion in the first passage seems to be that a satirist will be non-conformist in a temporal sense if he criticizes the shortcomings of the establishment judged by its own standards. In principle the exercise is perfectly 'conformist', an implication Jammes avoids, and the teller of those truths which 'for fear you dare not tell' may legitimately be called a satirist[30]. The second quotation is more radical and tends to contradict the first: Góngora never

actually takes the prevailing ideology completely seriously, though presumably seriously enough for his contemporaries to have ascribed <u>satires</u> to him. This in fact denies Góngora the title of non-conformist satirist. For Jammes, Góngora is in spirit a burlesquer rather than a satirist:

> En définitive, sa poésie tend moins à "corriger les moeurs de son temps" qu'à exprimer une attitude railleuse à l'égard du monde qui l'entoure. Le moraliste, avec ce que ce mot suppose d'austérité, n'apparaît guère chez lui, et encore moins l'homme d'Église. (175)

As such he is seriously devoted to the propagation of subversive values, 'le burlesque, chez lui, n'est jamais, en dépit des apparences, un simple jeu gratuit et sans portée' (44). If we were to define Góngora's burlesque by <u>Autoridades</u>, only a handful of poems would be sufficiently frivolous to qualify (40).

Jammes's reading of both satire and burlesque suffers from over-restriction. It is further to be doubted that his version of <u>burlesco</u> can qualify even as an accepted sub-meaning of the term. It is always assumed that the specific case of Góngora reflects general usage, but reference is exclusively made to Gongorine texts. To a large extent Jammes appears intent on justifying the classification he had made previously in his edition of the <u>letrillas</u>[31]. But if we are to allow burlesco only one sense then it must be that given by <u>Autoridades</u>, for which it had usurped precedence over <u>jocoso</u>. Yet Jammes has done a service in focusing attention on formal presentation as a factor influencing definition. And he has

also forcefully demonstrated that categorization must be vitally significant in the case of those many poems whose message is not readily, or at all reconciled with the Christian ethic.

The suggestion that satire and burlesque were often confused is irresistible of itself. But it will be argued that this may be attributed to causes other than those proposed by Jammes, reactions to the various manifestations of satire's bad reputation being foremost among these. The phenomenon was especially prevalent by mid-century. Of the poems styled 'satires' in Miguel de Barrios's Flor de Apolo (Brussels, 1665) some deserve the title: a 'poeta mordaz' is brought to account; a pedigüeña is reproached for deserting her now penniless lover; misers, thieves and go-betweens are subjected to various strengths of ridicule (176, 177, 179, 83, 184, 33). But the subject of one of these so-called satires is a pregnancy (178). There is no indication that the woman in question has been made pregnant by anyone other than her husband, or that there is anything socially irregular about her condition. The mere physical fact of being with child is the occasion for the fun. Moreover, the poem is structured on the equívoco. On two counts it might have more happily been classed as burlesque rather than satirical. In another 'satire' a woman has her face scratched by a cat as she speaks to her lover through a peep-hole (179), and it is the bathetic calamity of the incident rather than the occasion for her being there (about which we are told nothing) which forms the substance of the piece. It utterly lacks the censure of even mild, gratuitous invective. It would

seem that both these poems are called satires out of laxity in usage.

Similar anomalies are apparent among the items labelled burlesque. A woman giving birth, the marriage of a blind man to a dumb wife, the prospects of a son born to an exceptionally tall father, a windy fregona, belly-ache, the reproductive prowess of a friend, all are plausibly categorized as burlesques. But it is difficult to see two décimas against avaricious women as anything but satires, in one of its preciser senses, and the same holds good for his advice to a doctor that his wife has been having an affair with a priest. All three are called burlesque (158, 159, 157). In other instances the denomination appears less awkward. In one poem a gallant inveighs against the ingratitude of his lady, and then describes how he once came across her in the process of evacuation. The introduction of the lavatory perhaps indicates burlesque in spite of the spirited aggression of the whole. In another the misfortunes of a cobbler at the hands of his thieving, faithless lover are chronicled as burlesque. While the subject matter and moral ('beware!') are perfectly proper to satire, the playful exaggeration of the detail (she even steals his own shoes) might account for this. In collections of this sort one is often left with the impression that the compiler at least was sure of his distinctions. The burlesques and satires are largely separated into groups within the text and in the table of contents. In this case the essence of the poems shows the distinction to be only imperfectly maintained, or else grounded in criteria now obscured to us. In one instance, the poem about

his prolific friend, the epigraph burlesco stands in contradiction to the opening lines:

> Señor don Diego, esta vez
> Hemos de satirizarlo,
> Visto que con ser prudente
> Tiene cosas de muchacho. (95)

Any evaluation of the editorship of this type of material must take into account what may be conveniently described as satire's bad reputation. All types of satire suffered by it, not exclusively personal invective. For all that Renaissance theory heralded Latin satire as depersonalized, its contemporaries were of a different persuasion. Horace, generally considered as the gentlest of Roman satirists[32], defended himself against the accusation that 'Laedere gaudes . . . et hoc studio pravus facis' by claiming that it is motivation and the degree of venom involved which may disgrace satire, and not the actual naming of persons[33]. The latter he considers a permissible technique, quoting an example of it in an earlier satire of his (I, 2, 27) as something other than the product of a 'lividus et mordax' mentality (I, 4, 91-3). Lines 103-15 of the fourth satire also show him to be committed to the specific as opposed to general example, and in the first satire of the second book he argues that the satirist should run the personal risks involved in speaking out (ll. 60-83, ed.cit., 130-2). When Horace does indulge in circumlocution, as in 'simius iste' (I, 10, 18; 116), his motive would appear to increase the point of his criticism rather than to avoid the law-court (II, 1, 84-6; 132). It is worth pointing out that of those Horace names

a good few may be taken to have been alive at the time (I, 1, 105; I, 2, 27; I, 4, 21 and 65-6 etc.). It may be part of his 'evasive tactics' that he claims that his satires are not for public distribution but intended for his own benefit and the ears of the discerning few (I, 4, 73-6)[34]. While he may not have read them aloud at the baths, unlike some satirists, it is clear from I, 10, 78-83 that he did not manage to restrict their circulation successfully. Horace also claims that they are more morally justifiable than spleen indulged in for its own sake (I, 4, 78-90)[35]. He thus recognizes that satire must be selective, which reflects his previous admission that satirists were liable to attack without discrimination, 'dummodo risum/ excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico' (I, 4, 34-5; 50). But nowhere does Horace decry the explicit reproach. He has nothing but praise for the Attic Comedy which began it, and only upbraids its imitator Lucilius for writing too much with too little polish (I, 4, 9-11; I, 10, 50-71). The involvement of personalities he actually praises in him (II, 1, 62-8). In short, Horace was acutely sensitive to the criticisms levelled at satire, both generally and in his own presentation of it. And although he had to admit exposure of individuals as one of the main arguments against the style, he himself saw this as one of its strengths, its shortcomings to be found elsewhere. This is perfectly consistent with his view that 'sic teneros animos aliena opprobria saepe/ absterrent vitiis' (I, 4, 128-9; 58) - satire might reform others besides its immediate target.

The practice of naming survived Horace and Juvenal as it had the Greeks. Theoretically deplorable according to Christian principles, and universally denounced as bad satire by critics, the exercise might incur dire consequences for the writer:

> Dijo bien cierto alcalde que vio preso a un estudiante porque hizo una sátira, en que decía las faltas del lugar, que harto mejor fuera haber preso a los que las tienen.[36]

In any event it helped to maintain the stigma that attached to the very word 'satire', regardless of its particular form. This reputation was even exploited by writers in a tongue-in-cheek fashion whenever personal circumstance or the local political climate did not preclude their being very careful about the titles they selected for their work. Some idea of the diversity and diffusion of satire's ill repute may be gained from the following examples.

In Polo de Medina's Hospital de amor the poet is charged by a lesser devil that 'cuantas sátiras hay, las ha escrito él, así lo dicen todos'. He replies:

> Aquí echará de ver lo que es el vulgo, y lo que hay de creer, cuando dice que yo hago sátiras, él las hace, y miente por medio de las musas si dijera otra cosa. (Obras, ed.cit., 228)

The non-literary value of sátira is involved here: 'él las hace', the public 'slanders' him by marking him as a satirist. While it would be excessive to see Polo here disowning the genre which had served him so well, it is clear that, for all the levity of the context, the broadcast reputation as satirist

was unwelcome, at least in name. So often condemnation of the 'Poets Scandall and the Muses Shame'[37] is of less than fully convincing seriousness. One of the rules of the 1637 Academia burlesca reads:

> Que a los poetas satíricos no les dé lugar en las academias, y que se tengan por poetas bandidos y fuera de el gremio de la poesía noble, y que se pregonen sus faltas como de hombres facinerosos a la república.[38]

It is likely that slanderous poets are meant here since, for all the sophistication of their wording, many of the items on the list of set topics are stock satirical butts - the ugly, go-betweens etc. The fact that they are impersonal seems to account for their being allowed. In any case, the exclusion should not be taken at its face value. It is accompanied by another rule, 'Que ningún poeta sea osado hablar mal de los otros sino es dos veces en la semana' (21).

The following from Cubillo de Aragón simultaneously argues impersonalism as a defence and reflects that widespread unease inspired by the word:

> Si en academia alguna te hallares
> donde ya, por costumbre recibida,
> algún señor presida,
> obedece al asunto y no repares
> en que sátira sea,
> que como se usa allí de impersonales,
> ya pintado una vieja, ya una fea,
> un miserable, un calvo, un antojado,
> y en esta acción lucida
> no se tira a ventana conocida,
> puedes, sin que tu pluma desmerezca,
> decir cuanto al ingenio se le ofrezca.[39]

This was by way of a standard defence of 'academic' satire. Juan de Zabaleta claimed that 'en ellas [las academias] se aprende a chancear sin hiel y a punzar sin dolor', and Pellicer probably has the same in mind here, 'Aquí sólo viven scismas sin escándolos, escándolos sin agravios, agravios sin malicias, y malicias sin afrentas' (ibid.), although feasibly flyting is also indicated. In Cervantes's Coloquio de los perros similar conditions are imposed:

> Por haber oído decir que dijo un gran poeta de los antiguos que era difícil cosa el no escribir sátiras, consentiré que murmures un poco de luz y no de sangre; quiero decir, que señales, y no hieras ni des mate a ninguno en cosa señalada; que no es buena la murmuración, aunque haga reír mucho, si mata a uno.[40]

But the practical application of the doctrine proves, during the course of the novela, rather easier said than done. Cervantes investigates the relationship between altruistic correction and self-indulgent back-biting with a frankness and perception unusual for its time.

The degree of disapprobation afforded to satire varied. In contrast to some of the instances mentioned above, it might indicate as serious an accusation as an author might suffer. Here Pellicer de Tovar describes how he made Pantaleón presentable for the press:

> Hallé en efecto sus obras con necesidad de mucha esponja, y así cercené algunas inútiles para la opinión del poeta, otras poco decentes para la publicidad de la estampa, y otras sensibles para algunas personas a quien manchaba la tinta de

> sus burlas. Que si bien ninguna cosa tocaba en ofensa satírica, sino que se quedaba todo en una viveza salada, nadie quiere que pase lo que sufrió gustoso en un aposento con pocos testigos al teatro de un libro. (Obras, Madrid 1634, Prologue)

Remarkable here is the indication that 'ofensa satírica' is something more heinous than the personalized attack. Just what it consists of is not altogether plain, and the most we may deduce is that satire is characterized by the strength of its bite rather than by any more formal trait. As part of his editing Pellicer admits to 'mudando nombres, y deslumbrando indicios' not because the material in question is satirical but because 'vale más que dejar en pie la materia de queja para los interesados' (loc.cit.). Unconvincing as his apology for Pantaleón may be, there is little doubt that he has sought to identify satírico as the most extreme of the peripheral genres, hoping perhaps that the very gravity of the charge will ensure the poet's acquittal.

Satírico as an unmistakably pejorative adjective was commonplace. In the prologue to El tribunal de la justa venganza (Valencia, 1635) Quevedo stands accused of pandering to those 'inclinados a la mordacidad, y que tienen por el más regalado plato y sainete de su gusto todo lo que es satírico; que esto es lo que mas se precia y ostenta este desdichado autor' (Prólogo, 3). In his censura of the Cuento de cuentos Ponce de León objects that the uninformed laity can only be misled by Quevedo's exposure of the frailty of religious, 'pues estudiando arte para ser agudos, aprenden de los libros de Quevedo sus satíricos dichos y escandalosos

donaires' (OP, 365). In his censura to Luis Antonio's Nuevo Plato Juan Lorenzo de Aoiz speaks in terms strongly reminiscent of Pellicer's, postulating the 'satirical' to put the scrupulous conscience at ease: Antonio avoids the satirical, only indulging in 'diligencias fáciles del natural':

> Y así no porque en este plato no se halle lo raro y exquísito de lo heroico, ni los picantes vivos de lo satírico, cuyos rumbos no ha emprendido el autor, le faltan apacibles sales que lo sazonan. (loc.cit.)

In his dedication to Foncalda, Cubezas avoids calling the work satirical, insinuating that it comes of a more respectable if less vigorous stable:

> Costáronle algunos cuidados a Luis Antonio estas poesías, con que solicita divertir el ocio, sin que sea culpable lo divertido, ni merezca calumnia lo desocupado. (ibid.)

Even the de-personalized form, which in theory stood the best chance of being accepted, was prone to criticism. Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza seems to have been acquainted with it only in its decadence:

> ¿Sátiras quiere el pueblo? ¿ Hay tal desgaire,
> Que la malicia juzgan que es donaire?
> Si os holgáis de escuchar que no hay doncellas,
> Y celebráis malicias tan livianas, . .
> Gente de diablo, ¿no tenéis
> Infamar las mujeres y maridos,
> Solemnizáis ahora en los tablados?[41]

He seems to have been especially incensed by what is familiar to us as the News of the World technique - the satirist,

so-called, allows you to both enjoy the salacious detail and give yourself a moral pat on the back for being superior to the sordid goings-on. This is a pretty accurate diagnosis of a recurrent failing of much generalized and <u>contra estados</u> satire: that it encouraged hypocrisy, the very vice it prided itself on exposing. One of the great apologists for satire, Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, made the point in an important poem to the Prince of Esquilache that he was admittedly severe and quick to damn but saw this as preferable to the debased article satire so often appeared:

> ¿O cúlpasme quizá porque no canta,
> calzando zuecos cómicos primero,
> satíricos discursos mi garganta? (<u>Rimas</u>, II, 158)

The bitter fruit of satire was also maggot-ridden. In its tainted condition it was less likely to purge the moral system than to add to its corruption. But its popularity, at least, was assured.

The notoriety was responsible for a diversity of defences and other reactions. Satirists themselves often took the practical step of scolding those of their number who saw in satire an excuse for wanton or arbitrary malice. Polo de Medina chastized one 'vulgo bachiller, y maldiciente,/ de quien nadie se escapa' (<u>Bureo</u>, 91). Foncalda was especially alive to the problem, delivering a long diatribe against a 'poeta maldiciente, cojo, y manco' (<u>Poesías</u>, 166 et seq.). In another poem a corpulent gentleman complains that he has been made the object of a 'satire', 'Satirizáisme de gordo,/ Cuando vos sois el pesado' (145). Foncalda appeared personally sensitive to the satirist-cum-literary critic. Part of 'A quien leyere' reads:

De haber leído mis obras
(Siendo humildes) te obligaste,
Como el que todo lo enmienda,
A que mucho las realces.
. . . .
Porque condenas a todos,
Sin que reservas a nadie. (n.p.)

Sánchez notes the existence of a 'Romance a unos poetas que lo censuran todo' (Academias, 98), and examples from Barrios and Trillo de Figueroa were quoted previously. In his Anatomie of Absurditie Thomas Nashe protested that satirists had both unlawfully extended the bounds of their hunt and pursued the victim with excessive violence:

> [They] make the Presse the dunghill whether they carry all the muck of their mellancholicke imaginations, pretending forsooth to anatomize abuses and stubbe up sin by the rootes . . . [They] extend their inuectives so farre against the abuse that almost the things remaines [sic] not whereof they admitte anie lawfull use.[42]

The classic defence forwarded both by those who genuinely desired status for satire, and those who had to justify the output of an author recognized as a satirist, argued impersonality. This often comes over as little more than bare-faced bluff. In the prologue to his edition of the Rimas of his father and uncle (Saragossa, 1634), Gabriel Leonardo de Albión handles the inevitable objection with embarrassing priggishness:

> De las satíricas, el asunto es sólo reprehender costumbres depravadas y otros defectos que, si bien de menor momento, son reprehensibles, aunque

parece poder inferirse de la contextura de algunas que hubo objeto particular, a quien se pretendió lastimar. Advertencia fuera ésta excusada, si todos aquellos, a cuyas manos llegará este libro, tuvieran noticia de la candidez de ánimo de ambos hermanos.

(N.p.; in Rimas, I, 27)

He continues for a while in the same vein of complacent dismissal, as if affronted by the charge. Bartolomé's most lengthy satire (901 lines in the version now known to us) was described by a contemporary (c. 1602-5, according to Blecua) thus:

> Tuvo Bartolomé Leonardo mucha agudeza en las sátiras . . . De las sátiras que hay impresas, se conoce la gallardía de su espíritu; pero más se conociera de una que escribió en Salamanca que empieza '¡Déjame en paz, oh bella Citerea!'. Cifra en este poema ingeniosísimo una reprehensión general de los vicios, y puede competir con las sátiras que escribieron Juvenal, Persio y Horacio. (Rimas, II, 465)

In fact the poem contains several passages which do a fair impersonation of personal abuse, and this best explains why it did not reach the presses. In his important letter to Lesmos, more or less a manifesto on satire's behalf, Bartolomé serves up a de-formalized version of the Greek/Roman distinction:

> Mire, pues, V.E., que buena estuviera la sátira reducida a las pullas y apodos y a las injurias descorteses de la matraca. Éste fue su principio, y poco a poco, de la manera que un río

> nace pequeño, pero en alejándose, 'vires adquiret eundo', ha cobrado la sátira tanta autoridad, que por ser reprehensión de costumbres es la poesía que más provecho puede hacer en la república.[43]

He immediately mentions Horace, and then Juvenal and Persius, making it perfectly clear that he sees these as the pioneers of corrective satire. But he never explicitly congratulates the latter on avoiding the mention of personalities, just as he does not see it as the primary failing of 'Greek' satire to actually do so, indicating that the latter errs not so much by the naming of names but in virtue of being wilfully malicious, gratuitously injurious. As a serious student of the subject he would have known that Horace, while committed to satire as a valuable instrument of moral regeneration, practised the quotation of judiciously selected case-histories familiar to the circle within which he moved. In this he followed not only the more outspoken example of Lucilius, but the recommendation of his own father:

> Liberius si
> dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris
> cum venia dabis. insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
> ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.
> (I, 4, 103-6; ed.cit., 56)

By sleight-of-hand Argensola appears to subscribe to the standard apology without actually committing himself. His brother was less reticent, or more hypocritical. While he will keep his satirical muse fed on <u>brodio</u>,

> No le consentiré que muestre el odio
> sino contra los vicios, porque huya
> en todo de Pasquín y de Marfodio. (<u>Rimas</u>, I, 100)

Pasquino was the name of the resurrected remains of a Roman statue, located in Rome itself, which even prior to the sixteenth century became a sort of public notice-board upon which were posted particularly blistering lampoons. The writer might retain his anonymity while the identity of the victim was freely published. Marfodio appears to have been another ancient monument similarly abused. The two names commonly crop up as shorthand for satire in its most unrestrained and least dis^s^imulating form[44]. Both brothers certainly had the reputation of indulging in pasquinades. Albión admits in order to deny that 'algunos de los que han tenido sus obras manuscritas daban por asentado que conocían a las personas contra quienes se escribió lo satírico' (Rimas, I, 27). The definition of satire as the exposure of vice rather than of the vicious themselves is always best seen as prescription rather than description. While most all kept to the rule sometimes, and some law-abiding souls may have done all the time, transgression was general in the Spain of Quevedo's day. And it is to be doubted whether the satire of universal cases had ever managed to dominate any literature to the point of altogether excluding the influence of its shameless cousin.

The demand itself did create real problems for the satirist. Swift diagnosed its most serious flaw:

> But satire, being levelled at all, is never resented for an offence by any, since every individual makes bold to understand it of others, and very wisely removes his particular part of the burden upon the shoulders of the World, which are broad enough and able to bear it.[45]

An anonymous poet quoted in the Cancionero de 1628 saw this as reflective of a motes and beams situation. He wonders how efficient his satire will be since people

> . . . por su natural desatino
> ven el humo del vecino,
> no reparando en su fuego. (ed.cit., 354)

El Pinciano was one who believed in the viability of generalized satire. His two guide lines for its execution were that 'reprehenda vicios generales, y no a personas particulares', and that it should speak 'clara y abiertamente' (Philosophía, 501). But he then entertains the objection that 'el deleite mayor de este especie de poética' does in fact consist of naming (ibid.), and finally allows the exception of the veiled personal attack:

> Las personas sean de tal manera disfrazadas, que de nadie sean entendidas, y solamente lo sepan aquéllas a quien vos lo quisiérades revelar; usad de perífrasi y rodeos obscuros. (ibid.)

Pinciano makes much of this last point, 'que no seáis claro en este lenguaje', to the extent of granting a rare dispensation: 'En suma vengo a alabar en la satírica, la oración escura que tanto he siempre vituperado' (501). A perusal of anthologies and collections of the first half of the seventeenth century reveals that Pinciano's recommendation was matched in practice. Somewhat earlier even, Doni suggested that Burchiello had used the ploy when it was not judged discreet to accuse directly. The second and third of his

five divisions contrast markedly:

> I secondi [sonetti] sono scritti a riquisition' di questo, e quell'altro huomo che lo richiedeva, e ancor questi sono assai aperti. I terzi poi, per dir male, che non intendesse altri che coloro, a cui errono scritti; e questi è impossibile saperne l'interno. (Rime, 18-9)

Even this evasive procedure did not escape criticism. In As You Like It Jacques volunteers the timely defence that anyone who thinks himself the victim of a disguised satire deserves to have it directed at him[46].

But while satire was persistently challenged, whatever guise it might adopt, such claims as it had to legitimacy were to some extent to alter the contemporary value of maldecir and malicia. In Diomedes-based definitions maldiciente/malédico was used in a neutral, non-depreciatory sense. Hence Diego López:

> La otra manera de sátira más nueva es más maldiciente y compúsose para reprehender los vicios de los hombres y ésta hallaron solamente los Latinos. (Persio, f. 1v)

Maldiciente is favourably contrasted with the 'versos . . . desvergonzados y lascivos' of Greek satire (ibid.). In López Pinciano's definition malédico and mordaz are likewise absolved of their sins:

> Será, pues, la sátira un razonamiento malédico y mordaz hecho para reprehender los vicios de los hombres. (499)[47]

After all, this indicated the element which separated satire from direct moralizing. In his censure of the Cuento de cuentos, Ponce de León shows himself aware of the specific value of maldiciente, and simultaneously makes clear what he thinks of the usage, when he inveighs against 'Francisco de Rabelés, el cual se precia de ser picante y maldiciente' (OP, 365). In El tribunal de la justa venganza he returns to Rabelais, singling out donairoso as the latest circumlocution for maldiciente:

> Era éste de ingenio picante, pronto, despeñado, inclinado a mal y de lengua maldiciente, licenciosa y donairosa, que así se llama ahora la mala lengua.[48]

In one instance Quevedo himself styles maldecir as a laudable, almost religious pursuit:

> Y que desde aqueste punto
> toda mi vida consagro
> a decir mal de tus cosas,
> aun entre sueños hablando. (Planeta, 1170)

In all these examples maldecir in the sense of 'to curse' does not apply[49].

Malicia acquired the technical value of something like 'a pre-disposition to recognize and/or criticize the shortcomings of mankind', a mental faculty as it were. Giving his opinion of Martial to the Inquisitorial censors, Jerónimo de Zurita opined that 'cuando no trata de cosas lascivas tiene avisos dichos con malicia sabrosa y erudita, envuelta en mucho donaire'[50]. Quevedo begins a letrilla:

> Oyente, si tú me ayudas
> con tu malicia y tu risa,
> verdades diré en camisa,
> poco menos que desnudas. (Planeta, 706)

And González de Salas might freely use malicia with impartiality. Quevedo, fatigued with a sonnet after three lines, had asked him to complete it:

> Pero porque no se malograra tan solene principio, persuadido a que yo le continuara, hube de obedecer, bien sin más malicia de la que admite un mero desatino por donaire. (Planeta, 600)

But such instances are the exception rather than the rule. Satire was more often cursed with infamy than blessed with fame.

This was sometimes to exert a weighty influence upon classification. Diego de Saavedra noted that 'crece la estimación de las obras satíricas con la prohibición, y la gloria enciende los ingenios maldicientes'[51]. Satire sold. For all the official disclaimers which (of necessity) prefaced Luis Antonio's Nuevo plato, sátira is freely used in the epigraphs. Other poems are called pintura/ retrato or jácara as appropriate. Burlesco, festivo and jocoso are nowhere to be seen, although they would seem apter titles than satirical for some of the poems called that. One of the latter concerns a beau who bites his lady's nose while attempting to kiss her; another a capón done out of his supper by an inconstant lover; a third, the reasons given by a woman for rejecting a dwarf as her lover, constructed on the equívoco (Plato, 12, 7, 9). While it is not

astounding to find these called satires - there may be a moral (somewhere) in the second example, the third can be seen as an oblique attack, and loose usage would account for the first - the total preference of that term over burlesco etc. indicates that Juan de Ibar probably had sales figures in mind. Naturally content would not necessarily live up to the promise of the title in every case.

It may be generalized that from about 1650 onwards sátira and satírico were considered sufficiently safe to be widely used in epigraphs. They appear in the following: Cáncer y Velasco's Obras varias (Madrid, 1651; Lisbon, 1657); Foncalda's Poesías varias (Saragossa, 1653); Alfay's collection Poesías varias (Saragossa, 1654); Trillo y Figueroa's Poesías varias (Granada, 1652); Luis Antonio's Nuevo plato (Saragossa, 1658); Miguel de Barrios's Flor de Apolo (Brussels, 1665) and in the Parnaso (Madrid, 1648; Saragossa, 1649; Madrid, 1650), and Las tres musas (Madrid, 1670). Many of the apparent exceptions can be accounted for by text tradition. Pellicer de Tovar, keen that Pantaleón should not be branded as a satirist, seems to have kept a close eye on the progress of his Obras through the press, with the result that his edition (Madrid, 1631/4) eschews the generic satírico even where appropriate (47v, 147v, 152v etc.). All subsequent editions do likewise, since they are largely reproductions of Pellicer de Tovar's text. This is why the Madrid 1670 edition recognizes no satires as such[52]. According to Balbín Lúcas, it was not until the 1648 Madrid edition that four previously suppressed items were included by publisher Pedro Coello. These appear to carry their original epigraphs.

Moreover, two of them are written around members of the nobility, the count of Sastago and the Duke of Lerma, in a manner that might easily be called satirical (cf. Balbín, I, xxii). It should occasion little surprise that the title has been avoided. As its title indicates, Polo de Medina's Buen humor de las musas (Madrid, 1630) is to a great extent devoted to the satirical/burlesque. But satírico is utterly absent in the epigraphs. When the Buen humor was reprinted as a section of the Obras en prosa y verso (Saragossa, 1664, 1670 [two printings]) the epigraphs were left in their original condition. The same holds good for the reduced Bureo de las musas (Saragossa, 1659), with one exception - a sátira which is in fact a jácara. The more obvious satires are indicated by the harmless 'a' (cf. 168, 182, 187, 190 etc.). Polo was alive at the time of all these reprints, and may have kept an eye on things. Perhaps his fear of being known as a satirist, voiced in the Hospital de amor, was not totally facetious.

In Juan López de Vicuña's edition of Góngora's Obras en verso (Madrid, 1627) the sonnets, letrillas and romances given over to the relevant material are divided into the satirical and the burlesque. In the Madrid, 1633 edition of Gonzalo de Hoces the classification satírico is nowhere to be found. The poems previously included in the satirical sections still occur together in the same sequences, but are now called burlesque. In fact the text has been so crudely altered that the original numbering, changed only by the addition of some new poems, is maintained, and we end up with two burlesque sections of letrillas, romances and sonnets[53],

This hasty doctoring leads to the suspicion either that Hoces personally wanted to save Góngora's reputation from being tainted or, more likely, that external pressures made the publisher unwilling to sell 'satire'. It may be relevant that the previous year had seen the appearance of the new Index. Perhaps the increase of inquisitorial activity in the years preceding it had made publishers wary of classification that suggested scandal. In the subsequent Hoces reprints - Madrid, 1634, 1648, 1654 - the deletion of satírico is repeated, not out of continued reaction to satire's ignominy but simply as the result of the convenience of rehashing the text unmolested. Text tradition would also appear to be responsible for the use of the bland otro or romance in the various editions of the Romances varios de diversos autores, the first of which was published in Saragossa in 1640, somewhat prior to the general disposition to use satírico freely.

Apart from the 1627 edition of Góngora it is difficult to locate any early publication which exhibits unrestrained usage of the term. As far back as the Cancionero de obras de burlas, sátira is avoided in favour of some circumlocution, maldecir or [versos] fieros (ed.cit., 78, 90, 273)[54]. The Romancero general (Madrid/Valladolid, 1600-5) carries non-specific titles (otro/romance) as a rule, with sátira very much as a rarity. It does not appear in the epigraphs to the various sixteenth-century sources of the Romancero general where one might reasonably expect it. Non-specifics are the norm, with a few 'burlas de'[55]. In his compilation Flores de poetas ilustres de España (Valladolid, 1605), Pedro

Espinosa scrupulously avoids the denomination despite the proliferation of satires in the selection. Even the vague 'a' is rarely used (ff. 105v, 106r): the title granted to poems which carry titles is usually the author's name. Throughout Ledesma's Romancero y monstruo imaginado (Barcelona, 1616) burlas is constantly employed, even where aggression or moralizing would seem to call for sátira (ff. 130v, 124v, 99v, 83v).

Pedro Arias Pérez is one who does choose sátira as a heading in his Primavera y flor (Madrid, 1621, and following, amplified editions). But even he uses the term with discretion, and does not apply it to a clearly personally intended counter-attack to a charge of plagiarism, which is styled 'otro romance' (ed.cit., 77). Lope's Rimas humanas y divinas (Madrid, 1634) is replete with attacking satires (ff. 62r, 53r, 54v, 49r, 49v, 43r, 59v etc.), but not one earns the title. This may be seen not only as a reflection of the general trend, but probably also as part of a policy to disassociate Lope's published, acceptable satires from the vicious personal invectives at which he was so adept[56].

While an increasing toleration of the idea of satire is discernible towards and markedly after 1650, at any given time a number of other factors, inestimable for the most part, may have influenced the format of a publication - the preference of nomenclature on the part of author/editor/publisher; the prevailing attitude of local government, and the location of publication itself[57]; the disposition of individual ecclesiastical censors, and the great imponderable of 'fashion'. Common sense will often explain seeming anomalies. López de Zárate's

Obras varias (Alcalá, 1651) contains just a few poems which, given its elasticity of meaning, could be considered satires (83, 188, 193). As the volume is sectionalized into genres, it is hardly surprising that a whole category has not been created for these few items, and that they are consigned to lyric or amorous verse.

González de Salas was something of an expert on satire. He produced a scholarly edition of Petronius's Satiricon with an introduction that was original in many respects[58]; he translated and prefaced the third satire of Persius (Janer, 355). His reputation was sufficiently established for some of his Petronius material to be included in one of the later critical compendia of Juvenal[59]. He wrote satire himself and was very much alive to the personalities issue (Janer, 350). His views as aired in the Parnaso are doubly important. Not only do they reflect his most mature recorded reflections on the subject, but they comprise the most extensive application of theory to the practice of a contemporary satirist to be found in Golden Age literature. The exercise was not without its difficulties. The raw Quevedo did not always fit comfortably the mould de Salas intended for it.

He was obviously eager both to restore satire's esteem generally, and to defend Quevedo's version of it in particular. In some instances his approach recommends itself as solid. The vast majority of those poems in which Quevedo specifically quotes from or refers to a classical satirical source are inserted under Polymnia, the muse of moral poetry. These include a series of sonnets whose direct inspiration is Juvenal or Persius (Planeta, 43, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 69, 73,

77, 81, 89, 94, 97, 98, 99). In writing them Quevedo gives the impression of either having selected Juvenal at his most seriously censorious, or having toned him down. Their unsmiling solemnity places them at one of the frontiers of satire, adjacent to plain moral denunciation[60]. It also excludes them from Thalia which, by the same token, embraces Quevedo's adaptation of Juvenal's sixth, still lively and laugh-provoking for all de Salas's emendations (cf. page 191)

Again allocated under Polymnia are the two lengthy items, '¡Oh corvas almas!' and 'No he de callar', accompanied by extensive commentary. The first is styled 'Sermón estoico de censura moral', which he identifies with Horatian sermo (= satire), 'y por el género y sabor de la doctrina con que en él se discurre, añadimos estoico' (Janer, 355). However, if this is the 'Sermón estoico' mentioned by Quevedo in a letter (Planeta, 130), the identification looks doubtful. It may be that de Salas was trying to justify a title he knew Quevedo himself had applied to the poem. If so, his attempt was coloured by his personal reading of Horatian satire.

The second is called 'Epístola satírica y censoria', and identified with Horatian epistula. The latter has the same content, form and end as the sermo, only to be distinguished from it by its adoption of the 'traje y hábito de epístola familiar' (Janer, 356). (In essence this was a critical commonplace, and not the property of de Salas). The comparison in this instance is more feasibly acceptable. In short, both are 'satíricas composiciones' (Janer, 355). Their raw material is moral behaviour, their form 'censoria

y satírica', and their mission, reformation (355-6). So much is familiar, but González de Salas's novelty lies elsewhere. Those theories which claimed satire as exclusively Roman sorted it into two categories[61]. Diomedes wrote:

> Satira est carmen apud Romanos, non quidem apud Graecos, maledicum, et ad carpenda hominum vitia. archeae comediae charactere compositum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius, et Persius. Et olim carmen quod ex variis poematibus constabat satira vocabatur, quale scripserunt Pacuvius et Ennius. (Grammatici opus, 141r)

The second variety was characterized by its admixture of metre. The distinction resembles that given by Quintilian, who ranges Horace, Lucilius and Persius against the Menippean satire of Terentius Varro, which mixed prose and verse, and can claim to be 'prius satirae genus' (Institutio, X, 1, 94; ed.cit., IV, 52-4)[62]. In the 'De satirico. Praeludium 11' of the Satiricon de Salas quotes both, preferring the reading of Ennius or Pacuvius as originator as opposed to Varro, and identifying Petronius with this older sort of satire (18). The latter is a mixture not only in its construction but content, is less mordant and moral (or at least less consistently so) than the newer satire, and more fully justifies the etymological derivation from satura (18, 22). In the commentary to Polymnia he takes all this a step further, arguing that Horatian satire should be distinguished from the other manifestations of the 'new' satire, as well as from the old (Janer, 354). His reasons for doing this are not altogether clear, and are rendered in a fashion of which the following is typical:

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> Diversa, pues, afirmo ser, aunque en el mismo género consista de la de sus antecesores poetas, y también sucesores, toda la satírica poesía de Horacio, así la que en los libros de sus Sermones o sátiras se contiene, como también la de sus epístolas. (355)

He leaves the exact nature of Horace's originality to be inferred from the remainder of his argument, in which he persistently stresses that moral reform is always uppermost in Horace's mind. This would separate him from Lucilius, who certainly was not so single-minded[63]. But it seems that Horace imitated the early, farce-like saturae in at least one case (Satires, I, 7; ed.cit., 89), and it would be difficult to reconcile 'castigo . . . y enmendación de costumbres' with the tone of many of the Epistles (e.g. I, 10-13). De Salas has simplified Horace in order to present him as the epitome of all that is most laudable in satire. And although it may seem strange that he does not make anything of the idea that Horace called his satires sermones in order to disassociate them from an infamous genre, as an apologist for satire he was not keen to wash its dirty linen in public, preferring instead to treat satira and sermo as synonyms, and plead for a close association of satirical and regular moral sermo[64]. All this is intended to reflect very favourably upon Quevedo, who is presented as continuing Horace's crusade for his own day, and upon contemporary Spanish satire as a whole[65].

The bulk of the relevant material is contained under muses Terpsichore and Thalia. For the first qualify 'poesías que se cantan y bailan; esto es letrillas satíricas, burlescas y líricas, jácaras, y bailes de música interlocución'

(Janer, 365); the rest belong to Thalia. The epigraph to the latter is revealing:

> Canta poesías jocoserias, que llamó burlescas el autor. Esto es, descripciones graciosas, sucesos de donaire y censuras satíricas de culpables costumbres, cuyo estilo es todo templado de burlas, y de veras. (ibid., 370)

Quevedo's preferred term for the style was, according to his friend, burlesco. He certainly had every reason not to be known publically as a satirist[66]. Significantly, he never claimed in his writings to be a satirist. He was aware of the volatile nature of the subject, of the shifting value of the word itself. While his usage was 'orthodox' when he talked of Juvenal, as here:

> Mi Juvenal . . . a mi juicio escribió la política en versos con nombre de sátiras (no sin cuidado), pues este género de filosofía más necesita de lo sátiro que de lo comendable. (OP, 980)[67]

he often had recourse to one of the current meanings:

> Yo creo que el Consejo recogerá el libro por escandaloso y lleno de sátiras y vicios.
> . . . . . .
> Juventud sátirica y mal intencionada, ¿qué se le amoldrará, sino tirar chistes empedrados?
> . . . . . .
> ¡Qué fue de ver a vuestra merced, excelencia, tú y senoría, cuando se bajo la moneda, disparando chistes, malicias, concetos, sátiras, libellos, coplillas! (OP, 450, 818, 806)

However, González de Salas's estimation of satire was rather narrower; he did not personally share the grounds of consternation which made Quevedo so wary, and now that the maestro was dead he might freely claim him satirical, in the acceptable sense. The Thalia epigraph indicates that satire is a sub-division of the jocoserio, which de Salas himself prefers to call festivo or donairoso sooner than burlesco. The jocoserio itself is characterized in two ways: by mixing burlas and veras, and by being simultaneously useful and pleasing:

> Con la parte, conviene a saber, que deleita, también contiene la que es tan estimable de la utilidad, castigando y pretendiendo corregir las costumbres con artificiosa disimulación y mañoso engaño; pues tantas veces el que llegare a la golosina del donoso decir, quedará sin cuidarlo advertido, y enmendado alguna vez de los defectos y errores, que siéndole muy propios, aún no los conocía. (Janer, 372)

This makes the whole jocoserio style sound very much like satire in its intention, but more oblique in its execution. It further renders satire's status as a sub-species difficult to appreciate - how far can it dissimulate? This confusion seems due to his wish to present all of the poems in the Muse as fundamentally morally intentioned, which amounts to an appeal to see Quevedo as an earnest warden of mores even where he appears a carefree funster.

We may be asking too much of de Salas, who was using a plainly inadequate terminology. In the 'dissertation' attached to Terpsichore he discusses the satirical letrillas

at length, and then adds:

> Pero de las <u>letrillas</u>, que se siguen luego <u>burlescas</u>, confinan totalmente en su naturaleza con toda la musa <u>Thalia</u> . . . como también las <u>líricas</u>, por la mayor parte, con cualesquiera <u>cancionetas</u>, que para la armonía de la voz <u>Erato</u> suministre. (367)

Obviously inclusion under a certain muse was no cut-and-dried matter, and all the <u>letrillas</u> are for the sake of convenience gathered under Terpsichore. But there existed for him a real difference between satirical and burlesque <u>letrillas</u>, since the latter belong in spirit to Thalia, whereas the former do not. As Thalia's range included 'censuras satíricas de culpables costumbres', this is perplexing. In his textual epigraphs González de Salas maintains a definite distinction between satirical and burlesque. But the content of several of the poems points to its being as baffling as the theoretical criteria on which, presumably, it is based.

Most of the <u>letrillas</u> he classifies as satirical present no problem, being either <u>contra estados</u> (<u>Planeta</u>, 685, 689, 693, 695, 697, 698, 699, 701, 703, 706) or focused on a particular vice (ibid., 687, 709, 713, 714, 715, 717). What constitutes a burlesque remains, as in the theory, close to mystery. Of the five so called, four are concerned with women's lust for lucre (<u>Planeta</u>, 721, 723, 724, 725), a theme they share with all but one (687) of those in the second list above. In each instance the poet's intention seems to have been the same, to expose the trait as a uniquely feminine vice. Differences must then be put down to some characteristic of form or mood, but this resolves little in practice. The

burlesque 'Píntese por toda tienda' (721), with its dependence on the equívoco based on mosca, recalls 'Opilóse, en conclusión' (709), which largely derives its point from the meanings of oro and acero. That the first is addressed to the lady, and the second about her, solves nothing. The satirical 'Si la prosa que gasté' (714) is spoken directly to the offender, the burlesque 'Ved en qué vendré a parar' (725) to the sympathetic listener. This second poem is called sátira twice, in the Évora folio, and in the Biblioteca Nacional MS 3940 (Castalia, II, 188), which is significant since this MS's classification matches that of the Parnaso for the other letrillas (ibid., 142 et seq.). Two of the burlesques are dialogues, but there is no reason with which I am familiar for associating this form with burlesque (723, 724). In both cases the lady freely broadcasts her mercenary disposition, but the speakers in the satirical 'Toda bolsa que me ve' and 'Madre, yo al oro me humillo' (713, 717) do likewise. And if it is suggested that the two are parodies of the amorous dialogue, it can be countered that 'Madre, yo al oro me humillo' is itself a parody of a certain species of villancico in which a girl would confide in mother about her love-life[68].

If de Salas's application of burlesco seems inappropriate, that of satírico is at times hard to appreciate. 'Después que de puro viejo' (688) is just one of Quevedo's variations on the theme of 'picaresque' self-sufficiency (to be discussed more fully in the next chapter). It is pure burlesque à la Jammes, who might be surprised to find that Quevedo wrote such things (cf. Études, 55). De Salas calls

it satirical, but what, if anything, is being censured is not easily resolved. For a start the persona is not as transparent as in 'Toda bolsa que me ve' or 'Madre, yo al oro me humillo', wherein the poet's opinion of the speaker is easily discerned, nor as arbitrary as in most of the contra estados letrillas, which admit of a close identification of poet and speaker. Some of his views tally with those of Quevedo, 'satirist': he expects no more than death at the hands of doctors (ll. 21-2); he is alive to the predatory nature of women (ll. 35-6); he has no time for social climbers (ll. 27-30). Poverty, from which he sees no escape (ll. 7-12), has made him a philosopher in the school of 'de nadie se me da nada' (l. 16). The little that he has to eat he does not share (ll. 31-6). More serious are his admissions that he indulges in casual sex (ll. 23-4), and will bear false witness for payment (ll. 45-8). On the latter count he is at odds with Quevedo, 'satirist'.

The most intriguing part of his lecture concerns his exemption of himself from the hierarchical structure of society - having reached the bottom he has chosen to drop out altogether and become detached from the accepted social values. He is as good as anybody, nobles and the king included (ll. 19-20, 39-44). If we assume that the historical Quevedo was an aristocratic myopic, and that Quevedo, satirist, was the same, then we shall have to be scandalized by Palomo's effrontery, or at least laugh at it. But assumptions of that order cannot pass unchallenged (see Chapter IV). Anyway, Palomo is the one making the jokes (ll. 19-20, 41-5), with wry self-assurance, fully conscious of the irony of his

'decision', 'Entre nobles no me encojo' (l. 39). And his attitude is reflected in the contempt he displays for the aspirant to social advancement. If this persona is to be taken as of a piece, then it is likely we will sympathize with his predicament, condone the legal means he chooses to contain it, and laugh at his wit rather than at him. He who believes that Quevedo intends us to judge Palomo according to some version of Christian morality must be prepared for some pretty brisk gear-changing of his reactions to him, now laughing with him, now at him, alternating applause with disapproval. If his laughter will allow, he should condemn Palomo's materialistic meanness towards women. But if acquainted with much of Quevedo's other writing - Epístolas del Caballero de la Tenaza, for starters - he may have to modify his position drastically, or else start to wonder to what extent Quevedo's 'satire' does uphold the Christian ethic.

This is an example of a well developed and projected persona, obviously not the poet, nor one of those crudely constructed puppets who condemn themselves out of their own mouths. The denomination satírica seems out of place. At most one might suggest that in 'pretendiendo corregir las costumbres con artificiosa disimulación' Quevedo had overdone the subtlety, but that would imply that jocoseria/burlesca is, by de Salas's own definition, the fitting classification, and not satírica. Faced with this, and with the absence of any common denominator which characterizes burlesque as opposed to satirical letrillas, one might ask how much faith González de Salas put in the distinction, and to what extent he, like the rest, was handicapped by a limited and limiting terminology.

It may be that his burlesco is not the same as Quevedo's (which he calls jocoserio). Were this likely, which is not the case, it would elucidate nothing. For the sonnets and romances he uses individual and not generic titles, yet those he thinks satirical are easily singled out; e.g. 'Censura costumbres y las propriedades de algunas naciones', 'Censura contra los profanos disciplinantes', 'Quejas del abuso de dar a las mujeres', 'Comisión contra las viejas' (Planeta, 963, 862, 845, 850), and in titles which use 'abominar', 'maltratar' and certain instances of 'burlar de'. But many epigraphs contain no such interpretative directive for the reader, and the content of hhe poems concerned would seem to lie beyond the pale of 'satire' as de Salas saw it. Again, the letrilla was the most obvious vehicle for the satire of universal cases, especially in its contra estados manifestation. Quevedo relied on it as such, rarely employing it in his exploration of alternative moralities. Small wonder, therefore, that his friend felt confident about labelling these efforts satirical. To conclude, the material itself (setting aside the letrillas satíricas) might account for the varied inconsistencies of González de Salas's classification. It simply did not admit of efficient distinctions on the lines of satírico v. burlesco. De Salas himself seems to have over-emphasized the 'seriousness' of Quevedo and adopted a very restricted notion of the nature of that 'seriousness', which has only compounded the confusion. Whether he was truly committed to his reading of the jocoserio, or was led to it by the combined exigencies of editorship and making Quevedo acceptable to the censor, cannot as yet be determined.

Pedro Aldrete's performance as editor has not quite earned universal acclaim from commentators, including those who have failed to improve on it themselves. Recently Crosby has demonstrated how he appropriated much of González de Salas's material, in the shape of foot-notes and so forth, reproducing it intact without so much as the flattery of minor alteration[69]. That the extent of this discriminating plagiarism is as great as Crosby suggests is open to question. He argues that generic epigraphs in Las tres musas are the work of Aldrete;[70] extensive epigraphs, of González de Salas, and the intermediate variety, privativo (shorter than the extensive), also probably prepared by him (114). But in the text the epigraphs to all the humorous romances contain a generic element, indicating satirical or burlesque (Castalia, III, 112-47). This is a procedure González de Salas totally rejects in his own presentation of the romances in Thalia, just as he never classifies as 'amorous' the romances in Erato, unlike Aldrete, who again styles 'amoroso' the suitable pieces. So however much the jocular romances in Euterpe owe by way of preparation to Quevedo's first editor, and even if the non-generic parts of their epigraphs can be ascribed to him, the classification can only be Aldrete's.

The letrillas are not easily accommodated to Crosby's scheme. González de Salas uses purely generic titles for them except in the case of 'Como un oro, no hay dudar' and 'Si queréis alma, Leonor' (Castalia, II, 186-7). It would not be far-fetched to see him as the author of the solely generic headings of the letrillas of Las tres musas, rather than Aldrete (contrast Crosby, 120). Furthermore, the

privativo title of 'Es tu firmeza tan poca' - 'Letra satírica a la fortuna' - is best allotted to Aldrete, since the form letra occurs only in Las tres musas (here, and in a generic 'Letra satírica'), while the Parnaso sticks exclusively to letrilla. Crosby's criteria are no infallible guide to the origin of titles, and the letrillas are best considered singly[71].

'Hemos venido a llegar' is a contra estados satire called burlesca. As this is an inaccuracy of which González de Salas is never guilty, Aldrete may be taken to be responsible[72]. 'Que no tenga por molesto' is again contra estados, as several MSS testify (Castalia, II, 193). Its classification as satírica must be put down to Aldrete, since it is also called letra. Whatever his shortcomings, there is no reason to believe that Aldrete was too dense to appreciate the obvious similarity between these two poems. Assuming that he had actually read the texts with care, we can only attribute the discrepancy to some subsequent oversight and/or a general confusion of meaning at that time (c. 1669). The epigraph of 'Es tu firmeza tan poca' marks it as Aldrete's work also, as indicated. The remainder comprise a contra estados letrilla satírica, 'Que le preste el ginovés', which in view of the above can be taken as Aldrete's, as there is no other evidence to the contrary; a letrilla satírica against Fortune, probably Aldrete's since 'Es tu firmeza tan poca' shares the same subject and classification[73], and a letrilla burlesca on the 'evacuation' of the court from Madrid, 'Después que me vi en Madrid', a classification consistent with that of a romance of the same inspiration, 'De Valladolid

la rica', whose title burlesco is definitely Aldrete's. The evidence points to the letrilla epigraphs as Aldrete's. This is the conclusion reached by Crosby by a different route although, as suggested, if one is to adopt his principle of taking the reflection of the epigraph habits of González de Salas in Las tres musas as proof of the take-over of his preparation by Aldrete, then four of the six epigraphs could be credited to him. The internal factors enumerated make this highly unlikely.

The classification of the relevant romances may be unreservedly granted to Aldrete. The predilection for the equívoco in 'Ya sueltan, Juanilla, presos', the gentle, sympathetic malice of 'Contaba una labradora' and its parody of vulgar speech, are sufficient to justify them as burlesque, although elements in each would make the appellation satirical quite acceptable. 'Pues ya los años caducos', a relentless attack upon a disdainful and very much self-opinionated lady, is termed burlesco. There are some indications that poems in which the loved one was abused rather than appealed to or more delicately remonstrated with, were known as satires[74]. But if González de Salas could think of 'Ved en qué vendré a parar' as burlesque, Aldrete's choice here does not appear particularly eccentric. One passage is replete with parodies and absurd applications of some of the commonplaces of different traditions of amorous verse, indicating burlesque again (ll. 55-96). The title of 'Tocóse a cuatro de enero', 'Sátira a los coches', might precipitate our believing that the poem is directed against human abuse of the coach rather than the object itself, in the way that

an MS announces - misleadingly, I would argue - 'Un moño, que aunque traslado' as 'Sátira a las mujeres que traen moños postizos' (Castalia, II, 492)[75]. To some extent such a reaction makes sense. One coach accuses itself of being a mobile hide-out for illicit sex (Planeta, 1087-9, ll. 17-24); another complains of the vanity of his owner, a pretendiente whose maintenance of appearances results in a parody of impoverishment - the warning to the would-be privado is explicit (ll. 37-52); a third relates how he was the bait used to entice a young beauty to marry an old man 'della indigno', a case of 'la bella mal maridada' because of her own greed and her suitor's cunning exploitation of it (ll. 61-8). But in much of the poem a moral is conspicuous only by its absence

Un coche pidió licencia,
atento que había servido
todo lo más de su tiempo
en bodas y en cristianismos.
A este coche interrumpieron
cinco o seis coches mininos,
que, por menores de edad,
pretenden ser eximidos.
A éstos les condenaron,
por favor, y por ser niños,
a que sirvan de literas,
o que se estén suspendidos. (ll. 69-80)

It is difficult to read this as anything other than a send-up of the legislative machinery involved. Quevedo has focused upon the nonsense latent in the wording - 'premática contra los coches', or whatever the offending article might be - and taken it literally. Thus the defence of the 'innocent' coaches,

such as those quoted, and another which has served a man and his wife as a home (ll. 81-92). The overall presentation, including a travesty of the Last Judgement trumpets (l. 2), suggests Quevedo's stance to be one of amused detachment from the morality of the law rather than allegiance to it. And the way in which Quevedo follows his anthropomorphism through signals the presence of grotesque, not only in the Disney-like, self-propelled, talking coaches but most strikingly in the case of the 'cinco bizcoches . . . que del susto del pregón/ cocheril aborto han sido' (ll. 54-6). The visual shock of these lines is succeeded by interpretative disorientation. The five are ordered to remain in their coach-houses, 'que es condenallos al Limbo' (l. 60), since they are tainted with the Original Sin of coaches although guilty of no 'actual' sin. A none too respectful adaptation of the Church's doctrine on sin and judgement is accompanied by indifference to making a moral point. Quevedo has simply fashioned another joke from the ridiculous premise of the situation. Similarly, while we laugh at the confession of the brothel-on-wheels, we do not sympathize with the excuses of the wedding/ baptism limousine. These also earn our mirth, and if a 'point' must be found, then it can only be that the premática was indiscriminate in its application.

In all, it seems most reasonable to take the sátira in Aldrete's title as meaning'a funny poem'[76]. This is also its value in an MS title to 'Yo, cuello azul pecador', 'Sátira a la muerte de los cuellos' (Castalia, II, 402). Ostensibly a premática-inspired confession, the poem contains little to support the idea that Quevedo is campaigning on the premática's

behalf. On the contrary, he resorts to the invention of a series of ludicrous sins, of which the ruff confesses itself guilty (cf. Planeta, 882-3). The edict itself is held up to derision. It should be pointed out that not all the 'confession before tribunal' poems take this line. 'Allá van nuestros delitos' (Planeta, 786-7), for example, is a clearly enthusiastic promotion of the legislation against tapadas. Each poem is best interpreted without too much by way of assumption. The above-mentioned MS title to 'Un moño, que aunque traslado', 'Sátira a las mujeres que traen moños postizos', is not easily matched by the poem's content - the false hair-piece unashamedly boasts of her own worth and superiority over natural hair. Witty self-justification indulged in for its own sake, not some social or moral message, is the point of the poem.

'Sátira a' as 'a funny poem about' was not peculiar to Aldrete nor to his day. While he calls the romance 'Ya que descansan las uñas' burlesco, the more suitable title, the Romancero general, in a very rare appeal to the term, has 'Sátira a la sarna' (ed.cit., II, 320). Aldrete's classification of the remaining romances presents no problem. 'De Valladolid la rica' is burlesque, and its attack on Valladolid can be taken no more seriously than its eulogy of Madrid. 'Salió trocado en menudos', an abortive sexual adventure with two women, is likewise burlesque; 'Pues me hacéis casamentero', a reworking of the theme of the dangerous incapacity of the medical profession, satirical (Planeta, 1094-9).

For all the faults of his editorship as a whole, Aldrete's evaulation of the material under discussion is for the greater

part blessed by an internal consistency[77]. Others who handled Quevedo's work seem to have used the available terminology with no greater expertise. Arias Pérez shows how individual the exercise might be[78]. That he altogether avoids burlesco is perhaps not too surprising: in view of the date (1621-3) he may have considered it a new-fangled word, lacking in authority. He uses sátira in the sense of 'a funny poem' in the 'Sátira en redondillas de las calles de Madrid' (32). Quevedo's 'Don Repollo y doña Berza', at first glance a yarn about the wedding of two cabbages and the fruit-and-veg who came along as guests, is to some extent a very ingenious reflection on certain human types, which may account for the designation satirical (66). More directly contra estados items are again called satires, including Quevedo's 'Los que quisieren saber' (58, 147, 148; Madrid, 1623, 125r); and so is an attack, more for physical decrepitude than for immorality, on a go-between/virgin-mender (175). But significantly, poems in which some degree of immorality is championed and not directly challenged are given no title. These include a piece of isolationist propaganda (126) and the advice given by an experienced courtesan to one whose professional standards are sadly lacking (159)[79]. Each represents an established genre that was sometimes known as satirical, either because the compiler thought that the ultimate message was socio-critical, or by application of satírico in its identification with burlesque. In this case it seems most likely that Arias Pérez, aware of the suspicion attached to the word sátira, reserves it only for poems which are harmless or morally straight-forward. Its use in the case of

the dubious would only call attention to said items. The element of personal selection is an indispensable consideration. 'Don Repollo y doña Berza' struck others as more remarkable for its novelty and wit than for its social commentary. Two seemingly related MSS call it 'Papel curioso' and 'El curioso', and another, ascribing it to Góngora, 'Romance agudo y gracioso' (Castalia, II, 249). This itself suggests that perhaps Arias Pérez was, after all, simply describing it as a funny poem when he called it a satire.

The increasing popularity of Quevediana can be measured by its contribution to Pinto de Morales Maravillas del Parnaso (Lisbon, 1637)[80]. Morales's efforts to supply suitable epigraphs is at once dogged by the inadequacy of his tools and the intractability of the material. One would not question his analysis of 'Madre, yo al oro me humillo' and 'Yo, el primer padre de todos' as satirical (ff. 13v, 12v). That 'A la orilla de un brasero' is counted burlesque is consistent with its quality of parody (f. 34r). Beyond that his determinations are perplexing. '¿Estamos entre cristianos?', his refusal to be slandered with the loss of a girl's virginity (f. 4r), is extremely close in tone and execution to 'Yo, el primer padre de todos', in which, to quote González de Salas, 'Sacúdese de un hijo pegadizo'. Yet it is simply called otro. 'A buen puerto habéis llegado' (f. 5r) is a typically Quevedian piece in which the speaker exaggerates his own poverty in reply to the demands of a pair of persistent pedigüeñas. It too is classed as otro, despite the presence of a discernible target. 'Érase que se era', a relentless philippic against a Celestina followed by an account of her

come-uppance, is blandly defined as juguete. The object of attack and the poet's attitude towards it are cut-and-dried here. In a non-Quevedian piece 'Hoy pues estamos a solas', a gallant tells his 'Quintañona dueña mía' his tale of hard luck as they walk along the street, only to be given the brush-off (ff. 26r-28r). This is confidently entitled juguete satírico, although its interpretation in terms of offence and punishment is more debatable than in the previous example. 'Declárame por su vida' (f. 35v) can only be taken as a sneer at the simpering, starry-eyed lover, but is headed burlesque, not satirical. The impression that Morales was either completely arbitrary in his taxonomy, or that he found the available criteria little more than meaningless, is the one that lasts. 'Así consolaba a solas', in which a professional cuckold expounds to a newly-wedded husband the material benefits to be gained from turning a blind eye, he presents as satirical (f. 24r). While he may well have seen this as an oblique attack on the speaker, it is strange that 'Quien hubiere menester' is only entitled otro (f. 3r). In this a much-married and very willing cuckold offers himself in marriage to whomever might wish to take advantage of his compromised morals and set up in the marriage 'business' with him. So much does this resemble the first poem that the discrepancy in definition comes as more than usually anomalous, even for Morales.

While hard and fast rules are not easily come by, several inferences may be drawn from the foregoing. The application of satírico or burlesco in one of their meanings (or in a non-exclusive combination of them) was sometimes

accurate, sometimes make-do, sometimes hesitant and sometimes purely gratuitous. Especially in the case of sátira/satírico, each instance is best taken on its own merits. Satírico might suffer a near total identification with the moralistic. It did so for González de Salas, which was no novelty. In the previous century Antonio de Torquemada had brought forth his laboriously mirthless Coloquios satíricos (Bilbao, 1584)[81]. But it often heralded no more than a few jokes or a funny story. Between these extremes lay the various degrees of slander. The 'tribunal satírico' mentioned in a poem in Alfay's Poesías varias (168) are a gaggle of gossips and not a satirists' convention, as the title ('A ciertos murmuradores') makes clear. 'Verso(s) satírico(s)' was used frequently to indicate that the poem was composed in tercetos or décimas, and not necessarily as a comment on its contents.[82] All this is vital in any interpretation of Quevedo. That his works were called satirical by his contemporaries does not mean that they confidently saw them as a promotion of Christian ethics. Notwithstanding that it reaches back some sixteen centuries, and was supported by a scholarly conspiracy in the Renaissance, the myth of satire's impersonalism is only ever imperfectly matched in actuality[83]. In the case of Quevedo, much of his fame as a satirist was based on the staggering resourcefulness of his personal invectives.

So many of our twentieth-century prejudices as to the nature of satire will have to be modified or kept in check. Thoroughly to be resisted is any temptation to attempt a 'general' distinction between a fundamentally 'moral' satírico and a purely 'diversional' burlesco. This holds good for

those poems for which it holds good. But, as the hit-and-miss nature of much seventeenth-century editing shows, it was hopelessly inadequate when it came to that vast acreage of poetry which did not belong to either category and yet had to be allocated somewhere. It is rather like trying to divide European nations into those that are nominally Catholic, and those which belong to the E.E.C. France would be both while Sweden could not be included. The paradox is, of course, that the genre as a whole has come to be labelled the satírico/burlesco.

What really matters here is not that González de Salas apportioned certain poems to Erato (Planeta, 359 [no.327], 366) and to Thalia (574 [no.552], 579, 1035) when, in view of his habitual procedure, they seem more likely candidates for Thalia and Polymnia respectively. In all these instances, what the poem has to say is substantially unaffected by its classification. But there existed types of poem which pushed to the point of obsolescence the inherently debilitated critical lexicon. We may isolate two. In the first, the lesson that is taught seems to be at odds with the prevailing morality of its day - this variety is discussed in the following chapter. In the second, Quevedo's obsession with matter becomes an end in itself; it mocks the restraints which a moral or theological awareness would necessarily impose on it, wantonly re-designing the phenomenal world in a manner that is wholly inscrutable because wholly meaningless.

Grotesque defines it best. And it often occurs as what has come to be known as classic Quevedian 'satire'. For example, 'Viejecita, arredro vayas' (Planeta, 959) concerns

itself with an old woman who has the added misfortune (according to Quevedo's world-picture) of being married to a lawyer. It is virtually incomprehensible as a morally motivated piece. The insults derive from the plain fact and corporeal reality of senility, and González de Salas awakens us to this with the inclusion of pintura in his epigraph. When Quevedo brands her as a witch he does so not to expose and condemn, but to exploit the pictorial potential of the Satanic greeting. Her dripping nose is metamorphosized into that of a still, then into something more bestial:

> Doncella del alquitarre,
> vete a dar con el hocico
> hojaldre a las cataratas
> del ojo del enemigo. (Planeta, 961)

This wantonly revolting picture is indulged in for its own sake, serving no further purpose. It shocks, and the poem as a whole offers little by way of a comparative normality to alleviate the nastiness. There is no attempt by Quevedo to consolidate one static or permanent grotesque in the work. Grotesques jostle with, and sometimes displace each other. The quoted quatrain to some extent ousts the images of the following, of which variations were noted in the previous chapter:

> Barba, que con la nariz
> se junta a dar pellizco;
> sueño de Bosco con tocas,
> rostro de impresión del grifo. (961)

Moreover, the grotesques are interspersed with non-visual wit, e.g. 'no cara, sino Carón,/ el barquero del abismo' (ll. 37-8). The references back to the real are rare. In this example, the second line intimates that we should, perhaps, perceive an extremity of wrinkleage as opposed to a substitute reality:

> Cara forjada en encella,
> según arrugas atisbo,
> muesca de planta de pie,
> suelo de queso de Pinto. (960)

But the norm of pictorialism in the poem is for the human to be replaced by the object/animal, or to merge with it:

> Frente cáscara de nuez,
> que ha profesado de jimio,
> dos ojos de vendimiar,
> en dos cuévanos metidos;
> . . . . . .
> Considérote desnuda,
> andando sobre dos hilos,
> esqueleto en camisón. (960, 962)

Much of this sounds familiar. Apart from reminiscences in other poems, the detail here reproduces much of that in the Dueña Quintañona (OP, 189).

Quevedo often studied the decline of the female physique not for its own sake, but as a point of departure into a world where it would be re-fashioned. The one demand the grotesque does make is that the result should be pictorially feasible. Exaggerations and absurdities of an abstract character of themselves are best not counted grotesque, but they may often make a partial contribution to its context. In one sonnet,

the transformational grotesque dominates:

> En cuévanos, sin cejas y pestañas,
> ojos de vendimiar tenéis, agüela;
> cuero de Fregenal, muslos de suela;
> piernas y coño son toros y cañas.
>
> Las nalgas son dos porras de espadañas . . .
> cecina sois en hábito de arpía. (Planeta, 619)

The fourth line also involves a play on 'toros y cañas' = the fiesta, and in its metaphorical sense of 'much ado, a ding-dong of an argument'. But the emaciated, stick-like leg is mutated into the cylindrical bocel (toro), the shrivelled vulva into a cluster of dry reeds. To take the sonnet as a 'satire' would belie its essence. In one line Quevedo admonishes 'guardad los mandamientos', but this is a joke based on the previous line ('No es tiempo de guardar a niños, tía'). And his disgust that she allows herself to be seen in public is due to his own abhorrence of her appearance, not to her wish to flaunt or display herself (ll. 12-14). Lines 6-7 describe her resorting to cosmetics, but even these are concluded with 'y luego dais la teta a las arañas' (l.8) - a reminder that we are faced with something quite apart from the naturally deformed and the aberrations supplied by the real world.

Frye writes that 'the satirist has to select his absurdities and the act of selection is a moral act' (224). The grotesquer creates rather than selects absurdity, though his starting-point is usually that which lies on the periphery of the average or the normal. To that extent, he chooses. And he also limits himself to the sensibly comprehensible.

Within these bounds Quevedo managed to extend himself beyond his beloved crones. His poem about the wedding of a negro and negress, 'Vi, debe de haber tres días' (Planeta, 819), exemplifies the way in which grotesque can sweep our feet from under us in a subtle, non-dramatic fashion. To read it as a parody of social manners or as some sort of abuse of coloureds does not make much sense. Rather it consists of the construction of a literally black world. The couple arrive 'al negro patio/ donde está el negro aposento' and sit at a table

> donde también les pusieron
> negros manteles y platos,
> negra sopa y manjar negro.
> Echóles la bendición
> un negro veintidoseno,
> con un rostro de azabache
> y manos de terciopelo. (820)

In the terms of the poem this is fact, not fantasy. And it prepares us to believe in what follows. Some of the guests refuse the proffered black pudding:

> no las comieron, pensando
> se comían a sí mesmos.
> Cuál, por morder del mondongo,
> se atarazaba algún dedo,
> pues sólo diferenciaban
> en la uña de lo negro. (821)

For the ablutions the servant brings not a towel but 'las bayetas de un entierro', and when they have washed the water is pitch black, 'para ensuciar todo un reino' (821).

It could be argued that we may dispense with the hypothesis of the menacing grotesque in Quevedo by seeing these poems and passages simply as jokes to be laughed off. While in practical terms this objection is as difficult to uphold as it is to refute, it would appear that Renaissance theory of the risible cannot convincingly be made to account for artefacts of this kind. It was taken for granted that the ridiculous went hand-in-hand with the verisimilar. While a margin was allowed for caricature and exaggeration, being recognizably true to life was what made the funny funny. Aristotle allowed for an element of distortion in his definition: '[Comedy] consists in some blunder or ugliness that does not cause pain or disaster, an obvious example being the comic mask which is ugly and distorted but not painful'[84]. His thesis that the ugly was the inspiration of laughter was taken up by Cicero, who rendered it by turpitudo:

> Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi . . . turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur; haec enim ridentur, vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter. (De Oratore, II, 58, 236; Wilkins, 345)[85]

By deformitas he meant nothing other than physical deformity, so we cannot include grotesque here. Cicero had issued the general directive 'Haec igitur adhibenda est primum in iocatio moderatio' (II, 59, 238; 346). He had further prescribed:

> Est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum; sed quaerimus idem, quod in ceteris rebus maxime quaerendum est, quatenus. (II, 59, 239; 346)

This would make the admission of grotesque even more unlikely. In this tradition, Trissino wrote that the basis of the risible lay in 'il male picciolo, cioè non doloroso, e non mortifero, che in altri vedemo o udimo, come è bruttezza di corpo, schiocchezza d' animo, e simili'[86]. It was to be found in the everyday and common-place rather than in the fantastic:

> Se l' obietto che se appresenta a i sensi è mescolato di alcuna bruttezza, muove riso, come una faccia brutta e distorta, un movimiento inetto, una parola sciocca, una pronuntia grossa, una mano aspera, un vino di non grato sapore, una rosa di non bono odore, subitamente muove riso. (f. 37r)

Madius said that, naturally, the turpitudo could be ficta as well as vera, but all his definitions and examples abide by the Aristotelian and Ciceronian models and in no way make concessions to anything that resembles grotesque[87]. An explicit reference to the verisimilar is made by Nebrija in his definition, 'Iocatio est oratio quae ex aliqua re verisimili risum pudentem et liberalem movere potest'[88]. Grotesques cannot be fitted in here, nor do they belong to Castelvetro's notion of the source of laughter, 'le magagne del corpo con le loro operationi, qualunque volte ci sieno presentate copertamente'[89]. There is nothing covert or insinuated about a grotesque.

Against all this, it must be admitted that Horace had asked of the hypothetical monster which opens the Ars, 'spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?' (line 5). But the only commentator to link this with the ridiculous theory as

such was Paolo Beni in his elaboration on Aristotle's Poetics. And it is a rather grudgingly admitted connection that he makes:

> Ego non infitior posse pictorem quoque rem ridiculam imitari, quaeque risum (etsi longe minus quam comicum drama) excitet et gignat. Sed tamen pictoris vis ac munus non adstricta sunt ridiculis tantum abest ut intra ridiculi finibus coercatur: ac propterea definitio picturae haud potest ridiculis exprimi et conflari, quemadmodum Comediae constitutuitur definitio.[90]

The laughter Horace's invention might provoke pales in comparison with that stimulated by the more verisimilar comic drama, and it in no way calls for a revaluation of painting in terms of the ridiculous. Beni makes no mention of painted grotesques, which he certainly must have done had he believed that Horace was making a general point about the presence of the ridiculous in painting. Instead, he attempts an uneasy reconciliation between Horace's remark and Aristotle's notion of the ridiculous, and then goes on to deny all that it materially implies. The Aristotelian tradition overwhelms and stifles the implicit challenge levelled at it by Horace.

What this means for Quevedo is that where grotesques are incidental or subsidiary to the body of a funny poem, they detract from its humorous impact rather than consolidate it. Likewise, the 'moral' of some 'satire' will not be sharpened if the poem includes a protracted exercise in grotesque. If we look to the latter as justification for some attack, then we will quickly lose faith in the more credible grounds for that attack that a poem might contain.

Grotesques will not serve, and only set up tensions in poems where a poet is simultaneously intent on laughter or some didactic point. When they predominate, it seems not only desirable to talk of a context as grotesque but a safer procedure than using the alternative classifications. None of the many meanings of satírico and burlesco define its nature satisfactorily, and there is usually a flavour of positive criticism in the first, and always one of the comic in the second, both of which are essentially antithetical to the identity of grotesque.

CHAPTER THREE - NOTES

(1) Tesoro, 859.

(2) Iu. Iuvenalis Aquinatis satirographi opus . . . cum Iodoci Badii Ascesii familiaribus explanationibus (Venice, 1539), f. vi v; Diomediis grammatici opus, ab Iohanne Caesario ita emmendatum, scholiisque illustratum (Haganoae, 1526), f. 141r, quoted in full later in this chapter.

(3) John Minsheu, The Guide into Tongues (London, 1617), under satyra; Polydori Vergilii . . . de inventoribus rerum libri octo (Basileae, 1521), Bk I, Ch. 11, f. 7v. Although his definition, quoted shortly in the text, seems to derive from Diomedes, Vergilius may owe something to Donatus.

(4) Aulo Persio Flacco traducido en lengua castellana por Diego López (Burgos, 1609), f. 1v, quoted below.

(5) Or from lex satura. The alternative derivation, from satyrus, was the cause of a dispute, protracted even up to the time of Casoubon, e.g. in his De satirica Graecorum poesi et Romanorum satira libri duo (Paris, 1605), 312 et seq. For a sane account of the respective merits of the etymologies see Nicholas Rigaltius, Iunii Iuvenalis satirarum libri V (Paris, 1616), Prologue, f. ii v etc; or, more briefly, Diomedes, loc.cit.

(6) Porta de linguas (Lisbon, 1623), 354.

(7) Philosophía antigua poética (Madrid, 1596), 499.

(8) Dryden quoted in John M. Bullitt, Jonathan Swift and the Anatomy of Satire (Harvard U.P., 1953), 39.

(9) El tribunal de la justa venganza (Valencia, 1635), 14.

(10) Cf. the ed. by J. F. Montesinos (Oxford, 1954), 32.

(11) Segundo tomo del ingenioso caballero don Quijote de la Mancha (Tarragona, 1614), n.p.

(12) Cervantes, Don Quijote, ed. Martín de Riquer (Barcelona, 1965), II, 536.

(13) For the range of Lucilius beyond censure by ridicule, see F. Marx, C. Lucilii carminum reliquiae (Leipzig, 1904-5), 2 vols., passim; or the Loeb Remains of Old Latin, III (London, 1957), ed. Warmington. For a very short notice see H. R. Fairclough, in the Loeb ed. of Horace's Satires (London, 1970), xvi; or Niall Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Cambridge, 1966), 86. George Fiske's Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation (Madison, 1920) investigates the extent of Horace's debts; Rudd (ch. IV) is more concerned with his departure from Lucilius.

(14) For the common opinion of the equívoco, see n. (93) of ch. I; also Trillo, 154, and Alonso de Ledesma, Romancero y monstruo imaginado (Barcelona, 1616),f. 169r.

(15) In the Brussels, 1614 ed. of Santa Cruz de Dueñas's Floresta española de apothegmas, pt. VII, 159, equivocoques in the French text is translated as 'de dos significationes [sic]'.

(16) The Spectator, 1711, no. 62.

(17) I have avoided translating equívoco as 'pun'. For González de Salas it means either the homonym (homograph) - the different meanings of zapatilla, falta, grillo, brinco etc. were constantly exploited in the poetry of the time, and a classic case is the infans infans who was the Word - the value given in Gracián's definition, Obras, 396; or the purely 'conceptual' double-meaning, extrínseco and nothing to do with the form of the word, e.g. 'I shall flush my kidneys' = 'I shall get drunk'. Nowhere in his discussion (Janer, 373, 366) does he relate it to the non-homonymic homophone - 'The girl in the fruit shop has a nice pear' - hardly surprising in view of the phonetic regularity of the Spanish of even his day. Nor does he identify it with the impure homophone (rhetorical paronomasia) - 'Deligere oportet quem velis diligere'. However, Quevedo once calls a word-play on navaja/ no baja equívoco (OP, 806).

(18) The epigraph is supplied by J. J. López de Sedano in Parnaso español (Madrid, 1768), 328, from an earlier source.

(19) See Crosby's cited 'Quevedo, Horace ...', 436.

(20) See Blecua's note, Planeta, 620.

(21) So too Burchiello and his imitators, see Le più belle pagine del Burchiello e dei burchielleschi, ed. E. Giovanetti (Milan, 1923), 186-8, 27 etc. For details of the capitoli as such, J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, V (London, 1881), ch. 4.

(22) For one flea 'tradition' see R. O. Jones, 'Renaissance butterfly, mannerist flea: tradition and change in Renaissance poetry', MLN, LXXX (1965), 166-84. One might add Castillo Solórzano's 'A una pulga' in Huerta de Valencia (Madrid, [1629], 1944), 155. Vittorio Imbriani's chapter in Studi letterari e bizarrie satiriche, ed. Croce (Bari, 1907), 382-93, is less than useful.

(23) Cf. the prologues in Les nouvelles, ed.cit., 173 etc.

(24) Del Alcázar, Poesías, ed. F. Rodríguez Marín (Madrid, 1910), 50; Poesías satíricas y burlescas de don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (Madrid, 1876), 36.

(25) Rimas humanas y divinas (Madrid, 1634), f. 13v.

(26) Pantaleón, Obras ed. R. de Balbín Lucas (Madrid, 1944), 2 vols, II, 59.

(27) It is not registered in Covarrubias. Pedro Pineda's claim (indicated by the asterisk) that his Nuevo diccionario español e inglés (London, 1740) is the first to record it is far wide of the mark.

(28) As postulated by Ronald Knox, Essays in Satire (London, 1928), 15-43; James Sutherland, English Satire (Cambridge, 1958), 3-4; Frye, 224-5.

(29) Études sur l'Oeuvre Poétique de don Luis de Góngora y Argote (Bordeaux, 1967), 39 et seq. In fact the epigraphs are consistent in the Hoces eds. from 1633 onwards, discussed later in the text, thus including a period beyond the debut of the Parnaso.

(30) I borrow the phrase from R. Tofte's translation of Ariosto's Satires (London, 1608), 49.

(31) Letrillas de don Luis de Góngora y Argote (Paris, 1963).

(32) Francisci Vavassoris Societ. Iesu de ludicra dictione (Paris, 1658), 243; Scaliger, Poetices libri septem (Heidelberg, 1617), I, 12, 44, VI, 6, 773 etc. A rare exception is Badius, who sees Horace as steering a middle course between the acerbitas of Lucilius and the suavitas of Juvenal, Sermones et Epistolae Quinti Horatii Flacci (Paris, 1503), IIv. Those who only compare Horace with Lucilius only also decide in his favour - 'multum est tersior ac purus magis Horatius est', Quintilian, Institutio, X, 1, 94. Pinciano, 501, seems to follow Scaliger.

(33) Satires, I, 4, ll. 78 et seq., Fairclough ed., 54-6.

(34) The phrase 'evasive tactics' is Rudd's, 90. For further evidence of his targets being his living contemporaries, see Rudd again, 133-8.

(35) Fairclough, following Tenney Frank, sees the 'hic' in l. 90 as Lucilius (56, 120). I find this incompatible with Horace's appreciation of Lucilius, cf. Rudd, 91.

(36) Desvelos soñolientos y discursos de verdades soñadas (Barcelona, 1629), Prólogo.

(37) Bullitt, 75, quoting Otway.

(38) In the ed. of A. Pérez Gómez (Valencia, 1952), 21.

(39) Quoted by José Sánchez, Academias literarias del Siglo de Oro español (Madrid, 1961), 23.

(40) Novelas ejemplares (Barcelona, 1963), 367. The reference is to Juvenal, see Saturarum libri V, ed. L. Friedlaender (Leipzig, 1895), I, l. 30, page 137 - 'difficile est saturam non scribere'.

(41) Segunda parte del entremés de Maese Pedro y el médico de espíritu, in E. Cotarelo's Colección de entremeses, Nueva biblioteca de autores españoles, XVII (Madrid, 1911), 328.

(42) Works, ed. R. B. McKerrow (+ F. P. Wilson), (Oxford, 1958), 20. He particularly has Stubbes's Anatomie of Abuses in mind, as will be obvious from his jokes.

(43) Obras sueltas de Lupercio y Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, ed. Conde la Viñaza (Madrid, 1889), 2 vols., 296. The full text is not given in Blecua, Rimas, II, xxviii et seq.

(44) Cf. Planeta, 613, 617, and Blecua's notes; Trillo, 220; Marino, in Canto VII of the Adone, 'la lingua sua viepiù che spada taglia,/ la penna sua viepiù che fiamma coce', quoted by Luciano Erba, 'Realismo e italianismo in Saint-Amant', Aevum, XXXVII (1963), 285-97.

(45) From the preface to A Tale of a Tub, quoted by F. R. Leavis in 'The irony of Swift', in Swift: Modern Judgements ed. A. Norman Jeffares (London, 1968), 124. Cf. the more familiar 'Satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's face but their own', from the preface to The Battle of the Books.

(46) Act II, 7, 69 et seq. For this, and for many other references, I am indebted to Louis Lecocq's La Satire en Angleterre de 1588 à 1603 (Paris, 1969).

(47) As suggested before, much of Pinciano's argument derives from Donatus.

(48) For the identification of Laureles as Ponce de León see Astrana Marín's ed. of Obras completas: verso (Madrid, 1943), 1032. There is some likeness in the wording of the two passages.

(49) Nor does it for the Italian maledire, which Mazzoni discusses as the essence of satire. See Weinberg, II, 881.

(50) Quoted by Miguel de la Pinta Llorente, La inquisición española y los problemas de la cultura y de la intolerancia (Madrid, 1953-8), 2 vols., I, 26; also by Rodríguez Marín in B. del Alcázar's Poesias, lxxxviii.

(51) Quoted in Autoridades, 53.

(52) I have personally compared the Madrid, 1634 and 1670 eds. According to Balbín Lucas, the Saragossa, 1650 ed. is simply a reprint of the 1634, and the Madrid, 1648 matches the Madrid 1670.

(53) 'Cuando la rosada aurora' is an exception, finding its way into the lyric section of the 1633 ed. This was a commerce not without parallel, e.g. Castalia, II, 78.

(54) The word sátira was certainly around at that time, although perhaps in exclusive association with its Latin form. Jerónimo de Villegas produced a translation of Juvenal's sixth, 'Ésta es la sexta de sátira de Juvenal . . . (Valladolid, 1519). Corominas simply quotes Nebrija as his earliest source, Diccionario (Berne, 1954), I, under asaz.

(55) I base this on a scrutiny of the Romancero general (Madrid/Valladolid, 1600-04-05) in the ed. of A. González Palencia (Madrid, 1947), 2 vols. The various eds. of Flor de varios romances and Ramilletes de flores that appeared around the peninsula between 1589-97 offer a few examples of burlas de, but no sátira that I can find.

(56) Examples a-plenty in Cardos del jardín de Lope ed. J. de Entrambasaguas (Madrid, 1942).

(57) Similarly, geography seems to have played a part in deciding whether certain works were published at all, or in what shape. While the revised Juguetes de la niñez was the only edition of the Sueños published in Madrid, two separate editions of the Desvelos soñolientos unrevised version were produced in Barcelona in 1635, alongside the 'official' text.

(58) T. Petroni Arbitri E. R. Satiricon extrema editio ex museo d. Iosephi Antoni Consali de Salas (Frankfurt, 1629). It includes a novel etymology for satira, from saturi - drunkards - who are especially prone to indulge in gossip and pass judgement, which he links with maledicere (22).

(59) D. Iunii Iuvenalis Aquinatis satirae (Lugduni Batavorum, 1695), 903.

(60) Frye has two boundaries of satire, attack without humour, and the humour of pure fantasy (224-5). In seventeenth century terms, it might be useful to add others - the ridiculous, pure malice, the grotesque, irony (which Frye distinguishes from satire by making the latter 'militant irony' (223), and not a separate territory).

(61) Quintilian's claim that satire 'tota nostra est', (Institutio, X, 1, 94; ed.cit., IV, 52) has been interpreted as 'we are the best at satire' in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. But Horace himself called Lucilius 'Graecis intacti carminis auctor' (Satires, I, 10, 66; 120).

(62) An intact example of Menippean satire survives in Seneca's Apocolocyntosis Divi Claudii, according to the Britannica. It is clear that, for all his reservations as to Lucilius's artistry, Horace saw himself as writing in the tradition he had established, and that he considered Terentius Varro as an unaccomplished exponent of the same style, not the originator of a new one (cf. Satires, I, 10, 46-9). That the auctor of l. 66 can only be Lucilius is manifest from ll. 64-5 (contrast the Oxford Classical Dictionary entry under satura), and Horace nowhere refers to Ennius or Pacuvius as satirists.

(63) See n. (13).

(64) For the idea that Horace deliberately eschewed satura, see Badius, 'poeta noster, ne lectores acerbitate nominis territi aufugiant, maluit sermones quam satiras appellare' (Sermones et epistloae, f. IIv, cf. IIr, and the Venice, 1539 ed. of Juvenal, f. IIr); and Bartolomé Leonardo, 'Horacio, a honor de la nueva gravedad de la sátira, a una gran parte de las suyas las llamó sermones, que es lo mismo que si dijera razonamientos sesudos y graves', (Obras sueltas, 297). This must remain at the level of speculation. Against it one can quote Satires, II, 1, 1 and the fact that Lucilius called his own efforts 'ludus ac sermones' (Fairclough, xv).

(65) Note that González de Salas always assumes that Horace is impersonal which amounts, as argued, to a misrepresentation of him - one which has survived the Renaissance. Fairclough summarizes Satires, I, 4, 'Horace maintains that his own satire is not personal, but rather social and general in its application. He does not indulge in the invective of the Old Comedy, but rather follows the new in spirit as well as in style.', 47. The text cannot support this interpretation Note also that for G. de S., Juvenal is the 'famoso poeta de la sátira inferior latina' (Janer, 234).

(66) Whatever the cause of his imprisonment in 1629, for instance, the opinion was that satire had something to do with it, cf. Planeta, LIII.

(67) Note the 'incorrect' form, sátiro, from satyrus. Cf. Barrios, 176.

(68) Cf. Terry, Anthology, for examples: 6, 17, 18, 20, 21.

(69) See Ch. I, n. (12).

(70) Both romance and romance burlesco count as genérico for Crosby. Below I reserve the term 'generic' for epigraphs of the romance burlesco type, and not for plain soneto or romance.

(71) For what follows see Castalia, II, 191 et seq., and for the romances, ibid, III, 112 et seq.; in Planeta, 729 et seq., 1077 et seq.

(72) An accessible text is Janer, 300, who is also puzzled by the codification.

(73) Moreover, the poem is not Quevedo's, which González de Salas would probably have known (Planeta, CXXIII). For a text see Janer, 301.

(74) 'Si [los poetas amorosas] las quieren a sus damas, lo más que le dan es un soneto o unas otavas; si las aborrecen o las dejan es una sátira' (OP, 156); 'Escríbate, pues, sátiras quien quiera,/ que yo alabanzas solas quiero darte', Argensola, Rimas II, 104. The poem in question is called sátira or 'da matraca a' in MSS, Castalia, III, 124. Also, ibid., 179 etc; OV, 1137 for an epigraph to 'Corrido y confuso', deleted from the canon by Blecua.

(75) Using Crosby's norms we should see González de Salas's hand in the title 'Sátira a los coches' - a prototype privativo. But this would be the only time he used sátira in an epigraph to a romance. It is also thoroughly at odds with the high ideal of satire to which he subscribed, and the great respect he manifested for the word itself.

(76) It is not always easy to tell when a simple a in an epigraph means 'about', 'to' or 'on', as opposed to '(sátira) a'. Similarly, contra often means 'a joke about', indicating a mock attack on the non-human without there being any application to moral behaviour, even obliquely. Hence 'Quevedo contra Valladolid' in BN 3795 (Castalia, II, 476). Humour is expensive. If not a person, then an object must pay the cost. The MSS titles to 'Tocóse' - 'Contra los coches', all instances deriving from a pliego suelto according to Blecua - constitute no evidence that the poem intends a 'moral' (Castalia, III, 129).

(77) His prologue to Las tres musas bears witness to the confusion that could arise from overworking burlesco, using it both as a blanket term including satire, and to indicate moral-less humour. Aldrete starts off by claiming that his uncle's burlesque works, as well as the serious and religious, 'se dirigen a la reformación de costumbres' (Janer, 375). He repeats that this is the province of 'lo escrito sacro y serio', adding 'en lo burlesco trató de lo mesmo, rebozando lo agrio de la reprehensión con lo dulcemente sazonado de la chanza' (376). Later, referring to poems Quevedo wrote in his youth, he comments: 'Otras burlescas, de que no se saca moralidad, hizo para divertir el ingenio con la variedad' (ibid.). In the first two instances Aldrete is not totally identifying 'real' satire with burlesque. He is simply making the predictable and knowingly exaggerated claim (which he contradicts the third time) that his uncle was never merely frivolous. This does not reflect inconsistency on his part, but rather a characteristic indolence, appealing to two values of burlesco without bothering to use a synonym for one of them.

(78) I have consulted these eds. of the Primavera: Madrid, 1621, 1622 (a reprint), 1623 (expanded), 1626 (reprint of 1623); Barcelona, 1626 (the same, with different pagination). The Lisbon, 1626 ed., which I have also seen, offers little guarantee of being the work of Arias Pérez, much less do the later eds., judging by the data Montesinos gives of them. Montesinos does not supply epigraphs other than those of the princeps, and has not seen all the versions (notably the Madrid, 1626). References are to his ed. unless otherwise indicated. We may draw a veil of discreet silence over the sixteenth-century 'first edition' cited by Simón Díaz. Quevedo's contributions to this could only have been composed while he was being dandled upon his mother's knee.

(79) The poem is Ledesma's, Romancero, f. 112r. Alfay, obviously unconvinced that it was 'moral', called it a romance gustoso. Poesías varias, 18.

(80) Facsimile ed., The Hispanic Society of America (1902).

(81) R. O. Jones, referring to the Mondoñedo, 1553 ed., finds them 'lively'; A Literary History of Spain: The Golden Age: Prose and Poetry (London, 1971), 15. For the inclusion of straight moral poems under Thalia, see below. Private Eye, our only extant British satirical periodical (Punch lost its punch long since), alternates serious exposés of individuals and organizations with properly derisory attacks on same.

(82) See Castalia, II, 202.

(83) For instance, see Kenneth R. Scholberg, Sátira e invectiva en la España medieval (Madrid, 1971), esp. 281 et seq. The Eye is quite explicit about the identity of its victims, at least until they have won their libel suits. It also attacks types, as in the current 'Great Bores' series (and cf. The Life and Times of "Private Eye" [Penguin Books, 1972], 124). Its taste for lavatory jokes, mildish obscenity and non-didactic humour are also characteristic. In all, its pages reflect all those tendencies associated with sátira in Quevedo's day.

(84) Poetics, V, 1-2; trans. W. Rhys Roberts, Loeb ed. (London, 1927), 19-21. For similar classical precedents in Plato, Plutarch etc. see Mary A. Grant, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable (Madison, 1924), 25, 37 etc.

(85) In his translation of Aristotle, Antonio Riccobono used the Ciceronian term turpitudo: 'Comedia vero est . . . imitatio peiorum, at non secundum omne vitium, sed turpitudinis est particula ridiculum. Etenim ridiculum est erratum quoddam, et turpitudo sin dolore etc.'. Quoted from Aristotelis opera edidit Academia Regia Borusica (Berlin, 1831), 742-50.

(86) La quinta e la sesta divisione della poetica del Trissino (Venice, 1563), f. 37v. For this source, as for most here, I am indebted to Marvin T. Herrick's Comic Theory in the Sixteenth Century (Urbana, 1964).

(87) In Aristotelis librum de poetica (Venice, 1550), 305; 302.

(88) Given in Mayans y Siscar's Organum rhetoricum et oratorium concinnatum ex arte rhetorica Aelii Antonii Nebrissensis . . . et ex institutionibus oratoriis Petri Ioannis Nunnesii (Valencia, 1774), 78.

(89) Poetica d' Aristotele vulgarizzata et sposta per Lodovico Castelvetro (Basilea, 1576), 97. The reference is to Castelvetro's third category of the ridevole, the only one relevant here. The views of Francesco Robortello (reprinted in an appendix at the end of Herrick's Comic Theory, 227 et seq.) are quite consistent, for the purposes of the present argument, with the opinions of the other critics quoted.

(90) In Aristotelis poeticam commentarii (Patavii in Beniana, 1613), 162, ll. 1-4 of Horace are quoted on the same page.

IV

IRONY AND AMBIGUITY

Much of Quevedo, if it is to be taken as ultimately upholding the Christian ethic, can only work in some sort of oblique fashion. This chapter examines the extent to which various methods of indirect moralizing might justify or excuse the content of apparently subversive items, and concludes that in many instances the hypothesis of the circuitous but orthodox moral is plainly inadequate. Whether Quevedo was intent upon some deliberate programme of underground propaganda, or was privately airing grievances against establishment morality, or was simply executing a series of variations on a theme, is not altogether clear. And finally it is a dispensable consideration. No matter how listless, laboured and much-repeated one of his patently orthodox satires may be, it can still claim the sanction of being ethically correct. Likewise, a morally dangerous piece cannot be dismissed as merely frivolous unless this can be squared with Renaissance 'ridiculous' theory - a procedure, it will be argued, which barely recommends itself in practice. There is a tendency on the part of most modern critics to argue the existence of an 'ironical satirist' behind the dubious in Quevedo, a tendency that derives from the assumption - unsubstantiated, and probably originating in the pious brayings of Quevedo himself - that even in his humour he nearly always has a point, and that this point is unfailingly compatible with the Christian outlook. This assumption is avoided, and each poem is examined in the light of literary precedents and peers, and of any relevant

rhetorical structures involved. Thereby it is hoped in some measure to resolve the doubts pertinently forwarded by Louis Lecocq:

> Sommes-nous bien sûrs, après quatre siècles, de ne pas avoir perdu la faculté d'apprécier certains modes ironiques? Ne sommes-nous pas contraints parfois d'hésiter entre des interprétations opposées, et de nous demander si un auteur est un libertin ou un moraliste? (La Satire, 92)

Just why a poet who is at heart a moralist should choose to be devious rather than direct itself demands explanation. The customary answer is here formulated by Shaftesbury: 'If men are forbid to speak their minds seriously on certain subjects they will do it ironically'[1]. In the case of Quevedo, this cuts two ways. It is to his credit that he was quite forthright in his exposure of the carnality of the clerical class, of corruption in the police and in the legal profession. His honesty found little favour with the Inquisition, which explicitly took exception to the abuse of religious, however justifiable[2]. One might have expected him to have voiced his misgivings in a less open manner. On the other hand, if Quevedo was intent on disseminating, or simply examining, a moral incompatible with orthodoxy, frank assertion would not have recommended itself as the most suitable means of communication.

Further, while Quevedo was regularly direct in his attacks on establishment vice, it is strange that he so often chose the oblique when he dealt with sexual freedom, professional cuckoldry, hedonism, selfishness. Unequivocal

attack would not only be more useful for the reader, but perfectly safe for the writer. Examples of crude irony, in which praise patently amounts to blame, present no problem, but these are probably not in the majority in Quevedo. The rest range through various degrees of ambiguity to poems in which it is difficult to see anything other than the reasoned and sophisticated advocacy of compromised morals.

Except where expediency or necessity demands it, irony would, on the whole, seem a rather unlikely instrument for the 'satirist'. At best an unreliable servant, and always a tyrannical master, it has the habit of taking over. Brought in as the scourge of a pest, it can too easily become a pest itself. It is a weapon as likely to explode in the satirist's face as to hit the target, leaving the onlooker to take the unharmed evil as good. Sansovino argued that satire ought to be straight-forward:

> Basta al satirico apertamente riprender gli errori senz' altro artificio. . . . La satira richiede la verità ruda e aperta . . . una schietta semplicità con una acerbità severa.[3]

This approach not only makes the moral lesson clear, but is also related to the satirist's right to indignation (sdegno) in the face of vice[4]. A rather different demand that the writer be circumspect in his use of the oblique was voiced by Pellicer y Tovar in his criticism of funny plays:

> Y así debe procurar el artífice en su contento que saquen escarmiento, y no ejemplo, de las acciones malas, y ejemplo, y no escarmiento, de las acciones buenas; . . . para lo cual

> conviene que apure los colores a la elocuencia, y pinte los vicios tan feos, describa los delitos tan abominables, y represente las culpas tan horribles, que el mozo inadvertido, la doncella incauta, el hombre maduro, la mujer experimentada, y todo linaje de gentes, los cobren horror y no deseo, y vayan persuadidos, con aquella apariencia escandalosa, a huir la traición viéndola castigada, el adulterio reprehendido etc.[5]

Judged in the light of this, many of Quevedo's poems appear grievously at fault. An interlocutor will sing the praises of adultery, say, without there being the slightest indication that he has been, or will be punished. Moreover, the ironical aids of intonation and gesture, so frequent in theatre and oratory, are for the most part lost in a poem.

Again, the more accomplished an ironist a poet becomes, the greater the responsibility upon the reader to scrutinize his intention, and the more likely misinterpretation by the readership as a whole. González de Salas, quoting Saint Jerome, pointed out that 'la vileza del vulgo' was easily deceived, and most admired what it least understood[6]. With impunity might Francisco de Castro preface his versions of myth, 'Yo por fábulas las vendo, cómanse el meollo los que tienen más seso'[7]. If the satirist threw out a similar challenge to the understanding, he ran the risk of completely misleading the ignorant and slow-witted. Most modern commentators have been very kind to the Sueños, accepting them as fundamentally diagnostic and critical of various social ills. Some of Quevedo's contemporaries, less able or less willing to separate the direct from the indirect

attack, were dismayed at what seemed largely a huge joke at the expense of eschatological theology. The idea that Quevedo did not consider the Church's traditional teaching on Hell as a source of merriment did not occur to them. After all, making the underworld a laughing-stock, whatever your ultimate moral, is a very risky means of encouraging fear of the eternal punishments, too high a price to pay for the successful exposure of lusty friars and water-loving inn-keepers. It warns against the shallows yet makes light of the depths. Two censuras of the Discurso de todos los diablos represent a conservative, but by no means extremist ecclesiastical reaction to the format. Neither was written by anyone at that time a known enemy of Quevedo. Niseno begins with a very telling definition of the work: 'Es sátira; su principal artificio, hablar del infierno como cosa de burla, como de lugar donde los condenados dicen chistes, gracejan y se entretienen'[8]. The learned will be disedified at the mockery; the ignorant are in greater danger, 'porque creerán que en el infierno pasa así todo lo que aquí dice este autor; que no son las penas como nos enseña la fe' (198). The crudity of this general criticism is balanced somewhat by his specific objections, e.g. 'Dice que van contentas al infierno las mujeres. Si lo dice de veras, es error; si por donaire, irrisión de las penas, engaño de los ignorantes' (200). The cause of their satis-faction derives from their believing themselves exempt from 'Ibi erit fletus et stridor dentium', having arrived toothless (to which Niseno again takes great exception). The Dueña swiftly disillusions them - any stumps they have left will

suit the purpose - and they are then carted off for tinder. Possibly Quevedo's point is that no-one may escape their deserts. But the passage reads more readily as a none too reverent application of the words of Christ. More important is the fact that it is perfectly understandable as a moral-less joke. It makes sense without a lesson. As Niseno foresaw, the less alert brain (and the less scrupulous conscience, for that matter) would be quite content to enjoy this as a piece of daring parody. And one wonders how even the <u>docto</u> might be better equipped to sift out the didactic here - 'et stridor radiconum', if you please! Niseno ascribes to Quevedo appeal to the oblique as the endorsement of his approach:

> La salida que tiene el autor para disculpar el libelo es decir que es discurso enigmático y figurativo para significar su concepto; que la realidad, la verdad, no se menoscaba por él, se queda entera y en su lugar. (201)

This he dismisses on the grounds that it is not made sufficiently clear, 'No dice fue sueño, ni que es parábola, sino que pasa así como lo cuenta' (ibid.). Unlike Niseno, Bartolomé de la Fuente argues that since the work is 'fingido, enigmático y figurativo, para declarar su concepto por enigmas y figuras' one cannot attack its <u>proposiciones</u> as literal statements of truth[9]. However, he reaches more or less the same conclusion as Niseno by claiming that the <u>asumpto</u> will lead the 'ignorantes y gente vulgar' to hold in contempt the dogma of the torments of Damnation since Quevedo 'pone en ellas consuelo, alivio, entretenimiento y donaires y otras

cosas repugnantes al estado de los condenados' (201-2). He brands it as 'satírico y escandaloso', which (as must be obvious from the previous chapter) does not reflect some clerical or personal crusade against satire as a whole, but rather identifies the work with fringe literature[10]. Criticisms of this sort were made out of impatience with anything less than self-evident obliquity, and out of scepticism that there was, finally, a respectable precept to be reached.

It would be helpful at this point to sketch in the relevant rhetorical background, and then suggest which devices Quevedo himself used. Basic definitions give the impression that irony was normally understood as intending the contrary, the exact opposite of what was said[11]. Often the subsequent treatment of the idea and many of the examples quoted only very imperfectly match this definition, which derives from an attempt to succinctly and sufficiently differentiate the essence of irony from other forms of rhetorical allegory[12]. But pure, simple irony does not exist to the exclusion of 'impure' or more sophisticated varieties. And it does not help much to take irony as indicating a meaning 'in the region of' the contrary rather than the contrary itself, since it often involves the rejection or derision of the statement as fact, without implying affirmation of its opposite. Theories vary in how far they subscribe to the ideal, and even more so do the illustrations forwarded.

In his discussion Cicero identifies <u>dissimulatio</u> with <u>eironeia</u>, also introducing the Latin form <u>ironia</u> (<u>De Oratore</u>, II, 67, 270)[13]. His definition, which differs markedly from all those which succeed it, runs:

> Urbana etiam dissimulatio est, cum alia dicuntur ac sentias, non illo genere, de quo ante dixi, cum contraria dicas, ut Lamiae Crassus, sed cum toto genere orationis severe ludas, cum aliter sentias ac loquare.
>
> (II, 67, 269; Wilkins, 366)

The example he then gives is very revealing. Septumuleius had received as a reward for the head of C. Gracchus, once his friend, its weight in gold. Subsequently he asked Scaevola, about to leave to Asia as praetor, if he might accompany him as prefect. Scaevola answered: 'Quid tibi vis, insane? tanta malorum est multitudo civium, ut tibi ego hoc confirmem, si Romae manseris, te paucis annis ad maximas pecunias esse venturum' (ibid.). His meaning is clearly: 'I don't want to risk my neck by taking <u>you</u> along for company'; this is disguised as 'Stay in Rome and get rich by decapitating the evil men around', which is itself disguised as 'There are so many evil men in Rome, you'll get rich if you stay'. It is difficult to see this in terms of the contrary or opposite. For all the exaggeration, Scaevola had no doubt that Septumuleius would again be prepared to cash in on the politically expedient assassination. By <u>dissimulatio</u> he was able to convey this without actually saying it[14].

The back reference made by Cicero is to II, 65, 262, where Crassus is quoted, calling his rival advocate Lamia a <u>pulchellus puer</u> and <u>disertus</u> ('the little beauty', 'eloquent') while he was both deformed and, for Crassus at least, a poor orator (Wilkins, 361). This looks like classic irony. Perhaps we are meant to understand 'illo genere

[dissimulationis]' and not 'illo genere [facetiarum]' at II, 67, 269, but since at II, 65, 261 the Crassus quotation is identified as 'inversio verborum' and not as a type of dissimulation, this is unlikely. For Cicero, then, the feigning element is vital to the concept of eironeia/dissimulatio. For all practical purposes it is absent from 'pulchellus puer', whose meaning was perfectly evident to the whole court-room, whereas in the Scaevola example there is the possibility that part of the meaning will escape part of the audience - his words make perfect sense as a veiled attack on Septumuleius's mercenary loyalties, yet can be further applied to his refusal of the latter's offer.

It was probably with Cicero in mind that Quintilian wrote 'eironeia inveni qui dissimulationem vocaret', adding that dissimulatio is insufficient to cover all the meanings of the Greek word (Institutio, IX, 2, 44; Butler, III, 398)[15]. He enumerates some ten types of eironeia, all of which involve contraries (secs. 47-53), as is consistent with his basic definition, 'contrarium ei quod dicitur intelligendum est' and 'in eo vero genere [allegoriae], quo contraria ostenduntur, ironia est; illusionem vocant' (ibid. and VIII, 6, 54; Butler, III, 332)[16]. These range from antiphrasis - 'I won't tell you what a swine I think you are' does tell and is therefore contrary to what it appears to say; this figure involves negatio[17] - to so exaggerating the seriousness of an already grievous crime, such as parricide, that we make the very accusation incredible and it is transformed into a ready-made defence (Butler, III, 400, 406). Quintilian divides eironeia into trope and the nine sorts of

figure. The first (trope) corresponds to Cicero's 'inversio verborum'. He quotes an example from Cicero himself, 'ad sodalem tuum, virum optimum, Metellum demigrasti' (In Catilinam, I, 8, 19). As the context shows, Metellus was anything but a vir optimus, nor did he, in the event, show himself much of a friend (sodalis) to Catiline, who had to seek refuge elsewhere. Quintilian comments: 'in duobus demum verbis est ironia', i.e. in optimus and sodalis (Butler III, 400). The trope is more straight-forward than the figure:

> Tropos apertior est, quamquam aliud dicit ac sentit, non aliud tamen simulat. Nam et omnia circa fere recta sunt. At in figura totius voluntatis fictio est apparens magis quam confessa, ut illic verba sint verbis diversa, hic sensus [diversus] sermoni et voci et tota interim causae conformatio [diversa]. (ibid.)

This is an important qualification since apparens etc. places a fair part of the burden of understanding on the shoulders of the reader/listener. At the same time, it is clear from each of his examples for the figures that the diversum always indicates the contrarium. The figure as such does not depend upon the trope, but just as continuous metaphor can render the whole allegorical, so 'hoc schema [figure] faciat tropos ille contextus' (ibid.).

Quintilian singles out as superlatively comical that 'genus decipendi opinionem aut dicta aliter intelligendi', which can be separated into simulatio and dissimulatio 'quae sunt vicina et prope eadem, sed simulatio est certam opinionem

animi sui imitantis, dissimulatio aliena se parum intelligere fingentis' (VI, 3, 84-5; Butler, II, 484)[19]. Obviously this drastically reduces the range of Ciceronian dissimulatio. In the same context he admits of some other ways of oblique representation ('averti intellectus et aliter solet'). In the first, meaning 'ab asperioribus ad leniora deflectitur'. When asked what he thought of the adulterer who was caught red-handed, one dry individual replied that he had been very slow - 'tardum fuisse' (sec. 87; Butler, II, 486). Quintilian might have added that this was a way of passing comment on the questioner and his question. The second 'dicitur per suspicionem [insinuation] . . . intelligitur enim quod non dicitur'. Both of these fit Cicero's definition of dissimulatio. Lullo argued that Quintilian's distinctions were not altogether necessary, and that ironia should be treated as a single concept: 'ut unum sit unius rei nomen, etsi plurimum ex analogia, unum si lubet accipito' (De oratione, 306). He calls the adultery example ironical, for instance, and his definition of irony suggests a return to Ciceronian dissimulatio, in preference to Quintilian's contraries, as the basis of the notion: 'Haec [ironia] autem prorsus in fingendis tum nostris, tum alienis opinionibus sita est' (ibid.), the second clause allowing for Quintilian's dissimulatio[20].

That Quintilian's distinctions are neither water-tight nor mutually exclusive must be obvious. The first sort of obliquity is just a type of dissimulatio as he defines it. His third species of it is tellingly named fictio ex ironia, 'fabrication through irony'. A witness claims that the defendant had taken a sword to his thighs. Counsel for the

defence retorts: What else could he have done, since you were wearing a helmet and breast-plate? (sec. 91; Butler, II, 488). This misrepresents the facts, and thereby the nature, of the accusation. The defence pretends not to have understood, and mockingly turns the complaint against the complainer. It is difficult to see how contraries are relevant here. Quintilian's eighth ironical figure consists of exaggerating the charge so as to dismiss it easily, again something rather different from the present instance. This is not the only time that, despite himself, he allowed his ironia to be coloured by Cicero's dissimulatio. The following anecdote is offered as prototype ironia. The ambitious Didius Gallus had selfishly sought a provincial governorship. When it was granted to him, he fell to protesting that he had been coerced into acceptance. Which prompted Afer's exhortation, 'Age aliquid et rei publicae causa' (VI, 3, 68; Butler, II, 474). Taking the sentence as a whole, it is obvious that Afer meant it. The ironical element is 'rei publicae causa' - 'So far you've only looked after your own interests, think of the state for a change'. This makes sense as dissimulated censure. To read it as the signification of the contrary (i.e. presumably, 'Noli agere aliquid pro te') is extremely awkward. Not only is self-interest not, properly speaking, the contrary of patriotism (which is treason), but the sentence actually does mean what it says, whatever else it might imply. The oblique element operates via suspicio, Quintilian's second category of the indirect, and not through any of his eironeia figures.

Underlying Quintilian's contradictions of usage is the fact that once we move beyond that type of simplistic, unaccomplished irony which can be located in the single word, we enter a region where, to a greater or lesser extent, all or part of the meaning is liable to be ambiguous (obscure), or ambiguous (doubtful but clearly ambivalent), or multiple. Technically, rhetorical ambiguity only concerns the second of these[21]. Yet it is easy to appreciate how the others might be involved. In the last example, Didius, had he been as vain as he was greedy, might have taken Afer's remark as frank encouragement. Perhaps at the time of the utterance the intonation of the words conveyed their hidden meaning. But as they stand they admit of this additional interpretation, which places them even further apart from the irony of direct contradiction, in the sphere of the multiple meaning. The latter will nearly always involve some measure of obscurity for some of the listeners. And the ironist can be so subtle as to lose the comprehension of almost all but himself. In that case it is not so much that there exists a range of suitable interpretations but that only inadequate, ill-fitting explanations are forthcoming, and the speaker's or poet's mind remains inscrutable.

Demetrius wrote of an example of ambiguity [amphibole] that it would 'leave one puzzled as to whether it is meant as admiration or as mockery. This ambiguous way of speaking, although not irony [eironeia], yet has a suggestion of irony' (De Elocutione, 291; Roberts, 477). Quintilian himself had said that simulatio and dissimulatio most often found their opportunity in ambiguitas (VI, 3, 87). With appeal to his

treatment of the latter, one can speculate as to how this might happen. Quintilian is concerned mainly to show how to avoid ambiguity in the drawing up of wills etc., and does not examine how or why poets might wish to exploit it although he does quote from one or two. He makes a distinction between two main types of amphibolia (= ambiguitas); that of the intentional double entendre, and that deriving from the homonym (VI, 3, 47 and 62). The latter is eventually distinguished into three based on single words, and a further three based on grammatical structures which allow two meanings for the same words in the same sequence (VII, 9, 1-9; Butler, III, 152-6). We may take one of each trio. I might simulate praise of my enemy and dissimulate my scorn of him by saying that he lived 'inculto loco', in culto implying the exact opposite of inculto. If I were patriotic but staying at Rome I might tell the natives 'Aio vos, Romanos, Britannicos vincere posse', simulating flattery and dissimulating contempt[22]. To consolidate the deception I might adopt an ingratiating tone of voice, and if challenged could make appeal to the flattering sense of the words. Even if the other party were unable to decide as to my true disposition, the statements would still amount to dissimulation of my feelings, though not in that case to the successful simulation of contrary feelings. Furthermore, to disguise awareness that the statement you are making is ambivalent corresponds exactly to Quintilian's very circumscribed notion of dissimulatio[23].

The relationship between non-homonymic double meanings and dissimulatio/simulatio is more immediately apparent. If

I invite a young lady to see my etchings I dissimulate my true purpose by simulating an interest in art and a confidence in her critical faculties. Again, to choose an example which exactly matches Quintilian's dissimulatio rather than Cicero's, were I asked what I thought of the local crumpet I might reply that I prefer toast.

Both theoretical and practical efforts to disentangle the ironical from the ambiguous will meet with only limited success. A consideration of the Autoridades definition bears this out. Amphibología is defined:

> Modo de hablar artificioso, con equívoco, y con dos sentidos opuestos, o diferentes, con el que se deslumbra y engaña al que oye, sin mentir en nada el que habla. (276).

The explicit reference to contrary meanings makes it sound like 'pure' irony, recalling Demetrius's example, although 'pure' irony technically does lie (whereas the non-contradictory version does not). At one point in the history of English 'let' commonly meant both 'prevent' and 'allow'[24]. This would count as a 'sentidos opuestos' type of ambiguity. The lie qualification allows for a workable distinction between the irony of opposites and purely formal ambiguity. Where stark irony is inadvisable, amphibole based on the homonym or on syntactical inadequacy may be safely used in its place. If I call black white (to use the standard rhetorical example) I cannot plead misinterpretation on the grounds of ambiguity. Crassus would convince no one that he had been in earnest about Lamia's charms. But were it to become necessary, I stand a good chance of persuading my Italian hosts that I have a high

regard for their martial prowess and did not knowingly intend to slight it. As a phenomenon attendant upon the poverty of language the formally ambiguous was often looked upon as a vice to be avoided[25]. But Cicero argued that it might be used to great effect[26]. He gives a rare example of the homonymic being used for praise. Africanus the elder had trouble keeping his garland in place during a banquet, which prompted the flattering remark 'noli mirari si non convenit, caput enim magnum est' (De Oratore, II, 61, 250; Wilkins, 354). Obviously context counts for a lot. Cicero found this 'laudabile et honestum' and was in no doubt that the speaker had fashioned a witty compliment from the ambiguous, intending no oblique jibe about the size of Africanus's head, and cancelling out, so to speak, the element of doubt that is often vital and normally residual in these figures. At the same time, the example cannot be understood in terms of the irony of contradiction.

But once we move beyond these narrow values of ironia and amphibolia distinctions tend to come to grief. In view of all the above we might postulate that irony says one thing, does not mean it, but means something else; that ambiguity says more than one thing in a single utterance, and potentially (if not in practice) means more than one thing. But Cicero's quotation of Scaevola and Quintilian's of Afer, both presented as examples of irony, retain their superficial value in addition to their latent messages. The question of motivation and intention is manifestly vital but in fact helps little here. We are obviously concerned with that ambiguity which is used rather than with that which simply

occurs, the active rather than the passive. But this does not clarify a general irony/ambiguity distinction. Irony is always active. All non-contradictory irony is indistinguishable from all active ambiguity which is not homonymic or syntactical. But this only amounts to saying that pure irony can safely be separated only from the homonymic/syntactical, which had been established in the first place. Trissino was one critic who was happy to see overall resemblance rather than difference, 'che l'ambiguo quasi sempre fingendo ignorantia in se stesso scopre bruttezza in altrui, come fa parimente la ironia'[27]. Any evaluation of the ironical in Quevedo should take into account the ambiguous, if only to dismiss it subsequently.

On a purely technical level the texts reveal that this was an area of rhetorical usage with which Quevedo was familiar. Personally he used the term ironía in its most restricted sense, indicating the contrary of the stated or the denial of it. In the Providencia de Dios he claims that 'el hablar irónicamente es sagradamente misterioso, es lenguaje de la Sagrada Escritura, es de Dios' (OP, 1414). This remark occurs during his examination of the 'carpe diem' exhortations in Ecclesiastes, which he convincingly argues to be warnings against materialism calculated to inspire fear of God in the hearts of the young. Despite the reference to mystery, it is clear that Quevedo considers the message perfectly comprehensible. He brings out the significance of the various pointers to the presence of irony which Solomon leaves scattered throughout the book, as here:

> ¿ Que ironía más cara que decir: "Alégrate, mancebo, en tu mocedad y espáciese tu corazón en bienes en los días de tu edad floreciente, y entretente en los caminos de tu deseo, y satisfácete de cuanto vieren tus ojos" (que es todo cuanto parece que ha aconsejado), añadiendo consecutivamente: "Y sabe que por todo esto te juzgará Dios"? (OP, 1415)

All other references to ironía in this passage show that it is consistently used to signal the opposite of the literal value of the words. One of the illustrations, which turns up elsewhere also classified as ironical (OP, 1167), comprises a piece of Divine sarcasm at the expense of Adam after the Fall, 'Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est'. For all his status in Creation Adam was in no sense a serious rival to God and Quevedo was alive to the wry self-justification of his banishment. At one stage of his defence of Epicurus Quevedo quotes in his favour the line of Petronius 'Ipse pater veri doctus Epicurus in arte', and adds:

> Blasón que, si bien en Petronio, está profanado, cuya ironía ocasionó Cleomedes [the astronomer], llamándole inventor de la verdad, cuando falsamente afirma [que] dijo que el sol se apagaba chirriando en el mar como una lucerna. (OP, 987)

This value of ironía is also maintained in his attempt at the epigrammatic theme of the tomb of the inconstant wife, 'Yacen en esta rica sepultura'. The dog which barked at burglars but not at her lovers is sculpted along with his mistress:

> Leal el perro que miráis se llama,
> pulla de piedra al tálamo inconstante,
> ironía de mármol a su fama. (Planeta, 551)

González de Salas is sometimes explicit about the presence of the ironical. With a perhaps over-cautious estimation of the public's intelligence he annotates the very first line of Quevedo's poem about the outsize beauty, 'Si me llamaron la Chica', with 'por ironía' (Planeta, 790). In another case he isolates what he claims as the formally ironical as opposed to parenthetical interjection, such as described by Quintilian[28]. 'No fuera tanto tu mal' earns the title 'Alabanzas irónicas a Valladolid, mudándose la Corte de ella' (Planeta, 929). The poem largely relies for its effect on the deceived expectation, which Quintilian saw as a standard comic device, not restricted to the ironical but obviously happy to make use of the latter. In the following quatrain the normal idiomatic sense of the first line suggests that flattery is involved, an impression quickly dispelled by the remainder:

> ¿Hay cosa como tu prado,
> donde cada primavera,
> en vez de flores, dan caspa
> los árboles, si se peinan? (932)

The first line can be taken as temporarily ironical, so to speak. But it could be argued that Quevedo has taken the words at their face value while relying on the reader to think of the idiom, and has thus exploited an ambiguity. Nor are irony and amphibole easily separated here:

> Para salirse de ti
> tienes agradables puertas,
> y no hay conserva en el mundo
> que tan lindo dejo tenga. (932)

The insinuation of the first couplet is that the bridges are only pleasant in that they provide an exit from the city; otherwise they are as revolting as the rest of its architecture. One might say that agradables is, therefore, essentially ironical since an insult is finally intended. Yet the same word is undeniably the base of an ambiguity of thought which must be perceived for the insult to be appreciated. True homonymic amphibole is used in the second couplet, constructed on two senses of both conserva and dejo: 'There's no preserve in the world which has such a sweet aftertaste', 'There's no expedition in the world which involves such a sweet leave-taking (as leaving you)'. This can fairly be taken as irony: it appears to praise but in fact it attacks, which is about as total a reversal as one might demand[29]. Obviously Quevedo has shown considerable skill in the choice of his homonyms here. It is only their combination which permits the contradictory sense.

What seems most likely is that González de Salas simply used the 'irónicas' of the title as a blanket term, perhaps indicating comic 'en loor de'. Much of the poem consists of abuse which, while hardly aggressively direct, is not easily justified as ironical. When Quevedo denounces the 'grande desvergüenza' of the attacks on Valladolid's 'nobles edificios' irony may be safely diagnosed. The defence he then brings forward will not be so tidily classified:

> Pues si son hechos de lodo,
> de él fueron Adán y Eva;
> y si le mezclan estiércol,
> es para que con él crezcan. (930)

In his discussion of ironical figures Quintilian had isolated three closely related types ('inter se similes') based on concessio, confessio and consensio (IX, 2, 51; Butler, III, 404). By the use of appropriate gesture and intonation we might ensure that our audience took our confession as denial etc. Quevedo's procedure is rather more sophisticated. He concedes ('Pues si son hechos de lodo . . . y si le mezclan estiércol'), but does not follow up this concessio with a counter-statement to render it ironical. On the contrary, he deludes our expectations with a couple of bizarre nonsenses which only add to the insult. Which amounts to the ironization of the ironical. Something similar happens in this instance of confessio:

> Yo le confieso que es sucio [el Esgueva]
> mas ¿ qué importa que lo sea,
> si no ha de entrar en colegio,
> no pretender encomienda? (931)

The refutation promised by the second line evaporates to reveal another mocking absurdity based on the implicit equívoco of limpio ('clean', 'Christian'). A further variation is to be located in what at first sight looks like antiphrasis:

> No quiero alabar tus calles,
> pues son, hablando de veras,
> unas tuertas y otras bizcas,
> y todas de lodo ciegas.
> . . . .
> Tu sitio yo no le abono,
> pues el de Troya y de Tebas
> no costaron en diez años
> las vidas que en cinco cuestas. (929)

Ambiguity will have to be taken into account here. Quevedo exploits both the initially prominent rhetorical sense of the ironical 'No quiero alabar' formula and its literal meaning. Because of the context we expect the opening negatio to give way to some sort of eulogy, even if a comic one. But in the reflective second line, which signals the about-turn, Quevedo takes the wording of the formula at its face value and, finding that this suits the facts of the case better than the rhetorical declaration, is 'forced' to add insult to injury. This is the ironization of antiphrasis, and it makes Mark Antony look a beginner. This early poem of Quevedo may lack his more complex verbal expertise but it is no exercise in crudity. While its message is predictable, much of its method is not. It appears to explore the implications behind certain ironical figures, and is free of any slavish dependence upon facile irony of contradiction. This example alone suggests that if as a critic Quevedo did not exhaustively investigate irony, as a poet he did. Furthermore, when he is explicit about ironia in the quoted examples, the fact that simplistic irony is concerned in each case may simply be coincidental. The most one may conclude is that Quevedo, in the tradition of Quintilian, reserved the word ironía for this variety. It hardly proves that he was not conversant with the full rhetorical spectrum of the idea.

In poems of Quevedo which appear to pursue an unorthodox line the presence of one or more of the specific devices described above will obviously be vital in determining interpretation. But certain generalizations may be drawn immediately. If we assume that these items were intended to

warn the reader against vice, then it is difficult to see how they might function other than by the crude irony of contradiction. Any suggestion that immorality is being championed or excused will have to be quite transparent. The use of any other sort of irony would be dangerous, ambiguity calamitous. But if Quevedo were intent upon criticizing essences or applications of moral dogma, the shifting, nebulous character of many of the figures in the range would provide the necessary means for him both to have his say and parry the accusation that he had said it. A third possibility, of course, is that these efforts are just 'artistic' variations on stock themes, that Quevedo was more interested in ringing the changes than in bolstering or undermining accepted norms of conduct, in exploiting the possibilities of the ironical/ambiguous than in investigating the nature of vice[30].

But this assumes that there is a common basis to all the poems concerned. It may be more realistic to take each poem on its own merits, which points to the possibility that Quevedo was now ironical/orthodox, now ironical/unorthodox, and sometimes ironical/rhetorical. However, since moral issues are at stake the isolation of the third of these is fraught with difficulties. The use of moral behaviour as the raw material for uncommitted, impersonal 'art' would have been seen by Quevedo's contemporaries as an act reprehensible of itself. When faced with either good or evil, the Christian cannot allow himself to indulge in cool detachment. Typical of many latter-day theorists, Thomas Mann spoke of irony as

> . . . an all-embracing, crystal-clear and serene glance, which is the very glance of art itself: that is to say, a glance of the utmost freedom and calm, and of an objectivity untroubled by any moralism.[31]

Should it be established that Quevedo did achieve this degree of sublime aloofness, then it may convincingly be taken as a separate manifestation of unorthodoxy via irony.

The most awesome task confronting the critic is to decide on a set of criteria sensitive to the presence of the ironical. As we were seldom fortunate enough to have a poet read his work to us, one can perhaps sympathize with those who dispense with this need and trust solely to the diagnosis of intuition. Yet any suggestion that Quevedo is using a certain type of irony is best prefaced by some justification that he is being ironical at all. Here much can be learned from rhetoric proper, although admittedly the orator enjoys a distinct advantage over the poet in the ease with which he may signal an ironical intention.

Quintilian wrote that

> [Ironia] aut pronuntiatione intelligitur aut persona aut rei natura; nam si qua earum verbis dissentit, apparet diversam esse orationi voluntatem. (VIII, 6, 54; Butler, III, 332)

An apparent omission here (although probably to be understood in pronuntiatione) is gesture. Explicit mention was made of it in the definitions of Covarrubias and Autoridades:

> En el sonido o tonecillo que la decimos y en los meneos, se echa de ver que sentimos al

> revés lo que pronunciamos por la boca. (741)
> La explica el émfasis del tono o acción con
> que se habla. (309)

Artiga made a great deal of gesture:

> Hácese [la ironía] afectando el rostro,
> o con otra acción, por cuya
> causa das a entender, que
> lo que dices, repugnas.
> . . . . . .
> ha de ser con tal figura
> de semblante, acción y rostro,
> que conozcan que te burlas. (Epítome, 231-2)

This was obviously a cue of some importance - Bulwer even recorded stock gesticulations for irony - and one completely lost in poetry. Like most Spanish rhetoricians, Cipriano Suárez repeated Quintilian but Ceruto refined the matter by introducing 'adiunctio vocis', which turns out to be none other than Quintilian's ironical ejaculation (scilicet, 'forsooth!'); and 'addictio contrarii: ut, nos docebit, qui nihil umquam didicit?', of which 'You have the finesse of a bulldozer' is a variation (Arte rhetorica, 217-8).

To take the last first, Ceruto's two additions, having a purely verbal basis, would recommend themselves to a poet. The ironical ejaculation ¡ Oh ! is often used by Quevedo (Planeta, 553 [no. 524], 586 [no. 571], 588 [no. 573], 1174 [no. 834] etc.). But the element of irony is usually limited to the exclamation itself, revealing it to be a mock-serious and not solemn outburst. In no instance that I have found does Quevedo resort to it to decide our interpretation of a context whose meaning is dubious. It is decoratively

harmonious within a patently jocular poem rather than structurally vital in elucidation of an ambiguous one. Similarly, the second type will radically affect only its immediate context, though admittedly reinforcing the prevailing mood of a poem. So far as I know, Quevedo does not introduce the explicit contrary in order to inform our reading of the morally objectionable manifestos that occur in his poetry.

There remain pronunciation, person, and the nature of the subject[32]. The first would seem to defy any poet's resourcefulness. While we may perceive how a certain poem should be intoned, we normally do so only because of the presence of other pointers to irony in that poem. An orator could recite the 'Our Father' so as to make it sound like a blasphemous affirmation of atheism. A poet is powerless to match this effect. There is what at first appears to be an exception: colloquial or dialect forms, such as sometimes used by Quevedo (Planeta, 1138, 1079 etc.), might indicate that the poet intends a meaning alternative to the one stated. But this device only serves to focus our attention on the persona, and make us ask whether Quevedo is being ironical about the latter's views, or whether he is in sympathy with them. One of Quevedo's romances has an opening which looks a promising candidate

¿ Estamos entre cristianos ?
¿ Sufriráse en Argel esto ?
¿ Que a un estudiante le engañen ?
¿ Que a un poeta pidan censos ? (Planeta, 893)[33]

The poem is a reply to the false accusation by a mother that he had taken her daughter's virginity and should pay for it.

This fact does not come to light until late (l. 77 et seq.), although the BN MS 3940 title, 'A una madre que pedía la paga del virgo de su hija a quien no se le había quitado' gives warning of it (as, in a very much vaguer way, does the Parnaso title - 'Con nombre supuesto se queja de una madre y de una hija'). Were we to read the Maravillas text, simply headed 'Otro romance', our intonation will have to be put into abeyance for a while. We will sense that the questions are 'rhetorical', that they do not demand answers but themselves comprise oblique statements. But to decide upon the precise ironical tone required, we must read on. Yet whatever the circumstances in which the text is encountered, it is clear that appreciation of suitable intonation follows on from awareness of the 'rei natura'. And it is doubtful whether there can be any purely poetical equivalent to pronuntiatio independent of the more positive tests for irony.

By persona Quintilian probably meant him about whom the remark was spoken. But it can obviously be applied to the speaker - we will assume that a high-ranking Nazi extolling the virtues of the Jewish race at a Berlin banquet in 1942 is ironizing, although his estimation may be close to, or identical with, the truth. And the persona as modern criticism understands it must be counted a crucial consideration here. If his persona should advocate immorality, then the poet/moralist will have to make it clear that he stands condemned. In the first place this amounts to ensuring that a distinction between persona and poet can easily be maintained, unless the rei natura makes this unnecessary (in which case the persona has no interpretative significance anyway). As to rei natura, there is an appreciable difference between a poem

which encourages rape and robbery as a life-style, and one which lauds the easy life, bedding agreeable females, fiddling the income-tax and social security benefits. In Christian ethical terms the difference is one of degree. But on a practical level we are much less likely to identify with the overtly criminal than with the weakness of self-indulgence. A poet can always forestall such self-identification by making the speaker worthy of distrust or scorn. But where the _persona_ is indistinct or vanishes altogether, the burden of interpretation is thrown upon the shoulders of the reader and they may not be equal to it. In short, the rhetorical tests for irony which are suitable for deciphering extended contexts are reducible to person and subject matter. What follows argues that in many cases these two offer insufficient proof that an apparently subversive piece is ironically moral. This is prefaced by a consideration of Quevedo's expertise in handling the _persona_[34].

'"Padre Adán, no lloréis duelos"' (_Planeta_, 821-3) recounts Adam's good luck in having been free of a mother-in-law. It is a monologue but for a final quatrain in which the interlocutor is introduced:

> Esto dijo un ensuegrado,
> llevándole a conjurar,
> para sacarle la suegra,
> un cura y un sacristán. (823)

While not particularly reverent towards Genesis, the poem would hardly raise a clerical eyebrow except in amusement. There is no moral issue at stake, and the loss of the last quatrain would not alter the meaning or make identification

of speaker with poet perilous. The *persona* is a bonus, not a key to the proper understanding of the message. The nature of the thing rules out our taking this as an exercise in irony - Quevedo the defender of the *suegra*?

The sonnet 'Yo, que en este lugar haciendo Hurtados' (*Planeta*, 566) is spoken by a thief who has decided to give up his profession and settle down to a less exacting and much safer style of corruption: 'harto de hurtar a palmos con la mano,/ quiero, alguacil, hurtar con ella a varas.' (567). Common sense forbids our confusing poet and speaker, yet the poem exemplifies the barely disguised attack on establishment corruption with which Quevedo is in some quarters never credited[35]. In another sonnet (*Planeta*, 570) the scaffold itself declares that, were Justice to be done, 'no holgara la madera':

> En un credo, oficiales despachara
> que en despachar se tardan una era . . .
> Hubiera en mí más varas que no palos;
> presos y prendedores y ringlones;
> de pobres me extendiera a ricos malos.
> Ladrones, y quien hurta a los ladrones,
> gozaran igualmente mis resbalos. (570-1)

Even if one's knowledge of Quevedo were confined to this single poem, it only makes sense as a tirade against unpunished vice in officialdom, especially in law-enforcement. Quevedo is not ironical towards the scaffold, nor is the latter towards its opinions. Likewise, the fact that the talking candle of 'Si alumbro yo porque a matar aprenda' (*Planeta*, 567) is not technically the poet cannot prevent our seeing the sonnet as anything but a jibe at the ineptitude

of the medical profession. If we have read widely in Quevedo we will recognize this stance as characteristic.

However ingeniously fashioned, none of the above _personae_ make the moral of their poems problematical, nor are they pursued with any subtlety for their own sakes. '"Cruel llaman a Nerón"', which González de Salas calls 'Jocosa defensa de Nerón y del señor rey don Pedro de Castilla' (_Planeta_, 876-9) is more of an in-depth exercise. Its speaker is introduced in the final quatrain:

> Esto dijo un montañés,
> empuñando el hierro viejo,
> con cólera y sin cogote,
> en un Cid tincto un don Bueso. (879)

Although valiant, he is prone to ridiculous extravagance. From his appearances in the _Romancero general_ don Bueso emerges most forcibly as a figure of fun, given to bizarre attire and an equally preposterous manner in courtship, the latter causing him to split his breeches in a strategic position[36]. It seems clear that the poet preserves a definite detachment from him. Which raises the question: to what extent does he subscribe to the highlander's justification of two of History's favourite monsters?

The poem relies largely on the previously discussed principle of the ironical application of the deceived expectation. It promises valid grounds for refutation but in the event only serves to confirm:

> "Dicen que forzó doncellas,
> mas de ningún modo creo
> que él encontró con alguna,
> ni que ellas se resistieron.

Quísole Suetonio mal,
pues le llamó deshonesto
porque adoraba a su madre,
siendo obligación hacerlo.
. . . .
Gustó de quemar en Roma
tanto edificio soberbio,
dejando así castigada
la soberbia, para ejemplo." (877)

It is difficult to imagine that the speaker is unaware of the irony of his words. He seems well acquainted with the substance of Suetonius's account of the Emperor's little foibles, and so it cannot easily be argued that he is ignorant of the specific charges. But the last line of the poem tends to call this awareness into question, and invites the speculation that the wit belongs solely to the poet and that the montañés literally believes in his absurd defence. Yet note his last words:

"De emperadores y reyes
no hablan mal nobles y cuerdos:
que es, en público, delito,
y no es seguro en secreto." (879)

This seems to be knowingly said and thereby to reflect on what has gone before - 'It's unwise to criticize the powerful. To be absolutely safe I've even spoke well of those who are dead'. This again raises more problems than it solves. The ludicrous defence is a non-defence, is tantamount to an attack. But to what extent is the warrior conscious of this? Does he share the joke with Quevedo, or is he just the object of it?

To approach the poem as ambiguity helps. If the speaker is in the know, then he is purposely ambiguous. By making himself out to be a simpleton whose caution is unwittingly self-defeating he manages both to relay his true opinion and provide himself with a counter to the charge of being facetious. If he is ignorant of the ambiguity, it is only the ambiguity itself which informs us of this fact: he calls Nero 'amigo de novedades,/ de fiestas y pasatiempos' (877), whereby we understand that Nero was fond of theatrical sexual perversion and blood-letting and turn to the other available evidence to make a judgement about whether or not he intends this sense as well. But just which he is, itself is finally ambiguous. Were the persona to be 'dropped' matters would be simplified immediately. The poem would read as an ingenious, ironical justification of psychopathic cruelty, and we would have to try very hard to believe that it was to be taken at face value. The speaker would be none other than the witty and anonymous 'poet' whom we could fairly connect with Quevedo the 'satirist' in view of the complaints levelled against doctors, bad musicians, wives, pedigüeñas, and sundry molestations (ll. 2-12, 17-24). Although technically still present, the ambiguity would become utterly fathomable. All this would involve nothing more than the loss of the final quatrain. By slipping in a persona at the end, a device he resorts to elsewhere[37], Quevedo retrospectively influences interpretation. A single and static technical amphibole becomes multiple and mobile - the doubt as to whether the persona is ironical or ironized (or both) cannot be resolved. That Quevedo foresaw and desired this effect can neither be

proved nor rejected. But it would be cynical to see the inclusion of the speaker's identity as a gratuitous afterthought or merely decorational appendage. Such a move would be untypical of Quevedo who habitually makes the character of a speaker functionally relevant to its monologue[38]. However it is taken, few souls are likely to be jeopardized by this particular item. But that risk does exist to a greater or lesser extent elsewhere.

Cuckoldry fascinated Quevedo, not so much of itself but when adopted or exploited as a profession[39]. That he wrote so many poems on the subject might inspire the belief that it was a social malaise that particularly triggered his satirist's indignation. The poems themselves suggest otherwise. They leave a lasting impression of being but variations on a theme. Not that condemnation is altogether wanting. 'Cornudo eres, Fulano, hasta los codos' (Planeta, 599), co-written in Quevedo's lifetime by González de Salas and himself, is as explicit a statement of moral disgust as could be wished. The rest all involve personae. In '"¿ Es más cornudo el rastro que mi agüelo?"' (Planeta, 601) an old hand complains that young upstarts are poaching on his territory. In 'Cuernas hay para todos, sor Corbrera' (Planeta, 601) the 'cornudo óptimo, máximo y eterno' warns an up-and-coming cuckold that, while there is room for all, he himself is at the top and fully intends to stay there. The heroes of 'Echando verbos y nombres' and 'La que hubiere menester' (ibid., 1009, 872) boast of their professional accomplishment in speeches whose impact is due exclusively to their wit[40]. In all these cases a moral point is conspicuous only by its absence. If

we conclude that cuckoldry is evil, that is a prejudice we bring beforehand to the poems and not the inference that they themselves demand, which seems to be that cuckolds have great poetic and comic potential[41].

Three other items are more closely inter-related in that all make great play of the benefits that will accrue to the husband willing to turn a blind eye - a steady source of income thanks to the generosity of the adulterer and no loss of access to his wife's favours. In the sonnet 'Dícenme, don Jerónimo, que dices' (Planeta, 576), where the cuckold laughs at the lover who imagines he is deceiving him, this is set out as a formal argument:

> Este argumento es fuerte y es agudo:
> tú imaginas ponerme cuernos; de obra
> yo, porque lo imaginas, te desnudo.
> Más cuerno es el que paga que el que cobra;
> ergo, aquel que me paga, es el cornudo,
> lo que de mi mujer a mí me sobra.

There is a specific invitation to admire wit, but none to pass judgement. Irony seems irrelevant - is his reasoning not convincing and sharp? 'Selvas y bosques de amor' (ibid., 869-71), delivered by an erstwhile poet, is more diversified. Much of the exposition resembles that of the sonnet although the tone is declamatory rather than methodically deductive:

> Ándense poniendo nombres
> los celosos por mi barrio;
> que yo me iré por el suyo
> más ahíto y menos flaco.
> . . . . . .

Galanes de mi mujer
se llaman unos hidalgos
a quien llamo provisores,
a quien tengo por vasallos. (871)

But there is mixed in apologetics of a different order:

Para que nadie me tema,
todos mis poderes hago:
que el espantar a la gente
es habilidad del diablo. (870)

This sort of extravagance is not meant to convince. An ambiguity is dressed up as a general proposition: for 'nadie' we should read 'prospective paramour'. His claim to shun evil, with its cheeky insinuation that he chooses to do good, thinly disguises a more genuine fear of scaring off a source of income. Similar outlandishness (cf. ll. 43-4, 81-4) is intermingled throughout with the plausible. Quevedo at no time intervenes to suggest that the nonsense is other than self-conscious, and appears content to leave the ironical manipulation of the matter in the very capable hands of the speaker. Understanding the poem would seem to amount to appreciation of this fine alternation between the rationally persuasive and the wittily absurd. If Quevedo did intend a moral lesson, he spared no effort in thoroughly concealing it[42].

'Ansí a solas industriaba' (Planeta, 884-5) is composed according to a structure found elsewhere in Quevedo, wisdom or experience instructing ignorance or innocence - the profeso and the novicio (cf. ibid., 565 [no. 541], 886, 896). The ultimate precedent for this is that type of rather one-sided

classical dialogue which takes the form of authoritative exposition rather than the more equal exchange of views typified by the Platonic model. It is frequent in Cicero, serves Boethius's Consolations and Don Juan Manuel's Conde Lucanor, but Aretino's Ragionamenti come closest in spirit to Quevedo[43]. He himself introduces the experienced cuckold as 'un Tácito Cornelio', referring to Tacitus's Dialogus on the decline of oratory which is written in the style. The master's indoctrination of the rather unwilling novice is for the most part eminently reasonable, stressing the pecuniary advantages but also showing sane impatience with the excesses of honra

> "También yo pequé en honrado,
> y anduve a voces diciendo
> lo de 'En mi casa me como',
> lo de 'Ayuno, si no tengo'". (884)

Though not to the same degree as in the last example, self-vindication of this sort does give way to the gratuitous:

> "Ya dejó de ser costilla
> la mujer cuando la hicieron:
> sacósela Dios del lado,
> ¿por qué se la vuelve al cuerpo?" (885-6)

As any good salesman knows, a few jokes will put the customer in an agreeable humour that will dispose him to accept the merely factual arguments, even (and in some cases, especially) if they are jokes about the commodity itself. Once again it is difficult to accept that Quevedo is 'ironizing' when the persona himself is managing so well. When we have

finished laughing at the above quatrain, can it seriously be thought that we are going to reflect on the moral consequences of what is said (and of our own reaction to it)? The tradition responsible for this poem also informs the prose Siglo del cuerno, where the matter is pursued at greater leisure (OP, 91-3). The monologue in 'Que pretenda dos años ser cornudo' (Planeta, 676-84) appears more a hand-book of practical cuckoldry than a manifesto on its behalf. And the poet's personal appearance in both 'preface' and 'epilogue' reveals that he himself is not enamoured of the calling (ll. 64-9, 244-6).

Yet to seek some ethical conclusion in most of these poems can only result in an acute sense of moral disorientation, and the few that satisfy such a need are more plausibly taken as further variations on the theme 'cuckoldry' than as keys to the comprehension of the others. Taking the poems as a whole it may not be far-fetched to see in them a surrender to 'absolute' irony. Whereas the satirist considers himself superior to vice, the ironist (who has ousted the satirist he might once have served) thinks himself superior to being superior to vice - he is beyond morality:

> Irony, Jankélévitch says, practises 'l'art d'effleurer', adopting, one after another, an infinity of points of view in such a way that they correct each-other; thus we escape all one-sided centrismes.[44]

Taken singly most of the poems demand the same conclusion: they refuse to admit that morality is anything but poetical raw material.

It is obvious that Quevedo maintains a certain distance between himself and these _personae_, and no less apparent that the more they rival his wit the more the distinction blurs. But this dissociation does not necessarily entail his being critical of them[45]. In the poems which justify cuckoldry we are asked to concede the soundness of the polemic and/or the ingenuity of their jokes but not to condemn, or even to notice the incidental immorality. They represent Quevedo's contribution to one of the more sophisticated varieties of 'en loor de',[46] and beg to be compared with the sonnet in which 'Justifica su tintura un tiñoso' and those which delicately transform a lady's being one-eyed or blind into an occasion for compliment (_Planeta_, 577, 351, 352)[47]. Judging them in the light of the likes of the _Virtud militante_ only serves to accentuate the impassable gap which separates them from the overtly ascetical/moral in Quevedo. At the same time, convincingly praising vice, whatever the motive, incurs the risk that it will in some measure be taken seriously. The likelihood of this happening depends not only on the conviction of the dialectic but on the nature of the vice. A poet may praise bestiality to the skies and the takers will be few, yet men need little persuasion to indulge in less spectacular (but hardly less immoral) diversions. As to the case in hand, the attractions of being a complaisant cuckold probably do not outweigh the accompanying social stigma and loss of self-respect.

This makes a poem like 'Dícenme, don Jerónimo, que dices' ambiguous: it _is_ a genuine justification of cuckoldry as a career, but can we really be expected to agree, and does

the poet himself do so? Questions like this cannot be resolved, wherein lies the strength of the ambiguity[48]. I. A. Richards once wrote of discouraging 'our habit of behaving as though if a passage means one thing it cannot at the same time mean another and an incompatible thing'[49]. If we approve the logic but dissent on the grounds of subject (and what other honest option can there be?), we are committed to a limbo of indecision. The poem neither allows for nor requires an overall rejection of the speaker and his values. The poet, meanwhile, has gone into hiding, his attitude towards the persona calculated to remain an enigma. Poems like this give the lie to Booth's assertion that 'though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear'.[50]. In the case of 'en loor del cuerno' it is reasonable to see the illusion as the evasion of the consequences of treating moral matters with moral indifference. But a scrutiny of other themes suggests that this was not always the exclusive or the most significant motivation.

Quevedo penned a number of poems on what may conveniently (if not very accurately) be called the 'picaresque' outlook, of which the most remarkable is the long 'Tardóse en parirme/ mi madre' (Planeta, 1066-72). González de Salas's title - 'La vida poltrona', translated by Mas as 'la vie dans un fauteuil' (101) - scarcely conveys the complexity of this 'simple' poem. The persona surveys life in general and his own in particular. He is a fireside philosopher whose strangely variegated metaphysics balance absolute self-centredness against contentment with the simplicity that comes from being poor (as opposed to being a pauper):

Para mí me vivo,
para mí me bebo.
. . . .
  No pretendo cosa,
que todo lo tengo,
mientras con lo poco
vivo muy contento. (ll. 31-2; 37-40)

His fare is plain - stew, sausage, and wine. Hunger serves him as hors d'oeuvre, its satisfaction as pudding. He scorns the very idea of a sweet - 'no pretendo/ volverme yo abeja' (ll. 165-184). When it comes to furnishings and fittings he despises both ascetic meanness and pompous luxury (ll. 185-90). Let those who will wear fine clothes - a bottle of wine is more warming (ll. 192-200). He has no wish to marry, although he has a lady-friend who is mentioned briefly and appears to be a permanent fixture (ll. 53-74; 201). Judging from his attitude as a whole, it would be ingenuous to suggest that he turns to her for intellectual conversation.

His life-style seems to have resulted from an extremely pessimistic reading of the condition of contemporary life (ll. 1-30). And his misgivings partly inform his case for refusing to procreate (the other reasons being his distaste for marriage, and his refusal to waste effort in building up a legacy for his offspring to squander, ll. 81-8):

  Yo no quiero hijos,
ni aumentar el pueblo,
que harta gente sobra,
cansada, en el suelo. (ll. 77-80)

This is not spiritual contempt of 'the World' as understood theologically but something more ominous, suspiciously like

positive atheism. Consider God's appearance in the finale:

> Y sin pena alguna,
> vergüenza ni miedo,
> si Dios no me mata,
> moriré de viejo. (ll. 205-8)

The Almighty is dismissed with a sneer, casually reduced to the level of a fatal accident, his omnipotence challenged. It is consequently little wonder that he seems to contemplate suicide (presumably, should illness make life intolerable) in an otherwise baffling statement - 'No vendrá a sobrarme/ la vida, si puedo'. The Devil earns no more respect than his counterpart:

> De hacer por los suyos,
> hasta el diablo pienso
> que está ya cansado,
> perezoso y renco. (ll. 5-8)

The entire poem implicitly denies the existence of life hereafter. For instance, lines 205-8 could hardly have been spoken by someone facing the Judgement and Eternity. What is preached is a careful but total isolationism combined with a pleasurable but admirable simplicity, with death as the closing of all doors and the opening of none[51]. A more complete rejection of cross-carrying, a more sublime indifference to the fate of his fellow men would be hard to imagine. On this evidence alone it might be thought that Quevedo is ironical towards his <u>persona</u>, that he has set him up to be shot down. There are substantial grounds for thinking this highly unlikely, and they are all more or less directly connected with the problem of the identity of the speaker.

For a start, the persona makes a rather implausible plebeian pícaro. That he says 'Yo vivo picaño/ bien ancho y exento' (ll. 161-2) is hardly an admission of that sort of status. And he is sufficiently high up the social ladder for his friends to encourage him to curry favour with the powerful (ll. 93-132). Not beggarly, his poverty consists of modestly living within his (unspecified) means. None of his money appears ill-gotten. In so far as it is discernible, his standing does not seem utterly incompatible with that of the historical Quevedo[52].

Secondly, he bears more than a passing resemblance to Quevedo the serious moralist. His announcement that

> No he de fatigarme
> en buscar entierro:
> que en nosotros vive
> el sepulcro nuestro. (ll. 49-52)

restates the recurrent Quevedian theme of the beginning of life as the beginning of death, of life's being but a slow death, familiar from 'El escarmiento' and other pœms as well as prose works like La cuna y la sepultura (Planeta, 15, 3, 4, 6, 11; OP, 1191 etc.). His refusal to become involved in the flatteries and intrigues that secure social advancement and political influence, and his determination to be satisfied and (what is more) happy with what he has recalls Quevedo's insistent exposure of the corruption that goes with power and riches and his encouragement of 'menosprecio de la corte', of satisfaction with the physical and moral health that results from more modest living (ll. 95-152; cf. Planeta, 52 [no. 55] 53, 56, 69, 90, 91 etc.; OP, 1302 et seq., etc.). And his

awareness of being born into a decaying and degenerate world (ll. 17-28) more than smacks of the 'Epístola satírica y censoria' and its gloomy appraisal of contemporary Spain (Planeta, 140-7). Even his praise of the wholesome 'vaca y carnero' (l. 180) and his contempt for fancy food can be precisely matched in that poem's acoount of the Spanish diet of the robust and virile past (143-4). His lack of sartorial concern finds an echo in Polymnia (Planeta, 61), and his cool misogynism might readily have issued from the lips of Quevedo the satirist.

However, some of his views radically contradict those of the moral Quevedo, notably his love of wine and his decision to do no work (contrast Planeta, 58, 144). And we shall have trouble trying to reconcile his casual indifference to many of the teachings of Christianity with Quevedo's didacticism. All this renders interpretation extremely taxing. Knowledge of other Quevedian texts only confirms the impression the poem gives if taken in isolation: that by the measure of orthodoxy the persona is both exemplary and a disgrace. If Quevedo had intended us to mock him he would hardly have made him so acute a judge of contemporary ills, and then allowed him to follow up his diagnosis with a remedy that alternates the laudable with the scandalous. It is just possible that the poem is intended to inspire two separate reactions, now inviting applause, now disapproval. But to credit Quevedo with such a pointless and ill-constructed exercise would be a solution of despair.

Yet if we suppose that Quevedo was toying with a 'philosophy' that incorporated part of the prevailing morality

but also rejected part, the poem comes into its own. That he did not write a 'serious' poem on the subject should hardly occasion surprise: an outright manifesto, even if circulated in private or kept among the poet's personal papers, would have amounted to a highly dangerous commodity in Quevedo's day[53]. In fact, the demand for a 'serious' version is hardly necessary. While it has jokes the poem is for the most part remarkably unfunny. It is 'exaggerated' in the sense that, like all propaganda, its conviction does not allow for much by way of objection or acknowledgement of discrepancy and exception - Quevedo's moral poems are subject to exactly the same exaggeration. But in no way is it so fantastic that it defies belief. Furthermore, while we may choose to criticize the speaker, we cannot simply dismiss him with laughter for that would involve dismissing out-of-hand what is creditable in him. Of course, the poem is not serious in the sense of being solemn. One could hardly expect a first-hand account of the life-style depicted from some conventionally grave moralizer. Nor is sober declamation a suitable vehicle for it: long faces will not sell what is on offer here. This lends the poem its peculiar flavour. Unable rather than unwilling to employ stern self-righteousness it nevertheless makes its point perfectly. The effect is a superb illusion. The absence of the traditionally serious promises the unserious, but this expectation is frustrated by the substitution of seriousness of a different order. And paradoxically it is one coloured to a significant degree by many of the opinions of the conventional Quevedo. The question to be asked of the poet is not so much 'How can he mean it?' as 'How can he <u>not</u>

mean it?'. His procedure is of a subtlety quite distinct from ambiguity indulged for its own sake.

The hero of the poem defies facile definition. Rather too hearty and good-humoured to be consistently cynical he is too reserved and respectable in his self-concern to qualify as Cynical. His singularity, and his lack of it, may be gauged in the light of related poems. The persona of 'Con testa gacha toda charla escucho' (Planeta, 557), is a rather unappealing piece of business[54]. He freely admits to disguising his age both cosmetically and in dress (a vanity which was a pet hate of Quevedo's), breaking promises, eavesdropping, and resorting to bribery when faced with a court case. More anti- than a-religious, he avoids church ('no visito nicho') and looks upon sex as a business transaction which is nonetheless described in moral terms ('Yo pago a Silvia el pecado, no el capricho': 'I pay her to be immoral, I don't wait upon her whim and then pay'). He reflects 'La vida poltrona' only in his self-obsession and determination to be comfortable but even here fails to supply any sort of justification for his attitude. Nor can there be detected any connection with the overtly moral Quevedo. The poem may just be a variation on the self-sufficiency theme or, as is more likely, a case of the persona ironized, allowed to expose himself. But it certainly serves to throw the individuality of the romance into vivid relief.

The two sonnets 'Mientras que, tinto en mugre, sorbí brodio' and 'Volver quiero vivir a trochimoche' (Planeta, 603-4) are delivered in contempt of political ambition and in favour of an easy life enjoying women and drink[55]. In view of some

of his remarks (especially in the first tercet) the speaker of the first is much more readily identifiable as a <u>pícaro</u> than is that of the second. R. M. Price writes:

> No trace of a moral attitude towards picaresque life is apparent; this was presumably left to the greater scope of the prose . . . it is possible to see these sonnets as the working out, in a 'low' satirical key, of the moral rejection of court life and the praise of humility found in much more dignified sonnets . . . The satirist in one style is the moralist in another. (art.cit., 83, 88)

But equally significant is the fact that both speakers forgo one evil in favour of an immoral alternative, perhaps suggesting a case of the lesser of two evils. If we assume Quevedo's attitude to be unimpeachable, then he must be half-ironical towards them, commending their disgust but not their reaction to it. But this reading strains the undeniable cohesiveness of the poems (each comes over as a single attitude) if it does not fracture it altogether. These two items could be 'La vida poltrona' writ small, although they exceed it in the degree of sensual indulgence permitted.

Another farewell to the court and its corruption tends in the opposite direction, deciding 'que el "satis est" me alegra y me remoza'. It stresses 'carpe diem' happiness rather than self-preservation, enjoying pleasure as it comes but finding advantage in want:

> Pues vuela la edad, ande la loza;
> y si pasare tragos, sean de taza;
> . . . . . .

Menos veces vomito que bostezo:
la hambre dicen que el ingenio aguza,
y que la gula es horca del pescuezo.
(Planeta, 587)

This sonnet begs to be considered alongside 'Mi pobreza me sirve de Galeno' (Planeta, 958), which argues that real poverty keeps a man free from the ills that accompany over-eating and drinking, and from the designs of the burglar and heir (ll. 1-11). It also enhances appreciation of the plainest food:

Mi hambre es sazonado cocinero,
pues del carnero me convierte en pierna
hasta los mismos güesos del carnero. (ll. 12-14)

Though the speaker here lives in more reduced circumstances, the point is essentially the same as that made in 'La vida poltrona' (ll. 177-80) - hunger makes plain food tasty.

This in turn calls to mind what Horace said in Satires, II, 2, 38 - 'ieiunus raro stomachus volgaria temnit' (Fairclough, 138). But Quevedo may have had another (admittedly related) classical source in mind here. Consider the sonnet which begins:

Mejor me sabe en un cantón la sopa,
y el tinto con la mosca y la zurrapa,
que al rico, que se engulle todo el mapa,
muchos años de vino en ancha copa.
. . . . . .
Llenar, no enriquecer, quiero la tripa;
lo caro trueco a lo que bien me sepa.
. . . . . .
regüeldo yo cuando el dichoso hipa,
el asido a Fortuna, yo a la cepa. (Planeta, 550)

This again recalls 'Poltrona' in its belief in a belly well filled with honest fare, demonstrating its appreciation in a virile belch[56]. But the condemnation of exotic dainties ('que se engulle todo el mapa') and praise of plain eating were both Stoic commonplaces. Horace's (Satires, II, 2) is one of the fullest expressions of the sentiment which can be traced to Quevedo's beloved Seneca:

> Ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras. Alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. Nullis animalibus nisi ex fastidio pax est.[57]

Arnold comments that 'the sarcasms of Seneca are aimed not so much against excess in quantity or fastidiousness in quality, as against the collection of dainties from all parts of the world' (346). Elsewhere Seneca takes a stricter line:

> Hanc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum indulgeatis, quantum bonae valitudini satis est . . . cibus famem sedet, potio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus. (ibid., 317)

In the matter of food, if not of drink, these Quevedian personae implement this directive with enthusiastic thoroughness rather than disobey it. They scorn what is rich and fussy in favour of the substantial and mundane[58]. A more precise echo of Seneca is to be found in the opening line of a sonnet which pleads for templanza in the face of wildly excessive social eating, 'Comer hasta matar el hambre, es bueno' (Planeta, 586).

While these poems have a claim to their own identity, each takes up one or more of the concerns of 'La vida poltrona' and arrives at solutions that are similar rather than otherwise to those found there. Taken together they are most plausibly seen as hypotheses, as explorations of the possibilities, than as tightly integrated into a final decision on the subject, with 'Poltrona' the most extended examination of them all. Quevedo was not the only poet to turn to the isolationism/'hedonism' theme but he certainly made it into something of his own. No other example that springs to mind combines Stoicism with such a marked disgust for the physical and spiritual degradation attached to the acquisition and preservation of temporal wealth and power. The contenders are a superficial bunch in comparison[59]. Quevedo did not lamely follow the tradition: he fashioned it to his own liking and then set it to work.

Whether considered separately or as a group, these poems (with the exception of 'Con testa gacha toda charla escucho') do not permit the conclusion that the poet's detachment from his <u>personae</u> amounts to antagonism towards them. Obviously he is not meant to be confused with the pauper who makes a regular meal off bones but 'Mejor me sabe en un cantón la sopa' is a sufficiently transparent mask for the visage of the serious exalter of poverty to be recognized behind it[60]. If it <u>is</u> intended as a disguise then it is not only incompetent but meaningless. Few would be convinced that the 'rustic' Ofellus of <u>Satires</u>, II, 2, with his intimate knowledge of the high-life at Rome and his familiarity with literature, were anyone but Horace himself[61]. Classical theory postulated

three types of poetic narration, 'ratio poematis' or 'genus poematis'. According to Diomedes, in the '[genus] activum vel imitativum . . . personae agunt solae, sine ulla poetae interlocutione'; in the 'enarrativum vel enunciativum . . . poeta ipse loquitur, sine personae illius interlocutione'; in the 'commune vel mixtum . . . poeta ipse loquitur et personae loquentes introducuntur'[62]. While it is undeniable that Quevedo used all three, it is equally evident that often the distinction between the first and second is not easily if at all maintained[63]. Quevedo is celebrated as the scourge of doctors. In three sonnets the personae revolt against the physician's prescription of little to eat and drink, and that unpalatable, and enforced celibacy:

Fríeme retacillos de marranos;
venga la puta y tárdase la flota:
y sorba yo, y ayunen los gusanos.
. . . . . .
¿ De esta cura me pides ocho reales?
Yo quiero hembra y vino y tabardillo,
y gasten tu salud los hospitales.
. . . . . .
La edad, señor dotor, pide Jordán
Manzanares, la niña y la ocasión.
No me acompaña fruta de sartén,
taza penada o búcaro malsín;
jarro sí, grueso, y el copón de bien.
(Planeta, 560, 568, 573)

If this is not Quevedo the satirist speaking it is so consummate an imitation as makes no difference. Personae patently set up as targets are easily spotted. The jaque of 'Por más graciosa que mi tronga sea'(Planeta, 580) not only boasts of

his sexual indulgence but recognizes it as sinful, 'amo yo, glotón, todo el pecado'. The suffering patient who calls, Rochester-like, for his whore is not so tidily distinguished from his maker. Nor is he who quibbles about the price and then expresses his less than worthy desires. We may scrupulously ignore the fact that as a young man Quevedo once quarrelled with a doctor over a bill, that in a letter he opined that the medical profession was not only useless but positively dangerous (Epistolario, 353-3). But the relevance of the satirist who regularly equated medical incompetence with slaughter cannot be denied. The cry of disbelief that payment is asked for this torture is preceded by:

> Haz la cuenta conmigo, dotorcillo:
> para quitarme un mal, ¿me das mil males?
> ¿Estudias medicina o Peralvillo? (568)

Were Quevedo thoroughly committed to formulating his judgements according to the Christian ethic, it is perplexing, to say the least, that he allowed his more respectable and familiar poetic identity freely to associate with the propagator of anti-virtues. 'Pues él bien comunicado' (Planeta, 1119) is a case in point. The poet breaks his journey with a stop at an inn. He is at first taken aback by the sight of the landlady, a vieja, but in conversation with the stable lad comes to appreciate the advantages of an affair with an older woman, and proceeds accordingly. It is difficult to take the speaker as a persona independent of the poet[64]. Witness the reason for his travelling:

Hoy se cumplen cuatro meses
que dejé la confusión
y el tráfago de la Corte,
con justísima razón. (ll. 5-8)

And what really decides him on the venture is the prospect that the matron will be the antithesis of a pedigüeña:

"No me digas más - le dije -;
basta decirme que son
gente que da y no recibe;
no hay más que decirme, no". (ll. 49-52)

But he does enjoy the additional benefits:

Tratábame la tal vieja
por su daifo en cuanto amor,
por su primo en cuanto al vulgo
y en todo como a señor. (ll. 57-60)

Not to be overlooked is his claim that reason is on his side:

Mujer de cuarenta abajo
no me hable desde hoy;
sólo las viejas me valgan,
que es valerme la razón.
Porque es gastar con las mozas
hacienda y reputación,
como quien paga al verdugo
los azotes que le dio. (ll. 61-8)

The poem's advocation of an illicit and impermanent union is inextricably linked with its censure of women who exploit love for money. Does Quevedo mean it?

To answer this, a consideration of its pedigree is indispensable. The poem is both grounded in, and an advance on, 'en loor de'. But that the basis of its argument is a

sentiment so dear to the satirist's heart precludes our taking it simply as an exercise in witty justification. Again, it is utterly unlike any other eulogy of the older woman with which I am acquainted. A couple of Italian specimens are typically concerned with the physical to the exclusion of anything else - Quevedo's priority is quite the reverse. Gasparo Murtola's 'La bella vecchia' contrasts the hard, unyielding beauty of youth with the more generous and luscious fruits of maturity:

> Il sen', dove raccolti
> fur' tra bianchi ligustri
> pomi acerbetti, e di vaghezza pieni,
> è bello ancor . . .
> anzi ogn' hora a ripieni
> son [i pomi] di maggiore dolcezze,
> poiché di più soave
> nettare è l'uva grave
> quanto appar' più matura.[65]

A modern editor sums up Giuseppe Salomoni's 'La bella vecchia. Palinodia':

> Ha un tono argutamente ambiguo tra l'ammirazione per le superstiti attrative della donna . . . e la spietata notazione del guasto arrecato dagli anni nel bel volto e nelle belle membra.[66]

This extract is representative:

> Palidetto ed esangue,
> nel tuo languido viso,
> co' suoi vecchi angeletti anch' egli langue
> de le Grazie e d'Amore il paradiso;
> ma pur non men leggiadro e non men dolce
> l'anime alletta e molce. (906)

In spirit if not in time, Quevedo's poem stands light-years away from both these. It characterizes him at his inventive best, appearing to write within a tradition but ruthlessly exploiting it for his own ends.

The objection that the romance is a huge joke demands consideration. Funny it undoubtedly is, but we are invited to laugh with the poet, not at him. While the rhetoric of the stable-lad's litany of praises is calculated to raise more than a smile the poet's own reasoning is sober and restrained in comparison. And the contrast serves to make his case more rather than less convincing. Treating the poem as a parody does not render it frivolous. If it parodies comic 'en loor de' then it travesties travesty and de-ironizes the eulogy. A second possibility is that it parodies a hypothetical 'serious' statement of the same thing. Were this intended to debunk the 'serious' version, a more unnecessarily tortuous and haphazard method could hardly be imagined. On the other hand, 'In societies where it is not the done thing for a man openly to express his feelings he may by parodying them express them nevertheless' (Muecke, 238).

Contemporary aesthetic theory also argues against the poem being merely a piece of fun. Its subject is mortal sin, a clear breach of the sixth Commandment. Classical approaches to the ridiculous reflected the lesson of experience in their insistence that laughter depended on degree. A big nose is funny but no nose is not. Vanity may be depended upon to inspire a grin but only a deviant could make or laugh at a joke about murder. The idea, seminal in Aristotle (Poetics, V, 1-2), was expanded by Cicero who ruled out the extremes of both misfortune and immorality as risible:

> Nam nec insignis improbitas, et scelere iuncta, nec rursus miseria insignis agitata ridetur . . . Itaque ea facillime luduntur, quae neque odio magno, neque misericordia maxima digna sunt. Quam ob rem materies omnis ridiculorum est in istis vitiis quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum. (De Oratore, II, 58-9, 237-8; Wilkins, 346)

Inevitably Renaissance critics took up the precept. Typical is Trissino:

> Bene è da sapere che se le bruttezze e deformità dell' animo lequali si notano sono grandi, come sono falsità, pergiuri, e simili, non moveno riso ma sdegno, onde si dannano e si riprendeno. (La quinta, f. 37v)[67]

Within the context of Christianity adulterous and mercenary sexual indulgence must be included here. And if the poem *is* making light of the heinous then it must stand condemned of a grievous moral irresponsibility. But that is an unlikely possibility. The consensus of the evidence suggests that, while it relies on jokes to some extent, the poem invites our recognition that its *burlas* are in fact *veras*.

Analysis in the light of irony evinces the same conclusion. Quevedo elsewhere abominated the *vieja* as witch, procuress and hag. The lady in question is neither of the first two and, while he never pretends that physically she is becoming, her submissive generosity and appreciation of romantic attention renders sexual relations palatable enough. Not only does he find grounds for liking her but these are perfectly plausible of themselves. If *rei natura* does not indicate an

inversion of the message neither does persona. Recourse to ratio enarrativa or communis would have unequivocally signalled detachment from the views expounded. Even ratio activa with a sufficiently objectified speaker would have served the purpose. Instead, Quevedo produces a persona, practically indistinguishable from his characteristic poetic self, who charms with his wit and engages with the reasonableness of his discourse. If the poem is taken to be the simulation of approval and the dissimulation of scorn it may be asked why it makes such strenuous efforts to achieve the first and drags its heels about the second.

This makes it extremely improbable that we are in the presence of a true ambiguity simultaneously supporting contradictory theses. Such ambiguity as there is is much more one-sided. The artificiality of the setting and the nature and extent of the humour prove on examination to endorse the superficial sense rather than undermine it. But that they are present means that the poem stops short of the finest and certainly the bravest irony of all - the truth. If your opinion is shocking, state it openly. The chances are that the hearers, unwilling to even acknowledge its outrageousness, will assume you must be talking ironically. Colossally crude and beautifully subtle, it is difficult to imagine anything more ironical[68]. Quevedo came even closer to it when he confessed:

> Quiero gozar, Gutiérrez; que no quiero
> tener gusto mental tarde y mañana;
> primor quiero atisbar, y no ventana,
> y asistir al placer, y no al cochero. (Planeta, 613)

The internal logic of 'Pues el bien comunicado' points to its having been intended in earnest. Hesitant of being completely direct, it is only just oblique - the perfect vehicle for the spreading of subversion. That is not the whole story. Consequent on Otis Green's idea that Quevedo frequently saw in satire the occasion for a display of his poetical talents sooner than moral disgust arises the suspicion that this poem is similarly just a variation on the theme of unorthodox behaviour. In 'A la Corte vas, Perico' (Planeta, 896-9) the voice of experience warns against the dangers of court life in distinctively Quevedian tones, inveighing against pedigüeñas of all descriptions. Even viejas are included in the list of mercenary lovers and fregonas are recommended instead (ll. 37-9, 105-12)[69]. This apparent divergence of opinion may amount to artistry but can as feasibly be seen as the postulation of different solutions to the same problem: how to save money and secure sexual satisfaction at the same time. Nor is the incompatibility as rigid as it first seems. After all, the Court is not the country and a money-hungry urban sophisticate, however advanced in years, is a different proposition from a rustic hostess. Quevedo made a general contrast between the healthy spontaneity of the rural woman's approach to love and the ulterior motivation of her counterpart in town in 'Desde esta Sierra Morena' (Planeta, 858-62; ll. 109-24). As with 'Tardóse en parirme' and the sonnets in its orbit, these poems are in essence more consonant than not.

It might also be remembered that Quevedo was quite as prone to modulation in his moral writings, which are as much

artefacts as poetry of this kind[70]. In implicit sympathy with Otis Green, Ilse Nolting-Hauff observed how often in Quevedo's licit satire 'am Hertzen liegt' (Vision, Satire, 77). But that does not and cannot affect their rectitude. Such coolness is, I would argue, conspicuously lacking in a poem like 'Pues el bien comunicado'. Yet even were it suspected our moral sentence on the poem could not be altered. Evil is both comfortable and efficient when decked out as good. If Quevedo had been out to expose it, obliging it with its favourite disguise was as counter-productive a move as one might wish.

History helps little in deciding Quevedo's motives. From González de Salas we know that the manuscripts of the burlesque poetry especially suffered from loss and dispersal in the aftermath of his death. Evidently he had been preparing them for the press along with the rest, but how much was finished, how much remained to be revised, and which items now familiar from elsewhere were deleted in toto are matters probably doomed to remain in obscurity. It seems reasonable to assume of Quevedo what his 1664 publisher said of Waller, that he wrote these poems 'only to please himself and such particular persons to whom they were directed'[71]. Equally, the eventual prospect of publication must have exerted a considerable influence over revision and inclusion. González de Salas's tinkerings may reflect the sort of toning down Quevedo himself had proposed, or even in some cases executed. That both were aware that 'no todas las verdades han de salir en público, ni a los ojos de todos'[72] might account for the disappearance of some items from the Parnaso

and explain why others included there, such as 'Tardóse en parirme', may masquerade as satire but yet convey their sense to the discreto.

Once a satirical moralist ventures beyond the safety of 'inversio verborum', or praising three-leggedness, or putting a paean to Luther in the mouth of the Pope, he runs or deliberately invites the risk of losing the understanding of part (even all) of his readership, and of ceasing to be a satirical moralist. Paul Goodman writes:

> Generally, in any poem where the comic and serious, or other ethical kinds, are mixed continually, there is required the systematic interference of the author to direct the reading.[73]

This is an obvious precaution with which Quevedo often chooses to dispense. When that happens the resultant poems sometimes impress us as the voice of moral dissidence. For all its hysterical excesses (and it contains passages of psychopathic nastiness which even Quevedo would have had to admire)[74] the Tribunal de la justa venganza may have come close to the truth in some of its accusations:

> El deshonesto gozo con que habla, y aprobación
> que haze de los deshonestos y lascivos deleites
> . . . Lo que califica y alaba el distraimento
> y vida holgazana de los bribones y estafadores,
> a cuya cuadrilla junta tiene por religión.
> (Prólogo, 3)

Other poems create a sort of fog which confuses our moral antennae. Whether this is due to their being an aesthetic

exercise in ambiguity or to a more positive indifference to the ethical nature of the subject makes little difference: their failure to subscribe to the norm and their potential for deceiving renders them reprehensible.

Unless strictly monitored, irony will assume command, subordinating all the other instincts in a poet to that of εἴρων , and holding both subject and reader in equal disdain. Ronald Knox noted that 'There is, indeed, less contempt in satire than in irony' (Essays, 31). Aristotle was more forthright: 'Irony shows contempt' - 'καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία ' (Rhetoric, II, 2, 25; Freese, 185). This is a consideration best never underestimated. Lope wrote in the Arte nuevo:

> Siempre el hablar equívoco ha tenido
> Y aquella incertidumbre anfibológica
> Gran lugar en el vulgo, porque piensa
> Que él sólo entiende lo que el otro dice.[75]

In this consummately ambiguous statement can be detected more than a little scorn of the public which thinks itself so clever; combined with a hint that artistic 'incertidumbre' may not be so easily fathomed. Poems are corpses. Those examined above met their end in the defeat of the conformist by the heterodox, or expired transfixed on irony's web.

CHAPTER FOUR - NOTES

(1) Quoted by Norman Knox, The Word Irony and its Context 1500-1755 (Durham N.C., 1961) 44.

(2) 'Se han de purgar los escritos que ofenden y desacreditan los ritos eclesiásticos, el estado, dignidad, órdenes y personas de religiosos', Novissimus index, (Madrid, 1640), b2. Cf. Ponce de León's censura of the Cuento de cuentos, esp. 363, 365 of OP.

(3) Discorso sopra la materia della satira (n.p.) in Sette libri di satire (Venice, 1560), edited by Sansovino. Note how he carefully points out a case of irony - 169.

(4) The satiri 'essendo come provocati dalla moltitudine de vitii de gli huomini, si muovino sdegnosamente e con ira a riprenderle, non potendo a un certo modo più tacere' (ibid.). This is a paraphrase of Badius (himself expanding on Juvenal's 'difficile est . . .'): 'Ab indignatione aut ab admiratione faciunt satirici exordium; perinde ac si multitudine vitiorum lacessiti et provocati ad scribendum non possint amplius tacere' (Sermones, f. IIv).

(5) Quoted in Sánchez, Academias, 82 et seq.

(6) Nueva idea de la tragedia antigua (Madrid, 1633), 91-2.

(7) Metamorfosis a lo moderno en varios epigramas (Florence, 1641), 9.

(8) Not given by Felicidad Buendía; in Astrana Marín's ed. of the Prosa (Madrid, 1932), 198 et seq.

(9) Ibid. Fuente's wording closely recalls that of Niseno, which he is probably using. Nothing in Quevedo's preliminary material to the Discurso indicates that Niseno is quoting the author himself. R. M. Price, 'Quevedo's satire on the use of words in the Sueños', MLN, LXXIX (1964), 169-80, argues that Quevedo's claim that 'en ellos [Sueños] hallarán desengaños y avisos de lo que pasa en este mundo y ha de pasar en el otro por todos' is an 'assertion of moral seriousness' and that 'the ironical tone of parts of this and other prologues is absent' (169). If this is so, then the thesis that Quevedo's Hell is only symbolical is even less secure.

(10) Contrast the censura of the Sueño del Juicio final by the Franciscan Santo Domingo, who views sátira favourably, Astrana Marín, Prosa, 130.

(11) Luis de Granada, 205; Cipriano Suárez, 217; Ximénez Patón, 22v, 115r, 253r-v; Artiga, 231; Covarrubias, 741; Autoridades, 309; and Pineda.

(12) Herennium does not call irony by name but 'allegoria ex contrario', ed.cit., 344. For Quintilian, see below. Luis de Granada's is perhaps the most explicit statement: 'Ironia, quam illusionem vocant, allegoria est quae non solum aliud sensu aliud verbis ostendit sed contrarium' (loc.cit.).

(13) He also uses (once only) the form dissimulantia, for which see Wilkins, 367.

(14) For other Ciceronian texts naming dissimulatio, esp. in cases of Socratic irony, see Auguste Haury, L'Ironie et l'humour chez Cicéron (Leiden, 1955), 14 et seq.

(15) Which he amplifies into sarcasmos, asteismos, antiphrasis, paroimia and micterismos at VIII, 6, 57-9 (Butler, III, 332-4). For the still more exotic, see Haury, 5-6.

(16) He does use diversum where one might expect contrarium at VI, 2, 15 in a short definition, but when he does this again at VIII, 6, 54 it is obviously intended as a synonym for contrarium (which he invariably uses).

(17) It was also known as praeteritio and paralypsis. Aristotle said 'Irony [eironeia] is saying something while pretending not to say it, or calling things by the opposite of their real names', giving an instance of antiphrasis for the first, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Loeb trans. by H. Rackham (London, 1937), XXI, 361. Compare and contrast John Hoskins, Directions for speech and style, ed. Hudson (Princeton, 1935), 30.

(18) Ximénez Patón was adamant that irony could not be a trope but had the gall to claim Quintilian as one of his authorities, Mercurius, 115r. See Brian Vickers's argument that irony is a trope, not a figure, Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry (London, 1970), 86.

(19) Elsewhere in Quintilian simulatio simply means the intensification of emotion, e.g. a lawyer feigning outrage to impress the jury (VI, 3, 47). That referred to here seems to be a particular type of comic stimulation.

(20) Lullo explains 'O bone vir' for an evil man as the simulation of praise. Quintilian's answer to this would be, I suggest, that simulation of opposite feelings may safely be called eironeia but that unspecified simulation may not. Note that at IX, 2, 51 he calls eironeia hac simulatio.

(21) It is true that multivalent as opposed to strictly ambivalent words must be included here, e.g. Quintilian's gallus, 'cockerel', 'Frenchman', 'priest of Cybele'. But multiplicity in rhetorical ambiguity is restricted to the homonymic of single words and parts and combinations thereof, and does not correspond to multiple meaning as I define it below.

(22) I have adapted Quintilian very slightly (and without misrepresentation) in this second example.

(23) In the foregoing I have used it in the Ciceronian sense.

(24) This is William Empson's seventh type of ambiguity, full contradiction, to which I am indebted for the example; Seven Types of Ambiguity (London, 1947), 192. Ximénez Patón claims that antiphrasis is not a type of irony but is exemplified by words like pelón which should mean bald but in fact means the opposite (77r-v). This can be matched by Diomedes who quotes the example of the Parcae, the Fates 'quod minime parcant' as antiphrasis (Grammatici opus, 124r).

(25) E.g. by Aristotle, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, XXV, ed.cit., 369; Luis de Granada, 194.

(26) De Oratore, II, 62, 254; Wilkins, 388. Ximénez Patón condemns it in Latin but not in Spanish (Mercurius, 108r, 248r; see also his Elocuencia española en arte [Toledo, 1604], 49v).

(27) La quinta, 39r. As an example of the ambiguous as opposed to the ironical he quotes a sonnet in which Aretino calls someone a 'filosofo mortale'. But this makes perfect sense as irony, insult for praise (and technically it also involves paronomasia, 'mortale/morale'). Artiga quotes an example in which irony in the grand manner and ambiguity are finely interwoven: Judas embraces Christ, 'abrazo tan apretado/ muy grande pasión anuncia' (Epítome, 299).

(28) 'Illae elevationes', such as 'scilicet' and 'O di boni' which, uttered at the appropriate moment in the appropriate tone, turns the encomium into scorn etc. (IX, 2, 48). For the Quevedo example see Planeta, 76.

(29) On the frequency of the praise: censure/contempt motif see Knox, 12.

(30) Otis H. Green is the leading apologist for the 'artisic' thesis, citing similar ideas in A. Kernan's The Cankered Muse: Satire of the English Renaissance (New Haven, 1959), 247-8. See Spain and the Western Tradition, III (Madison, 1965), 428-32; 'A Hispanist's thoughts on The Anatomy of Satire [by Gilbert Highet]', Romance Philology, XVII (1963), 123-33; and his review of Mas's Caricature, HR, XXVIII (1960), 72-6.

(31) Quoted by Muecke, 219, Cf. the opinion of Goethe, ibid. Here I do not mean that Quevedo was 'indifferent' in the sense that he was artistically committed to the authentic representation of life as it is lived, good mixed with evil in the proportions found there. This sort of scrupulously unbiased naturalism was known as indiferencia in mid to late seventeenth-century Spain, though there are rather earlier examples. For references and discussion see Jack Sage, 'Texto y realización de La estatua de Prometeo y otros

(31 cont.) dramas musicales de Calderón', Hacia Calderón (Exeter, 1969), (37-52), tirada aparte, 41-2. I mean instead that Quevedo indifferently manipulated moral issues for artistic purposes.

(32) The matter of for whom, if anyone, a particular poem might be intended, is dealt with at the end of the chapter.

(33) Note the variety here: feigned ignorance followed by feigned hyperbolical indignation.

(34) For Otis Green the persona in Quevedo's satire is a very considerable 'literary asset' but nothing more ('A Hispanist's . . .', 125; cf. the Mas review, 73-4). I suggest that this is not the whole truth.

(35) By critics likes Salomon and Jammes (see Conclusion). Bartolomé de la Fuente's censura accuses Quevedo of attacking positions in the non-ecclesiastical Establishment (loc.cit.). This was also a commonplace in the Tribunal de la justa venganza, 41-2 etc.

(36) Romancero general, II, ed. A. Durán (Madrid, 1922), Biblioteca de autores españoles XVI, no. 1719; 'En la ante-cámara, sólo', p. 565. Other refs. are not so explicit. Cf. ibid., no. 1710, p.559. In J. Álvarez Gato's Obras completas, ed. Artiles (1928), 29, 'romances de don Bueso' are contrasted with 'lindas canciones', and 'locura' with 'seso' in the same context. In no. 434 of the Cancionero de Baena don Bueso is used as an insult in flyting. For these and other refs. see the Austral ed. of Menéndez Pidal's De primitiva lírica española, 103 et seq. Autoridades, I, 706 suggests that don Bueso was later simplified into 'hombre vestido ridículamente o de mojiganga'. It gives a ref. to Quevedo's 'Pues ya los anos caducos' but there the allusion is to a generalized bueso and not to don Bueso himself as here (cf. Planeta, 1083). According to Covarrubias cogote could simply mean cabeza: 'sin cabeza' would again imply that the speaker was touched. As the latter is a montañés perhaps Quevedo also intends him to be an asturiano: 'Descogotados, los que no tienen cogotes, como los asturianos' (Covarrubias, 334).

(37) E.g. Planeta, 1131, 1138, 592 etc. One of the most intriguing examples is that of '"Parióme adrede mi madre"' (ibid., 811): its final stanza awakens us to the fact that the speaker, Fabio, is a forlorn lover, which might inspire us to connect his speech with a certain type of amorous poem. See E. M. Wilson's study, 'Quevedo for the masses', Atlante, III: 4 (1955), 151-66, which suggests the parodied literary precedents. One must not forget the ending of Horace's 'Beatus ille' monologue: 'haec ubi locutus faenerator Alfius, /iam iam futurus rusticus, omnem redegit Idibus pecuniam,/ quaerit Kalendis ponere' (Epodes II, in Odes and Epodes, C. E. Bennett's Loeb ed. [London, 1968], 368).

(38) As in the examples given in the previous footnote. BN MS 3940 carries the title 'Paradoja de Nerón emperador y don Pedro rey de Castilla' (Castalia, II, 395). This suggests granting some ultimate credibility to the argument for its own sake, which seems extreme.

(39) The few exceptions are Planeta, 576 [556], 607, 602, the third being a purely verbal exercise. There are other incidental references, e.g. 615 [612].

(40) The cuckold of 'Echando verbos y nombres' protests '"¿Abro puerta sin toser,/ y sin decir: 'Yo soy c'abro'?"' (Planeta, 1011) - a rare example of homophonic as opposed to merely homonymic equivoco in Spanish: qu' abro, cabro. Note that the wit is his before it is Quevedo's.

(41) An exception is 'Mi marido, aunque es chiquito' (Planeta, 995). This is spoken by a woman in praise of her cuckold husband: her carefree admission of greed and lust more than sufficiently damns her of itself.

(42) The estribillo included in the MS 3940 version, 'Mas ¿ qué no hará en la hambre de un hidalgo/ moza y casamentero y dote al diablo?', does not fit the facts of the poem particularly well.

(43) Quevedo might have known any of the sixteenth-century clandestine printings. There was a Spanish version of Part I, Day Three called Coloquio de las damas (Seville, 1548, 1607 and at least one earlier ed. to judge by the 1548 title page), itself eventually translated into Latin. But this does not use the teacher/pupil motif exactly whereas the three days of the second part do. See Gio. Aquilecchia's ed. Sei giornate (Bari, 1969) or Raymond Rosenthal's trans., Aretino's Dialogues (London, 1971). Others who wrote in the Aretino tradition were Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 'Consejos de don Diego' (Poesías satíricas, 45) and Ledesma (Romancero, f. 112r).

(44) Muecke, 234.

(45) Which would mean that Quevedo always used the species of rhetorical irony called micterismos, facetiously aping the language and manner of the victim or opponent. Thus Quintilian, 'micterismos (dissimulatus quidem sed non latens derisus)', (Institutio, VIII, 6, 59). Ximénez Patón is more explicit about the mimetic element: 'In omni micterismo est mimesis . . . repraesentat dicta aliena cum irrisione' (Mercurius, f. 23r). It is argued below that this idea is fundamentally faulty.

(46) For some other examples see Pietro Toldo, 'Études sur la poésie burlesque française de la Renaissance', Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie, 1901, 71-93 etc, 90-1.

(47) 'Si a una parte miraran solamente' is, as González de Salas pointed out, more ambiguous (Planeta, 350). Note that the comical element is not introduced until the final tercet.

(48) I.e. dubious as opposed to clear ambiguity. As an example of the latter here is Dido to Aeneas: 'Del fuego sacas a tu padre, y luego/ me dejas en el fuego que has traído/ y me niegas el agua que deseas' (Planeta, 578): 'You leave me in

(48 cont.) the fire of my love and of my suicidal pyre; your yearning for the water of the sea denies me the water of tears of compassion'. This mixes verbal equívoco with the conceptual ('You desire the water of the sea' = 'You want to seek your promised land'). Purely conceptual is the clear ambiguity about Marica, 'Resfriόse de enfaldarse/ muy a menudo las sayas;/ de cubrirse y descubrirse' (ibid., 811): 'She caught a cold from dressing and undressing so much' = 'She caught the pox from too much intercourse'.

(49) The Philosophy of Rhetoric (London, 1936), 38.

(50) Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 8th imp. (London, 1968), 20.

(51) Note his adoption of the catch-phrase 'No se me da nada' (1.33), probably intending the fully proverbial form which adds 'que en muriéndome yo, todo se acaba'. Cejador calls this 'gravísima cordura . . . no hay verdad más colosal que la de ese refranillo, vestido de bobo', but from a Christian point of view it is ambivalent: heretical for what it says about the next life but suggesting detachment in this one ('La ironía y el gracejo en los refranes', La España moderna, 207 [1906], 85). In the poem it is not Christian detachment that is championed but one of pure self-interest, quite oblivious of the world to come.

(52) Henry Ettinghausen categorizes Quevedo as one of 'the poorer nobility . . . on fixed or irregular incomes' (Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement [O.U.P., 1972], 133), a station consistent with what we know of the persona. The latter also shares the historical Quevedo's love of sausages (cf. Epistolario, 272; they were 'celestiales').

(53) In the present state of Quevedo scholarship we do not know whether this was a poem Quevedo intended for the Parnaso in its extant condition or at all, or whether its inclusion was exclusively González de Salas's decision.

(54) González de Salas's title runs 'Felicidad barata y artificiosa del pobre', which is somewhat inappropriate. The speaker can afford bribes and has enough to dress and drink well, and to hoard besides. There is no indication that he is a professional beggar.

(55) R. M. Price has exhaustively elucidated most of the idioms in these two poems, 'A note on three satirical sonnets of Quevedo', BHS, XL (1963), 79-88.

(56) He also praises plain clothing, ll. 5-8.

(57) Quoted by E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism (London, 1958 [1911]), 346. Cf. the remarks of Musonius (345-6).

(58) Horace, Satires, II, 2 is apparently indebted not only to Cicero but also to a letter of Epicurus to Menoecus that is given in Diogenes Laertius's Lives (Fairclough, 135). In his defence of Epicurus Quevedo refers to Diogenes account several times. He does not refer to this letter but it seems highly unlikely that he was unfamiliar with it in the text. On the defence itself see Ettinghausen ch. 2,esp. 53-6.

(59) See Góngora, Obras completas, ed. J. and I. Millé y Giménez (Madrid, 1961), 114, 289, 428 etc.; Primavera y flor, 126, 223; Lope, Rimas humanas, f. 77r, and Tristán's speech in praise of clerical bachelorhood in El mármol de Felisardo, Obras (XXX), ed. Menéndez y Pelayo, Biblioteca de autores españoles, CCXLVI (Madrid, 1971), 353.

(60) Cf. Planeta, 6 etc.; Virtud militante and Cuna y sepultura, the relevant passages discussed by Ettinghausen, 101 et seq.

(61) See Rudd, 171-2. Note how Persius in his first satire does not disguise that he is both interlocutors of the dialogue (l. 44).

(62) Grammatici opus, f. 139r. Scaliger, who is actually talking about satire, makes the same distinctions in slightly different terminology (Poetices, 44).

(63) Bullitt sees two sorts of persona in Swift, the honest: objective and well-informed observer versus the dramatically erected stooge (57-61). But even this refinement solves nothing in the case of the anomalies in Quevedo.

(64) Or even from the historical Quevedo. His journey comprises the first leg of the trip to the Torre, Madrid to Toledo, as described elsewhere, e.g. Planeta, 973.

(65) Rime (Venice, 1603), 'Di bella Giovinetta', 7-10, 9-10.

(66) G. G. Ferrero, ed. Marino e i marinisti (Naples, 1954), 905-7. He gives the Bologna, 1647 text. For similar French examples see Jacques Bailbé, 'Le thème de la vieille femme dans le poésie satirique de seizième et du début du dix-septième siecles', Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXVI (1964), (98-119), 108, 119.

(67) Cf. Beni, In Aristotelis,161 - 'vero quia malum etc.'; Madius, In Aristotelis librum, 302 - 'Ridiculum igitur etc.'. Of course, the theory was not always reflected in vernacular usage; thus Santo Domingo, 'La sátira es picante, pero lo que conviene para ridicular el vicio y corregirle' (Astrana Marín's Prosa, 130). But it must be remembered that it was maldecir rather than laughter that distinguished sátira from the exclusively moral. Quevedo's own usage contradicts that of his censor when he actually contrasts the ridiculous with the culpable: '¿Pues, cómo, maldito, lo que es justo será reprensible ni ridículo?' (OP, 806).

(68) Quintilian's eighth ironical figure, exaggeration of the charges against us, is nearest in spirit to it.

(69) In 'Ya que al Hospital de Amor' (Planeta, 1109) the poet's night of love with a fregona turns out to be a pretty grim affair, but the poem is a send-up of romantic love rather than abuse of kitchen-maids. A remarkable statement of the physical superiority of the untainted fregona over the cosmetic dama was penned by the shadowy figure of the Sacristán de Vieja Rúa, more or less contemporary with Quevedo. See Quevedo y Concellón's El Abad Maluenda y el Sacristán de Vieja Rúa (Madrid, 1902), 22-3; Añibarro y Rives's Intento de un diccionario (Madrid, 1889), 29 et seq. Compare an anonymous poem in the Cancionero antequerano, 171-2.

(70) Cf. Ettinghausen, 102: 'The delight Quevedo took in working out rhetorical variations upon Senecan sententiae is self-evident'.

(71) Quoted in Palmer/Bradbury's Metaphysical Poetry, 240.

(72) Rosamunda in Cervantes's Persiles y Sigismunda, ed. J. B. Avalle-Arce (Madrid, 1969), 119.

(73) The Structure of Literature (Chicago, 1954), 117.

(74) E.g. Tribunal, 54.

(75) El arte nuevo de hacer comedias en este tiempo (1618 ed.), ed. Juana de José Prades (Madrid, 1971), [324]. On page 214 she gives further refs. to Anfibológico in Lope.

CONCLUSION

Criticism of Quevedo's prolific labours tends in a single direction. The familiar argument runs that as to meaning if not style his works are concentric and harmoniously interrelated, and can only be understood as an entirety. This reading is often based on a very partisan selection of texts and, in its popular and less scholarly manifestations, on stale and second-hand assumptions and even plain ignorance of the range of material. Applied to his contributions to the so-called satírico/burlesco this 'whole Quevedo' theory presents him as a consciously committed and actively crusading moralist who, give or take a few youthful indiscretions and a sprinkling of light-hearted but harmless frivolities, and with allowances made for a natural disposition towards melancholy and spleen, could not fail to edify with some pointed and ethically quite unexceptionable truism[1]. Elsewhere the reconciliation of diversities can be accomplished and convincing, as in Ettinghausen's study of Quevedo's Stoicism. But apart from some vague mumblings in recognition of the fact that his amorous verse often shows more interest in the grave than in Eros, no one has yet suggested how it does or might take its place in the grand scheme, or forwarded grounds for its non-inclusion[2].

This estimation of Quevedo as a miracle of complex oneness has not gone without qualification, which generally crops up as the contradiction thesis. The latter reaches back to Mérimée and beyond, but it has never been examined at more than article length and is normally confined to a sentence or two[3]. When brought to bear on the moral

personality of the writer it has been known to produce the conclusion that Quevedo is sometimes immoral or anti-Catholic[4]. In every case illustrative material has been in sadly short supply.

This dissertation has argued that contradiction in Quevedo amounts to something deeper, more extensive, and more serious than is suggested by the inevitable juxtaposition of hagiography and a bum-book (OP, 1136-54; 95-100). In breaking the rules, a dirty joke or a piece of irreverence acknowledges them. The loss of the code means the loss of the joke. But certain of Quevedo's poems mark a significant departure from an implicit pact of this kind. They call the rules into question, challenge them, and set up substitutes in their place. Their regular fate has been to be altogether ignored by commentators or hastily interpreted so as to reflect the pre-supposed whole Quevedo theory. This misrepresentation is worrying not so much for its deference to the undeniably substantial amounts of the doctrinally legitimate in Quevedo as for its readiness to ignore the existence of literary fore-bears and family, dispense with the relevant contemporary theory behind technical structures like irony, and rely on a narrow and misleading twentieth-century version of 'satire'.

Perhaps the greatest single source of aberration centres on the satirist himself. Modern criticism either humbly declines to probe, or else tends to endow him with complete moral immunity and absolute moral discretion[5]. Leavis attempts to justify this near-total willingness to take the satirist on trust:

> But, actually, the discussion of satire in terms of offence and castigation, victim and castigator, is unprofitable, though the idea of these has to be taken into account[6].

But the seventeenth century was not so sensitive to the niceties of 'critical' profit. More hard-headed and sceptical, it was fascinated by the man and often granted his qualifications and methods little credibility. Among the more vociferous chastisers were satirists themselves[7]. Two mutually relevant questions were repeatedly asked: what was he like as a man, and what did he do as a satirist? In As You Like It the Duke chides Jacques: 'Most mischievous foul sin, in chiding sin:/ for thou thyself hast been a libertine', an accusation Jacques parries but does not actually answer (II, 7, 69 et seq.). In the Coloquio de los perros Cervantes voiced his impatience with satire's traditional self-vindication, and those who appeal to it:

> No tiene la murmuración mejor velo para paliar y encubrir su maldad disoluta, que darse a entender el murmurador que todo cuanto dice son sentencias de filósofos, y que el decir mal es reprehensión y el descubrir los defectos ajenos buen celo; y no hay vida de ningún murmurante, que si la consideras y escudriñas, no la halles llena de vicios y de insolencias.[8]

In Persiles and Sigismunda he re-examined the subject in the shape of Clodio, who admits 'Tengo un cierto espíritu satírico y maldiciente, una pluma veloz y una lengua libre' (ed.cit., 118). His utter dedication to his calling - 'deléitanme las malicias, y por decir una, perderé yo, no

sólo un amigo, pero cien mil vidas' (ibid.) - is no idle boast. As Rosamunda points out, his invective is socially indiscriminate, not only tilting at kings, family and friends but, significantly, bringing the witty and experienced within its sights (118-9)[9]. Clodio's defence is that he never utters a lie (119), which Cervantes does not contradict. In the second book the author gives his own opinion:

> Era Clodio . . . hombre malicioso sobre discreto, de donde le nacía ser gentil maldiciente: que el tonto y el simple, ni sabe murmurar ni maldecir; y aunque no es bien decir bien mal, como ya otra vez se ha dicho, con todo esto alaban al maldiciente discreto; que la agudeza maliciosa no hay conversación que no la ponga en punto y dé sabor. (181)

He dies not at the hands of some offended party but accidentally, struck by an arrow intended for the pathetic and bathetic Cenotia. Cervantes sees both the nature and occurrence of the wound as poetic justice: 'le pasó la boca y la lengua y le dejó la vida en perpetuo silencio. Castigo merecido a sus muchas culpas' (203).

Clodio is sufficiently <u>discreto</u> not only to be entertainingly and incisively satirical but to know where to draw the line. This enables him to enjoy a jester-like exemption from the consequences of his barbs for he never suffers direct retribution. The implication is that this amounts to an abuse of <u>discreción</u> or, perhaps more accurately, an adulteration of it. This latter reading is borne out by a passage from the <u>Coloquio</u>. Cipión allows Berganza 'impersonal' satire as a concession, but recommends otherwise: 'Si puedes agradar

sin ella [la murmuración], te tendré por muy discreto' (Novelas, 367). In the figure of Clodio Cervantes epitomized the professional who could honestly claim to indulge in detraction but not calumny, to attack the mighty and the astute as well as lesser mortals, yet always do so with sufficient presence of mind to escape human revenge. And as part of his creative privilege he redressed the balance.

Quevedo himself was very much aware of the question mark suspended above the satirist's head. A letrilla begins:

> Sin ser juez de la pelota
> juzgar las faltas me agrada,
> no pudiendo haber preñada
> que tenga más, si se nota. (Planeta, 685)[10]

This admission of personal immorality, amply evidenced by the salacious delight taken in surveying the faults of others, is most enlighteningly seen as an unfavourable reflection on the office of satirist. It makes little sense as a humble declaration of imperfection when called upon to undertake the necessary correction of others. In his plagiarism of the poem Trillo y Figueroa's clumsy attempts at disguising the theft mangle Quevedo's subtlety:

> Como juez de la pelota
> He venido a juzgar faltas,
> Que unas se pasan por altas,
> Y otras por de humilde nota.[11]

Throughout his letrilla Quevedo uses the refrain, 'Concertáme esas medidas', to highlight the contrast between the moral law and its daily infringement. But its appearance at the end of the first stanza specifically brings out the satirist's

presumption in daring to judge:

> El negocio va de rota,
> pues que sin ser ni haber sido
> coronista, me he metido
> a espulgar ajenas vidas.
> Concertáme esas medidas. (ibid.)[12]

The intentional integration of casual murmurador with 'official' satirist should not be overlooked. It occurs elsewhere, notably in

> Yo, que nunca sé callar,
> y sólo tengo por mengua
> no vaciarme por la lengua,
> y el morirme por hablar,
> a todos quiero contar
> cierto secreto que oí.
> Mas no ha de salir de aquí. (Planeta, 699)[13]

This sort of introspection passes judgement on the ethics of satire, and the verdict is not flattering. Quevedo both has his say and questions his right to do so, implying the conclusion reached by Nashe: 'I account such men [satirists] neuer the holier, because they place praise in painting foorth other mens imperfections'.[14]

Despite these tacit invitations to monitor his activity as a satirist, Quevedo is normally credited a priori with the best of intentions. In addition, unawareness of the clear signs of decadence in contemporary satire,[15] of its accompanying unhappy reputation, and of the very intricacy of this multifarious topic, conspires to add conviction to this picture and more deeply entrench the 'whole' Quevedo theory. The

hypothesis of cohesion is also endorsed by more recent criticism which argues Quevedo's satire to be the reaction of a fervent aristocrat and confirmed snob to the inroads being made into establishment wealth and influence by the business and professional classes[16]. Although comparison is on occasions unavoidable, even desirable, such total identification of the man and his writings seems perilous even in the abstract. Moreover, one suspects that in practice it is based on a less than comprehensive scrutiny of texts. Suspicions are confirmed in the case of Jammes, who is happy to use just the Sueños and letrillas satíricas to formulate an opinion 'd'une façon générale' (Études, 55). This view also fails to account for Otis Green's 'artistic' thesis and explain why such a passionate involvement is so often pursued with less than zealous interest.

Even when less familiar poetry is discussed unity is frequently taken for granted. Levisi writes that the 'figuras compuestas' are always related to 'un problema de tipo moral':

> Su máximo interés está en criticar o en zaherir ciertas características que merecen reprensión y el método utilizado es parte de esa crítica.
> (art.cit., 232)

These cursory comments are not backed by any examination of the influence of the phenomenon on its immediate context, or of the relevance of precedents other than Arcimboldo. Quevedo's grotesque, of which 'figuras compuestas' are a species, seems to have evolved from his pronounced interest in pictorialism. Its presence weakens rather than intensifies

any moral point in a poem, and is ill explained as a sort of joke. As with painted grotesque, its indulgence of the fantasía is not beyond reproach. Even though Quevedo's motive must, strictly, remain a matter for speculation, we may ask with Nashe: 'But graunt the matter to be fabulous, is it therfore friuolous?' (Works, I, 27).

The time may be ripe for some alteration in perspective on Quevedo and the Inquisition. His appearance on the Index is characteristically put down to the spite of his enemies and the ascription of the spurious to his name by printers. The assumption that these 'enemies' were incapable of a balanced assessment of his work is very popular and yet equally questionable. The text of Juguetes de la niñez, the castrated version of the Sueños into which Quevedo was intimidated by the hierarchy, is immediately remarkable more for its de-blasphemization than its revision of the errors of others. There can be no doubt that the exception taken to his work was founded on its unjustifiable irreverence, its commendable exposure of corruption in religious life, and its persistent straying beyond the pale of permissible vulgarity into the (sometimes more than disgustingly) pornographic. All are clear breaches of Index reglas[17]. The pressure was apparently enough for Quevedo to eventually disown all but the Juguetes and some of the serious prose[18]. While his unwillingness to legitimize manuscript collections may be explained as impatience with the adulterated or falsely attributed, it may also reflect a fear of the consequences of his distinctly subversive poetry coming to light. It has been argued, especially in Chapter 4, that such fears would have been well founded[19].

Fresh appraisal of the considerable literary event we call Quevedo, and even of the less significant historical happening of the same name,[20] is in short supply. This dissertation has been ventured as a small contribution. Though fronted by an imposing façade of orthodox integrity, the corpus shows signs of being more labyrinthine than monolithic. I hope to have contributed towards demonstrating the nature and extent of the insecurity of the edifice, indicating how the poet of Terpsichore and Thalia was often ruled by priorities incompatible with those of the author of the Providencia de Dios.

Throughout his literary career Quevedo sustained and gradually refined his concern with the pictorial, a fascination about which he was sometimes explicit. I have argued that much of his metaphor and conceit can validly be interpreted as pictorial, and that we should resist the intellectualist interpretations of metaphor deriving from Tuve. The latter scarcely recognize the important place allowed for sense-appeal in metaphor by the rhetorics of both antiquity and the Renaissance, and these especially stressed the primacy of the visual over the other sense images. Furthermore, Quevedo's pursuit of the pictorial led him to the achievement of an effect which cannot usefully be understood as figurative at all. Certain 'metaphors' turn out to be simply verbal equivalents of far-fetched pictures in which reality has not been rendered metaphorically but actually metamorphosed. The natural has not been so much defined or highlighted with the aid of metaphor as replaced by creation of a different order which selects elements from

the normal, re-combining them to fashion the extra-normal. The result is best defined as grotesque, a claim endorsed by Renaissance aesthetic theory which saw the essence of grotesque in the chimerical. Moreover, this same theory was, as a whole, critical of the apparently meaningless self-indulgence of grotesques, at best useless but at worst misleading for those who might seek significance in them. Even grotesque's few champions were hard pressed to define its message, being reduced to speak vaguely of mystery or else avoiding the issue and trying instead to justify the phenomenon as the high-water mark of the _phantasia_. _In situ_ Quevedo's grotesques do not serve some ulterior motive on the poet's part. Neither do they make their context moral nor does their context make them moral. As with painted grotesque they are themselves their own message, a wilful and gratuitous reorganization of the natural. For Paleotti and others the plastic version mocked God's Creation without a single saving grace that might render the exercise permissible or even comprehensible. It was not the highest order of _phantasia_ but the latter gone mad, babel rather than glossalalia. Thus it scorned the theology of intellection and imagination itself. Quevedo's offerings are open to exactly the same criticisms.

The critical usefulness of 'grotesque' becomes highlighted when one considers the worth of the terminology current in Quevedo's day. To look to _satírico_ and _burlesco_ epithets as a sure or even as a general guide to how contemporaries judged a poem's content is an unreliable procedure and on occasions a thoroughly dangerous one. Both terms

were subject to a number of nuances and it is often impossible to tell which is intended. Moreover, evidence suggests that the two were regularly considered interchangeable, and that usage was sometimes quite arbitrary or subject to extra-literary and extra-linguistic factors. Perhaps the greatest single source of peril lies in assuming that the seventeenth century inevitably thought of satire as essentially moralistic. The satirist's claim to be motivated by zeal for impersonal reform was itself persistently challenged. And in one of its more popular acceptances sátira might signify the most groundless slanderous excess, while in another it was a convenient cipher for peripheral, underground literature. While the likes of González de Salas could explain Quevedo's sátira by the reprehension of vice formula so familiar to us nowadays, for others the word implied those gross but accomplished invectives with which he managed to clapperclaw his way into hateships of long standing, or material that was at best ethically dubious but often actually dangerous. Significantly, much as he admired and imitated Juvenal, Quevedo never prided himself on being a satírico or laid any claim to the title whereas he was quite alive to the pejorative connotations of the word. In suggesting that certain of Quevedo's poems defy the moral authority of their day I pursue a line similar to that of Jammes in his evaluation of the burlesco in Góngora. But it looks highly unlikely that we can reserve burlesco for this type of material: the word was not employed in anything like so single-minded and precise a fashion.

I again differ from Jammes in my estimation of the methods involved in the production of this poetry of the unorthodox,

of the implications to be reached and, of course, in claiming that Quevedo was capable of such rebelliousness.

Examining his poems of dissidence in the light of irony only confirms the impression that they were written in disaffection for they make little sense as inverted moralizing. That he was much more than casually acquainted with the ironical figures of rhetoric is reflected in many instances. The skill he was accustomed to display makes it extremely unlikely that he could have been guilty of the bungling-and-confusing crudity that the 'ironical moralist' thesis demands of some poems. In other cases, to see the contumacious as the legitimate in disguise would involve our ignoring one half of a poem's content and performing some more than exacting mental gymnastics with the other. Quevedo appreciated that the finest irony worked by subtlety rather than complexity. By wearing a smile and by feigning a persona who in fact was little removed from his own poetic identity he could argue a reasoned and convincing case for an alternative morality with relative impunity. The message of such a poem is its direct statement, the 'truth'. And the mood is just sufficiently ambiguous to allow the poet his defence without being enough to discredit the message.

In a genre characterized as a whole by triviality and repetition Quevedo seemed to find the perfect and perhaps the only potentially safe means of letting off the steam of dissent. At times it may have been his 'artistry' which led him astray, but how far his commitment was authentic or 'posed' cannot easily be decided. This holds good for his moral

treatises as well. In his reading, Quevedo mixed with bad company as well as good. Both his orthodoxy and its opposite probably reflect influence as well as choice. Remembering his own advice, 'El arte es acomodar la locución al sujeto' (OP, 469), might sharpen our appreciation of some of his 'verdades en camisa' and reduce the risk of dismissing the 'unserious' out of hand. Acceptance of the idea that his poetry is in no small measure divisible will save us from the quicksands of a critical polarization which can only serve his long-term reputation ill.

CONCLUSION - NOTES

(1) See Buendía, OP, 29; Doris L. Baum, Traditionalism in the Works of Francisco de Quevedo Villegas (Chapel Hill N.C., 1969), passim, but esp. 106 et seq.; R. M. Price, An Anthology of Quevedo's Poetry (M.U.P., 1969), 11-12, 'A note on three . . .', 88, 'Quevedo's satire on the use of words', 169-70; J. Juderías y Loyot, Don Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas (Madrid, 1922), 166. In 'Quevedo for the masses' E. M. Wilson writes: 'The wit and satire nearly always imply a serious moral attitude made plain in his works of edification, though occasionally he indulged in bawdy or humour for its own sake' (152). He concludes that Dámaso Alonso's remark, 'Quevedo es un poeta indivisible que sólo unitariamente puede ser entendido' is 'well worth meditation' (166). The ref. is to Poesía española (Madrid, 1950), 612.

(2) For a recent and typical evaluation see Alejandro Paternain, Quevedo: agonía y desafío, Cuadernos de literatura, XIII (Paysandú, 1969).

(3) Ernest Mérimée, Essai sur la Vie et les Oeuvres de Francisco de Quevedo (1580-1645), (Paris, 1886), esp. 409-12. Mérimée perceptively wonders whether these contradictions were 'préméditées ou non' (411). Americo Castro also raises issues in 'Escepticismo y contradicción en Quevedo', Humanidades, XVIII (1928), 11-17, unfortunately with little evidence.

(4) 'Inmoral' is a term used by Cayetano Soler, Quien fue don Francisco de Quevedo: estudio psicológico (Barcelona, 1899), 50; for Antonio Espina the 'proclividad quevedesca contradice algunos principios de la doctrina católica', Quevedo (Madrid, 1962), 41.

(5) An exception is Ronald Knox, Essays, 36-7. One of the great offenders is Gilbert Highet's Anatomy of Satire (Princeton, 1962).

(6) 'The irony of Swift', 124.

(7) For the occurrence in England, see Lecocq, 189 et seq.

(8) Novelas ejemplares, ed.cit., 375.

(9) Rosamunda herself attacks only the 'sujeto flaco y poco discreto' (118), but Cervantes sees her as 'torpe y viciosa' (181).

(10) Cf. Covarrubias, 'De la pelota dice un enigma: "Soy hembra preñada/ que cuento más de mil faltas,/ bastando nueve; ando hinchada/ tráenme baja y levantada etc."', a Noydens, 1674 add.

(11) This instance of Trillo's piracy (and others) has been pointed out by Robert Jammes, 'L'imitation poétique chez Francisco de Trillo y Figueroa', Bulletin Hispanique, LVIII (1956), (457-81), 470, but without any discussion. I quote the Trillo poem from the Gallego Morell ed., 214-6.

(12) This cohesion of meaning is again lost in Trillo: 'Seré juez de la rota,/ Pues todo va tan rompido,/ Mas ¿ quién me ha de dar oído/ Juzgando de ajenas vidas?'.

(13) See also 'Santo silencio profeso' and the cynical 'Muchos dicen mal de mí' (Planeta, 691, 1075).

(14) Works, ed. McKerrow, I, 20. Spellings are [sic].

(15) While it may be doubted that the 'golden age' of satire ever existed (cf. Chap. 3), the myth was perpetuated. George Gascoigne wrote that after its 'ravishment' by 'Delyght' satire had become only fit for self-criticism: 'I may sometimes, Reprovers deedes reprove,/ And sing a verse, to make them see themselves' (The Complete Works, ed. J. W. Cunliffe [C.U.P., 1910], II, 146). This epitomized its decadence.

(16) Jammes, Études, 55; Noël Salomon, Recherches sur le Thème Paysan dans la 'Comedia' au Temps de Lope de Vega (Bordeaux, 1965), 259; Ettinghausen, 131-5; and, with the qualification that 'Quevedo's work is 'not easy to get into focus', R. O. Jones, A Literary History, 136-7, 161.

(17) E.g. Index librorum (Madrid, 1612), reglas VII, XII; Novissimus index (Madrid, 1640), b2. The rule about eroticism/obscenity in the classics was that it was permissible for style but should not be made available to the 'juventud' - Novus index (Madrid, 1632), regla VI; Index librorum (1612), regla VII. It is clear that the deletions prescribed for Santa Cruz de Dueñas's Floresta española by the Index auctorum (Lisbon, 1624) do not extend to moderate vulgarity which does not involve clerics. Small wonder that the Buscón was banned altogether. J. Zurita's Dictamen opines that a little naughtiness is permissible if the style is good (219, full ref. in Bib.). Even Boccaccio, with some expurgation, could be considered. He also concedes that 'algunos libros han de quedar para occupar la gente sensual, que no sabiendo ocuparse en cosas más altas por fuerza han de tener algunos manjares gruesos' (221). Note that when Quevedo is sexually subversive, as in 'Desde esta Sierra Morena' or 'Pues el bien comunicado', he is neither smutty or vulgar. That is reserved for the likes of 'En el ardor de una siesta' and 'Ya que al Hospital de Amor'.

(18) Contrast the two entries in prohibition: 'Varias obras que se intitulan y dicen ser suyas, impresas antes del año de 1631, hasta que por su verdadero autor reconocidas y corregidas se vuelvan a imprimir' (Novus index, 1632, 399); 'Todos los demás libros y tratados, impresos y manuscritos, que corren en nombre de dicho autor, se prohiben, lo cual ha pedido por su particular petición, no reconociéndolos por

(18 cont.) suyos' (Novissimus index, 1640, 425). A. Sierra Corella, apparently unaware that the entry in the Index librorum (Madrid, 1667) is simply a reprint of the 1640, rather embroiders on it: 'se recogen unas declaraciones suyas, hechas espontáneamente por el a los censores y redactores del Índice' (La censura de libros y papeles en España [Madrid, 1947], 289). He also alludes, without an exact reference, to the existence of 'papeles originales' in the Archivo Histórico Nacional but these have not yet come to light.

(19) The Parnaso was not expurgated until the Index of 1707, and most deletions characteristically concern criticism of the cloth and too explicit eroticism. For details see Castalia, III, 522-3. 'Padre, yo quiero al próximo' might be taken as an ironical attack on hypocrisy but is still ambiguous enough to appear to advocate moral compromise. It is banned altogether. It may also be of significance that a rule prohibiting the use of 'palabras dudosas y equívocas que pueden mover los ánimos de los lectores para que . . . se inclinan a opiniones malas y nocivas' was only introduced with the 1640 Index.

(20) For a step in this direction see Francisco Ayala, 'Hacia un semblante de Quevedo', La Torre, XV (1967), 89-116. Some idea of the man's sheer spitefulness may be gained from Luis Rosales not utterly impartial Pasión y muerte del Conde de Villamediana (Madrid, 1969), 91-5. At least no-one nowadays suggests that Quevedo visited taverns in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the vices he wished to expose (Goyanes y Capdevila, 11).

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De veri precetti della pittura di M. Gio. Battista Armenini da Faenza, libri tre, ne' quali con bell' ordine d'utili e buoni avertimenti, per chi desidera in essa farsi con prestezza eccellente, si dimostrano i modi principali del disegnare e del dipingere e di fare le pitture che si convengono alle conditioni de' luoghi e delle persone (Ravenna, 1586).

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Epitome de la Elocvencia Española. Arte de discvrrir y bablar [sic], cō agudeza, y elegācia en todo genero de asumptos, de Orar, Predicar, Arguir, Conversar, Componer Embajadas, Cartas, y Recados. Con chistes que previenen las faltas; y Exemplos que muestran los aciertos (Huesca, 1692).

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